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ABSTRACT

Sino-Albanian Relations During the Cold War, 1949-1978: An Albanian Perspective

by

Ylber MARKU

Doctor of Philosophy

This thesis is an exploration from the Albanian perspective of the Sino-Albanian
relations during the Cold War. Based on primary sources, I look at the Sino-Albanian
alliance in the broader context of the Cold War, and international relations’ system.
In particular, I explore this alliance as an asymmetric role-based Cold War alliance,
in which Albania provided political support to China, whereas China provided
economic and military support to Albania.
As a small country with little political leverage on the international stage, following
the Second World War Albania became first a Soviet satellite and the Soviet outpost
in the Southeastern European flank, providing Soviet Union with a strategic position
in front of the NATO bases in Italy – around forty miles from Albanian coasts.
Eventually, two factors undermined the Albanian-Soviet alliance: Khrushchev’s
reformation, reflected in the destalinization process, and the Soviet rapprochement
with Yugoslavia – by then Albania’s main antagonist. In this context, China emerged
as the new ideal ally for Albania, for political, ideological, and economic support.
The Albanian leadership’s decision to intensify relations with Beijing was motivated
also by the new Soviet leadership’s refusal to assist Hoxha in his economic plans to
prioritize the development of heavy industry. The combination of the economic
aspects with those concerning the political reforms after Khrushchev’s model, which
undermined Hoxha’s Stalinist rule, pushed Albania to seek in China an alternative to
the Soviet Union. For China instead, following the Sino-Soviet split, Albania became
the only European country to provide Beijing with support in its claims for
leadership in the international communist movement, and to support – although not
fully endorsing – Mao’s domestic policies. Albania, arguably, became the only
country to provide external support to the Chinese Cultural Revolution, mitigating
China’s self-imposed isolation.
In the broader context of the Cold War, Albania served as the only European
platform for China’s power projection in the western hemisphere. It also became the

strongest voice in supporting China and Chinese interests on the international stage,
and international organizations, the most important being the United Nations. In this
context, for a limited time and for limited tasks, Albania’s diplomatic network, and
Albania’s foreign policy, was put at China’s disposal. During the 1960s, between
China and Albania developed a surrogate diplomacy: Tirana, acting on behalf of
Beijing, provided China with the diplomatic infrastructure Beijing lacked because of
its underrepresentation.
The Sino-American normalization, however, undermined the ideological axis upon
which Albania had allied with China. Later, Deng Xiaoping’s reformation era
reshaped China’s foreign aid principles, reducing also the aid to Albania. Finally,
towards the end of the 1970s, the Sino-Albanian alliance ended.
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INTRODUCTION

Between 1945 and 1961, Albania passed from being under Yugoslavian protection to
a Soviet satellite, and then definitely allying with China once relations with the
Soviet Union soured. Although a country unknown to Albanians prior to 1949, China
had the greatest impact on Albania during the entire Cold War period. Albanian
leaders ditched the alliance with Moscow after the coming to power of the new
leader in Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, who reversed Stalin’s repressive manners
and reformed the communist system altogether, undermining Albanian leaders’
regime. In addition, Khrushchev pursued a policy of rapprochement between the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia which, for the Albanian leaders, by then was deemed a
threat to national independence. 1 In the same period, deep divergences emerged
between China and the Soviet Union, and so Albania and China offered their
respective assistance to each other.2
Albania could offer its ideological and political support on the international
stage, acting as China’s spokesperson in international organizations where the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) was unrepresented. China, in turn, provided
Albania with substantial economic and military assistance. By 1961, this peculiar
alliance had been fully established and it endured until 1978. Following a longstanding yet tacit national strategy, Albania could continue to rely on a ‘big
protector’, 3 in an asymmetric relationship in which, according to Womack, ‘the
disparities in capacities create systemic differences of interests’ that make
asymmetric relations often unstable. 4 Indeed, Sino-Albanian relations were not
immune from trouble and disputes – sometimes openly and others veiled. Only

1

William E. Griffith, Albania and The Sino-Soviet Rift, (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1963).

2

For the Sino-Soviet conflict see Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet conflict 1956-1961, (London:
Oxford University Press, 1962); Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist
World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Mingjiang Li, Mao’s China and the Sino-Soviet
split: ideological dilemma, (London: Routledge, 2012).
3

Elez Biberaj, Albania and China. A Study of an Unequal Alliance, (Washington: Westview Press,
1986).
4

Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam. The Politics of Asymmetry, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 17; See also Anthony Reid and Yangwen Zheng, eds., Negotiating
Asymmetry: China’s Place in Asia, (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009).
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following the recent declassification of important documents, mainly in Albania, is it
possible to analyze more accurately this alliance.5
The scholarship regarding the Cold War has been broad and extensive.
However, due to the gradual opening of archives in the former Soviet Union and East
Europe, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the most fruitful research work has
been done. Yet most of the historiography has concentrated on the East-West (United
States-Soviet Union) dichotomy, and historians have preferred, for good reasons, to
focus more on the macro factors and variables of the Cold War and the role and
interplay between superpowers.6 This has caused debates among scholars regarding
even the definition of Cold War: some restricting the term to the East – West
confrontation with its epicenter in Europe;7 others, without denying the primary role
of the superpowers’ confrontation, expand their use of the term to include many
peripheral ‘Cold Wars’;8 and others still focusing on ongoing debating its effects.9
Recently more studies have been finalized regarding the role of smaller powers
5

The main historical documents regarding the Sino-Albanian relations are at the Central State Archive,
in Tirana, [Arkivi Qendror i Shtetit – AQSH, hereafter], Party’s Archive [Arkivi i Partisë – AP,
hereafter], Leading Organs, [Organet Udhëheqëse – OU, hereafter], and relations CCP-PLA,
[Marrëdhëniet PKK-PPSH/AP-MPKK, hereafter]; Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Arkivi
i Ministrisë së Punëve të Jashtme – AMPJ, hereafter]– The United Nations Organization, [Organizata
e Kombeve të Bashkuara – OKB, hereafter]; Archive of the Ministry of Defense, [Arkivi Qëndror i
Ushtrisë – AQU, hereafter]; File, [Dosje – D., hereafter]; Viti, [Year – V., hereafter]; page, [fletë – f.,
hereafter]. Translation from the original into english is mine.
6

John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War, (London: Allen Lane, 2006); John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War:
A New History, (New York: Penguin Press, 2005); John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries
into the History of the Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); John Lewis Gaddis, We
Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Jeremy Scott Friedman,
Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World, The New Cold War History,
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Mingjiang Li, Mao’s China and the SinoSoviet Split: Ideological Dilemma, (London and New York: Routledge, 2012); Jussi M. Hanhimäki
and Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, (Oxford
University Press, 2004); Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, The Cambridge History of the Cold
War, (Cambridge University Press, 2010); Odd Arne Westad ed., Reviewing the Cold War:
Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, (London and Portland, OR : F. Cass, 2000); Walter LaFeber,
America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2000, 9th ed., (Boston, Mass: McGraw-Hill, 2002). John
Gaddis view of the Cold War has been recently scrutinized and debated by Geir Lundestad. See Geir
Lundestad, “The Cold War According to John Gaddis”, Cold War History, Vol. 6, no. 4, (2006): 535–
542.
7

Federico Romero, “Cold War Historiography at the Crossroads”, Cold War History, Vol. 14, no. 4
(2014): 685-703.
8

Pierre Grosser, “Looking for the Core of the Cold War, and Finding a Mirage?”, Cold War History,
Vol. 15, no. 2 (2015): 245-252; Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions
and the Making of Our Times, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
9

Vojtech Mastny, “The Cold War in Retrospect: Too Early to Tell?”, Cold War History, Vol. 14, no.
4 (2014): 487–499.
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during that period.10 In this context, the Balkans have been at the margins of the
scholarship, with some exceptions.11 Albania, however, has been almost completely
neglected.12 Regardless of the definition we give to the Cold War, Sino-Albanian
relations were a Cold War alliance built upon the divisional lines that the Sino-Soviet
split created within the eastern bloc. This research will elaborate the role Albania
played, during its intense relations with China, as a small country with a unique
position in Europe and the world. It will also explore China’s role in its attempt to be
an alternative to the Soviet Union’s leadership within the international communist
front.

An Important but Understudied Alliance
Scholars thus far have done very little study of Albania’s role during Cold War, let
alone Sino-Albanian relations. Elez Biberaj has conducted the only extant study on
the Sino-Albanian alliance in 1986. This remarkable work however, for obvious
reasons, was mainly based on officially-released documents, public declarations and
secondary sources. Biberaj’s perspective is that of a political scientist who, among
others, poses questions to some of which only now is possible to give an answer
thanks to the recent declassification of archival documentation. Nonetheless, his
study remains a milestone for any scholar aiming to study Albania’s history during
Cold War. William E. Griffith has also conducted research on this topic, but his

10

László Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War, 1945-1956: Between the United States and the Soviet
Union, (New York: Central European University Press, 2004); L. Borhi, “Empire by Coercion: The
Soviet Union and Hungary in the 1950s”, Cold War History, Vol. 1, no. 2 (January 2001): 47–72;
János Radványi, Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik, (Stanford,
Calif: Stanford University, 1972); Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler, eds., The
Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, (Lanham, Md: Lexington
Books, 2010).
11

Laković and Tasić, “The Tito-Stalin Split and Yugoslavia’s Military Opening toward the West,
1950-1954”; Ivo Banac, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist splits in Yugoslav Communism,
(London & Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Jovan Cavoski, “Overstepping the Balkan
Boundaries: The Lesser Known History of Yugoslavia’s Early Relations with Asian Countries, (New
Evidence from Yugoslav/Serbian Archives)”, Cold War History, Vol. 11, no. 4,(2011): 557-577; A. A.
Ulunian, “Soviet Cold War Perceptions of Turkey and Greece, 1945-58”, Cold War History, Vol. 3,
no. 2 (2003): 35–52; Konstantina Maragkou, “Favoritism in NATO”s Southeastern Flank: The Case
of the Greek Colonels, 1967-74”, Cold War History, Vol. 9, no. 3 (2009): 347–366.
12

Elez Biberaj, Albania and China: A Study of an Unequal Alliance, Westview Special Studies in
International Relations, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); Elidor Mëhilli, “Defying De-Stalinization”,
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 13, no. 4 (2011): 4–56. These are at the moment the most known
scholars (if not the only) to have conducted, in different periods, limited research on this topic.
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study is limited to 1963. The merit of this work was the central position it found for
Albania in the Sino-Soviet rift.
My aim is to advance what these scholars have started, in light of accessible new
sources, and add to our understanding of the Sino-Albanian alliance, China, Albania,
and Cold War in general. More specifically, this research will try to answer, but not
limit to, the following questions. First, what were the factors that led to the SinoAlbanian entente first, alliance later, and split eventually? What was the role of
political, economic, and ideological factors during the Sino-Albanian alliance? How
these different factors played a role in different periods of the Sino-Albanian
relations? Second, what was the role Albania had in China's international relations
during the “Global Cold War”? What was the role that China played both in
Albania's international relations and in communist dictator Enver Hoxha's power
inside Albania?
One of Biberaj’s main arguments is that Albania sought many concessions from
China, highlighting Albania’s capacity to convince China that Tirana could play an
important role. The last part of his argument is corroborated by archival documents.
They show that Tirana not only convinced Beijing of its capacity to play a role in
international politics, but really did fulfill its promises, in particular by capturing
many communist groups and political parties from Europe, Africa, and Latin
America under Beijing’s sphere of influence. Less true, I will argue, is the rest of the
argument of Biberaj. China prioritized Albania as a recipient of foreign aid, and no
other country in times of peace received from China such economic and military
assistance, proportionate to population, as did Albania. This seemingly corroborates
and reinforces Biberaj’s cost-benefit analysis, according to which Albania benefitted
enormously by extracting concessions from China with no guaranteed political
return. But this analysis neglects the long term consequences of the relationship, and
is true only in the short term, 1961-1978.
However, my argument is that this did not come about because of China’s
generosity, but as a reward for the challenge Albania had posed to Soviet influence.
In Europe, only Yugoslavia pursued a policy of departure from dogmatic
communism, and it was backed by the West. Albanian leaders, in order to legitimate
their decision to not undertake any reformation, challenged the Soviet Union by
calling on the original principles of communist ideology, for them embodied in
4

Stalinism. Moreover, unlike other communist countries, Albania strongly supported
China’s claim for leadership within the international communist movement, and
recognized and praised China’s importance and emergence as a global player. On the
other hand, China’s support for Albania was an investment which did indeed have a
return. In retrospect, it can be said that China used Albania for political support
during the “turn left” period of its policy in the 1960s. No country supported China’s
revolutionary policy with greater conviction than Albania – not even Asian
communist countries in China’s historical area of interest and influence. In addition,
Tirana tried and often played an important role regarding Beijing’s integration into
the international system by continuously bringing attention to China and trying to put
Chinese issues on the agenda, be it in the United Nations Organization (UN) or other
agencies. Albania contributed to China’s integration into the international system,
which China once wanted to disintegrate. On this point, here I try to show how
Albania’s diplomacy replaced China’s lack of representation, by becoming Beijing’s
voice in international organizations. In this way, I argue that a surrogate diplomacy
developed during the 1960s, by which term I mean the use of Albania’s diplomatic
network for China’s exclusive interests in its international relations, and in pursuing
China’s agenda in general. China eventually became a global player, while Albania
turned even more dogmatic and self-isolated. Although for a short time, the Albanian
regime survived thanks to Chinese economic assistance, the economic projects that
had been implemented, which largely consisted of poor technological equipment,
deteriorated quickly and made Albanian industry obsolete. In a way it is possible to
say that after the 1970s, China moved West, while Albania remained East.
Biberaj argues that both countries held the same views of Stalin, but documents
reveal instead that Chinese and Albanian leaders had diverged on Stalin since the
very beginning of the alliance and that later the Chinese Cultural Revolution brought
these differences into the open. Another of Biberaj’s arguments is that Albania’s
alliance with China diminished the former’s maneuverability. However, Albanian
leaders seem to have thought the opposite. The choice was either to, on the one hand,
remain an appendage of the Soviet Union, subject to commands from Moscow, with
national sovereignty limited at best, certainly menaced by the presence of Soviet
soldiers in the naval base of Vlora, or on the other hand, seek an alliance with
Beijing. The latter choice allowed Albania to pursue its way of communism more
5

easily than it had while cooperating with Moscow. Moreover, Tirana mattered much
more on the international stage – or at least the leaders there thought so – and gained
a prominent position for promoting the struggle against Soviet Union’s “revisionism”
by collaborating with China and actively promoting Chinese interests instead of
defending Soviet policies.13
One of my arguments is that Sino-Albanian relations were a Cold War
asymmetric role-based alliance, wherein Albania served as China’s power projection
platform in the international communist movement and as a spokesperson in
international organizations where China was unrepresented. In this way, Albania, to
a certain degree, mitigated China’s international isolation, in particular during the
first phase of the Cultural Revolution. China, on the other side, served as an
economic source for the Albanian regime and, comparatively to other small
countries, raised Albania to a prominent position on the international stage. Albania
served as a platform for China’s interests, and for the time these interests were
common: the struggle against Soviet revisionism, against American imperialism,
support for Tirana’s fierce struggle against Tito’s Yugoslavia, the assistance to
communist parties that adhered to rigid ideological principles legitimizing both
Chinese and Albanian policies. In this sense Sino-Albanian relations were a role
based asymmetric alliance. Albania supported China politically in international
forums. In return China supported Albanian efforts to develop its economy and
provided huge amounts of armaments for Albania’s defense.
It may be disputed if Albania has to be considered a small power at all since no
small nation necessarily projects power. However, according to the definition of
small power given by Robert Rothstein, as ‘a state which recognizes that it cannot
obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and it must rely
fundamentally on the aid of other states’, Albania should be considered a small
power.

14

Biberaj in his study endorses Rothstein’s definition but, perhaps

unintentionally, ignores Robert Keohane’s refutation of that definition as

13

The term “revisionism” was first used to attack Tito’s Yugoslavia following the Soviet-Yugoslavian
split in 1948. Following the Sino-Soviet split, and the Albanian-Soviet split, the term was used also by
Chinese and Albanian leaders to attack the CPSU and the Soviet leaders.
14

Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, (New York and London: Columbia University
Press, 1968), 29.
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‘anachronistic’, restrictive and vague.15 Keohane has his own definition of a small
power, ‘a state whose leaders consider it can never, acting alone or in a small group,
make a significant impact on the international system’. More interesting is his
definition of middle power, ‘a state whose leaders considers that it cannot act alone
effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an
international institution’.16 If one refers to the public discourse of Albanian leaders
during their friendship with China, often corroborated by archival documentation, it
seems they did believe they could impact the system by supporting China’s claims in
the international stage. Whether or not this makes Albania a middle power, this study
will try to show how much it says of the particular and prominent position Albania
acquired by cooperating with China.
In any case, specific definitions aside, I will prefer to call Albania, for the
purposes of this study, simply what it is: a small country. For David Vital, small
countries pay a big price for security from big partners ‘in terms of sacrifice of
autonomy in the control of national resources and loss of freedom of political
maneuver and choice’.17 I will try to show that Albania, by allying with China, tried
precisely to avoid constraints that could reduce its autonomy. Indeed, from Tirana’s
viewpoint, the alliance with China seemed, initially at least, to leave more room for
political maneuvering on the international stage. This autonomy, although limited,
nonetheless was comparatively higher than the autonomy Albania had maintained
within the Soviet alliance. Though this poses another important question – what
definition, or definitions, can we give to alliance? As Keohane has argued, ‘The
imprecision of international relations terminology is nowhere more obvious or
painful than in discussions of alliances’. 18 Besides, certain definitions of alliance
would not fully apply to the Sino-Albanian relations, not at least if we assume that an
15

Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputians” Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics”, International
Organization 23, no. 2 (1969): 291-310. For Keohane even big states in western Europe could
possibly be under this category.
16

Ibid., 296.

17

David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 5. This work was aimed at the study of unaligned states.
18
Some of early definitions of “alliance” are given by these authors: Rothstein, Alliances and Small
Powers; Robert Endicott Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1968); George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1962); George Liska, Alliances and the Third World, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1968).
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alliance would require ‘an arrangement between independent states that involves
treaty agreements’.19 In this case a treaty of alliance never existed, only arrangements
in the form of trade agreements, common declarations or joint communiqués. After
all, China and Albania had a community of interests that ‘so obviously call for
concerted policies and actions that an explicit formulation of these interests in the
form of… a treaty of alliance appears to be redundant’, particularly where ‘an
alliance adds precision, especially in the form of limitation of the concrete measures
to serve’ these common interests.20
Contrary to the rhetoric flaunted at the time, and contrary to the perception
among scholars and observers of Sino-Albanian relations as a solid alliance,
divergences between Tirana and Beijing were persistent even at the peak of their
collaboration during the Chinese Cultural Revolution. In the beginning of their
partnership, both countries based their collaboration on shared communist ideology
and principles. Both sides thought that adherence to common communist ideals
would be sufficient to shadow possible differences in their cultures. In fact they were
wrong, as both China and Albania would come to suffer from a mutual lack of
knowledge of each other’s past cultural identity, and the respective impacts on
national identity, which led to grave misunderstandings regardless of shared
contemporary ideology. These faults showed when China proposed Albania an
alliance with Yugoslavia, lacking sensitivity to the Albanian national question yet
unresolved. Tirana, for its part, did not fully understand, nor easily accept, some
aspects of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, in particular those surrounding Mao’s
thought, the demolition of political power, and the tabula rasa China sought
regarding its own cultural heritage.
On this point it is important to note that another important aspect that emerges
through archival documents is the previously-unknown fact that once Chinese
communist revolution turned towards Maoism (a manifestation of Mao’s thought) as
a further step in the development of socialism, Albania did not receive it without
resistance. Indeed, I will argue that Albania refused to consider any sort of Chinese
way of communism that was not Stalinism, no matter the implications this could
19
Paul H. Nitze, “Coalition Policy and the Concept of World Order”, in Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance
Policy in the Cold War, (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), 22.
20

Hans J. Morgenthau, “Alliances in Theory and Practice”, in ibid. 185–186.
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have had in its relations with China. This refusal led to an open confrontation which
almost ended the alliance, but was eventually resolved in the most mutuallybeneficial ways. Both sides managed to conceal their differences very well, in
particular when China most needed Albanian support – during the first years of the
Cultural Revolution.

Patterns of the Alliance
Many were the factors that impacted the Sino-Albanian alliance, the common
communist ideology undoubtedly among them. Viewing this ideology as the
common ground upon which the alliance could be built, we also see that to keep it
standing required other factors as well. Most obviously, the geographical distance, at
least from a Chinese perspective, made Albania a very unusual ally. Indeed, after
1949, China had attempted to build alliances mainly with communist countries (and
with communist parties in non-communist countries) within its traditional area of
influence: East and Southeast Asia. Historically China’s relations with its neighbors
in East Asia were hierarchic, where Beijing occupied the central position from which
legitimacy drifted. Although Mao’s China claimed equality in international relations,
even more so with communist countries, Beijing’s power could not help but shadow
its smaller allies making any possible alliance an asymmetric one. In addition to
considerations of its size, China’s refusal to be an appendage of Moscow’s power
within the communist bloc, created ipso facto a hierarchic situation between China
and any smaller communist country it cooperated with. Sino-Albanian relations, as
mentioned, were certainly asymmetric, but they were also less hierarchic than those
China could have imposed had the two shared a border, or had Albania been within
China’s reach.21 More importantly, at least for the Albanian leaders, they were less
unequal than those Tirana had had with Moscow.
Not much time after the proclamation of the People’s Republic, China
established and announced in 1954 its own principles of foreign policy, the so-called
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Although initially aimed at the relations
between China and Third World countries, not necessarily communists, as Sophie
Richardson has shown, these principles came to be part of a universal guideline of
21

Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry. The author’s arguments in this
book cannot easily, if not at all, be applied to the Sino-Albanian relations.
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China’s foreign policy.22 Nonetheless, although China applied these principles even
to relations with countries ruled by communist parties, they did not constitute the
framework of Sino-Albanian relations. China, as Zhou Enlai and other high officials
often used to say, preferred to put these relations in the category of the ‘special and
particular relation, different from any other’.23 My impression is that, unlike Chinese
relations with many other countries, the principles that guided Sino-Albanian
relations were dealt with on a moment-to-moment, issue-by-issue basis, depending
on the particular subject of contention or agreement. The fact remains that SinoAlbanian relations were, in the first place, relations between two communist
countries, and it is not possible to explain the interstate relations without the
interparty relations, nor is it possible to separate the two levels since the communist
parties in both countries led the state and its policies. This leads us to consider the
importance of the ideology that both countries – though more so Albania – used to
measure and question the alliance depending on the level of loyalty to the communist
dogma. But Tirana and Beijing held different interpretations of the communist
ideology at times. No matter the solidity of the alliance both sides espoused publicly,
these interpretations caused continuous disputes regarding the very founding
principles of Tirana-Beijing friendship.
Agreements or disagreements came about from both visible and invisible factors.
Some concerned the very rule Albanian leaders and their internal positions. Other
national factors, on both sides, as economic and political domestic issues, were
reflected in the two nations’ behaviors towards the alliance. Still others existed
regarding their respective views on communist ideology, Stalin’s place in history,
class struggle or which strategy to adopt against Soviet Union. The divergences can
be comprised into three main sources of conflict, each containing its own variety of
conflicts of interests: domestic policies and their impact on the alliance; international
relations and politics; and ideological disputes. Each kind of conflict could be
understood in terms of both countries’ very different historical and cultural
backgrounds, which permeated their national identity. Lastly, of course, is the
geographical dynamic – the distance between Tirana and Beijing that was
22
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determinant in shaping the alliance. Indeed, Tirana’s distance from Beijing allowed
great autonomy in dealing with its ally and in disputing eventual policies, but also
affected Albania in its dealings with closer nations, some of which were perceived
enemies, capable of threatening Tirana without fear of the great but distant ally. In all
cases, what seems to be clear is Albania’s stubbornness in most of these situations
and China’s flexibility towards its small ally.
Another important aspect is the role played by policy makers and the interplay
between their economic and security decisions and the existing ideological factors.
This could explain better when and to what extent the political leaders were moved
exclusively for reasons of national interest or were idealists, acting according to their
ideological beliefs. In addition, it is important to see how respective domestic
policies impacted drastically the alliance because they impacted the respective
domestic and foreign policies. This is clear, for instance, when the rise of Deng
Xiaoping in mid-1970s changed China’s approach to foreign aid, consequently
changing one of the main reasons of Albania’s support for China.24 The same can be
said of the Cultural Revolution, which had great impacts on the ideological
dimension of the alliance. Domestic policies, in particular in Chinese domestic
policies, at times were reflected in Chinese leaders’ attempts to address Albanian
economic problems, or military issues. This is reflected in many conversations Zhou
Enlai, Li Xiannian and other Chinese leaders had with Albanian officials. This
however, did not escalate into any interference in Albanian internal affairs,
something Chinese officials had learned from Soviets to be counterproductive in the
case of Hoxha’s Albania, nor did the Chinese even have any interest to interfere.
Again, Albania, geographically far from China, did not belong to the core area of
Chinese national interests in East Asia.
Some years ago, in the bulletin of the Cold War International History Project,
(CWIH) parallels were drawn between Cuba and Albania’s roles during Cold War. In
fact, for the authors, from Beijing’s viewpoint: ‘Much as Fidel Castro’s revolution
24
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had given the Soviet leaders a highly valuable strategic outpost in the US-dominated
western hemisphere, Enver Hoxha’s break with Moscow provided the People’s
Republic a political beachhead at a neuralgic spot on the southern edge of the WPO
[Warsaw Pact Organization]. Much as Moscow supported the infant regime in
Havana with generous military and economic aid, Chinese leaders stepped up aid in
grain, industrial materials and knowhow to the Albanians after the fall-out with
Khrushchev’. 25 Although tactically-speaking, this comparison makes sense, yet in
strategic terms, Albania did not have the same importance for the Soviet Union that
Cuba had for the United States. Nor did Beijing even believe that Albania could
matter so much. On the other hand, as Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali have
shown, in the case of Cuba ideological issues were less incisive in Castro’s decision
to embrace the Soviet system. Cuba’s revolution initially was just a revolution, not a
specifically communist revolution. Castro is even reported to have said that he was
‘… against communism’, during his Operation Truth travel to the United States four
months after the political takeover in Cuba. 26 Nixon noted that Fidel Castro’s
‘primary concern seemed to be to convince me that he was not a communist’. 27
Beyond these considerations, the fact remains that because of Cuba’s strategic
importance for the United States, two superpowers went to the verge of an atomic
war. Albania’s split from the Soviet Union, however, did not cause any real military
escalation between China and the Soviet Union.
Differently from the Soviet-Cuban alliance, in Albania’s case, ideological
implications were paramount in building the alliance with China. Hoxha, eventually
backed by Beijing, had initiated a crusade against Khrushchev over the reformistic
path he had undertaken, which undermined Hoxha’s rule. Cuba or not, Albania
offered to China greater presence within the communist camp led by the Soviet
Union and an opportunity to challenge Moscow from an eastern European spot – the
Soviets’ core area of interests, power and influence.
25
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Structure and Sources
To understand the reasons for the alliance between China and Albania it is necessary
to go back and explain shortly the reasons of the Albanian-Soviet split. So the first
part of the thesis will be dedicated to explaining this rift and concurrent alliance with
China. Since both these moments were contemporary, it is interesting to see the
interaction in the Moscow-Tirana-Beijing triangle and what role Albania played, if
any, in the Sino-Soviet split. In this part I also try to explain the main patterns of
Albanian communism, which was Stalinism, as shown by Hoxha’s refusal to
embrace the reformistic path that Khrushchev promoted. As we will see, these
patterns – Hoxha’s menacing personal rule and the national security dilemma derived
from Khrushchev’s rapprochement with Yugoslavia – were the main factors
instigating the Albanian split with the Soviet Union.
The second part will be dedicated to the peak of Albanian collaboration with
China during 1962-1971. During this period, Albania strongly supported the Chinese
revolutionary path and made great efforts to defend Chinese interests in international
forums and organizations. Yet, it is also in this time that ideological differences
emerged, but both countries found a way to solve them and continued to support each
other. In the same period, at a time when China was going through great economic
hardship, Chinese economic and military aid to Albania reached the unprecedented
amounts. In fact, Albania occupied a central place among recipients of Chinese
foreign aid, ranked third after North Korea and North Vietnam. The third part will
review the beginning of the decline of the alliance and how both countries began to
move in opposite directions. China started to open to the West and reform its
economy in the mid-1970s, although this process would move speedily only after
Mao’s death in 1976. During this period, ideological considerations in the SinoAlbanian relations started becoming less important on China’s side, while Albania
showed signs of intolerance and impatience. This was reinforced by difficulties in the
implementation of the economic projects China had committed to in heavy industry.
The last chapter concerns the end of the alliance following the deaths of Mao and
Zhou Enlai in 1976, and the emergence of a new class of pragmatic reformers in
Chinese leadership who promoted drastic changes in Chinese foreign policy. These
changes inevitably impacted the alliance with Albania, reflected in the lack of
13

commitment to assist in its new five-year economic plan. The Sino-Albanian split
was less dramatic than the Albanian-Soviet split, and did not result in a complete
interruption of relations. Indeed, diplomatic relations were not interrupted and
limited economic and cultural exchanges continued.
The main sources for my research come from the Albanian central state archives.
In particular the archives of the Party of Labor of Albania. Other valuable sources
were those coming from the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry
of Trade, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Culture and Education, and finally the
Ministry of Defense. In addition a number of former officials and protagonists of that
time – students, specialists and scholars have contributed with their valued
interviews and comments. I am confident that these documents may say much of
China’s competition within the communist bloc. Most part of the primary sources I
used for this research, consisting mainly on archival documentation, are here for the
first time revealed. Being the first study based on primary sources, I am sure my
work will not be exhaustive. Besides, a complete study of this alliance would require
first of all access to Chinese documents. Unfortunately, in part because of Chinese
limitations on archival research, and in part because of the limited time, the main
sources for this research are Albanians. However, I have used some Chinese sources,
recent publications, and interviews with Chinese specialists that worked in Albania –
a courtesy of Radio Beijing which had conducted most of these interviews for one of
their rubrics.
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THE FOUNDING OF THE SINO-ALBANIAN ENTENTE
1954-1961
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CHAPTER ONE
SHIFTING ALLIANCES
Introduction
Albania’s security dilemma was the main factor that pushed Albania, and Hoxha,
from Yugoslavian to Soviet arms. For the same reason Albania embraced China and
ended Moscow’s support when Soviet leaders undermined his power. The
destalinization process, undertaken by Khrushchev in Soviet Union, undermined the
despotic and personalist-style rule of Enver Hoxha. In fact, following the events in
East Europe in 1956, Albania was the first European socialist country to oppose the
destalinization process, consequently the first to support China in defying Moscow’s
leadership of the international communist movement.
The above points can be explained if firstly, and shortly, traced the national
security vicissitudes of the Albanian state since its independence in 1912. In fact, at
the end of the Second World War, Albania’s quest for security was still pending due
to the expansionist policies of Greece and Yugoslavia. The first entered in a civil
war, which moved away the possibility for Greece to constitute a real threat for
Albania. Yugoslavia instead, passed from the main supporter of Hoxha, to his main
antagonist. Initially the Yugoslavians had thought that Hoxha could be maneuvered,
and Albania would unite with Yugoslavia, as part of Tito’s plan for a Balkan
Federation. Tito, working on his plan, to which Albania initially agreed, convinced
Hoxha to agree to joint economic development. In desperate need to rebuild the
economy and provide some benefits of their rule to their people, the Albanian leaders
accepted Yugoslavian assistance in the form of basic equipment and technologies to
build small factories in light industry, and agreed to a united customs regime.
The state changed in 1947-48, however, with a series of rapid political
developments, which would eventually go in Hoxha’s favor. Tito, upon seeing the
possibility of a Balkan Federation as unrealistic, and the economic integration with
Albania in serious risk, thought to move towards a fait accompli by deploying the
army in Albania. In late 1947 he had managed to impose within the Albanian
Communist Party a purge of any elements against Yugoslavia. In early 1948
Belgrade pressed Tirana to allow the deployment of the Yugoslavian army in
16

Albania under the pretense of defending it from possible Greek attack. After the
Second World War the political confrontation in Greece between leftist and rightist
groups had escalated into a large-scale civil war. 1 Hoxha knew that politically
conservative parties in Greece did not conceal their animosity towards Albania, but
he sensed that the real danger now became Yugoslavia instead. This posed the first
serious threat to the communist regime. The stake was not the survival of the
communist regime as such, rather than Hoxha’s personal rule and the Albanian
independence. Fortunately for Hoxha, Tito was too ambitious, and Stalin too
paranoid. The Soviet leader was unwilling to allow any challenge to the hierarchy of
power within the communist camp, and saw a Balkan Federation under Tito’s rule as
a threat to his influence over Southeastern Europe. Tito had shown some autonomy
in his standing towards Soviet Union, due to the fact that unlike the rest of eastern
Europe, Yugoslavia was not liberated by the Red Army, and Tito had fought almost
alone against the Nazi occupation. Consequently he felt less tied to the Kremlin and
its many commands. Yugoslavian leaders soon discovered that Tito’s plans crushed
also with Hoxha’s ambitions. Hoxha did not want in fact to become a vassal of Tito,
but wanted to rule in his own, possibly undisputed by any force, externally or
internally. Fortunately for him, Hoxha was assisted by historical circumstances
which made possible his political survival, and made also possible for him to master
the art of the international politics and take advantage from the confrontation
between great countries and superpowers. From a marginal leader during the war, to
the liberation of Albania, which he accredited himself as the partisan’s leader, to the
undiscussed and absolute leader of Albania, the jump was short for Hoxha. A jump
that decided the fate of the country for almost half a century.

Albania and its Short Independence
After the 1912 proclamation of independence, following almost five centuries of
Ottoman rule, Albania barely managed to survive. In 1913, the Conference of the
Ambassadors in London – a forum of the great European powers – decided to
recognize Albanian independence. They imposed a monarchic regime and offered the

1
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crown to Prince William Wied (German aristocrat from Bavaria), who ruled for only
six months until the outbreak of the First World War. 2 Albania’s internationally
recognized borders, however, included less than half of the Albanian inhabited
territories, and half of Albanian population. After the end of the First World War,
Albania proclaimed itself a republic, but the new state remained weak, with an
extremely poor economy.3 Its security was threatened by its southern (Greece) and
northern

(Yugoslavia)

neighbors,

which

never

easily

accepted

Albanian

independence.
In 1928 Ahmet Zogu, a long-ruling and controversial politician, reinstated the
monarchy. In his new role as “King of Albanians”, after decades of political
instability and internal conflicts, he tried to consolidate the state, ending the internal
disputes, and promoting western style laws and systems of state building.4 A process
of economic restructuring and revitalization began thanks to limited foreign
investments, which facilitated the emergence of the first true, albeit small, middle
and working class. It was precisely within this class of people that the communist
movement took place in the mid-1930s. 5 During this period, a flow of Italian
specialists, from across many fields entered the country. King Zog tried to balance
the overwhelming Italian influence by attempting closer relations with Yugoslavia,
but ultimately Italy prevailed, being able to offer much greater assistance than
Yugoslavia could – particularly in terms of infrastructure: still today the national
road network follows that planned and in part built by the Italians. It is thanks to
Italian architects that Tirana, from a little more than a village, transformed into a
modern Western-style city in the late thirties. This contributed to the Albanians’
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perception of Italy as a friendly nation. April 7, 1939, the day Italian troops marched
into Albania and ended its short independence, would prove them wrong.
The Italian occupation found the communist movement consistent of only a few
small groups of young students and intellectuals, mainly in urban areas, who did
little, and little could do, to become a complete and fully-functional political
organization. Moreover, due to their limited number, they lacked capacities to create
a strong field of work to convey their ideas to the peasantry, which at the time
constituted the most part of the population. To this lack of organization had
contributed also the monarchic regime and its persecution of the communists,
pushing many into self-imposed exile. Some, such as Mehmet Shehu, who later
became Hoxha’s lieutenant and Albania’s prime minister, went to fight for the
republican cause in the Spanish Civil War. 6 Despite these issues, the Italian
occupation, and the Second World War, resulted in an historic chance for the
communist groups to merge into an organized political party. During the war, both
the British and Americans had sent military emissaries to assist local rebellion in
their efforts against Fascist and Nazi occupation. 7 They all reported that the
communists, with their partisan units, were the most active in their struggle against
the invaders. The war created the ideal conditions for the communists to expand both
their illegal activities in the country, and the base of their supporters. In the
meantime, the conflict gave them the opportunity to crush all of their rival groups,
mainly the nationalists grouped under the National Front. However, not until late
1943 did the Communist Party emerge on the national stage as a main protagonist in
Albanian politics – and fierce opponent of foreign occupation – as not until late
1943, after the fall of Mussolini, was the Italian occupation replaced by the much
harsher German Nazi invasion.
6
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The Founding of the Communist Party in Albania
The history regarding the founding and the emergence of the Communist Party is still
subject to disputes in Albania, especially regarding Yugoslavian role therein.
Regarding the founding of the Communist Party, ‘there is nothing to show that he
[Communist Leader Enver Hoxha] was one of the organizers’;8 yet his emergence to
its leadership was most likely due to Yugoslavian support. Some historians have
argued that the Communist Party of Albania became powerful only after strong
assistance from Tito, the Yugoslavian communist leader. Tito’s interest was in
preventing the emergence of a communist leadership in Albania that would demand
the handover of Kosova (Albanian inhabited territory left under Yugoslavian
sovereignty) to Albania after the war. This hypothesis is reinforced by the fact that
many prominent communist leaders – and proponents of a post-war united Albania,
inclusive of the Albanian territories then under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, today
Kosova and parts of Macedonia (FYROM) – died under unclear circumstances
during the war. Others still were purged by Hoxha once he consolidated power
towards the end of the war. In fact, the initial aim of the communist groups in
Albania was to liberate the country and rectify historical mistakes imposed by the
great powers in 1913. They wanted a united Albania, including Kosova. Hoxha
instead, few historians argue, left the Kosova issue in silence, reinforcing the
allegations that he had been a Yugoslavian investment within the Albanian
communist movement.9 If this was the case however, Yugoslavia soon discovered
that Hoxha was much more ambitious and less maneuverable than they had thought.
8
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At the end of the war, because of the communist efforts against Fascist and Nazi
occupation, Albania sat on the winners’ side at the Paris Peace Conference after the
Second World War. There, Albania met strong opposition, and even calls for
exclusion from the conference, from the Greek government. Since the Italian attack
on Greece in October 1940 had been launched through Greece’s northern borders
with Albania, the Greek government had proclaimed a state of war with both Italy
and Albania. After the war, Greece attempted to put Albania in the same ranks with
Italy, and tried unsuccessfully to undermine Albania’s claim of being a victim of the
war. Eventually, the Greek declaration of war was removed only towards Italy, and
never towards Albania, paradoxically being officially in force still today.
During the negotiations among the three big powers about the post war
arrangements in Europe, Albania was at margins of the talks and was left as an open
issue until the end of the war.10 Stalin had agreed to give Churchill free reign in
Greece and accept 50/50 control over Yugoslavia. They both agreed to an
independent Albania, but left open the issue of the borders. Perhaps this was due to
the divergences between the United States and Britain regarding post war Albania;
where Churchill backed Greek territorial claims, the United States supported
Albanian pre-war borders.11 And so, Albania’s post war future was ultimately left
largely to chance. At the beginning of 1946 the Communist Party called a constituent
assembly and proclaimed Albania a Popular Republic. Since 1945 Hoxha had
maintained close relations with Yugoslavia. Because of his ideological bent, Hoxha
was persuaded to rely on Yugoslavia for economic recovery and, most importantly,
for defensive arrangements towards eventual Greek threats from the south. Hoxha
knew that Britain would support the Greeks, but he lacked the experience, as
historian Ethem Çeku puts it, ‘to understand that the United States instead differed
from the British stand towards Albania’.12
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Stalin and the End of the Yugoslavian Influence in Albania
In July 1947, Enver Hoxha visited Moscow where he met for the first time with
Stalin.13 Hoxha was very anxious to meet the father of the nations, and had great
expectations regarding the course his country would take. In fact, that same summer
the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia had encountered a series of difficulties
and Hoxha looked to Moscow to help find a way out. In the Albanian leadership,
great concern had been raised over the Yugoslavian attitude towards Albania;
concerns primarily about the use of the economic resources and the lack of
Yugoslavian commitment to implement the investments it had promised.14 Yet the
greater cause of tension was the national sense of resentment. One of the main
opponents of the ever-strong cooperation with Yugoslavia was Nako Spiro, in charge
of the supervision of the economic affairs. He was the only outspoken Politburo
member to state openly that Belgrade’s intentions towards Tirana were not friendly.15
Keeping to economic affairs, he suggested that without necessarily breaking
economic ties with Belgrade, the Soviet Union, instead, be the nation with which
relations must increase. Tito’s plans were to unite Albania with Yugoslavia as a first
step towards a Balkan Federation that would possibly also include Bulgaria.16 In this
13
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context, in July 1946, Albania and Yugoslavia had signed the Treaty of Friendship
and Mutual Assistance which was the first step towards their full integration.17
However, Yugoslavian-Albanian relations soon escalated into disagreements
over economic cooperation, as the agreements signed were not fulfilled by
Yugoslavia. In this way, discontent emerged within the Albanian communists, as the
country, rather than recovering, was further impoverished. 18 Within the Albanian
leadership the pro-Yugoslavian man was Koçi Xoxe, an almost illiterate individual
who had become minister of security for his blind execution of the orders of his boss
Enver Hoxha.19 Even Spiro feared Xoxe, who had been merciless in the execution of
the political opponents, or suspected opponents, after seizing political power. Xoxe
strongly supported the discussed union of Albania with Yugoslavia. In May 1947,
when Hoxha informed the Politburo of the Yugoslavian request to deploy military
troops in Albania, to defend it from possible attack from Greece, where a bloody
civil war was ongoing, Xoxe reinforced Belgrade’s request with information that
‘…the monarch-fascist Greeks have accumulated troops at the border with us, and in
order to encircle the [Greek] partisans, they will cross the Albanian border’.20 Hoxha
did not answer to the Yugoslavian requests, preferring to procrastinate on the issue
until his visit to Moscow in July 1947. But when Yugoslavia’s leadership was
informed of Hoxha’s trip to Moscow they promptly reacted by trying to prevent any
rapprochement with the Soviet Union by instigating a clash within the leadership in
Tirana, with the conviction that the pro-Belgrade faction would prevail. In fact, after
some meetings with Nako Spiro, and one with Koçi Xoxe, the Yugoslavians
managed to inflect the economic problems of Albania with a political color, and soon
began to criticize Albanian leadership for its irresolute decisions, or lack of decisions
altogether. Tito’s man in Tirana, Savo Slatiç, referred to the ‘emergence of another
line’ within the Albanian communist party, reinforced by Xoxe in the meeting of the
Politburo when he stated that ‘in practice a line of suspicion [towards Yugoslavia] is
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crystallized within our party’ clearly alluding to Spiro and to factions within the
leadership against Belgrade. During the discussion in the Politburo meeting of July
1947, Spiro reacted by criticizing the submissive behavior of Tirana and suggesting
that Albania would soon be relegated as Yugoslavia’s satellite. Apparently the Soviet
diplomats in Tirana backed Spiro, who was seen going back and forth to the Soviet
embassy. This emerges from the Politburo records where among others, he reported
that even ‘Soviet engineers said that Yugoslavians are wrong in their stand towards
you [Albanians]’. 21 Other prominent members of the Politburo supported Spiro,
expressing their criticism for the interference of Yugoslavia. But Hoxha would not
take any side yet, perhaps waiting to hear the voice of Moscow during his planned
trip in mid-July 1947.
During Hoxha’s trip to the Soviet Union, Moscow’s stand was ambiguous.
Economically the Soviets showed readiness to assist Albania, and granted an initial
loan of six million dollars. In addition, they agreed to provide technical and academic
education to dozens (later becoming thousands) of Albanian experts in industry and
the military. They agreed also to send more Soviet specialists to Albania together
with more equipment for the manufacturing and the building of light industry, related
to the production of consumer goods. 22 Stalin is even reported to have been so
impressed by the Albanian request for the high number of Soviet experts to have
wondered if ‘the Albanians will work at all?’23 If this seemed to envisage a new
perspective for Albania’s economic development, on the other hand, Soviets made
clear that although ‘your relations with us [Soviets] are good, our assistance for you
will pass through Yugoslavia, it is with them you will have to deal’.24 Therefore for
Hoxha it was clear that the way to Moscow would pass via Belgrade. From Albanian
sources it is not clear if the Soviets informed Belgrade of the talks with Hoxha in
Moscow, but they thought Stalin would not oppose their plan towards Albania.
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Almost one year later Stalin is even reported to have wished the ‘swallowing of
Albania’ by Yugoslavia.25 Back in Tirana, Tito pressed Hoxha to limit any possible
reticence and remove obstacles to the further integration with Belgrade. On this point
Hoxha and Xoxe met many times with Slatiç, Yugoslavian emissary in Tirana, in
November 1947.26
Afterwards, Hoxha called the meeting of the Politburo. The meeting, which went
on for three days, 18-20 November 1947, resulted in a dramatic moment in the
history of the Albanian Communist Party. Hoxha led the Politburo in a positive turn
towards Yugoslavia and called on Spiro to speak on his motivations against
Belgrade. Spiro had been establishing a favored channel of contacts with the Soviet
diplomats in Tirana who were sympathetic to him, but the decision for Albania to
strengthen relations with Yugoslavia was to be made at the highest level: in Moscow,
not the Soviet embassy in Tirana. Spiro requested five days of preparations, perhaps
looking for a signal from the Soviet embassy, but Hoxha gave him twenty-four
hours. In the Politburo even those who had backed Spiro earlier, now supported the
pro-Yugoslavian faction. Under great pressure and feeling abandoned, Spiro
committed suicide on 20 November 1947.27
Having removed the most serious opponent to the Yugoslavian plan for union
with Albania, Tito’s representative in Tirana had a series of meetings with Enver
Hoxha and Koçi Xoxe. Yugoslavia pressed Albania to move forward ‘towards the
union in a federation’, because, as they claimed, Albania would not survive without
external assistance. 28 To prevent a close up with the Soviet Union, Slatiç asked
Albania to avoid ‘the implementation of Soviet projects in Albania that are not part
of the common economic plans [with Yugoslavia]… Nako Spiro has taken
advantages in the past of Soviet advices’.29 By mid-December 1947, following the
events in Tirana, Hoxha paid a visit to Belgrade on his way to Bulgaria. He spoke
with Tito who mentioned the idea of a federative economy between Yugoslavia and
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Albania. Then would follow the political union, which would eventually include
Bulgaria as well. Hoxha basically seemed to agree with Tito, but when he visited
Bulgaria, to his surprise, in Sofia he did not find the same readiness to join in a
Balkan Federation. On the contrary, Bulgarian leaders seem to have suggested to
Hoxha that they wanted closer relations with Soviet Union instead.30
Events took a turn when an alarming report was delivered to Hoxha by a general
of the Yugoslavian army, whose name in the documents is deleted. He reported of an
imminent Greek attack on Albania. To face the possible attack, Tito sent a message
to Hoxha asking to deploy two military divisions in Southeast Albania, to which
Hoxha initially agreed.31 Regarding this issue, some years ago Svetozar Rajak has
stated that ‘Tito’s alleged unauthorized deployment of two Yugoslav divisions to
Albania was nothing more than Belgrade’s willingness to consider Albania’s request
for military assistance’. 32 Unfortunately Rajak brings no evidence to prove this
statement, whereas Albanian documents, (here above mentioned, but also others
more) show that Albania never requested such assistance. On the contrary, it was
precisely because of Belgrade’s request to deploy two military divisions in Albania
that Hoxha was suspicious of the alarmistic information given by the Yugoslavians,
and decided to inform also the Soviet diplomats in Tirana. To his surprise, the
Soviets replied that they had no information of such Greek plans, nor had they been
informed by Yugoslavia of this move. Hoxha decided to put the Yugoslavs on hold
and intensified his contact with the Soviets. 33 In February 1948, Stalin met with
Yugoslavian leaders (not Tito) and attacked Belgrade’s foreign policy bringing as an
example their actions towards Albania. So followed months of reciprocal accusations
between Belgrade and Moscow, which at the end of June 1948 resulted in the
expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform.34 Tito’s split with Moscow made Hoxha’s
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decisions easier and finally in July 1948 Albania interrupted the relations with
Yugoslavia.35
According to Ivo Banac, the main reason behind Moscow’s split with Belgrade
‘was Stalin’s fear that Yugoslavia was beginning to see itself as a regional
communist center, with all the possibilities for mischief in relations with the West
that such a role implied’. 36 This view is reinforced by Soviet archives which
‘…indicate that the main reason for the conflict was Stalin’s dismay when Tito
continued to pursue an expansionist foreign policy agenda towards Yugoslavia’s
neighbors, especially Albania…’.37 Regardless the real motivations, Tito and Stalin’s
falling out provided an opportunity for Stalin to establish a stronger position in the
Balkans by making Albania the only Soviet bridgehead in the Adriatic coast. This
was a departure, in Stalin’s favor, from his informal agreement with Churchill to
concede partial control of the western Balkans. Stalin saw the Yugoslavian-Albanian
split as an opportunity to thwart Tito’s ambitions and plan for a Balkan Federation,
and stood on Tirana’s side to prevent the possible annexation of Albania by
Yugoslavia. This made Stalin an idol and point of reference for Hoxha for the next
forty years; and it made Stalinism the non-negotiable model of communism for
Albania. Another way to see the Soviet-Yugoslavian split is that Stalin might have
used Hoxha and Albania to outmaneuver Tito once he lost control of Yugoslavia,
provided that he ever had it fully. This hypothesis, however, remains to be proved.
The fact remains that Albania became the Soviet Union’s bridgehead in the
Southeastern European flank. In turn Soviets provided Albania with political,
military, and economic support.
Once out of the Yugoslavian yoke, Albania became the strongest ideological
opponent of Tito and a fierce bridgehead of Stalinism in the Balkans. Following the
Tirana-Belgrade split, Hoxha purged Koçi Xoxe – who was shot later – and
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rehabilitated ex post Nako Spiro. A huge campaign was launched in the country to
denounce the “revisionist” policies of Yugoslavia. Unlike in any other European
communist country, in Albania, Stalin was cherished and celebrated as much as in
the Soviet Union, if not more. Enver Hoxha, more than any other leader, was
personally dedicated to promoting of Stalin’s cult. For him, love for the Soviet Union
became a guiding principle of the Albanian people; Stalin represented a great leader,
‘the genius38 … a milestone in the entire people’s [Albanians’] life and future’.39
Hoxha co-opted Stalin’s policy towards Yugoslavia purely to legitimize his own
policies, because he probably knew well that Stalin may not have even truly cared
about Albania, let alone been the one to save it. Nonetheless, this furthered the split
between Stalin and Tito, and furthered Stalin’s ambition to maintain Soviet influence
in the Balkans.40

CONTACTS WITH CHINA AND A NEW LEADER IN MOSCOW
The further re-alignment towards Moscow forced Hoxha to pay more attention to
international affairs. There is no evidence of any contact between Chinese
communist officials and Albanian authorities prior to October 1949. Even after this
date, Tirana’s contacts with Beijing were only through Moscow. Immediately after
the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a note dating October 1st
1949 from Zhou Enlai was sent through Moscow to all European communist
countries inviting them to recognize the PRC. But, with the explanation that Moscow
received it late from Beijing, it was delivered to Albania only in January 1950.41
Albania recognized the PRC before receiving the letter, though it was the last of the
eastern European countries to do so, in November 1949.42 It is not clear why this
happened; there may be no specific reason beyond the fact that, in that period, not
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many issues regarding Asia were high on Albania’s agenda. Tirana did not have
diplomatic missions in any Asian countries, and clearly China was not a priority yet.
So, in a few words, this delay perhaps was simply due to neglect, which nonetheless
raised many discussions in the diplomatic circles in Moscow.43 The fact that not until
1954 did the two countries establish diplomatic missions in their respective capitals
shows how far away China, and Asia in general, remained from the attention of
Tirana.
In April 1951 Enver Hoxha visited Moscow again. By this year, a number of
loan agreements, (barter agreements), were signed between the Soviet Union and a
number of East European countries in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON), which Albania had joined in February 1949. These agreements, which
would fund the first Albanian five-year plan (FYP) from 1951-55, totaled 254
million rubles. The lion’s share was the Soviet Union’s grant of 83 million rubles,
followed by Poland’s 46 million, Czechoslovakia’s 55 million, the German
Democratic Republic’s (GDR) 50 million, and Romania’s 20 million.44 The most
important conditions of these agreements were the obligations they imposed on
Albania. Some countries, East Germany and Czechoslovakia specifically, put clauses
in the agreements which had penalties in case Albania did not meet quotas of exports
of raw materials as part of the barter agreements. Another aspect was their focus on
the investments in consumer goods and light industry in general and the refusal to
invest in the Albanian plans of developing heavy industry. 45 In addition to these
investments, Albania needed specialists, which began to arrive en masse.
Interestingly, the Soviet Union and the other East European countries asked Albania
to ‘treat them [the specialists] with other criteria [than the locals]: the best wages for
them and their families, and the best living standards’.46 All this shows that despite
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the public narrative of brotherhood, none of the eastern European countries, nor
Soviet Union, were sensitive to Albania’s situation.
Enver Hoxha, in order to build a base from which to legitimize his policies
created a myth around Stalin, portraying him as the savior of Albanian independence.
He knew that Stalin did not know anything of Albania before 1948. In fact, it had not
been a Soviet mirage but a historical coincidence that Albania became an ally of the
Soviet Union. Nonetheless, he could all but have expected the turn Khrushchev gave
to Stalinism in the Soviet Union and East Europe.47 The destalinization process and
Albania’s close up with China are two inseparable processes precisely because the
latter hardly would have occurred without the first. It is with the destalinization and
the Hungarian upheaval that followed that the Chinese and Albanian vicissitudes
came to overlap enough to make possible the collaboration which eventually resulted
in an alliance.
When Stalin died in March 1953, Hoxha called for national mourning such that
Albania would not see again until Hoxha’s own funeral more than three decades
later. On 9 March 1953, the day Moscow was holding Stalin’s funeral, in Tirana,
Hoxha together with thousands of citizens in a public ceremony bowed in front of
Stalin’s statue and made the oath to follow Stalin’s line.48 This would perhaps be the
promise he most faithfully kept until the day of his death.49 Soon after, in June 1953,
Enver Hoxha, together with a lengthy entourage, paid a visit to Moscow, but did not
meet with Nikita Khrushchev who had not yet risen to leadership.50 Hoxha’s visit
was preceded by a report courtesy of the economic adviser of the Albanian embassy
in Moscow, who wrote of the difficulties they had encountered regarding the trade
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agreement for that year. 51 Despite the fact that Hoxha’s main interlocutors in
Moscow were still the old guard of the Kremlin, Beria, and Molotov, there was a
new attitude in Moscow. Both of them strongly criticized Albania’s economic
course: they mainly opposed Albanian state apparatus inflation, neglect of agriculture
in favor of heavy industrialization, and the situation of the peasantry. This criticism
was understandable in the context of the East German turmoil that year, with the
workers’ strikes demanding better living standards.52 But a similar critique had been
applied to Hoxha, by Stalin himself, in 1951 when he had sought to ‘devote serious
attention to the industry, but insufficient attention to agriculture. Soviet institutions in
charge of agricultural issues almost never receive any request from Albania
regarding agriculture’.53 In addition, for Moscow, economically it did not make sense
to invest disproportionally in a country of around one and a half million people,
when Soviet attention was focused on assisting countries strategically more
important for Moscow. Furthermore, they told Hoxha that one third of the army was
composed of enemies, which was a sign that the party ‘was not in the right course’.54
Basically Soviet leaders were asking Hoxha to purge the army of the old [Stalinist]
elements. Most importantly, to Hoxha’s surprise Molotov suggested ‘a revision of
your relations with [neighbors] … and Yugoslavia’, because Soviet Union would
improve them too.55 If Stalin had come to Hoxha’s aid in his dispute with Tito, now
Molotov asked Hoxha to make a complete reversal of his foreign policy. Hoxha did
not oppose in principle, but he was surprised and did not take any concrete steps to
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enforce Soviet directives. He could not easily accept a rapprochement with Tito, so
he awaited new leadership in Moscow with the hope it would bring better times. A
hope that soon fell in vain.
In fact, ‘Khrushchev wanted Yugoslavia to integrate itself back into the alliance
which the Soviet Union had built with other eastern European countries’.56 At the
end of May 1955, Khrushchev visited Belgrade and blamed the past mistakes of the
Soviet Union, thus excusing Tito, for the Soviet-Yugoslav split. Albanian leaders, in
a meeting with Peng Zhen in Tirana a few years later, claimed to have sent a letter to
Khrushchev just before his departure for Belgrade, requesting that before his trip to
meet Tito, ‘it should first be discussed Yugoslavian position with all the parties’
including, of course, Albania.57 If this letter really was sent then in hindsight it is
possible to say it was ignored. This did not have immediate repercussions in SovietAlbanian relations, as Albania did join the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) that
same year, but the new Soviet course in eastern Europe and the Balkans was clear.
Curiously, the WPO was founded just days after the Soviet disarmament proposal –
the proposal was issued on 10 May 1955, and four days later the WPO was
founded.58

China’s Approach to Albania
In September 1954, China invited an Albanian delegation to Beijing to participate in
the celebrations of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the PRC. The small
delegation headed by the Albanian minister of foreign affairs, Behar Shtylla, who
later served as Ambassador in Beijing, did not have great expectations since the visit
was intended to be merely for formalities. Instead, unexpectedly, they were
impressed by the ‘particular regards’ China showed for them. After the celebrations,
just when Shtylla was about to leave, Zhou Enlai called him for a short informal
conversation and asked him about the economic situation. Chinese leaders ‘had
already discussed about Albania earlier’, and probably they knew the shortages of
consumer goods for the population. China most likely was informed, although not by
56
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Albania, about the attrition between Tirana and Moscow. Zhou Enlai, to the surprise
of the Albanian minister, asked him ‘what are your main urgent [economic] requests
to make’ as China felt obligated, Zhou said, to help a communist country.59 Although
the Chinese move was a way to engage more with Albania, at this stage this step did
not harm Albania’s relations with Soviet Union. China too was enjoying a
‘honeymoon’ with Moscow, which would endure until 1956-57.60 Albania was not
yet thinking of China as a replacement for the Soviet Union, but perhaps a
complementary source of aid for projects the Soviets did not support. China itself
was benefitting from substantial Soviet economic assistance. While the Albanian
delegation was in Beijing, Khrushchev expanded Soviet assistance to China further
than even Stalin had done. 61 After all, China’s readiness to meet Albania’s still
modest requests was within the global readiness China was beginning to show
towards many other countries.62
But in light of the mutating situation with the Soviet Union, Shtylla immediately
took the chance and asked Zhou Enlai, to whom he did not explain the difficult talks
Hoxha had had with Beria and Molotov in Moscow, if they could possibly provide
assistance for the coming second FYP of 1955-60. Zhou Enlai confirmed without any
hesitation China’s readiness ‘to help… for the FYP as well’.63 By mid-November
1954, the Politburo in Tirana made a request for a loan of 50 million rubles. 64
59

“Report of the minister of foreign affairs, Behar Shtylla, at the Politburo in Tirana, 03 November
1954, about his visit to China on occasion of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the PRC”, in,
AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1954, D39, f.11-14. The minister reported that “the entire leadership, except
Mao, came to meet us at the train station, something they had not done for other eastern European
delegations”.
60
Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959: A New History,
The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 101–131. The
authors call the two years from 1954 to early 1956 the ‘honeymoon’ of the alliance because were the
most cooperative among the two countries.
61

Shu Guang Zhang, Beijing's Economic Statecraft during the Cold War, 1949-1991, (Washington,
D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2014), 59–71; Shu Guang Zhang, “Sino-Soviet Economic
Cooperation”, in Odd Arne Westad, Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance,
1945-1963, (Stanford University Press, 1998), 189–226; Sergei Goncharenko, “Sino-Soviet Military
Cooperation”, in ibid., 141–164.
62

John Franklin Copper, China’s Foreign Aid: An Instrument of Peking's Foreign Policy, (Lexington,
Mass: Heath, 1976), 19–40; Shu Guang Zhang, Economic Cold War: America's Embargo against
China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1963, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2001),
153–156; Zhang, Beijing’s Economic Statecraft during the Cold War, 1949-1991, 97–121.
63

AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1954, D39, f.14.

64

“Reports, decisions and records of the Politburo, 13 November 1954: On the request of a loan from
the PRC”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1954, D40, f.69 & f.99; “Politburo, Tirana, 13 November 1954:

33

Following the visit of Behar Shtylla, the first agreement between China and Albania
regarding the trade between the two countries was signed. 65 The first aid China
provided, however, was a collection of basic goods that came as a donation, not part
of the loan.66 It was the first in a long list of donations China would offer during the
two decades to follow. Chinese signals were reinforced again in 1955 when Deng
Xiaoping reported to Hoxha that he had criticized the Yugoslavian ideological course
during the conversation with two members of the Yugoslavian leadership.67 This step
was in a direction opposite that which the Soviet Union was taking. Furthermore, in
July 1956 China granted an additional loan of 30 million rubles to Albania, for an 80
million rubles sum of Chinese aid for the second Albanian FYP.68

1956 AND ITS AFTERMATH: LEANING ON CHINA’S SIDE
In early 1956 Enver Hoxha visited Moscow again, this time to participate in the
works of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) in
February 1956 – a turning point in the history of the communist camp. 69 To his
dismay, there he heard the famous speech delivered in secret, in which Khrushchev
revealed Stalin to have been a criminal who had caused tremendous suffering to his

About the request of a loan to the People’s Republic of China”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1954, D40,
f.69-70. All the exchange and loans were calculated in Soviet Union rubles; the loan was approved
and the agreement signed on 03 December 1954. See “About the relations of our country [Albania]
with China”, in AMPJ, Kina, V. 1960, D110, f.3.
65

“Agreement on the exchange of goods and payments between the People’s Republic of Albania and
People’s Republic of China for the year 1955”, in AQSH, Ministry of Trade, F.503-504, V. 1955,
D270, f.1-3.
66

“List of the Ministry of Trade for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the goods Chinese
Government donated to us”, in AQSH, Ministry of Trade, F.503-504, V. 1955, D76, f.1-2.
67

“Memorandum of conversation between Deng Xiaoping and the members of the CC of the
Yugoslav Communist League, Begovic and Stamenkovic, 26-27 May 1955”, in AQSH, F.14, APMPKK, V. 1955, D1.
68

“Correspondence between the PLA CC and the CCP CC, and the Chinese ambassador in Tirana Xu
Yixin, July 1956”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1956, D1. For the second FYP 1956-60 China
granted a total of 80 million rubles. With the official rates of the 1950s (0.25USD=4 rubles, was
around 20 million USD; All the loans Albania had from the Soviet Union and the other countries of
the socialist camp carried an interest rate of 2 percent, but China instead, granted Albania an interest
rate of only 0,5 percent. See “Notes from the talks in Tirana with the Chinese parliamentary
delegation, headed by Peng Zhen, 16 January 1957”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1957, D1, f.33.
Later China granted some loans without any interest.
69

Vittorio Vidali, trans. Nell Amter Cattonar and A.M. Elliott, Diary of the Twentieth Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (New York & London: Lawrence Hill & Co, 1984).

34

people over the long years of his regime. 70 Curiously it was Beria – a known
contributor of Stalin’s purges – who led the first investigations into Stalin’s actions
and whose conclusions were eventually reflected in Khrushchev’s speech.71 It is not
clear if Hoxha adopted what he had read and heard of Stalin’s rule as a guideline for
his rule in Albania, or was shocked as many in attendance were.72 Yet he did not
comment on the report, he merely informed the communist establishment in Albania
of its content while prohibiting any press releases or discussion with the people.73
During the congress Khrushchev outlined Moscow’s new line on international
relations which was comprised of three notions: peaceful coexistence, peaceful
transition, and peaceful competition. 74 On the relations within the socialist camp,
Khrushchev stated that ‘the rift with Yugoslavia had been an unnecessary and
shameful mistake’.75 Hoxha also heard Khrushchev advocating multiple (national)
ways of transitioning to socialism, an authorization to undertake reformistic paths
which Hoxha, preferring Stalin’s manners instead, would avoid. 76 To the further
denunciation of Stalin, in April, Khrushchev disbanded the Cominform, less than ten
years after Stalin had founded it.
Not long after Hoxha’s return from Moscow, in Tirana in April 1956, came the
local party conference. Inspired by the events in the Soviet Union, and the speech of
Khrushchev in particular, the conference turned into open criticism of Hoxha’s
70
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totalitarianism, with many participants asking Hoxha to cease his repressive
measures and reduce the gap in the living standards between the leadership and the
people.77 Hoxha, for the last time in his long rule, allowed the emergence of critical
voices; later, he purged all those that had so criticized him. Frightened by the
prospective of losing control, Hoxha had some executed and others detained for
many years. Personally, he still avoided giving any assessment of Stalin or of
Khrushchev’s speech. However, he did not conceal his suspicion that behind the
transgressions at Tirana’s party conference was Yugoslavia. Hoxha was among the
first eastern European leaders to face an internal challenge to the Stalinist-style rule
after Khrushchev’s speech, but also the first and the last to react by strongly
reaffirming it.78
At first, Chinese leaders did not entirely dispute Khrushchev’s evaluation of
Stalin and his cult. 79 What they eventually disputed was the way Khrushchev
delivered it.80 Even years later, Soviets held that the Twentieth CPSU Congress ‘was
of exceptionally great importance for the further improvement of Soviet-Chinese
relations. It created an atmosphere of… amicable exchanges of candid views’. 81
Perhaps too candid, as on 5 April 1956, Renmin Ribao published the article ‘More on
the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat’, which was personally
supervised by Mao and marked a veiled departure from the Soviet Union regarding
Stalin’s position. As Roderick MacFarquhar has argued, the article defended Mao,
without explicitly mentioning him, on the one hand, with the argument that he had
not pursued his cult, and on the other hand reappraised Stalin ‘by assigning him
credit for achievements which entitled him still to be described as “an outstanding
Marxist-Leninist fighter” [although] acknowledging that he had committed a number
of major errors’.82 For MacFarquhar communists may have looked at the article as a
‘first attempt at establishing Peking as a fount of doctrinal guidance on at least an
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equal footing with Moscow’.83 A similar point is also affirmed recently in the work
of Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia. Although they see the Chinese reaction to the issues
that emerged during the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU as contradictory, to them it
is clear that, for Mao at least, the doctrine of peaceful transition to communism was
hard to digest.84 In fact they have argued how ‘the CCP felt that violent revolution to
gain political power was a proud example of CCP’s emulation of the Russian
October Revolution and CCP’s contribution to the world revolutionary process’.85
Regarding the peaceful coexistence however, Chinese foreign policy was already
acting based on its own ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, which had been
announced in 1954.86 Later on, as Chen Jian has argued, ‘With the radicalization of
China’s political and social life in 1957-58… he [Mao] had no intention in opposing
personality cult in general and his own in particular’.87 For Benjamin Schwartz, ‘the
entire previous history of Marxism-Leninism, from Lenin to Mao, had somehow
demanded the creation of space for the notion of transcendent leader, and for the cult
of personality’. 88 In Mao’s eyes was also correct Stalin’s model of development
based on heavy industrialization, and for the former, the mistakes of the latter were
limited to methods rather than the model. 89 Thus China came to reconsider
destalinization in the light of a new assessment of Stalin which concluded that
Stalin’s merits overshadowed his mistakes.90
Hoxha visited Moscow again in May-June 1956. By now, Khrushchev knew
Hoxha’s sensitivity towards Yugoslavia and to show fairness between Tirana and
Belgrade he accepted Hoxha’s invitation to visit Albania three years later. More
importantly, he summoned Hoxha to inform him of the talks he had had with Tito in
Moscow. Khrushchev’s standing apparently was contradictory. On one hand, he
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claimed to have blamed Tito for not being cooperative with Albania. Khrushchev had
reminded Tito that ‘…you have turned the Yugoslav Legation in Tirana into an
espionage center against Albania… your agents organized the Conference of Tirana
to overthrow the leadership’.91 On the other hand, Khrushchev was critical of Hoxha
too. He asked Hoxha ‘to put an end to the past [with Yugoslavia]’ and seek
reconciliation.92 Hoxha agreed out of necessity rather than conviction, but did not
take concrete actions towards that end. This was the second time the Soviet leaders
urged Hoxha to improve relations with Yugoslavia.
In September 1956, when China invited a delegation from Albania to attend the
CCP Eighth Congress, Hoxha decided to pay his first (and last) visit to China. This
was clearly intended to show that Albania prioritized increasing collaboration with
Beijing. The visit came after China had not shown particular enthusiasm about
Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin; this was not lost on Albanian leaders, who
were well informed of, and themselves read, articles in the Chinese press. On the
way to Beijing Hoxha and his entourage also visited North Korea. Hoxha and Kim Il
Sung had in common a Stalinist ruling system and rejection of destalinization.93 But
contrary to Hoxha, Kim eventually managed to find balance between Beijing and
Moscow. 94 Hoxha was impressed by the Soviet Union’s generosity towards
Pyongyang when he was told the amounts of economic aid the latter had received
from all eastern European countries. 95 This contrasted with the hesitations of the
Soviet Union and East Europeans to back Hoxha’s plans of industrialization, which
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in comparison, he thought to be modest. If for Mikoyan ‘without bread, butter and
meat there is no socialism’, for Hoxha without industrialization there was no working
class, and consequently no communist base. 96 Due to more than just ideological
considerations, Hoxha’s plans for industrialization came as a consequence of his
belief that making use of the rich natural resources he thought Albania possessed
would have contributed to economic self-reliance. In fact, Hoxha’s plans for heavy
industrialization were based on the projects that had in-part existed before the war
and were drafted mainly by Italian engineers who had attempted to conduct careful
research regarding Albania’s underground resources. Their conclusions were very
promising.97
In his speech to the CCP’s congress Hoxha praised ‘China’s emergence in the
international arena as a big power’.98 In Beijing, Hoxha found great rapport with
Mao Zedong about international issues of common interest, and had confirmed
China’s availability to assist Albania, as ‘one hand helping the other’.99 After all, as
Zhou Enlai said, satisfying Albanian requests was going to be ‘nothing but a very
small thing’. 100 Significantly, in his meeting with Hoxha, Mao wanted to know
Hoxha’s opinion on some of the most preoccupying issues for Albania. On the tense
relations between Albania and Yugoslavia, Mao stated that ‘…it is neither your fault
nor Yugoslavia’s, the big mistake was made by the Cominform’, clearly alluding to
the Soviet Union.101 He also asked what the Albanian leader thought of Stalin. Hoxha
answered in a Chinese way: he appreciated Stalin’s contribution but also admitted
some minor mistakes. Mao appreciated that Khrushchev’s speech had not been
published in Albania, in a way marking the difference but also indicating a link
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between denouncing of Stalin and the first strikes in East Europe. 102 Finally he
endorsed ‘the right course of the [Albanian communist] party’: a statement quite
different from what Hoxha had been hearing recently from Soviet leaders. Most
importantly, China’s political endorsement put Hoxha in a stronger position in his
uneasy situation with Khrushchev. In fact, not long time before Hoxha’s visit in
Beijing, Khrushchev met with Tito. For Hoxha, China’s support became a card to
play in the possible case of disagreements with Moscow. This trip definitely laid the
basis for further intensifying ties between Tirana and Beijing.103
But in Beijing, in meetings with other delegations from Europe, Hoxha also
spoke of the complicated situation within the Hungarian leadership. During a
conversation with Mikhail Suslov, member of the CPSU Presidium, he was told of
Yugoslavian possible involvement in the situation. Of the Yugoslavian activities of
espionage complained also the Romanian leader, Gheorghiu-Dej, to whom the events
in Hungary would later teach a lesson.104 When Hoxha had visited Moscow earlier in
June 1956 he had stopped one night in Budapest on the way back to Tirana. Received
by many members of the Hungarian Politburo, he had heard that ‘intellectuals, and
members of the party want to take possession of the thesis of the Twentieth Congress
of the CPSU’ and undermine the communist rule. 105 The suggestion was that
Khrushchev, by denouncing Stalin, had unleashed a spread of reformistic sentiment
that could potentially cripple the authority of the communist establishments
throughout East Europe – those same regimes Stalin had imposed and supported.
Hoxha had seen such sentiments in Tirana. His fear of losing control in this new
environment was further reinforced when he heard about the workers’ strike in
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Poznan, Poland.106 This possibility seemed especially real when, in October 1956,
events in Hungary escalated into a popular uprising against the dictatorship and the
Soviet Union such that Moscow had to send the army to re-establish the local
communist party’s control.107 The drama of the events in Hungary reached its peak
when Imre Nagy, the Hungarian communist leader, once supported by Soviets,
joined the protesters and announced in early November 1956 the neutrality of his
country and withdrawal from the WPO.108 This provoked a second Soviet military
intervention which dismissed Nagy and definitively put an end to the revolution.

The Hungarian Uprising: A Turning Point for the Sino-Albanian Entente
With the events in Hungary, China passed from being a passive actor to an active
protagonist in the affairs of East Europe. Later, Mao would blame Khrushchev for
his attack on Stalin, which, to some, is a reason for the Sino-Soviet split, but at the
beginning of the events in Poland and Hungary, his standing was not clear. 109
Initially China’s eagerness for economic and cultural exchanges, which increased
from 1949 to 1957, pushed Beijing to support Khrushchev’s relaxation and openness
in East Europe because ‘only after Stalin’s death Sino-East European relations
intensified’.110
Actually, China’s relations with the Soviet Union, and Mao’s with Stalin, had
been controversial, if not tense at times because of Stalin’s hierarchic perception of
106
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China as a Soviet appendage, as most visibly manifested in Stalin’s hesitations to
support China’s intervention in the Korean War.111 As Mercy Kuo has pointed out,
Stalin’s death allowed China ‘to reach an equal footing with Moscow which raised
concomitant issues of independence, sovereignty, autonomy… matters which in
effect emboldened the East European communist leaders, namely Poland and
Hungary, to contend for the independence of their own country’.112 Scholars have
also connected the events in Poland and Hungary in 1956 with the Hundred Flowers
Campaign launched by Mao during that year.113 In fact, during the workers’ strikes in
Poznan, many in Poland – in particular students and intellectuals in the universities –
thought that China was on their side, as reported by Chinese ambassador in Warsaw
Wang Bingnan.114 Although initially Mao called on people to speak out without fear,
when, in early 1957, this eventually happened, as many scholars have argued,
China’s Hundred Flowers Campaign was proven to be a well-orchestrated trap by
Mao to draw out critical voices and then crush them for good.115 In October 1956,
just before the uprising in Hungary, Mao is even reported to have expressed his
support for Poland in the possible case of Soviet military intervention. 116 Shen
Zhihua and Yafeng Xia report how ‘it was rumored that China, Poland and
111
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Yugoslavia would form an anti-Soviet united front’.117 However, as argued by Shen
Zhihua, China played no role in the Polish strikes during summer 1956.118 Poland in
all cases avoided Soviet military intervention because its leader Wladyslaw Gomulka
assured Moscow sufficiently that they would not allow any subversion of political
order.
In Hungary, however, the course of events went differently. At the beginning of
the conflict, Chinese leadership lacked clear information about the situation, due
perhaps to the difficulties in communication between the Chinese ambassador in
Budapest, Hao Deqing, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing. 119 Yet in
Hungary, Mao clearly saw how political dissent could easily transform into “counterrevolution”. As Lorenz Lüthi argues, Mao since 1955 ‘had promoted policies similar
to those of Stalin from a quarter of century before… So Khrushchev’s criticism of
Stalin’s mistakes was potentially dangerous to Mao… [because] destalinization
threatened to undercut Mao’s domestic position’.120 Yet it will be the Great Leap
Forward campaign a few years later to weaken ‘for the first time the Chairman’s
leadership of the party and state’.121 Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and other Chinese
leaders were in Moscow, invited by Khrushchev for consultations, when the crisis in
Budapest erupted. In continuous communication with Beijing, they were first
instructed by Mao to suggest to Khrushchev the extension of the five principles of
peaceful coexistence to the interstate relations within the communist camp, thus
suggesting equality among states and, most importantly, non-interference in internal
affairs. Only when the situation seemed to escape the local communist party’s
control were they instructed by Mao to solicit a firm Soviet military intervention in
order to prevent further instability within the bloc.122 Not long after, a connection
was posited between Tito and the uprising. Indeed, as Csaba Békés has argued, ‘the

117

Shen and Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959, 183.

118

Shen Zhihua, “The Polish-Hungarian Crisis and China”, Part I, Lishi Yanjiu, no. 2 (2005): 119-143,
in Shen and Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959, 168.
119

Shen and Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959, 169.

120

Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, 2008, 46.

121

Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 82.

122

Shen and Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959, 172–176; Chen, Mao’s China and
the Cold War, 156–157.

43

Yugoslavian model of non-aligned communism was appealing to many Hungarian
communists who were seeking reformism within the socialist regime’.123
Hoxha took this event as a chance to attack Tito and to show the Soviets how
dangerous Tito was to the communist camp. Moreover, some participants at the
Tirana communist party conference in April 1956 who had attacked the cult of
Hoxha, attempted to escape to Yugoslavia.124 For Hoxha, it was becoming clear that
Khrushchev had wrongly judged the political situation in Hungary, especially in that
he had permitted Yugoslavian interference. But what Hoxha saw as a Soviet
recognition of the Yugoslavian way of communism, Khrushchev instead saw it as
‘…provisional concessions and gestures… to sweet-talk Tito back into the
communist community, including Yugoslavia’s entry into the WPO’. 125 News of
Tito’s involvement, combined with the lack of official information from Moscow
alarmed the Albanian leadership. For Hoxha the moment when Tito attempted to
overthrow him and unite Albania to Yugoslavia in 1948 was still recent. In short,
Tito and Yugoslavia had become Hoxha’s primary concern. Most importantly,
Hoxha was trying to use these events to convince the Soviet Union of a step
backward in the rapprochement with Yugoslavia Khrushchev had promoted. With
the Belgrade-Moscow axis re-established, Albania’s position was marginalized in the
Soviet geostrategic policy, and Hoxha’s position vulnerable.
Only when events in Hungary became internationally known did the Soviet
ambassador in Tirana meet with Hoxha. The meeting came after Hoxha had been
personally and publically attacked by Tito as an opponent of reformism and example
of tyranny: ‘Where are these roots? In the bureaucratic apparatus, in the methods of
leadership and the so-called one-man rule… in various Enver Hoxhas… who are
resisting the democratization of the decisions of the 20th Congress and who
contributed a great deal towards strengthening Stalin's system and who are working
today to bring it back to life and power – here are the roots which must be
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corrected’.126 The Soviet ambassador delivered to Hoxha the letters between Moscow
and Belgrade regarding the events in Hungary. Hoxha reacted angrily to the fact that
Soviet leaders had not informed him of the crisis in Poland and Hungary until it
became evident.
First, Hoxha was reported to have noted to the Soviet ambassador that the
Soviets did not even criticize Tito’s attack, although Tito was in part responding to
the attacks Hoxha had made through Pravda in the first place.127 Second, Hoxha was
surprised that the Soviets had preferred the ascent to leadership of Hungary of János
Kádár, whom Hoxha had called, in his meeting with the ambassador, a ‘betrayer of
communism’, because initially Kádár had supported Imre Nagy. 128 From the
documentation, is not clear if Hoxha knew of the meeting between Khrushchev and
Tito in the Yugoslav island of Brioni in the night between 1 and 2 November 1956,
at which the Yugoslavs clearly stated their preference for János Kádár. 129 Hoxha
certainly would have preferred to see the rise of Matyas Rakosi in Budapest, known
to have been the most Stalinist Hungarian leader.130 The fact that Hoxha accused
Kádár of ‘collaboration with Yugoslavia and Tito’, means that he was suspicious of
Tito’s role in his emergence as a leader of Hungary and noted that Albania gave this
issue maximum priority and concern. Hoxha had already sent word to Moscow
through the ambassador in Tirana that he suspected of Tito’s involvement in the
events in Hungary. Therefore he noted to the ambassador that ‘…the CPSU knows
very well that in addition to the imperialists [West] our party is convinced that Tito
also is hundred percent involved in the counter-revolution in Hungary. We say this
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because it is Tito who is defending Nagy’.131 Hoxha was furious of the fact that the
Soviet Union had completely neglected Albania with regards the events in Hungary.
He had preferred some consultations between Moscow and Tirana before the
contacts with Tito. On this point he had to say that ‘Marxism-Leninism does not
consider the size of a country when it comes to [communist] principles… Thus we
think we should have been informed of these events, because they are strictly related
to the very defense of our party. The CPSU knows very well that we accuse Tito of
interference in our internal affairs and that he wants to overthrow the rule of our
party’.132
Hoxha’s concern was that Albania, a full member of the WPO, had been left at
the margins, its interests towards its neighbor ignored, and the ideological
legitimation of the regime undermined. Hoxha told Krylov that ‘…we could go
public and explain to our people this entire situation’, implying an exposure of the
Soviet position. Hence the message was for Soviet leaders to reconsider Soviet
relations with Tito in light of the recent events, because otherwise ‘Tito tomorrow
may act against us with still more force’. 133 Hoxha certainly feared for his own
personal future as leader, but he disguised this as a worry about the ‘compromising
of the unity of the communist camp’. Therefore, he claimed that for Soviets the best
to do was to rectify their policies of the last several years.134 Furthermore, from the
Albanian viewpoint, the recent Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation did not result in any
better position for the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Tito had been left with more
room to maneuver, and in Tirana it did not pass unobserved the fact that during both
meetings between Tito and Khrushchev in May 1955 and June 1956, Tito, as Zoltán
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Ripp puts it, ‘did not trade concessions in its international position for
normalization’.135
The Soviet ambassador, perhaps unaware he would further aggravate the
situation, asked Hoxha about the fate of Dali Ndreu, a critic of Hoxha who had
attempted to escape to Yugoslavia but was arrested and later executed. Hoxha noted
in the Politburo that the fate of a dissident was of no concern to the Soviets. This,
together with the fact that Ndreu had tried to escape to Yugoslavia, reinforced
Hoxha’s suspicion that Tito was involved in supporting dissidence during the Tirana
conference earlier that same year. The ambassador’s remark would be later
interpreted as proof that Moscow too was behind the Yugoslavia’s supposed attempt
to challenge Hoxha’s personal position. The rise to power of Kádár in Hungary – a
Yugoslavian preference – together with the fact that Khrushchev supported him,
strengthened Hoxha’s fear of a similar scenario playing out in Albania. If the Soviets
backed the Yugoslavian choice for Hungary’s leadership, what would impede
Moscow from supporting Tito’s choice for the leadership in Albania if there was a
chance? Having to do with his own position, Hoxha noted to the Soviet ambassador
that ‘…the interests of Albanian people require us to defend the unity of our
party…’. He reinforced that ‘…in this situation we have not acted wrongly… and we
do not agree with you’.136 For the first time Hoxha did not comply with the Soviet
course, but openly disagreed with it instead.
When Mao advocated resolute Soviet military intervention in Hungary, he did
not realize that China had taken a decisive step towards become the new lighthouse
for Hoxha, who had begun to see himself as one of the increasingly few opponents of
destalinization. Hungarian events convinced Hoxha that Khrushchev’s denunciation
of Stalin had contributed to the emergence of political turmoil and so, from his point
of view, his refusal of destalinization, and the purge it went with, was correct.
Consequently, Albania’s mounting divergence with Moscow pushed Hoxha to seek
new allies. For Albania, it was now China, rather than the Soviet Union, which
advocated and upheld the unity of the bloc. With its unexpected involvement in the
events in Hungary, China had risen to a prominent position within the socialist camp.
Although Chinese leaders claimed to support Soviet leadership within the camp, they
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well realized that China could claim to co-lead, if not lead, the socialist camp.
Albania would be the first to support it. From this moment onward, Albanian
archives show how it is because of the events in Hungary that, for the first time, the
correspondence between Tirana and Beijing drastically intensified, which explains
the increasing coordination of political positions between Beijing and Tirana that
followed.
China’s position as an advocate of the unity of the socialist camp was reinforced
when, in January 1957, Khrushchev invited Zhou Enlai to Moscow to mediate
between the Soviet Union and Polish and Hungarian governments. In what is called
Zhou Enlai’s shuttle diplomacy, he visited Moscow, Budapest, and Warsaw, for two
weeks with the intention, according to Shen and Xia, to ‘consolidate the socialist
camp on a new basis… the modification of leadership principles in the international
communist movement, that is, the transition from “the Soviet Union as the head” to
“joint Sino-Soviet leadership” of the movement’.137 During his stay in Europe Zhou
stressed the importance of the unity of the bloc under Soviet leadership, but in the
meantime stressed his desire to avoid intervention in internal affairs, avoid Soviet
hegemonic tendencies, and also ‘…avoid great-nation chauvinism’. 138 In fact, in
Moscow, Zhou did not conceal his criticism of the Soviet Union, while in Budapest
and Warsaw he advocated unity under Soviet leadership, which for him was not to be
understood as the right of Moscow to interfere in domestic issues nor the obligation
for other parties to take orders from Moscow.139 Nonetheless, his trip was a success
in that it accredited Beijing as a reliable partner within the communist bloc and
opened to China new channels in East Europe – once Moscow’s exclusive domain.
At the same time that Zhou Enlai was pursuing his shuttle diplomacy, Peng
Zhen, as the head of a Chinese parliamentary delegation, was paying a visit to
Albania, in a trip that ended in Belgrade. Albanian leaders greatly appreciated the
fact that Peng had chosen to go to Albania first and then to Yugoslavia. To meet him
in Tirana was Premier Mehmet Shehu and the Politburo member Hysni Kapo – one
of the most important ideologues of the PLA. In Tirana, the leadership knew of Zhou
Enlai’s visit to Moscow. When they met with Peng Zhen on 16 January 1957, the
137

Shen and Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959, 179.

138

Ibid., 182

139

Ibid., 181-188.

48

main topic of the conversation was the situation in East Europe in the aftermath of
the Hungarian upheaval. Kapo told Peng that they would like to discuss issues
regarding

Albanian-Yugoslavian

divergences.

Mehmet

Shehu,

in

a

very

straightforward language, started with pointing out that ‘for Albania the most
important issue is the relation with Yugoslavia… and these relations have not just a
local character but are an important issue of principles [communist] … whoever
wants to assess properly the political and ideological position of the Yugoslavian
leadership, should study the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia’. The
message for China was that the Soviet Union on this point had ignored Albania, and
that any friendship with Albania underscored a lack of it with Yugoslavia. In fact in a
more direct way Shehu told Peng how in May 1955, they had tried to persuade
Khrushchev that before visiting Belgrade it would have been better to hold
consultations with other communist parties, in particular Albania, ‘because we know
better [than the Soviets] the Yugoslavian leadership’.140
In a long speech, Shehu explained to Peng the historical roots of the
disagreements between Albania and Yugoslavia. When explaining the Albanian
position about Yugoslavian involvement in recent events, Shehu stressed how Tito
‘was involved in a plot in Tirana on the same grounds Hungarian counterrevolutionaries organized one in Budapest’, in an attempt to overthrow the leadership
in Albania in April 1956 with the collaboration of local communists. Shehu also told
Peng that, ‘yet based on our own experience we are convinced of the Yugoslav
involvement in the counter revolutionary actions in Hungary’, although he admitted
that he had no evidence of this. Peng, who mostly listened in silence the long
explanation of Shehu, affirmed that he too ‘personally’ thought Yugoslavia was
involved ‘but we have no evidence of such intervention’. Nonetheless, Shehu said
that such evidence could be found in the statement of the Yugoslav minister of
Defense to the Soviet ambassador in Hungary that if the Soviet Union would have
not intervened militarily then Yugoslavia would have. This meant for Shehu that
‘Tomorrow Yugoslavia might consider to intervene militarily also against
Albania’.141
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Peng and the Albanian leaders also discussed problems that perhaps more
directly concerned China – issues related to the international communist movement.
It is significant the position regarding Stalin. Shehu stated that ‘we are completely in
agreement with you… about the fact that Stalin should be assessed with both his
negative and positive aspects … [yet] it should be highlighted first of all his positive
aspects and only then perhaps mention some negative’. Regarding the class struggle
in the transitional phase from capitalism to socialism, contrary to the principle of
peaceful transition announced by Khrushchev, Shehu stated that the ‘Soviet Union
perhaps is in another situation because socialism there is consolidated, but different
instead is the situation in other socialist countries where class struggle is needed to
resist counter revolution, as Hungarian events showed’. Shehu then accused Tito of
completely denying class struggle while pursuing the ‘national way of socialism’,
which for him was against the principles of Marxism. On all these issues, Shehu
emphasized not only the difference between Yugoslavian revisionism and the
Marxist course, but also the fact that ‘Albania will always take into account the
CPSU and CCP standing towards Yugoslavia’ and related issues. This meant that for
Albania, China was already on equal footing with the Soviet Union. Peng Zhen
assured Albania that China would avoid the ‘great nation chauvinism in dealing with
all countries’, a way to affirm that the size of the country was not a criterion in
Chinese relations with Albania. 142 It was also a way to mark the difference in
principles between China – which claimed to base its foreign relations on the
principle of equality – and a Soviet Union that often was guilty of great-nation
chauvinism, as Zhou Enlai was remarking in the same moment during his trip in
Moscow. Finally, Albania found a common understanding with China regarding
these issues. Nonetheless, at this point rather than opening the divide with Soviet
Union, China called and worked for unity.

Albanian Official Assessment of the Events in East Europe
To further assess the recent events in light of the positions of the actors implicated, in
Tirana was called a plenum of the PLA in February 1957. The report of Enver Hoxha
to the Plenum was centered upon issues that had emerged since the Twentieth
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Congress of the CPSU. 143 In this plenum, Hoxha wanted to seal definitely his
Stalinist line of opposing any and all reformation, and he needed legitimation
through a formal act of a party institution which would give the semblance of a
collegial decision.
Some aspects of this long report are very important. First, it reinterpreted the
recent events, from destalinization to the Hungarian upheaval, in a way analogous to
China’s public assessment and placed China in a central position in his analysis.
Second, it highlighted the importance of struggling against revisionism – embodied,
from the Albanian perspective, in the Yugoslavian course. Third, it shut down any
possible rapprochement with Yugoslavia, in light of the Yugoslavians’ presumed
involvement in recent events. Fourth, and most importantly, it stated, in open but
careful language, an association between Khrushchev’s policies and the events in
East Europe.144 Regarding the Hungarian leadership, Hoxha briefly mentioned Imre
Nagy as the main internal cause, and praised and supported Janos Kádár whom
Hoxha had earlier attacked in front of the Soviet ambassador. The report gave great
merit to the Soviet Union for having repressed the counter revolution, and it
criticized the Yugoslavian interpretation of the events as ‘a popular revolution of all
the working people’. For Hoxha, it was instead a counter revolution of all the
reactionary classes that had survived the proletarian dictatorship.
Regarding Poland, there was mention that the ‘nationalist elements took
advantage of some true mistakes of the Soviet Union in its relations with Poland’ –
alleging clearly to the Soviet Union’s great national chauvinism that Zhou Enlai had
mentioned in January. Hoxha disputed the Polish rehabilitation of many political
prisoners, the purging of old revolutionaries from leading positions in the army and
the party, and the freedom (limited) of the Catholic clergy that Gomulka had
allowed. The point he aimed to make was that Soviet intervention in Hungary had
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reestablished the full control of the party, while the lack of intervention in Poland
had left room for an autonomous path which could be dangerous for the unity of the
camp. Hoxha appreciated that Zhou Enlai’s recent visit to Warsaw had contributed to
improving the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union – clearly appraising
China. 145 It is significant that when analyzing the events in Poland and Hungary
Hoxha did not even mention Khrushchev by name, but referred to the Soviet Union
in general. But his criticism of Yugoslavia was also a veiled critique of Khrushchev
for the trust he initially had placed in Belgrade. Hoxha strongly emphasized that with
its ‘revisionist course’ Yugoslavia was the most direct menace to the socialist unity.
Belgrade, Hoxha said, denied the class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat and
the leading role of the communist party ‘using as a mask the struggle against
Stalinism’. This ‘came immediately after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU…
which opportunist elements used to discredit socialist countries, the communist
parties and their leaders… But our party acted correctly… we learned important
lessons from the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and took all the measures to fight
against those that in the conference of the communist party of Tirana, backed by
Yugoslavia using the pretext of “struggle against the cult of individual”, wanted to
push our party out of the Marxist-Leninist path’.146
Hoxha affirmed that within the international communist movement the leading
role belonged to the Soviet Union for historical reasons: it was the fatherland of the
October Revolution and consequently the first country to have experienced
socialism, and it had the merit to have defeated Nazism and Fascism in the Second
World War. The factors mentioned all occurred under the reign of Stalin, and so in a
way he was affirming that the leading role was subject to the return to the old values
of Stalinism. To this point, he also quoted Stalin to affirm the necessity of defending
the Soviet line. To affirm the leading role of the Soviet Union, Hoxha quoted parts of
the article “More on the Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship” published
on 29 December 1956 by Renmin Ribao in China. So Hoxha was again endorsing
and following China’s analysis. Significantly, the quotation he cited did not refer to
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the Soviet Union as the leader of the socialist camp but as its center – which implied
less hierarchy, if not equality, among socialist countries.
Regarding Stalin, Hoxha stated that, ‘We do not agree with those that liquidate
the revolutionary side of Stalin and see only the dark side. He should be assessed on
the right light…’ After extolling Stalin’s merits, Hoxha did mention some of his
mistakes, but exonerated him because ‘his tragedy lays in the fact that even when he
made mistakes he thought they were necessary for the sake of the revolution.’ Here
he also emphasized how ‘Hungarian events show again… how dangerous it is to
disorient the working class with the theory of denying the class struggle’ in the
transition from capitalism to socialism. Clearly he alleged that Khrushchev’s theory
of peaceful transition had undermined the ideology at the base of the class struggle.
Further yet, ‘The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU considered that was wrong
Stalin’s thesis that with the building of socialism it escalates also the class struggle…
some liberal elements in some countries interpreted in an opportunist way the thesis
[of the 20th Congress] that the class struggle does not escalates… they made a
distorted analogy between the Soviet Union where socialism is consolidated, and
their countries where it is still in the transitional phase’. Ultimately, contrary to what
he had affirmed to the Soviets but in light of the events in Hungary, Hoxha stated
that ‘we do not want to have any interparty relations with Yugoslavia, although we
will try to have friendly relations with the Yugoslavian people’.147 Hoxha used the
tension of 1956 in East Europe to legitimate his decision not to improve relations
with Yugoslavia, and not undertake any internal reformation. On the contrary, for
him these events were reason to strengthen his personal rule. All of this report, which
was a clear re-assessment of the Khrushchev line since 1953, came only after Beijing
had emerged as a possible safety net with which Hoxha might defend his course.
In order to outline more clearly Albania’s position on all the controversial issues
within the bloc, as well as to find common understanding with Beijing, just after the
plenum, in early May 1957, a delegation of PLA officials headed by Rita Marko
(among which Nexhmije Hoxha, wife of Enver Hoxha and member of the Politburo)
visited China. But when they met with Liu Shaoqi, Liu told them that it was perhaps
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a mistake, in 1948, when China had considered Yugoslavia an enemy of
communism, and invited Albania to make efforts to improve relations with
Belgrade.148 To Albanian officials, this statement seemed contradictory. In a ciphered
telegram to Hoxha that day, Marko noted that ‘the view of Liu Shaoqi [on this point]
seemed to me very similar to that of the CPSU’. 149 In their meeting with Mao,
Yugoslavia was not even mentioned. Mao focused more on Albania’s relations with
the western countries, particularly the communist parties of the western countries.150
He suggested that Albania extend its diplomatic network towards African, Arabic
and other countries. 151 Furthermore, he said that the African countries, and the
developing countries in general, have good potential to lean on the communist side –
China had been one of the main promoters of the Bandung Conference in April
1955. 152 It seems that Mao wanted to know if Albania had any potential to be a
channel of communication through its diplomatic network with communist parties in
countries where China lacked recognition.
The most important meeting during this visit, which might explain the attitude of
Chinese leaders towards Yugoslavia, was perhaps the one with Peng Zhen, who
informed Marko of his visit to Yugoslavia in January, just after his visit to Albania.
His motivation for going to Belgrade, parallel to that of Zhou Enlai with regards to
the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary, had been to convince Yugoslavia to join the
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conference of the communist parties in Moscow. Tito would not agree to sign any
document wherein the Soviet Union was described as the head of the communist
camp and so eventually he refused to participate. At the same time, according to
Peng, Tito had expressed the will to improve relations with Albania, but in the
context of improving relations with all other socialist countries.153 What is clear at
this stage is China’s efforts to contribute to the unity of the socialist camp, which
inspired the invitation for Albania to try improving its tense relations with Belgrade.
The Soviet Union also sent a signal to Tirana by approving most of Albania’s
economic requests in 1957 and seemed to leave behind any attrition there had been
over political and economic issues.

The Conference of Moscow, 1957 – A Brief Moment of Unity
As Niu Jun has argued, ‘the relationship of leading (Soviet Union) and being-led
(China) that had been created during the formation of the alliance [Sino-Soviet]
could not be sustained after the shock of the revolts in Poland and Hungary in
1956’.154 Yet both Soviet and Chinese leaders at this point seemed to want cohesion
within the socialist camp. These efforts to re-strengthen unity resulted in the Moscow
conference in November 1957 – the meeting of sixty-four communist parties from
throughout the world. For some Chinese scholars the conference was a Chinese
initiative, and Mao personally played a great role in its successful outcome. For
others however, it was an initiative of CPSU, and China was involved only after
Khrushchev failed to convince Yugoslavia to participate. Clearly this confirms that,
if nothing else, China participated in the conference ‘on an equal footing’.155
Moreover, regarding the transition to communism in capitalist countries, Mao
successfully managed to convince the Soviets to include in the declaration, next to
the principle of peaceful transition, also the revolutionary option. At the end, two
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declarations were issued: the first was the Peace Manifesto, signed by all parties,
Yugoslavia included, and the second and more important was the declaration of the
ruling parties that Yugoslavians refused to sign. This final declaration came to be
ambiguous and vague on many issues upon which the ruling parties did not reach a
full agreement – Polish communists in particular had opposed many aspects since the
very beginning. Consequently, after the conference this declaration was interpreted
by all parties in their own way, becoming little more than a useless piece of paper.
Yet following the conference the unity of the camp seemed to be assured for a short
period.
But it was short indeed. In 1958-59 Mao launched two campaigns that signified
a dramatic shift in his domestic policies: first the Great Leap Forward campaign in
1958 with the task to surpass the industrial production of western countries, first the
United Kingdom, and in a longer period the United States.156 The real goal of the
Great Leap, however, according to Shen and Xia, was to surpass the Soviet Union by
establishing the People’s Communes as new units of Chinese society ‘as a result of
the merging of the industry, agriculture and the army’.157 Initially the Soviets assisted
China in its industrial production but later Khrushchev attacked the Chinese People’s
Communes’ experiment as a return to the dark time in history when, in the Soviet
Union under Stalin, similar communes had caused such great suffering. For Lüthi,
the Great Leap Forward was not necessarily a campaign addressed against Moscow;
rather, it was the first domestic mass movement Mao launched after the political
takeover, when ‘all elements (charismatic leader, salvational mission, mass
mobilization, and an illegitimate authority structure as the target of the struggle) of
Mao’s continuous revolution merged’.158 Similarly Chen Jian argues that ‘China’s
alliance policy towards the Soviet Union was always an integral part of Mao
Zedong’s grand continuous revolution plans designed to transform China’s state,
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society, and international look’.159 Then, once the Great Leap Forward resulted in a
disaster, which in turn resulted in the purging of Peng Dehuai and his followers who
had criticized it, subsequently Mao launched another anti-rightist campaign in
1959.160
Although Mao was promoting a left turn in domestic policies, the real attrition
with Moscow was the Soviet hesitation to collaborate with China in developing its
atomic arsenal. Furthermore, with an attitude similar to that which Moscow had
previously taken regarding satellite states in East Europe, Khrushchev demanded a
joint military radio transmitter station co-led by Moscow on Chinese soil, and a joint
submarine fleet under a

similar scheme. Mao reacted angrily to this proposal

because he understood it as a Soviet attempt to limit China’s military
maneuverability towards Taiwan, as Moscow was pursuing a policy of relaxation
with United States.161 Khrushchev had to rush and visit Beijing secretly in order to
settle these misunderstandings, and eventually agreed with Mao to give up the joint
submarine fleet. Less than a month after this meeting, Mao provoked a crisis of
international dimensions when, in August 1958, the People’s Liberation Army
bombed Jinmen Island in what is known as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.162 For
MacFarquhar with this crisis ‘the Chinese were responding to external events: the
Middle East crisis and the Soviet failure to take a strong action’. 163 For Lüthi,
instead, the main aim of this crisis was to boost Chinese people’s enthusiasm in order
to increase steel production in the Great Leap Forward campaign, but also as a
protest against the lack of progress during Geneva ambassadorial talks from 1955-57
on Taiwan.164
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This left turn was reflected also in the Beijing-Belgrade-Tirana triangle, when in
April 1958 China transmitted to Albania the correspondence between the CCP and
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), wherein was reflected China’s
refusal to participate at the Seventh Congress of the LCY. The CCP considered many
of the theses of the project drafts to the congress as ‘non-conform with the Marxist
theory and in contradiction to the Moscow declaration’.165 This for Tirana, was the
most desirable turn of Chinese policy towards Yugoslavia, which contrasted with the
conciliatory tones towards Belgrade Liu Shaoqi had adopted with Albanian officials
in May 1957. Furthermore, the rapprochement between Tirana and Beijing was made
stronger yet when in late 1958, despite the fact that the failure of the Great Leap
Forward had become clear since October 1958, yet China granted to Albania a loan
of 55 million rubles (barter agreement) for its third FYP 1961-65.166 To inform about
this campaign, Chinese officials summoned the ambassadors of the socialist
countries at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early June 1958 where Bo
Yibo had a long talk explaining the Great Leap Forward, and mentioning goals and
the first results which seemed very optimistic regarding China’s industrial
production.167 In fact his speech was concentrated on the economic implications of
this campaign, highlighting how the steel production had increased. In Tirana, this
campaign was interpreted as proof that China would soon reach the level of Soviet
economy, and possibly surpass it. Therefore, China could possibly replace Soviet
economic assistance to Albania, if necessary.
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Khrushchev’s Visit to Albania
Between the end of May and early June 1959 Khrushchev visited Albania for the
first (and last) time in a run from north to south, meeting people and giving speeches
for around ten days. During the visit, Khrushchev largely ignored the most important
political and ideological issues Albania had been concerned with in recent years.
Indeed, as shown in the records of the Politburo in Tirana, before his visit, Albanian
leaders did not even expect to have long talks on their main concerns, which at this
moment were the economic requests they would present to Khrushchev. Although
the visit of the Soviet leader was not aimed at negotiating economic agreements, for
Albania it was a chance to introduce him to the plans for long term investments in
heavy industry.168 In fact, Hoxha was seeking a political endorsement of his national
policies.
At first, the Soviet leader praised Albania’s political and ideological
developments, what Hoxha called, ‘a fist to the revisionist Yugoslavs… because we
are with them in an open war [ideological]’.169 Regarding economic issues, contrary
to Albanian expectations, Khrushchev made clear that he ‘did not come here to talk
about these issues’, and then criticized and demolished most part of the Albanians’
plans for developing the heavy industry. The communist regime in Albania wanted at
all costs to fill the gap – which was a gap with the course of history – and develop
their heavy industry to exploit the national resources. But Khrushchev questioned the
economic profitability of these industrial projects – for instance he reminded that
Albanian oil had high sulphur, which made its quality low. Yet he left room for
‘further studies’ and possible revision in the near future. On the other hand,
Khrushchev suggested a full concentration on agricultural projects and perhaps light
industry with focus on the production of consumer goods. Already in 1956, he had
suggested to Hoxha a complete concentration of the economic efforts on agriculture
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with priority on wheat, citrus, cotton, and cattle breeding. Now, that position was
further cemented when he was most impressed by Albanian climate and its
geographical position. Now, he suggested ‘to make treasure of your land, sun and
water’ to produce products to sell in foreign markets – firstly, of course, the Soviet
Union.170 Khrushchev audaciously also asked to revise the Albanian policy towards
Yugoslavia. Hoxha responded passively to the Soviet demands, since he did not have
much choice.
Agriculture was not the only focus, however, of Khrushchev’s visit. He was very
impressed by the southern coast of the country, particularly Vlora bay and the nearby
island of Sazan, where the mountains descend steeply onto the Adriatic coast – with
the clear sky it is possible to see the Italian coast just around forty miles on the other
side of the Adriatic Sea. There he committed to build a joint naval military base –
which Hoxha claimed to have requested in Stalin’s time. 171 Eventually the base
would pass to Albanian control once it was properly equipped and the Albanian army
properly trained. From a Soviet point of view, this base was Moscow’s bridgehead in
Southeastern Europe, which could be used as leverage towards NATO and the West.
In fact, it was precisely during this visit in Albania that Fidel Castro was
consolidating his political power in Cuba, which eventually leaned to the Soviet side,
opening the door to one of the most dangerous crises of Cold War history. But Soviet
attention to faraway places such as Cuba also pushed Moscow to rationalize its
foreign economic assistance, and Albania had to pay its price – which explains in
part the Soviet Union’s refusal to back Albania’s expensive plans for the developing
of the heavy industry.
At the time of his visit to Albania, Khrushchev knew of Hoxha’s increasing ties
with China and might have interpreted it as a tactic to get concessions from Moscow.
Khrushchev however, did not cede. Either by declining or procrastinating on
Hoxha’s requests for support, Khrushchev perhaps wanted to study the Albanian
170

Ibid., f.1-19; Later in November 1960, Khrushchev sustained that he had ‘ordered that everything
should be done in order that Albania becomes a garden’ referring to the economic plan focused in
agriculture. In “Report of the Meeting of the delegation of the Party of Labor of Albania with Leaders
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 12 November 1960”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKBS, V.
1960, L.14/1, D24.
171

Report of the meeting of the Albanian Labor party delegation with leaders of the communist party
of the Soviet Union, 12 November 1960. This document was made possible with support from the
Leon Levy Foundation, in http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117494, (last accessed 25
Feb. 2017).

60

situation with Beijing. An additional blow came later for Hoxha when in February
1960 Albania requested from the Soviet Union, and other East European
governments, a loan of 500 million rubles exclusively in consumer goods, in addition
to the possible loans of the FYP 1961-65. Hoxha argued that ‘the request comes due
to the low level of living standards of Albanian people, [and] … it should be modest
if compared with the Soviet possibilities’. 172 Khrushchev turned down Hoxha’s
request by the end of April 1960 in a very short letter which did not even mention
what Albania had requested, but instead granted a delay of fifteen years of the
repayments of the instalments of previous loans Soviet Union had provided.
Khrushchev, ironically, argued ‘you can use those resources to increase the living
standards of your people’.173 For Albania, Soviet doors in Moscow were closing.
In this situation, Hoxha, who had mastered the skill to march along parallel
roads, looked for other options. In January 1959, a barter agreement of 55 million
rubles between Albania and China was signed in Beijing for the FYP 1961-65, and
aimed at increasing investments in industry. 174 Only a month before the visit of
Khrushchev in Albania, Hoxha had sent to China his most faithful lieutenant, Hysni
Kapo, with the task of ‘studying the Chinese experience in building socialism’.175 It
is significant how, for Hoxha at this point, China had emerged as a model regarding
domestic policies. In fact, he had always followed a model, but he remained faithful
only to the model that better assured his power: the communist party had been
founded with the Yugoslavian model in mind. When Belgrade undermined Hoxha’s
leadership, he changed course and adopted Stalin’s model until Khrushchev ditched
it. And now Mao’s model had emerged. Kapo’s reports of his talks with Chinese
leaders – which were not confined to economic problems, the expressed aim of his
visit – were impressive, in particular when compared to those Hoxha had in Albania
with Soviet leaders. For Mao’s turn left policy, the year 1959 was a difficult one, and
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he needed allies. First, when an uprising erupted against the Chinese regime in spring
1959, in Tibet, Soviet standing came as a shock to Beijing. The Dalai Lama and part
of the Buddhist clergy of Tibet, together with thousands of people, fled to India.
India openly accused China of repression in Tibet. The crisis later in 1962 escalated
into border clashes between China and India regarding the McMahon line. The
Soviet Union initially showed solidarity with Beijing, but soon declared neutrality in
this matter, for fear of pushing India towards the western camp.176 For China, this
was a gift to the United States ahead of the planned visit of Khrushchev, as for ‘the
first time, United States became a major issue in the evolving Sino-Soviet
disagreements’. 177 In summer 1959, Peng Dehuai, Chinese minister of defense
questioned, effectively so, the economic results of the Great Leap Forward, and he
praised the Soviet economic system instead. He was purged after a dramatic
conference in Lushan in August 1959, and materials on this issue were relayed to
Albania.178
In this context, while Soviet leaders showed resistance and reticence regarding
Albanian economic development, Chinese leaders in Beijing instead told Kapo that
their economic principle is ‘to walk with two foots [sic], which mean develop in
parallel the industry and the agriculture, the heavy industry and the light industry’.
Significantly, Zhou Enlai told Kapo that ‘you have requested to us very few things…
our assistance to you is not a big deal for us’.179 The most important aspects here
were Zhou Enlai’s remarks regarding Albania’s ideological standing. He stated that
‘China knows well your position… we stand on the same side, we are a united front
against revisionists’. In this sense, ‘your [ideological] struggle against Yugoslavia is
absolutely right’ as you are encircled by dangerous enemies.180 This position was
reinforced by Mao as well. In his meeting with the Albanian delegation in mid-May
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1959, Mao praised ‘the bravery with which you stand against Titoism and
Yugoslavian revisionism’. Mao endorsed Albania’s political struggle against
Yugoslavia again in June 1960, when meeting an Albanian delegation, telling them
that ‘Albania is not alone [against Yugoslavia], behind you stands all the socialist
camp’. 181 Mao however, mentioned also the Soviet assistance to both China and
Albania, and the fact that, at that moment ‘we are tied to the Moscow declaration’.182
A tie that was soon broken.

Conclusion
Enver Hoxha had thought that Albania would have a central role in Soviet Union’s
policy towards Southeastern Europe. Albania’s inclusion in the WPO, and the
subsequent construction of the military base in southern Albania, spoke in this sense.
He also thought that because of this role, Soviet Union would include Albania in the
making of the Soviet agenda in issues regarding the socialist camp. Khrushchev, not
only did not consult Tirana on such issues, but he undermined Hoxha’s rule by
promoting both, the destalinization process, and the rapprochement with Yugoslavia.
It was this latter step that definitely jeopardized Hoxha’s trust in Moscow.
Khrushchev in fact prioritized the rapprochement with Yugoslavia, in order to
reintegrate Belgrade within the communist camp. Between Albania and Yugoslavia,
from a strategic point of view, Khrushchev had seen correctly that Belgrade was
fundamental for Moscow’s control of the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea, which
was also the Southwestern flank of Soviet Union’s area of influence in Europe. In
this way, Khrushchev would have recovered what Stalin had lost by expelling
Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948. This removed that centrality that Hoxha’s
Albania had acquired in that area by acting as a counterbalance, under Soviet
leadership, of Tito’s Yugoslavia.
The events in Hungary further convinced Hoxha that Khrushchev did not regard
Albania as a strategic point as had been considered by Stalin. Furthermore, Tito
initially had been a supporter of the reformers that caused the turmoil in Hungary.
Hoxha feared that Yugoslavia might foment similar policies in Albania. He became
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even more convinced of this by the fact that the Soviet Union completely bypassed
Albania in its talks with Yugoslavia regarding the Hungarian events. The Soviet
leaders did so even when Albania asked to have a say on these issues. In this context,
China emerged rapidly as the new chance for Hoxha to reassure the legitimacy of his
regime. Chinese leaders, after initial hesitations, considered Khrushchev’s criticism
of Stalin, and the reformism in general, as an open door for counter-revolution to
emerge. Mao praised Hoxha, and Albania’s standing towards the events in eastern
Europe. In this way China gave the space Hoxha had expected to have from
Khrushchev. But most important, Mao emerged to be the new defender of Marxism
that Khrushchev instead, in Hoxha’s eyes, had seriously undermined. In this way,
both countries found to be on the same line against the full reformism of
Khrushchev, and to defend Stalin. For China, Albania emerged as a golden
possibility to challenge Khrushchev from a European position, central area of Cold
War division. The last factor that determined Hoxha’s close up with China, in
addition to ideological considerations, was China’s readiness to assist economically
Albania. Indeed, China not only showed availability to provide assistance to Albania,
but it did encourage Albania to prioritize the industry. This says much of how China
had understood Hoxha’s sensitivity to the developing of the industry. Perhaps
something they later regretted, considering how insatiable Hoxha became in the
coming years towards China.
Therefore, for Hoxha, China emerged as an alternative to Soviet Union
regarding both, ideological and political axis, and economic model. This even more
after that in 1959, contrary to the expectations of Hoxha, Khrushchev during his visit
in Albania reaffirmed his disagreement with Hoxha regarding the relations with
Yugoslavia, asking to improve them, and regarding the economic model, asking to
concentrate in the agriculture. For Hoxha, who had had enough of Khrushchev’s hold
over his country, China was the opportunity he was waiting for to end the alliance
with Soviet Union, which by now had become inconvenient if not an obstacle to his
plans for Albania’s future. The events that followed, shows how Hoxha managed to
find a way out from the Soviet joke without risking a Soviet intervention which
could have possibly ended Hoxha’s rule.
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CHAPTER TWO

BREAKING AN ALLIANCE, BUILDING AN ALLIANCE, 1960-61:
THE COLLAPSE OF THE UNITY OF THE COMMUNIST CAMP

Introduction
There were three forums during 1960 at which the Sino-Soviet split manifested with
great evidence, which also collectively and definitively sealed the alliance between
China and Albania. First, the meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions
(WFTU) in Beijing at the beginning of June. Second, the meeting of the communist
parties at the Eighth Congress of the Romanian Workers’ Party in late June, and
third, the Moscow Conference of eighty-one communist parties in November the
same year. Though these meetings alone did not entirely bring about the Sino-Soviet
split, they effectively ditched Soviet-Albanian relations. For those few scholars, here
above mentioned, who earlier have conducted research on this alliance, it was in
these events that lays the foundations of the Sino-Albanian alliance. As shown in the
previous chapter, the foundations of the Sino-Albanian entente lays in the aftermath
of the Twentieth CPSU Congress, followed by the destalinization process and the
East European turmoil. I instead, argue here, that the period 1960-1961 is a
conclusive process of both the Soviet-Albanian split, which had begun with the
disagreements since the rise to the leadership of Khrushchev, and his undermining of
Hoxha’s regime, and of the establishing of the Soviet-Albanian alliance. Related to
these arguments follows the other: paradoxically Albania’s best entente with China
was precisely in the period 1956-61 – when the alliance was not yet established –
contrary to the later period when attrition would be continuously persistent. The
destalinization process and its immediate consequences pushed Beijing and Tirana to
build a united front in opposing the reformation process that Khrushchev had
instigated. Therefore, in this chapter I show how the events during these two years
were tactically used by Hoxha as an opportunity to pursue his strategy of
disengagement from the cumbersome Soviet ally. In the same time, he skillfully
frustrated the Soviet leaders pushing them to fully expose their positions towards
Albania, for then give to Hoxha arguments he used internally to convince his
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Politburo that the Soviet Union had become a threat rather than a protector. It is
through these events that he channeled his uneasiness with Moscow, and established
the alliance with Beijing instead. Contrary to Soviet Union’s standing towards
Albania during the turmoil in East Europe, when Moscow had avoided consulting
with Hoxha, China, on the other hand, either coordinated, or informed Hoxha of all
the steps and the backstage of the Sino-Soviet disagreements.
The process of the split with Moscow, however, would not be easy for Hoxha
and his leadership. In fact, part of the Albanian leadership was known to be strong
supporters of Soviet Union. In addition, after Hoxha’s request, which dated before
Stalin’s death, Khrushchev had started the building of the WPO military base in
Vlora bay, in southern Albania. Although a WPO base, yet the soldiers stationing in
Vlora, in addition to the Albanians, were all Soviets, managing powerful weapons.
Albania’s disengagement with Soviet Union would be potentially difficult also
because of a large number of cadres and Albanian officials of all ranks that for years
had attended Soviet academies. Documents shows that Soviet Union looked for the
possibility to open a breach within the Albanian leadership, precisely counting on
those Albanian officials that had been educated in Soviet Union. Therefore, Hoxha’s
challenge to the Soviet leadership, and his subsequent decision to ditch the alliance
with Moscow, could have been a risky step. Yet Hoxha used skillfully the
combination between many factors: China’s support for him; the Soviet difficulties
in international relations after Moscow’s intervention in Hungary; Albania’s
geographical position, which would have made possible but undesirable any Soviet
military intervention to overthrow Hoxha; Soviet attention to the emerging Cuban
issue.

The Meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Beijing
To participate in the meeting, which was scheduled to begin on 31 May 1960,
Albania sent a delegation headed by Gogo Nushi, representing Albanian trade
unions. Another delegation from Tirana, apparently unrelated to the first but
travelling in the same time and headed by Liri Belishova and Haxhi Lleshi, all old
comrades of Hoxha since the war, toured China. The delegations landed in Beijing
on May 30, and Nushi prepared the matters drafted prior, and slated for discussion
the following day: the international situation and the role of the unions, and their
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contribution in the struggle against colonialism. In the meeting, according to
Albanian accounts, there were to be at least 300 delegates from all over the world –
mainly from the communist bloc. To the surprise of many, however, the meeting did
not begin the next day. Despite the fact that Albanian leaders knew of the SinoSoviet divergences, it was in Beijing where they witnessed for the first time how
serious they were.1
On 1 June 1960, Chinese officials informed Albanian delegates that the delay
was due to disagreements between China and the Soviet Union regarding the draft of
the report to be submitted to the conference of the unions. Liu Ningyi, the Chinese
representative of the unions, asked to amend parts of the draft, which his Soviet
counterpart did not agree. These disputes – at least as the Chinese told the Albanians
– were caused by the Soviets’ lack of acknowledgement of the Chinese achievements
during the Great Leap Forward campaign, which Soviets had criticized heavily.
Trying to understand both sides, the Albanian representative of the Unions asked to
meet also with Soviet representatives, who instead told him that the disputes came
about from Chinese views on issues such as the peaceful coexistence (that China
refused), peaceful transition, or the general disarmament. The Soviet Union promptly
sent a letter on June 2 to the ruling parties, and others, inviting them to discuss the
international situation during the works of the Romanian Workers’ Party congress
scheduled twenty days later. The meeting in Beijing eventually began on June 5, and
the Albanian delegation noted how in the days before the meeting, ‘Chinese officials
met with many delegations trying to bring them on their side’.2 That same day some
seventeen delegations were invited to have dinner with the Chinese leaders,
including Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi. The aim of the dinner,
according to Zhou, was ‘to inform you of the disagreements we have with Soviet
Union on issues of line and principles concerning our epoch’.3 Then Deng Xiaoping,
in more than an hour long speech, explained how, contrary to the Soviets, China
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‘considers our time the last stage of imperialism and capitalism… an epoch of the
proletarian revolution’. 4 After that, Zhou Enlai took to the floor, but many
delegations, among which the Soviet, opposed the continuing of these discussions
because ‘these issues should be discussed in a bilateral meeting among the CPSU and
the CCP’. Zhou Enlai accepted but argued that ‘we only want to clarify all the Soviet
objections to the Great Leap Forward and other Chinese domestic policies’. 5 The
next day, Zhou Enlai met with the Albanian delegation and told them that China
considered ‘impossible the peaceful coexistence with imperialism’. He added also
that divergences with the Soviet Union ‘already existed, but now they are becoming
visible’. The Albanian delegates in Beijing noted ‘a marked anti-Soviet tone in
Chinese standing’. Albanian leadership showed extreme interest in the emerging
Sino-Soviet disputes, but also a calculated caution before taking any position. Hoxha
instructed his comrades to ‘avoid any comment’, and not to take sides in the dispute.6
Ultimately, China renounced the plan to include its views in the final
communiqué of the meeting, a step that Andropov, some days later in Bucharest,
attributed to Albania’s refusal to sign a document that did not reflect unity between
the Soviet Union and China. 7 Although ideologically leaning towards Chinese
leadership, Enver Hoxha decided to advance without openly supporting Beijing, as
shown by the letters sent to Belishova in China, suggesting not just caution, but ‘to
emphasize the decisive role of Soviet Union’.8 His closeness to China instead, was
shown by his praise of the Chinese position on the issue of peaceful coexistence,

4
“Notes of the conference organized by the CCP CC on 05 June 1960 with some delegates of the
World Federation of Trade Unions”, in ibid., f.16-20.
5

In AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1960, D4, f.10. On similar terms this meeting is accounted also by
Lorenz Lüthi in The Sino-Soviet split, 167-68.
6

“Urgent: Telegram of Enver Hoxha to Gogo Nushi in Beijing, 07 June 1960” in AQSH, F.14, APMPKK, V. 1960, D4, f.4.
7

“Telegram of Hysni Kapo from Bucharest sent to Enver Hoxha, 21 June 1960, informing of the
meeting he had with the Soviet representative of the CPSU, Yuri Andropov, on 20 June 1960, who
informed Kapo of the divergences surged between China and the Soviet Union, in “Correspondence
during the year 1960 between the PLA First Secretary, comrade Enver Hoxha, and comrade Hysni
Kapo who headed the Albanian delegation at the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers Party and
the meeting of the communist and working parties in Bucharest”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, Mbledhja e
Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e Punëtore në Bukuresht[Meeting of the Representatives of the
Communist and Workers’ Parties in Bucharest] – Qershor 1960, D1, f.10.
8

“Telegram of Enver Hoxha, 04 June 1960, sent to Liri Belishova that was in Beijing, instructing her
on the content of her speeches with Chinese leaders in Beijing”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1960,
D2.

68

‘because otherwise how communists could assist the countries struggling for national
liberation’ if they would have to commit to the peaceful relations with imperialism.
Liri Belishova however, who among the Albanian leaders was the most pro-Soviet,
interpreting Hoxha’s messages as support for the Soviet side, reported to the Soviet
ambassador in Beijing what Chinese leaders had told her about the disputes.9 For this
reason, once the Soviet-Albanian split became evident a few months later, she was
the first to pay the price, being condemned and expelled from the party and from
political offices. In Beijing, however, China had reached its objective to bring to the
world’s attention its position on the most important questions regarding the
international communist movement. In the Politburo in Tirana, Hoxha analyzed the
situation, and officially maintained equal distance between Beijing and Moscow.
From the records of the Politburo has emerged that Hoxha was informed by the
Soviets that disagreements between Moscow and Beijing persisted on, and were
limited to, issues concerning the international relations between camps. Yet he
preferred to ‘see carefully how they [Soviets and Chinese] pose these issues in detail
and then we will say our opinion’.10 In this sense Hoxha sought to first see the road
ahead in its entirety, in order to better calculate his steps. To this aim, when Beijing
informed Albania that most of their members did not wish to attend the Bucharest
meeting, Hoxha strongly urged the Chinese part to participate.

Bucharest, June 1960: A Twofold Split
The great convergence between China and Albania, and the great divergence
between China and the Soviet Union, and between Moscow and Tirana emerged very
clearly at the meeting of the representatives of the communist parties that
participated in the congress of the Romanian Workers’ Party in Bucharest.11 In a
letter sent by Soviets in early June (Albania received it on 4 June 1960), the Soviet
Union mentioned the necessity for consultations among the communist parties on the
international situation, in light also of the disagreements between the Soviet Union
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and the United States.12 The meeting eventually took place between 24 and 26 June
1960, right at the margins of the Third Romanian Workers’ Party Congress (20-25
June). Soon, however, this letter was interpreted, at least in hindsight by Albania, as
a duplicitous means of convening the communist parties to discuss the Sino-Soviet
divergences.13 In fact, for Albania it had become clear that Soviet intentions from the
beginning were to turn the Bucharest meeting into a forum of revenge against China
for its attempt to gain support from the communist parties during the WFTU in
Beijing just days earlier.
Immediately after the Albanian delegation’s arrival in Bucharest, Yuri
Andropov, head of the CPSU’s CC International Liaison Department, together with a
member of the Romanian government, Alexandru Moghioros, met with Kapo for the
first time on 20 June 1960. 14 But instead of mentioning disputes regarding
international relations, as mentioned in the letter of invitation, Andropov repeated all
the Sino-Soviet disagreements since 1956.15 Moghioros reinforced Andropov’s point
by labelling Mao ‘a warmonger’ for not accepting the peaceful coexistence; he
accused China of taking the ‘wrong course’ and of disloyalty, referring to the events
in Beijing earlier.16 Albania’s official position had not changed from Beijing and so
Kapo had instructions to take no side, but reminded Andropov how harmful these
divergences were for the unity of the socialist camp. The fact that almost all the
leaders of the communist countries of eastern Europe were participants in Bucharest
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reinforced Albanian suspicion that this meeting had been prepared in advance, that
its aim differed from that stated in the letter, and that Albania once again had been
left at the margins by the Soviet Union. In fact, in Bucharest, Hoxha was almost the
only leader absent – which had been his decision. But the fact remains that he had
just received a short letter in which no information was provided on the nature or
content of this meeting except Soviet-American disagreements. Since the discussion
switched to problems that had emerged after the Twentieth CPSU Congress – issues
on which Albania was now closer to Beijing – Hoxha eventually choose to abort his
plans to attend the meeting he saw as a Soviet maneuver to isolate Beijing. Most
important, he wanted to survey of the situation and be well prepared to defy Moscow
only after full exposure of its position. Nonetheless, he remained continuously
informed through intense correspondence with Hysni Kapo, head of the Albanian
delegation. On this point, based on the Selected Works later published by Hoxha,
Lüthi states that ‘the Albanian party was struggling over how to respond to the
situation’.17 On the contrary, what apparently seemed to be a struggle was actually a
calculated tactic to frustrate the now inconvenient partner, so as to force and test
Soviet leadership’s determination, or lack thereof, to interfere with China and
Albania, indicated by the correspondence between Hoxha and Kapo as Albania
awaited China’s seeking a more definitive alliance with Albania.
Regarding the Soviet attempt at bringing Albania to its side on key issues, which
had undermined his very rule since 1956, Hoxha instructed Kapo to respond firmly
by rejecting the third portion of the meeting, Moghioros’ ‘…lessons of the right or
wrong course of China. Moghioros can go and sell his goods in another market, not
to Albania’.18 More specifically, on the Sino-Soviet quarrel, Hoxha’s tactic since the
very beginning consisted in taking no side – no matter how the situation evolved. But
Albanian refusal to unconditionally support the Soviet Union was already a challenge
to Moscow, and did not pass unobserved as the Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov told
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Kapo that ‘you Albanians do not agree’, with Moscow.19 Indeed, the statement was
true. When the Chinese and Soviet views became a matter of public contention in
Bucharest, Albania took the chance to criticize the way Moscow and Beijing were
dealing with these disputes – a criticism that per se was addressed to the Soviet
Union as the provocateur of the situation. In his interventions, Kapo, after
disapproving of China’s maneuver earlier in Beijing, affirmed that before involving
other communist parties in resolving disagreements, Moscow and Beijing should
have established bilateral talks in order to settle their disputes.20 Even when other
parties (and parts) were involved, for Albania, ‘both sides were trying to explain to
others their position through gossip, by word of mouth, in informal talks, from ear to
ear’, thus jeopardizing the unity of the camp.21 The Soviet Union instead challenged
Albania, trying to force it to take a position. During those days, Mikoyan had spoken
to two Albanian diplomats in Moscow, and mentioning Sino-Soviet disputes, had
stated ‘I am surprised that the leadership [Hoxha] did not inform you of these
disputes’. He was referring to the conversation of Mikoyan with Hoxha and Shehu
on the Sino-Soviet disputes in May. 22 Furious at this statement, Hoxha instructed
Kapo to remind Andropov that since it had been Mikoyan who had asked Hoxha to
keep secret the conversation, then ‘our party keeps always its given word, and does
not treat these issues as a public gossip’. The most important point for Hoxha was
that ‘Albania notes two dangerous tendencies in the Soviet standing: first,
underestimation for revisionism [Yugoslavia], second, the tendency to blame the
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[Albanian] leadership’ by insinuating secrets between the leader and the Politburo
members.23
Contrary to their letter of invitation, the sixty-eight page document that the
Soviets distributed in the afternoon of 23 June, just one night before the meeting of
all parties, focused on issues concerning Chinese domestic policies, such as the Great
Leap Forward or the Hundred Flowers campaign.24 In fact, the next day, Peng Zhen
wondered rhetorically, in the presence of Khrushchev, whether the aim of this
meeting was, ‘to exchange views on international issues, or judge and accuse our
party? [for its domestic policies]’.25 Peng Zhen had known already by 17 June of the
document – although not its content – during his stopover in Moscow on his way to
Bucharest. There he had ‘battled over international politics’ with Kozlov, a CPSU
Presidium member, who warned him of issues ‘that we will discuss… after we have
arrived in Bucharest’.26 The document was urgently sent to Albania, where Hoxha
noted his views in handwriting over the draft.27 In Hoxha’s handwritten notes, he
clearly stands on China’s side. For instance, to the Soviet remark that ‘we cannot
agree with Chinese declarations such as “we should not fear war”’, Hoxha noted that
‘to imperialists we should show firmness not flatteries’, rejecting the Soviet claim
and embracing Chinese view. To the Soviet affirmation of the possibility of peaceful
coexistence between countries with different social systems, Hoxha wondered ‘how
should the class struggle develop then’. Regarding the general world disarmament,
Hoxha noted that ‘for me this is quite an illusion’, as China had also affirmed. He
23
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reinforced, some pages later, that this was a soviet ‘lie… is this not but a
propagandistic issue?’. When, in the report, the Soviets mentioned how they had
always defended the right course of the Marxist line, citing their ‘unmasking of the
Yugoslavian revisionism’, Hoxha noted how the Soviet position towards Belgrade
‘has been opportunistic’ instead.28 Clearly, Hoxha at this point was ideologically on
Beijing’s side. Yet, officially he refused to declare his position.
The next day, 24 June 1960, after receiving another telegram from Hoxha, Kapo
met with Andropov, to whom he transmitted Hoxha’s message for the Soviets: that
Albania did not take lesson of right and wrong [referring to Moghioros affirmation
that China was wrong], and that they stood firm on the decision that these
divergences should be discussed in Sino-Soviet bilateral talks. This came
immediately before the Soviet attack on China on that day, in the meeting of the
twelve ruling parties. To Albania’s suggestion of bilateral Sino-Soviet talks,
Andropov answered that this was not a bilateral issue, but a matter of all the
communist parties, because Beijing had violated the Moscow declaration (of 1957).
Andropov pressured the Albanians, implying this meeting may have been their
possible last chance to align. He mentioned that regardless of the coming conference
in Moscow, since all parties were already in Romania, it was there they wanted to
resolve these issues for good. After this meeting, Hoxha instructed Kapo to not sign
any document or communiqué that was not first studied by Tirana – in fact he wanted
to see if Beijing would sign it first. He also authorized Kapo to make known to others
‘what you have told Andropov’.29
But the situation was evolving rapidly, and with the intention of bringing
participants to the Soviet side, Khrushchev wanted the parties to speak in the meeting
just some hours after they had received the material. According to Kapo, ‘the way
things are evolving here are quite strange… I told Andropov that we don’t agree with
this situation… The fact is that the other socialist countries, their leaders, must have
agreed before on everything… The Soviets are concerned if we will speak against

28
“Informative material distributed by the CPSU in the meeting of Bucharest, 21 June 1960: On the
different views that exists between the CPSU and the CCP on important issues of foreign policy, on
the ideological front, and on the building of socialism, and others”, in ibid., f.17-40.
29

“Top-Secret: Telegram sent by Enver Hoxha to Hysni Kapo in Bucharest, 24 June 1960”, in AQSH,
F.14, OU, Mbledhja e Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e Punëtore në Bukuresht [Meeting of the
Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties in Bucharest] – June 1960, D1, f.36-37.

74

China or not. They have organized everything in the way that others must speak
against China’.30 It is not clear if Peng and Kapo discussed this issue – years later
they affirmed to have not31 – but it is significant that a telegram with similar content
was sent by Peng to Beijing.32 Among the European socialist countries, and among
all the other world communist parties, Albania was the only one that did not support
the Soviet Union. 33 The North Korean and Vietnamese representatives, although
refusing to attack China, remained in silence.34 To persuade Albania, Khrushchev
sent Andropov again, around midnight of 24 June, to speak with Kapo before the
opening of the next session. He told Kapo that ‘Khrushchev is very concerned of
Albania’s consideration that these disputes are first of all between the two parties…
the issue is that China has gone against the Moscow declaration’. Kapo reported that
‘the point is that they [Soviets] want to know which side we will take’. 35 Kapo
repeated to Andropov the official standing of Albania. At the plenary meeting next
day, Kapo delivered an official speech that reflected Hoxha’s instructions, which
moved the attention to procedural issues such as the necessity of CPSU-CCP
bilateral meetings, and the necessity for the unity of the camp. Albania’s stubborn
position to not support officially any side was frustrating for the Soviet leadership.
Khrushchev exacerbated the situation when he exposed publically his frustration
and disappointment with the Albanian standing. Khrushchev spoke at the end, and
when attacking China he turned towards Kapo, wondering aloud ‘[do you share my
view] or not, comrade Kapo?’. Kapo, who had been instructed to respond firmly ‘to
30
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possible accusations’ (and provocations), promptly took the floor, trying to calm
Khrushchev by saying ‘please, I just have expressed the view of our party’. The
quarrel followed with Khrushchev affirming provocatively ‘[since] I don’t get to
understand the Chinese comrades, perhaps we should send you [Albanians]’.36 Kapo
replied in a polemic tone that he considered this an accusation against his party. In a
menacing tone, Khrushchev replied that ‘then I want to express the point of view of
our party. We have taken note of your standing, but you do not want to take note of
ours instead’.37 Therefore, the meeting on the Sino-Soviet disputes resulted into a
Soviet-Albanian quarrel. 38 Kapo responded to Khrushchev by affirming again the
official standing of Albania, but took the chance also to remind him of issues that
revealed part of reasons of the real dissent between Tirana and Moscow. Kapo
pointed out that Moscow did not have a clear standing against Yugoslavia, ‘which
only in the last years has sent 194 spies to our country… and you know very well
that Belgrade sells to United States every possible information it can collect from our
camp’. At the end he affirmed the need for a conference of communist parties and
stated in a tone, also menacing, that ‘there our party will state clearly its view’.39
Curiously after this polemic, Kapo’s telegrams to Hoxha denoted an ironic standing
towards Khrushchev, who is mentioned as ‘the big’ which in Albanian can
sardonically mean “the boss”. 40 At the end all the parts decided to appoint an
Editorial Board, (consisting of the twelve ruling parties and fourteen largest parties
of the non-communist camp), which would convene in Moscow in early October,
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and draft the documents to be discussed at the conference of the communist parties in
Moscow, eventually taking place in November 1960.

The Road to Moscow
William Griffith wondered in 1963, ‘when and how Albanians took their final
decision to defy Khrushchev and ally with Peking’?41 The answer is that Albania had
defied the Soviet Union on two unpublicized occasions: the meeting with the Soviet
ambassador in November 1956, and the plenum in February 1957, both here above
analyzed. More recently, for Lorenz Lüthi ‘It was only the outcome of the Albanian
intraparty struggles in late summer [1960] that triggered a clear pro-Beijing line in
Tirana’s stance’. Relying on Griffith and Biberaj, who wrote of the events in 1963
and 1985 respectively, Lüthi concludes that ‘Ultimately, Hoxha’s pro-Chinese policy
was not the result of ideological concord but intraparty struggles and Khrushchev’s
strong-arm tactics’.42 On the contrary, the archival documents suggest that the events
in 1960 were not determinant, but rather consequential of a process of estrangement
between Moscow and Tirana that had begun shortly after Stalin’s death.
Moreover, we now know, by 1960, no such intraparty struggle within the
Albanian leadership was strong enough to challenge Hoxha’s position. Even when it
seemed so, he prevented further escalation by purging, after 1956, many party
members and high officials. Khrushchev’s denouncing Stalin and the events in
Hungary had eroded further Albania’s ties with Moscow. Now, it was not a matter of
if, but when and how the split would occur. With Khrushchev’s last steps, he gave
this opportunity to Hoxha to move forward towards denouncing the alliance with
Moscow. Yet in Bucharest Albania pursued caution rather than confrontation, and
Hoxha’s instructions to Belishova to praise Soviet leadership of the communist camp
during her stay in Beijing were just a calculated contradiction in Hoxha’s policy. In a
way he was waiting for the best offer, and fully maximize the benefits, from the
Sino-Soviet split. Meanwhile, his caution was a way to prevent Moscow from
stretching relations with Belgrade – which could possibly have happened in case of
Albania’s conflict with Moscow. The road to Moscow’s Conference went through a
summer of intense contacts between Tirana, Moscow and Beijing. Clearly Albania
41
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was on the verge of a break with the Soviet Union, but the leadership in Tirana
waited for an opportune moment for the official split. In fact, the situation was not
easy for Hoxha. In the military base of Vlora, hundreds of Soviet soldiers were
stationed after the agreement reached in 1959 to build the joint military base.
Moreover, Albania was tightly tied to the WPO and to a series of agreements with
the Soviet Union and the East European bloc in general.
Yet from Tirana’s viewpoint, the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev personally, had
directly undermined Hoxha’s rule by not supporting his policies. Additionally, the
Soviet Union had impeded Hoxha’s economic plans, thwarting his projects of
industrialization, which in turn undermined the communist regime’s long term
project for the country’s development. But the one issue stronger than any other in
causing the Albanian-Soviet split, was Khrushchev’s contradictory standing towards
Yugoslavia. First courting Tito, then blaming him for the Hungarian events, and then
again pursuing a pragmatic policy towards Belgrade, Khrushchev pushed Hoxha to
think that the time might return when Tirana’s road to Moscow must pass through
Belgrade. For a short period in 1959, Hoxha thought that Khrushchev, by stretching
even further the relations with Albania, he wanted to balance Tito. Khrushchev’s
visit to Albania in early 1959, and more importantly, the decision to build the naval
base of Vlora, were interpreted in Tirana in this sense. At a time when Khrushchev
had accused Tito of intervention in Hungary, Hoxha believed the military base of the
WPO in Albania would provide a clear and definitive protection to Albania against
any Yugoslavian interference, or possible expansionist ambitions that Belgrade may
have retained. On the other hand, the existence of the naval base in Vlora could have
also turned in a boomerang for Hoxha – Soviet direct intervention to overthrow him.
But to avoid a permanent Soviet presence, Hoxha had been farsighted enough as to
stipulate in the length of the Soviet army’s stay in his country – the time necessary to
build the infrastructure and train Albanian soldiers with the new technique. His plans
designed that the base would become and remain a WPO naval base, managed and
directed by Albania. The base had the advantage of giving Albania its first military
advantage in a key area, with the most modern Soviet equipment, enabling Albania
to exercise control over Otranto channel, the strip of sea where Albanian and Greek
coasts face the Italian, and where the Adriatic and the Ionian Sea meet. Only through
this channel could Yugoslavia access the Mediterranean Sea. Hoxha labelled years
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later the base as the key to the Adriatic Sea through which ‘not even the Soviet fleet
could pass’.43
The events during summer 1960 reinforced Hoxha’s conviction that the alliance
with the Soviet Union under Moscow’s conditions had come to an end. In fact,
Moscow used the time between the Bucharest and Moscow conferences to pressure
Albania, rejecting its economic requests. This came after a formal agreement had
been reached in April 1959, when the Soviet Union granted a loan of 300 million
rubles for the period 1961-65, but they had left to further negotiations to decide the
annual barter agreements.44 But, during summer 1960, when Albania, due to drought,
struggled to provide the necessary amount of wheat for the population, two letters
with request for assistance, one to the Soviet and the other to Chinese government
were sent in mid-July by Albanian authorities. Only Beijing replied, providing fifty
thousand tons of grain, which paradoxically China purchased in part from the Soviet
Union.45 China argued that this was a good way to thank Albania for its support in
Bucharest.46 Soviet rejection was a hard blow for Albania, especially if it was true, as
Hoxha claimed sometime later to have been told by the Soviets: ‘the grain Albania
needed was nothing but the amount the mice eat in Soviet warehouses’.47
Moreover, when Albania asked to conclude the agreements on the annual quotas
of exports for the FYP 1961-65, the Soviet government wanted the Albanian
economic delegation to visit Moscow in November 1960, concurrent with the
meeting of the communist parties – a way to test, and pressure Albania. In Moscow,
43
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the Albanian delegation was left behind the door for more than two months before
the Soviets decided to receive them. Even once talks started, there were continuous
obstacles put in place by the Soviets, further delaying the talks.48 Ultimately, instead
of concluding agreements for the entire FYP 1961-65, Soviet authorities insisted that
the talks only regarded possible assistance for the year 1961. Albania agreed to sign
the agreement, but understood that it was a Soviet signal to Tirana to conform to the
Soviet course, and therefore only one year of time to see if Albania would submit.
During June-October 1960, different telegrams from Albanian diplomats abroad
noted the cold attitude of Soviet diplomats towards Albania.49 In October 1960, one
of the directors at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, named Pisarev in the
document, told clearly the Albanian ambassador in Moscow that ‘you are against the
CPSU and against Khrushchev’.50 In Moscow, Albanian generals of the general staff
of the army, met in mid-October 1960 to discuss the Soviet military assistance. In the
reception given by Andrei Grechko, commander in chief of the WPO forces, the
Soviet minister of defense, Rodion Malinovskij stated that ‘Albanian people are
going away from the friendship [with Soviet Union] because of some personal
standing which lead to the individual cult [of Hoxha]’. 51 The next day, general
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Grechko went further yet, menacing that ‘your party is going far from the CPSU and
it would be better if you think about this before it is too late’.52 The last time the
WPO members assisted Albania with military equipment was in March 1961, mainly
spare parts of armaments that were already becoming obsolete or needed
maintenance.53 In Albania instead, a letter that the Albanian ambassador in Moscow,
Mihal Prifti, had received from Tirana, informed of the ‘provocative Soviet
interfering in the internal affairs of Albania… the Soviet ambassador Ivanov went so
far as to ask to some Albanian generals, to who is loyal the army?...’. 54 All this
leaves room for the hypothesis of a Soviet search for a breach within the Albanian
leadership.
In fact, from the Soviet viewpoint, the possibility must have been real. Within
the Albanian establishment, a large number of cadres had been educated in the Soviet
Union, including the Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, the minister of defense Beqir
Balluku, the members of Politburo Ramiz Alia and Liri Belishova, and nearly all the
commanders of the general staff of the army. 55 That summer, Hoxha purged Liri
Belishova, the most pro-Soviet of the Politburo who in all cases never displayed any
serious opposition to Hoxha’s disputes with Moscow. Her fault was to have reported
to Soviet diplomats in Beijing of the conversation she had had with the Chinese
leadership about the Sino-Soviet divergences during her trip in early June in China.
Her purge captured the attention of Soviet diplomats. In Pyongyang, the Soviet
ambassador asked the Albanian ambassador ‘why have you purged Liri Belishova?’,
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and to the Albanian response that she was against the party’s line, he added ‘but what
if she was right instead?’.56
In a lower level hundreds of officials in the army had passed through Soviet
military academies, and a large number of the intelligentsia had been educated in
Soviet universities, where many of them had also encountered their partners. No
Soviet soldier had passed through Albania during the Second World War, so
Albanian people did not experience any of the horrors East Europeans went through
when the Red Army marched to Berlin.57 Moreover, the Albanian people in general
had been imbued for more than a decade, through the official propaganda, to
appreciate the Soviet Union and to love it as the fatherland of the revolution. On the
other hand, the economic relations with China were not very assuring for many
Albanians. Although China had made clear its decision to assist Albania, the first
Albanian delegations had noticed how poor China was compared to the Soviet
Union. Some wondered how they could expect help from a country they perceived
poorer than Albania. Even Hoxha in his trip in 1956 had noted China’s
backwardness, in particular within the working units, because he had seen the lack of
machinery. From the economic perspective, it was objectively difficult to imagine
China as an alternative to the Soviet Union. In this context, Hoxha had a difficult
situation to manage. But considering not the best for his country, but for himself, he
found the choice with ease.
The Sino-Soviet situation was evolving at this time as well. In July, the Soviet
Union withdrew all the specialists from China, interrupting around 200 projects.58
Soon followed the mediation work of Ho Chi Min – who aimed to put both sides on
the same table of negotiations in bilateral talks, hoping that by November 1960, they
could come to the Moscow meeting with at least closer positions.59 So, in August the
CPSU invited the CCP for bilateral talks, with the aim to find a common
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understanding and settle the issues in advance of the conference. 60 A long
informative document was sent from Beijing to Moscow, on 10 September 1960, just
before the bilateral talks took place, outlining the CCP’s line on all the issues arisen
since Khrushchev’s secret speech until the recent confrontations in Bucharest. 61
Significantly, Hoxha’s notes in handwriting, praised China’s answer to the CPSU,
and commented negatively on the Soviet position instead – Chinese and Albanian
standing definitely converged, if not merged. The CCP-CPSU bilateral talks
eventually took place in Moscow, in mid-September, and ultimately concluded
unsuccessfully, with the two parties still holding their previous positions. 62 The
Soviet Union promoted bilateral talks also with Albania. Initially they invited Enver
Hoxha for vacations, where they hoped to convince him to support Moscow. After he
refused, by 13 August, they sent a letter to the PLA inviting a delegation for talks, to
which again Hoxha refused, ‘because we could not go there and talk behind CCP’s
back’.63
In October 1960, Chinese and Albanian delegations appointed teams, headed by
Deng Xiaoping and Hysni Kapo respectively, to participate in the Editorial Board of
the Moscow Conference. They met twice in Moscow, with the clear purpose to
coordinate their standing and action. In their meeting on 2 October 1960, Deng
Xiaoping told Kapo that ‘your ideas [on all the issues] are correct’, and encouraged
him to ‘speak out openly during the conference’. He reinforced further, ‘because
certain issues are vital for the communism… like the problem of the metallurgic
industry in your country… certain problems require a long struggle, at least ten
years, no matter if we are the minority, with us is ninety percent of the world’s
60
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population that wants revolution’.64 But the most important meeting between Deng
and Kapo was on 23 October 1960. Deng first reported that conciliation with
Khrushchev would be impossible, and then spoke of the talks he claimed to have had
with Khrushchev regarding Albania. Khrushchev, according to Deng, told him that
‘to Albania we have given everything and now they spit on us… Now our relations
with Albania will be the same as with Yugoslavia [tense]’. On the bilateral issues,
Deng claimed to have been told that ‘you defend Stalin, and Molotov, why you don’t
just take to China Molotov… Gao Gang [purged by Mao] was my friend… if you
want to rise high Stalin we will do the same with Gao Gang’, and accused Kang
Sheng to be ‘China’s Ežov [Nikolaj Ežov, the head of the NKVD who led Stalin’s
purges in the late 1930s before being shot]’.65 On Soviet-Albanian disagreements,
Deng said that ‘it is clear that yours and our party’s divergences with Soviet Union
are the same’.66 By this time Albania had accumulated a number of documents that
Beijing had relayed, and on the other hand the CCP was also informed of the
Albanian position on each and all issues of dispute. This was the moment of major
agreement between China and Albania.

Moscow Conference, November 1960: Hoxha’s Attack on Khrushchev
Enver Hoxha decided to lead the Albanian delegation to Moscow, where eighty-one
communist and workers’ parties met in November 1960. When the possibility to
participate in Bucharest had been mentioned – after the meeting had begun – Hoxha
refused to go with the excuse that had not been prepared any summit, and did not fall
into to the Soviet traps. Now, after digesting pros and cons all summer, re-assessing
years of relations with the Soviet Union, and thinking of his personal future and rule,
he had prepared enough to face Khrushchev and to ditch the alliance with the Soviet
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Union. Beijing’s reassurances of political and economic support were further
determinants in Hoxha’s decision.
Hoxha until this moment often had been called “Commander” for his
participation in the war. However, beyond the official propaganda narrative, his
name does not appear in the records of a single battle, and his lieutenants knew this.67
By contrast, those under him, beginning with the prime minister, but also most of the
Politburo members, had fought on the front line in the mountains. Hoxha knew that
this contrast could discredit him, and used the visit to Moscow as a chance to show
bravery to the Albanian people and the party officials some. The split with
Khrushchev, displayed in front of hundreds of world communist parties’ leaders,
where Hoxha claimed to defend Marxism from revisionism, was a marvelous
spectacle that he knew would increase even further his credibility, and his cult,
among his people.
The Albanian delegation arrived in Moscow in early November 1960, in time to
participate in the annual celebrations in honor of the October Revolution and the
military parade on 7 November. To attend Hoxha and his entourage, to the airport
went Frol Kozlov, member of the Soviet Presidium. The next day, Soviet officials
relayed to Albania the Soviet response to the CCP’s letter in September, where at a
certain point were listed all the socialist countries, except Albania. In that response,
Albania was also mentioned as an example of tyranny where the democratic
centralism and party’s democracy had been ignored, ‘as the expulsion of Liri
Belishova shows… and for what? … for being friends of the Soviet Union’. Hoxha
accused Khrushchev of pressuring Albania, when he had mentioned to Deng
Xiaoping that ‘we will treat Albanians the same as Yugoslavians…’ and
congratulating Deng because now ‘we lost an Albania, and you gained an Albania’.
Under such conditions Hoxha refused to meet with Khrushchev on 9 November
1960, because ‘there were no equal conditions after these accusations against
Albania were distributed to eighty one parties’. An attempt, on that same day, to talk
with Hoxha was made by Maurice Thorez, head of the French communist party, who
reminded Hoxha in a three hour long speech of the ‘dogmatic line’ of the CCP and
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also of the great Soviet assistance to Albania.68 Thorez was interested in the SinoSoviet unity, because his party ‘struggled to preserve an identity that was
revolutionary without the Chinese type of “adventurism”… and orthodox without the
heavy Soviet bureaucracy’. 69 His talk failed to change Albanian leadership’s final
position, but convinced Hoxha to meet with their Soviet counterparts. Over the next
three days, the Albanian delegation met three times with Soviet leaders, the last
meeting being on 12 November 1960 with Khrushchev. According to Albanian
accounts, in the first meeting, the Soviets asked ‘what do you want in exchange of
improvement of your relations with us’, to which Hoxha reminded them of all the
incidents that had happened during the summer: the Soviet attempt to undermine the
Albanian leadership’s unity; the comments on political dissidents; the incidents in the
military base of Vlora between Albanian and Soviet soldiers and officials; and
others. At the end, Hoxha asked them ‘to accept, condemn and not to repeat such
actions in the future’.70 He was asking them for an endorsement and to accept his
way of ruling without questioning it. The Soviets rejected the Albanian demands, and
affirmed that in Albania ‘an anti-Soviet spirit has been put in place’. The second
meeting on 11 November 1960 did not change the position of the two sides.
It was the meeting between Hoxha and Khrushchev that better revealed the real
divide between Tirana and Moscow. In both Soviet and Albanian records it is well
documented how this meeting contributed to the further deterioration of the relations
rather than their improvement. After the formal greetings Khrushchev said that ‘I do
not understand what has happened since my visit to Albania in 1959. If you have
been unhappy with us since then, I must be very dense and naïve not to have
understood this’. Hoxha was very nervous, showed by his passionate tone and replied
that, ‘We have had disagreements before, such as about the Yugoslavs, but the
68
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change in attitude happened after Bucharest, and it is all coming from your end’.
Khrushchev answered ‘that we have had different views on this issue is news to me. I
hear it for the first time. We have held talks in Albania [Khrushchev’s visit in 1959]
and you never raised this issue… The Yugoslav matter, which you consider as
contentious between us, we may set aside for the moment. That is not a principal
issue’.71 But for Hoxha this was indeed a principal issue, one which Khrushchev had
neglected to understand for long time. Hoxha then blamed Khrushchev for the
deterioration of the relations after Bucharest. But Khrushchev realized correctly that
‘The issue seems to be that even before Bucharest you have not been in agreement
with us… The fault with all this rests with me for having trusted you too much’.72 In
fact Shehu reminded Khrushchev that the Soviet Union had clearly ignored Albania
in dealing with Yugoslavia since 1955. Then they exchanged very animated
accusations regarding the possible Soviet support for recently expelled prominent
Albanian leaders such as Liri Belishova. On this point Khrushchev attacked Hoxha
for ‘expelling a strong woman like Belishova in a Stalinist way’, and reminded also
that the Albanian minister of defense Beqir Balluku had accused Khrushchev of
being not a Marxist on many occasions. Then, the already-tense conversation
switched to the issue of the military base of Vlora, to which Hoxha showed particular
attachment. To Albanian accusations of Soviet officials’ quarrels with the Albanians
within the base, Khrushchev said ‘if you want we can remove our base’, and retold
how Albania’s membership in the WPO had been opposed by Molotov, who had
wondered why the Soviet Union should fight for Albania.73 Hoxha took this as a
provocation intended to pressure Albania and replied that ‘this issue should be
discussed in the meeting of the WPO’. For Hoxha, however, the message was clear:
the Soviet Union was not reliable as Albania’s partner in its tense relations with
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Yugoslavia. The meeting continued with reciprocal accusations until the Albanians
literally just left the room.74
Unlike in Bucharest, this time the Albanian leadership had gone to Moscow
prepared to take a side on all issues that had emerged in the Sino-Soviet divergences.
Hoxha had approved a report in the end of October 1960 to be read in Moscow.75
Consulting with the Chinese party, Hoxha endorsed Chinese consideration of the
present as a revolutionary period, wherein the decolonization process was but part of
the broader struggle for the people’s emancipation from exploitation. In this sense he
interpreted and supported Mao’s affirmation that ‘the east wind prevails on the west
wind’.76 Both sides, China and Albania, made great efforts to convince other parties
to bring them to their side, but the success was minimal. Nonetheless, unlike at the
Bucharest meeting, when China had been left almost completely alone, in Moscow,
some parties, mainly from Asia, agreed in part or completely with the Chinese
thesis. 77 Albania’s real dissent with Moscow was however, on issues, regarding
Albania’s national security – possible conflicts with neighbors – and issues regarding
the legitimation of Hoxha’s personal rule. In this sense Hoxha reminded his Politburo
that ‘we have disagreed with the Soviets since 1955… on the relations with
Yugoslavia… when they ignored the Cominform [in fact ignored Hoxha]… they
took unilateral actions and rehabilitated Tito’s cliqué’. He continued that ‘we have
been in disagreement with Soviet comrades also regarding their evaluation of the
Hungarian events, with their hesitations to intervene resolutely to eliminate counterrevolution and their hesitation to condemn and unmask Yugoslavian interferences in
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this’. Furthermore, ‘our party has disagreed also with some issues emerged in the
Twentieth CPSU Congress… criticism of Stalin, and Stalin’s cult…. because this
was done with no prior consultations with other parties… ignoring that Stalin had
been not just Soviet Union’s leader but also the leader of the world proletariat’.
Hoxha mentioned also the intervention of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of
Albania, ‘in issues such as the problem [Soviet support] of the party’s enemies such
as Liri Gega and Panajot Plaku, [all purged by Hoxha]’. The final aim of Soviet
leaders ‘was to undermine the leadership’s rule, divide the people and the party, and
as a way to establish a new leadership’.78 Hoxha was going to Moscow with the
intent to defy the Soviet Union, eventually becoming the only WPO member to do so
after the failed Hungarian upheaval. This would accredit him as the most reliable
partner for China with which to eventually create a united front against Soviet Union.
At the meeting, Khrushchev’s opening speech ignored the disputes with Albania
and China and Moscow’s attitude to Beijing seemed to be conciliatory, yet China
assumed a conflictual position. 79 The conciliatory attitude is reflected also in
Hoxha’s report from December (after his return from Moscow), although he did
sustain that Soviet concessions were due to China’s and Albania’s struggles. In fact,
he stated that ‘of the 175 pages of amends to the draft, our delegation had 20 pages
and China 40 pages… none of our arguments was rejected, although not all was
included… nonetheless the draft changed drastically, growing from 36 to 52
pages’. 80 Most importantly for Hoxha, the final declaration included a paragraph
which condemned the ‘Yugoslavian revisionism’. Some days later, Deng Xiaoping
delivered his speech, which was less neutral than Khrushchev’s, as he criticized the
events of Bucharest. Although less passionate than Hoxha, who spoke later, Deng
reminded the Soviet Union that ‘not because Soviet Union provides assistance to
Albania, gives to it the right to interfere in Albanian internal affairs… The CPSU in
its letter of 5 November to the CCP goes so far as to support anti-party elements in
Albania, calling them friends of Soviet Union’.81
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The tone of confrontation reached a crescendo on 16 November 1960, when
Hoxha delivered his fiery speech, certainly that which provoked the most negative
reactions – intentionally so, if the speech’s title is any indication.82 He began by
praising the Soviet Union’s leadership in the communist camp and its aim for
peaceful coexistence. But on this he added that ‘some [Khrushchev] even go so far as
to assert such absurdities as China and Albania are allegedly opposed to peaceful
coexistence. Obviously, such harmful and erroneous views should be rejected once
and for all… But this does not imply, as the modern revisionists claim that we should
give up the class struggle’. 83 Then, however, Hoxha exploded in personal attacks
against not only Khrushchev, but the Italians, Bulgarians, Polish, Hungarians, and
other communist leaders. Disputing peaceful transition and the parliamentary system
as viable means for the communist parties of the capitalist countries to achieve their
goals, Hoxha asked rhetorically: ‘Will they do this by violence or by the peaceful
parliamentary road? This question has been clear and it was not necessary for
Comrade Khrushchev to confuse it in the 20th Congress, and do so in such a way as
to please the opportunists’. He rallied further against Soviet leadership, ‘They say
that we are in favor of war and against coexistence. Comrade Kozlov has even put to
us, Albanians, these alternatives: either coexistence, as he conceives it, or an atomic
bomb from the imperialists, which will turn Albania into a heap of ashes and leave
no Albanian alive. Until now, no representative of American imperialism has made
such an atomic threat against the Albanian people. But here it is and from a member
of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union’. Then he attacked Bulgarian leadership for promoting complete disarmament
in the Balkans, which they had mentioned in correspondence with the Greek
government. Then he attacked the economic relations among socialist countries, in
particular the Soviet assistance. For Hoxha, before assisting India or other countries,
82
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the Soviet Union should have assisted its fellow communist countries – and he did
not conceal that Albania deserved more support for its economic plans. He attacked
also the Polish leader Gomulka for his proposal in the United Nations to not expand
further the military bases between camps. On this point he posed, ‘why should China
not have the atomic bomb?’. 84 Hoxha strongly emphasized the tense relations of
Albania with the ‘revisionist’ Yugoslavians and ‘chauvinist’ Greeks, both among
which he rejected any peaceful coexistence.
In Moscow, Hoxha condemned the Bucharest meeting as an ‘anti-Marxist Soviet
trap’, where Khrushchev had accused China ‘without any fact… in that case our
party thinks that Soviet leadership made grave mistakes towards China’. He followed
by accusing Khrushchev directly for having pursued in Bucharest a tactic of dividing
the communist camp. 85 Moving on, he addressed issues such as the Hungarian
upheaval, about which he restated publically what he had affirmed in the plenum of
his party in Tirana in February 1957. However, back in Tirana, in order to blame the
Soviet Union for the split with Albania, Hoxha had lied to the plenum when he said
that ‘Bucharest signed the beginning of the irritation between the Soviets and us’.86
Hoxha would also claim that the divide between Moscow and Tirana had started to
develop in 1955, but he only made this statement after showing Albania’s standing in
Bucharest to be correct and decidedly Marxist. The situation Hoxha wanted to
portray was one in which the PLA had done exactly what a communist party should
do, following and defending the Marxist line, so as he put it, Albania had been
attacked unjustly by the Soviet Union and could be blamed for nothing. Continuing
his speech in Moscow, Hoxha attacked Soviet leadership for having rejected the
Albanian request for grain, for having tried to undermine Albanian leadership, and
all the other issues for which Albania and the Soviet Union had been quarrelling in
the last year. The final major issue for Hoxha was the revisionist assessment of
Stalin. On this point he claimed that: ‘The Party of Labor of Albania solemnly
declares that it is opposed to these acts and to these assessments of the work and
person of Joseph Stalin’. Throughout his speech Hoxha carefully attacked only the
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current leadership of Soviet Union, not the country, which he praised many times in
the long speech.
Outrage at Hoxha’s speech came from all directions. It began with Dolores
Ibarruri, the leader of the Communist Party of Spain, who labelled it ‘the most
shameful speech during the long years of the communist movement’.87 She went so
far as to call Hoxha ‘a dog who bites the hand that feeds it’.88 The Polish leader,
Gomulka, found it to be a ‘disgusting speech’.89 Similar reactions were expressed by
western communist parties and almost all the European ruling parties.90
Eventually all parties approved the final declaration, which did not settle any of
the issues, and was similar to Moscow’s declaration of 1957 – another useless piece
of paper that all the parties would interpret it in their own way. Before leaving
Moscow, some members of the Albanian delegation in Moscow, namely Mehmet
Shehu and Hysni Kapo, met with a Soviet delegation, Kozlov and Mikoyan, on 25
November 1960. The meeting was a total failure, with each repeating the previous
accusations against the other. The Soviets, however, made clear two important
points: first, they intended to discuss the issue of the Vlora base in the meeting of the
WPO; second, they would be more reticent to assist Albania economically. For
Albania the result was that in a disunited camp, between Moscow and Beijing,
Hoxha clearly embraced Beijing. In Tirana, Hoxha warned that the Soviet Union
might reinforce it's assertive policy towards Albania, but in Moscow Chinese leaders
had assured them that ‘regarding economic issues, do not worry, we will assist you
unconditionally’.91 At the same time, Chinese leaders suggested that Albania remain
pragmatic, and try to maintain good relations with the Soviets, at least formally –
Hoxha would later ignore this suggestion. On the last day of 1960, Hoxha decided, in
a meeting of the Politburo, to go public in Albania about Albanian-Soviet
disagreements and discuss them in all the local party’s committees.92
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The Final Break with Moscow, 1961
After their return from Moscow, Albanian leaders were invited back in December
1960. In fact the invitation was the response to Albanian requests to close the barter
agreements that had been left to further negotiations. But Hoxha understood that the
Soviet Union actually wanted to open talks in Moscow on issues regarding the
Soviet-Albanian divergences. In their letter, the Soviets did not make mystery of
their intention when they stated that, ‘the economic issues are directly related to the
normalization of the relations, which under present conditions should be discussed at
the highest level of the parties and governments’. 93 Thus, Hoxha rejected the
invitation. He was also working in parallel with China, in order to assure the FYP in
case of Soviet withdrawal. To this aim, vice Prime Minister Spiro Koleka paid a visit
to China, in January 1961. By early February, following the letter he had received
from Koleka, Hoxha could inform his plenum that ‘the plan [FYP 1961-65] has not
just been assured in case Soviet Union provides anything [loan], but even in case all
the socialist countries provides anything’.94 Furthermore, China assured the quantity
of grain and wheat for the coming five years, and the support for the industrial
projects that the Soviet Union had refused to support. By the time of these
agreements the disastrous economic outcomes of the Great Leap Forward had been
known to Chinese leaders – making Chinese loans to Albania even more valuable,
and showing how important Albania’s support for China had become.
During this time, the Soviet Union decided to withdraw some of its specialists
from Albania – the experts of oil extraction.95 More important to Albania, though,
China provided a loan of 500 million rubles for the Albanian FYP 1961-65, with two
thirds of it dedicated to industrial projects.96 To seal conclusively the new course of
disagreements within the international communist movement, on the violations of the principles by
the current Soviet leadership, on the defense of Marxism by our party, and other issues. It is decided
that the letter be discussed by all party organizations”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1960, D28.
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Albania, Hoxha called in February 1961 the Fourth Party Congress. Now the only
step left was the definitive break with Soviet Union, which by now had become a
cumbersome partner. China was looking forward to this split, which Mao used ‘to
radicalize the domestic political discourse’.97 Hoxha’s speech to the congress was
conciliatory towards the Soviet Union, perhaps because the message that Li
Xiannian, head of the Chinese delegation, brought from Moscow on his way to
Tirana, affirmed that Soviet leaders wanted this to be ‘the congress of the friendship’
between Albania and the Soviet Union. 98 In fact, its leading role within the
communist movement, in Hoxha’s report to the congress, was praised and
highlighted. However, the struggle against revisionism was outlined throughout the
report, together with the need to fight against Titoism. Khrushchev was never
mentioned.
Hoxha’s stubborn refusal to go to Moscow drew a Soviet delegation to the
congress to seek a meeting with Hoxha. In a way, it would replace the talks Moscow
desired between Hoxha and Khrushchev. In Tirana, Hoxha received Piotr Pospelov,
Yuri Andropov, and the Soviet ambassador in Tirana Josif Shikin at the end of the
congress, on 20 of February 1961. Unfortunately this meeting was as futile as all the
meetings between Albanian and Soviet leaders since the confrontation in Bucharest
the previous year. Here, the Soviets made a point of reminding Hoxha of
Khrushchev’s role as their leader – and that to improve relations with the Soviet
Union meant Hoxha would have to improve his relations with Khrushchev.99 Hoxha
on the other hand, stated that ‘Albania wanted to move forward with the issue…
resolve these relations in a gradual and long process… only through a Marxist way,
not other ways’. 100 Significantly, Hoxha said it was with the current leaders that
their struggle against imperialism and revisionism; the issues Albania should consider in its economic
collaboration with China, Chinese loan of 500 million rubles provided to Albania for the years 196165, the long-term trade and collaboration, the military supplies; on Chinese remarks to the third FYP
of Albania, on the development of Industry and Agriculture”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1961,
D1.
97

Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, 194.

98

“Records of the meeting between the Albanian leadership headed by Enver Hoxha, and the Chinese
delegation, headed by Li Xiannian that has come on occasion of the PLA Fourth Congress, Tirana, 09
February 1961”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1961, D2, f.4.
99
“Records of the meeting between Enver Hoxha and the Soviet delegation that came in Albania to
participate at the Third PLA Congress, 20 February 1961”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKBS, V. 1961, D7,
f.2-26.
100

Ibid., f.6.

94

Albania would possibly improve relations, naming Khrushchev first, prompting
Andropov to mention for the first time that the Soviet Union too ‘wants that this
friendship be with comrade Hoxha, comrade Shehu…’.101 In this way, Soviet leaders,
out of necessity, were endorsing Hoxha’s leadership. To the Soviet insistence on
Hoxha’s visiting Moscow to re-discuss economic issues, for which agreements
existed already, Hoxha refused on grounds that were the conditions of the agreement
to be violated, the Soviet Union would be responsible. So, the meeting resulted in
another stalemate, the Soviet half-endorsement came too late, and without sufficient
sincerity, for Hoxha.
Khrushchev again invited Hoxha and Shehu to visit Moscow only one month
later, to attend the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the WPO.102
Hoxha and Shehu refused to participate, ‘for health reasons’, appointing the minister
of defense Beqir Balluku, and the minister of foreign affairs Behar Shtylla as their
delegates. 103 In the meeting between Balluku and Grechko on 28 March 1961 in
Moscow, both parties accused each other of provocations in the military base of
Vlora. To Albania’s insistence on the fulfillment of the agreements to provide the
base with the military equipment, Grechko replied, ‘our relations have changed, we
don’t know in which hands this equipment will be… you have removed
Khrushchev’s photos everywhere and you would like to have him overthrown… if
you strengthen the friendship [with Soviet Union] as it was in the past, then
everything will be fine’.104 Grechko affirmed the necessity to send a commission of
the WPO to Albania to study the military issues of dispute and report to the
respective leaders in Albania and the Soviet Union. Balluku agreed, but on condition
that the commission reported also of the violations of the agreements by the Soviet
Union towards Albania. Eventually no commission was sent.
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Another issue emerged in this meeting, which aggravated the Albanian position
in the WPO. The Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, asked ‘why Albania did not
inform the WPO regarding the Yugoslavian-Greek plot’.105 What he was referring to
was Hoxha’s speech to the PLA congress the month earlier and his conversation with
the Soviet leaders in Tirana, where he had affirmed that the ‘Governments of Greece
and Yugoslavia, in collaboration with internal reactionary enemies, agents, and the
sixth American fleet, had organized an attack on Albania’.106 On this point Gomulka
accused Hoxha of ‘fabrication of such facts’ and attacked him for ‘undermining the
unity of the entire communist camp’.107 At the end Khrushchev proposed to remove
the naval base from Albania, or ‘have a sole command of the base in Soviet hands,
without Albanian interferences, and the military vessels should have only Soviet
crew’. 108 This meant total revision of the status quo agreed upon in 1959 – the
warships would have mixed Soviet-Albanian crews, and a common command. So the
plot Hoxha announced in the congress turned into a boomerang, against which
Balluku, in Moscow, had to go on the defensive, reconsidering the magnitude of the
plot, and reducing it from ‘an organized attack against Albania’ to ‘the arrest of
internal conspirators before the organizing of the attack against Albania’.109 Finally
the Soviets, imposing their authority, approved a document according to which
‘Albania has violated the articles 3 and 5 of the WPO by having provided no
information on the alleged foreign attack… [Furthermore] the situation in the naval
base in Vlora has become unsustainable… [consequently] is approved the [Soviet]
proposal that the warships in Vlora bay should be served only by Soviet crew and
their command should depend on the Commander of the WPO forces [Soviet
general]’. 110 Alarmed by these decisions, Albania promptly replied with a letter
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rejecting all the accusations against it, and explaining better the supposed foreign
attack by reassessing it in the sense expressed by minister Balluku in Moscow. Most
important, to avoid further Soviet interferences, which could possibly escalate into
clashes involving the WPO, Hoxha affirmed that ‘Albania will create all the
necessary facilities for the evacuation of Soviet forces from the naval base’ if it is
decided to remove it.111
The situation in the Vlora base was very tense, and Hoxha sensed that could not
be sustainable for long. In a voluminous document, information was collected about
the tension between the Soviet and Albanian crews, which nearly escalated to
physical confrontations. 112 Between May and June 1961 the Soviets decided to
withdraw the vessels, but had to leave those already in the hands of Albanian crews
because Albania claimed all the vessels as its own – in accordance with the
agreement. The base was eventually built with Chinese assistance in the coming
years. In August, another invitation came from East German leader Walter Ulbricht,
who informed Hoxha of the meeting of the WPO members to discuss the Treaty of
Peace with Germany and the Berlin issue – in fact, the meeting was to discuss the
building of the Berlin Wall. 113 To Moscow, Hoxha sent Ramiz Alia, one of his
lieutenants who spoke fluent Russian, who was denied to take the floor, because
‘Albania was under-represented in the meeting, and the invitation was for the first
secretaries of the parties’.114 Only China, which participated as observer during all
these WPO meetings, defended Albania, because it was also a chance for Beijing ‘to
sever the institutional links of the People’s Republic with the WPO’.115
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However, what saved Hoxha from possible, and feared, Soviet intervention was
the international situation. It is not the case that Hoxha actively decided to aggravate
relations in 1961, knowing that Khrushchev’s international attention was elsewhere,
tackling issues such as the Berlin Crisis. In this same year, the situation in Cuba grew
into a military collaboration between Havana and Moscow – which led to the missile
crisis the following year. 116 Furthermore, Albania had not been part of the Yalta
division of Europe; therefore the Albanian-Soviet split did not challenge post-war
European division. Hoxha realized that the Soviet Union hardly could afford another
crisis in its already large list of confrontations with the West, with countries, and on
issues, much larger than Albania. Soviet intervention in the Adriatic Sea ‘would have
required a major naval operation… to which America could not have remained
indifferent. This in turn would have affected the build-up of missile capability in
Cuba’. 117 In August 1961, the Soviet ambassador left Albania, officially for the
holidays, but never to return. During the rest of the year followed an intense
correspondence of accusations between Albanian and Soviet leadership, ending what
little was left of the Soviet-Albanian entente.118 In October 1961, during the Twentysecond CPSU Congress, Khrushchev ‘criticized [attacked] Enver Hoxha by name’,
whom only Zhou Enlai defended. 119 Finally, in early December 1961, the Soviet
Union interrupted all diplomatic relations with Albania.120
Although formally a full member of many of the eastern bloc’s organizations,
following the interruption of the relations with Soviet Union, Albania either refused
or was not allowed to participate in all international forums of the eastern bloc led by
the Soviet Union such as the WPO and COMECON. Albania, the smallest and
weakest of the European socialist countries had defied the Soviet Union, the greatest
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and most powerful socialist country in the world. Albania urged China instead to
become the leader of the international communist movement. It was the only country
to offer such a crown to China, and was ready to struggle for it. It cannot have been
easy for Khrushchev to digest such defiance, as several initiatives to bring Albania
within the ranks were undertaken between 1961 and early 1962 – most likely
instigated by the Soviet Union. Ho Chi Minh’s initiative, in summer 1961, to mediate
talks between Albanian and Soviet leaders was the first. Although Ho Chi Minh said
it was his personal initiative, most likely he had been persuaded by Moscow. This
seems to have been suggested also by both the Albanian and Chinese leaders.
Eventually neither Beijing nor Tirana welcomed his initiative. Albania refused even
to receive him in Tirana, and his planned trip to Albania was simply postponed sine
die.121 Furthermore, when the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, Chervonenko, told Liu
Shaoqi that the Soviet Union would like to invite Albania to participate in the
Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU scheduled in October 1961, Hoxha refused
the invitation – although Chinese leaders welcomed this initiative. 122 During the
CPSU congress, Zhou Enlai discussed with Khrushchev the problem of Albania, and
defended his ally against the attacks Khrushchev had made in his speech. For Zhou,
‘regardless many Albanian mistakes…’ it had been unjust to interrupt the assistance
to Albania. 123 However sincere the attempt to ease tension between Tirana and
Moscow may have been, Zhou Enlai’s allegations of Albanian ‘mistakes’ to
Khrushchev sounded unpleasant when they reached Hoxha’s ears. When the Chinese
ambassador in Tirana, Lo Shigao, informed Hoxha of Zhou Enlai’s meetings in
Moscow, Hoxha reacted by denying any ‘mistakes’ in relation to the Soviet Union.
The Chinese ambassador retreated, stating that the document had been translated
wrong.
In December 1961 another attempt was made, this time by the Indonesian
communist party, to convene a meeting of all the communist parties, after the model
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of the last Moscow conference, intending ‘to discuss the Soviet-Albanian
disputes’. 124 Similar initiatives were undertaken also in the first months of 1962,
when letters from communist parties of New Zealand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Sweden,
and England, were sent to China calling for a meeting of the international communist
movement to settle the Soviet-Albanian disputes. China did not oppose in principle
and relayed to Albania the correspondence with the Soviet Union. China remained
convinced that these parties had not been after Moscow’s support. 125 But Hoxha
firmly opposed, posing unacceptable conditions to the Soviet Union, such as the
public admittance by Khrushchev of his alleged mistakes towards Albanian
leadership, the revival of all interrupted economic and military agreements, and
rectification of Soviet policies in international relations with particular reference to
the policy of peaceful coexistence.126 Hoxha’s strategy had become clear: accredit
Albania as an undiscussed and exclusive ally and supporter of China. In turn,
Albanian leaders expected China to prioritize the economic and military assistance to
Albania, even at the expense of other countries if necessary. On this point, when Li
Xiannian visited Albania in February 1961, meeting with Enver Hoxha, had clearly
outlined the roles of the two countries in their alliance: China provided Albania with
economic assistance, whereas ‘you [Albania] supports us [China] in the political
field’.127

Conclusion
Although officially Albania protested the Soviet interruption of diplomatic relations,
Hoxha – we can say in hindsight – must have enjoyed very much the end of Soviet
influence over Albania. Now his hands were free of any regional or continental
alliance system which could have been used against him, as Yugoslavia first and
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later the Soviet Union had done. In this sense, China’s geographical distance was
highly advantageous. Hoxha tied himself to China also for reasons concerning the
very nature of the allies’ political power. After Stalin, Khrushchev had showed to be
more flexible and less ideological. Biberaj argues that it was economic necessity
rather than ideological affinity to push Albania towards China. 128 This is only
partially true; ideology was of equal importance to economic necessity – if not more.
The events since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU showed that it was Soviet
undermining of the ideological legitimacy, not only the lack of Soviet economic
support that eroded Hoxha’s power. To Hoxha, Khrushchev’s leadership could not
guarantee continuous support because it depended on factors others than ideology –
and consequently, was unpredictable. On the contrary, China was ruled by a single
man, Mao, who yet retained unquestioned control, and who showed a Stalinist-style
zeal for the communist cause which permitted solid legitimation of Hoxha’s rule. In
1960-61, Hoxha tried to play the ideology card to accredit himself as the true
upholder of the banner of Marxism, so as to align himself with China and distance
himself from Khrushchev. Once he successfully played this card, and his hands were
free of ties to the Soviet Union, the ideological considerations became less important,
and economic construction could be prioritized. In fact, China was so geographically
distant, if necessary he could afford to take from it only in part Mao’s own ideas of
socialism, still pressuring to get as many concessions as possible for his model of
economic development. Yet, if from 1956 to 1961 the ideology was paramount to
Hoxha’s hold on his power, after that period, ideology and economy became equally
important. However, this policy did pose limitations: Hoxha’s room to maneuver
ideologically, and take from Mao’s ideas whatever suited him the most, became
larger, but his economic hands were tied very strongly to China, and eventually this
became one of the biggest limits and failures of Albanian socialism.
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PART TWO

ALLIES, 1962 – 1970
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CHAPTER THREE

A RESTLESS ALLIANCE

Introduction
The alliance between China and Albania came only after the estrangement of both
Tirana and Beijing from Moscow that had begun in the mid-1950s. Albania emerged
as the only ideologically-similar ally of China in Europe. Similarly, Mao Zedong, for
Albania, emerged as the upholder of the right line of Marxism and possibly the new
leader of the international communist movement. In this way, China was greatly
appealing to Hoxha. First, it was a great country, with a long revolutionary tradition
forged in the war against Japan, which, for the public narrative in Albania, was very
important. Second, Mao was indisputably a leader, who claimed adherence to the
orthodox dogma of communism. This was important to the legitimation of Hoxha’s
personal initiatives in Albania. Third, China, albeit poor, was also perceived as a
resourceful country, at least in Hoxha’s eyes, capable of replacing the Soviet Union’s
economic and military assistance to Albania. In addition, China’s ideological rigidity
would be a reason for Albania to strongly support China internationally, though the
alliance remained informal. In opposing Khrushchev’s reformism, Tirana and Beijing
had come to form a common front in an unexpected way, and once the partnership
was established, China and Albania coordinated their actions on the international
stage – whenever common interests were at stake.
Initially, it was beneficial to both countries to maintain an informal system,
which allowed both sides to take their own steps towards problems on a case by case
basis. Although no treaty was ever signed between Beijing and Tirana, joint
communiqués were released on certain occasions to affirm the countries’ unity.
These could be used as official propaganda in Tirana to challenge the image of
Albania as an isolated country – the most isolated in Europe. The other benefit of
these communiqués was that they accredited Albania worldwide as a supporter of
China and vice versa, consequently making Tirana an important interlocutor in the
attempt to bring other small communist parties and revolutionary groups to China’s
side. The intention was to build an alternative international communist movement,
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which tried to challenge the Soviet Union’s leadership of communism. Eventually,
all this became part of what is known as Global Maoism – a form of internationalism
opposed to that of Soviet Union. Another factor that made a formal treaty of alliance
superfluous was the geographical distance. However strong the Chinese will to
support Albanian security and sovereignty might have been, the obstacle of
geographical distance rendered impossible Beijing’s implementation of any
obligations deriving from a formal treaty. When Albania invited China to sign a
formal treaty of friendship in 1964, it was also the geographical factor that Beijing,
among many factors, cited in refusing the offer. China was not willing to commit to
expensive operations that did not guarantee political return, as Albania was outside
the core area of China’s security – which was (and is) East Asia. Moreover, Chinese
refusal of a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance was intended to discourage
possible provocative actions of Albania in the region, especially when considering its
tense relations with Yugoslavia during the sixties. Eventually, the Sino-Albanian
alliance’s informality was entirely overshadowed by its substantial outcomes.
Yet the alliance began with attrition because China tried to seat Albania in talks
with Moscow, and seemed to show a conciliatory attitude towards the Soviet Union.
Later, with the Khrushchev’s dismissal from office, China had the illusion of a
possible improvement of the relations with the Soviet Union. Both these moments
negatively impacted Hoxha’s image of China. He, in fact, perceived Chinese
standing often weak, contradictory, and ideologically not as solid as he had expected
Beijing to be. It is in this period, however, that the Sino-Albanian efforts to capture
small communist parties worldwide intensified, and the collaboration with them
became systematic. It is also during this period that strong efforts were made by
Albania to defend Chinese interests on the international stage, which made of
Albania China’s spokesperson in issues such as the Sino-Indian border clash in 1962,
the issues of Tibet in United Nations, and other important issues.

Disagreements Between Tirana and Beijing
Following the interruption of the diplomatic relations between Tirana and Moscow,
to further advance the alliance with Beijing, an Albanian high political delegation
headed by Hysni Kapo visited China in June 1962. The visit was at the invitation of
the CCP and was significant because of the political issues that the two sides
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discussed. Kapo met six times with Deng Xiaoping; their long conversations entirely
centered upon ideological issues, and on both the Sino-Soviet disputes and the
Albanian-Soviet split. Deng, from the first meeting to the last tried unsuccessfully to
convince Albania to participate in a possible meeting of the world communist parties,
which among other issues would try to settle the Soviet-Albanian disagreements.1
More specifically, what Deng had in mind was the Soviet proposal, submitted to
China at the beginning of March 1962 by Soviet ambassador Chervonenko, ‘to mend
relations with Albania and set aside Sino-Soviet differences’. 2 Then with another
letter, delivered at the beginning of June 1962, the Soviet Union proposed to have a
meeting of the communist parties in Moscow that same month, just before the World
Congress for Disarmament and Peace, scheduled in Sweden, 9-15 July 1962.3
In Chinese correspondence with Soviet Union, Khrushchev had listed Chinese
support of Albania as one of the causes of the Sino-Soviet split – at least this is what
Deng Xiaoping told Kapo. 4 Finding it impossible to bring Albania to talks with
Soviet Union, Deng changed his position and reinforced instead the divide with
Soviet Union, affirming that Moscow had made mistakes of ‘great state chauvinism’
with both China and Albania. Deng tried to accredit China as a supporter of Albania
against the Soviets, and also defended Stalin against Soviet attacks. Moreover, he
claimed that the Soviet Union ‘pursues a tactic of convincing China… to marginalize
Albania’ and then normalize Sino-Soviet relations.5 Deng was affirming that China
was paying a certain price to maintain its support for Albania. But Kapo returned the
favor the next day affirming that ‘you well know that our relations with Soviet Union
begun to deteriorate after the Bucharest meeting’, although the affirmation was only
1
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partially true as Soviet-Albanian relations had deteriorated before Albania’s
sympathy for China in Bucharest.6 Deng, however, insisted on participating in the
meeting of the world communist parties, where China, he argued, would have to give
its opinions on issues that it had been prevented from giving in the past. In particular,
he referred to the Soviet consideration of Yugoslavia as a ‘socialist country’, and to
the defining of the concept of dogmatism for which China had been attacked by the
Soviets, and other related issues. In this sense, Peng Zhen reinforced Deng’s
arguments affirming that a meeting after the Moscow Conference would be an
opportunity to speak to communist parties from within capitalist countries, ‘where
China has no diplomatic representation’. 7 At the same time that the Albanian
delegation was in China, the CPSU sent a long letter, relayed to Albanian delegation
on 10 June 1962, inviting the Chinese to defend the unity of the communist camp. It
explained to the CCP all the reasons why, according to the Soviets, Soviet-Albanian
relations had deteriorated. The letter was full of accusations against the Albanian
leadership, but was friendly to the CCP. With the intention to open a breach in the
Sino-Albanian interparty relations, the Soviets eventually wished that ‘the Albanian
question should not be a reason for the Sino-Soviet tension’, and for not promoting
an international meeting of the world communist parties.8
But Albania’s position remained irremovable. Beijing was inclined to support
the meeting of the communist parties after the model of the previous Moscow
conferences, whereas Tirana, fearing the forum would further isolate Albania, did not
want such a meeting to take place. In this sense, Kapo argued how Albania had
already become a reference point for communist parties in the West, pointing to the
Italian Communist Party [Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI], and Pietro Secchia, an
Italian communist who had come to Albania asking Hoxha for support and
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suggestions on the possible split with the PCI – eventually no split took place. 9
Knowing the passionate public discourse of Albanian leaders against Soviet Union,
which could be counterproductive, Deng noted ‘the necessity to say always the truth,
act in our benefit, and be moderate’ in the ideological struggle against Soviet
Union. 10 Albania instead wanted an open and firm polemic through the parties’
propaganda channels (press and diplomatic contacts) to ‘unmask Khrushchev’. This
could be pursued through both ‘the press… and capturing the revolutionary groups
within communist parties’.

11

Hoxha’s instructions for Kapo also included

underscoring the Yugoslavian revisionism, and fostering resistance towards it –
because during Kapo’s visit to China, Khrushchev was in Bulgaria, praising
Yugoslavia. 12 Hoxha sought also to establish an air route between Beijing and
Tirana, which he deemed ‘absolutely necessary… regardless of how expensive it
could be for Beijing’, but the issue was postponed by Chinese leaders.13
Chinese moderation and Deng’s initial attempt to persuade Albania to participate
in a meeting of communist parties were interpreted as a “sway” of the CCP.
Moreover, Hoxha thought that Deng’s arguments were ‘weak’ and China ‘fears too
much to be isolated in the international communist movement’. In this way China
‘underestimates the capacity of resistance of the revolutionary forces in the world,
and overestimates the Khrushchevian influence… they [Chinese leaders] seek a way
out by claiming that the struggle [against revisionism] would be long’. Deng’s
suggestion to temper the polemic against the Soviets was deemed ‘a wrong tactic,
unacceptable for us’. For Hoxha, the first and the best way to deal with the Soviets
would be ‘the revolutionary struggle against revisionism’. The other options would
9
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be either Chinese participation in communist parties’ meetings, but not Albania’s
participation, or ‘going all us to the meeting and getting out of it exhausted’ –
disregarding China’s choice, ‘we [Albania] will choose the first way… and in all
cases never the last [Albanian participation in Moscow meetings]’. 14 Hoxha also
rejected Deng’s argument that since Khrushchev used the Soviet diplomatic network
to convey Moscow’s positions to other communist parties, a meeting of world
communist parties would be a proper forum for China and Albania to talk to these
parties. For Hoxha ‘this position is absolutely baseless… do our friends [Chinese
leaders] think that after such a meeting the Soviets will not try to push other parties
against us? ’Such a view was noted also in Hoxha’s personal diary, where he
affirmed that ‘Chinese friends fear to be accused by the Europeans of interference in
internal affairs’ if they openly assisted Marxist parties in these countries.15 Hoxha
instructed Kapo to make clear that Albania considered this a primary issue of
principle for the international communist movement, because ‘had we taken into
consideration the economic and political potential of Khrushchev [Soviet Union]…
then we should have not opened any dispute with him for two centuries to come…
but our position has to be avant-garde, not behind the lines’. 16 Eventually, Deng
retreated, affirming in the third meeting with Kapo that China would not participate
in any meeting of world communist parties to which Albania was not invited, nor
would they go without guarantees of equality among all parties. On this issue,
however, Albania’s position was ‘clearly opposed to Chinese standing’.17
In 1962, several events further motivated Hoxha’s refusal to talk with the
Soviets. First, a Czechoslovakian newspaper attacked the Albanian leader, and in
mid-June of that year, Walter Ulbricht, the East German leader, also attacked
Albania and the CCP, concluding that he would not participate in any meeting to
which Albania was invited.18 In each case, Hoxha’s decision was not to participate in
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any meeting, unless Soviet leaders ‘accept publically all the mistakes they have made
to us’. Chinese efforts to convince Albania to participate in possible meetings of the
international communist movement were for Hoxha ‘contradictory… with a strong
mark of opportunism’. But the impact of Hoxha’s refusal on Sino-Albanian relations
was well calculated because Hoxha thought that China ‘will not go without us
[Albania], as this would be… a political loss in the eyes of the communist
revolutionary parties’.19 Hoxha informed Kapo also that soon he would open the new
session of the parliament with an attack on Soviet revisionism – a step that went
against Deng’s suggestion about being moderate in the polemic towards the Soviets.
Finally, despite the stubbornness the Albanian delegation displayed with Deng
Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai tried to convince Albania to participate in the proposed
meeting of the communist parties, but to no avail. Then Zhou informed the Albanians
that it would not be possible to implement most of the important industrial projects
China had agreed to build in Albania for the ongoing FYP, reducing the commitment
from 29 to 10 such projects. The reasons given were Chinese ‘internal economic
difficulties’, and the lack of foreign currency to purchase equipment from other
countries.20 The meeting with Zhou took place after the long conversations between
Hysni Kapo and Deng Xiaoping. Leading Kapo to assume, ‘these economic
problems are connected with the others [political issues discussed with Deng]’.21
More likely, the decision to back out of these projects came as consequence of the
failed Great Leap Forward. 22 But neither Zhou Enlai nor other Chinese leaders
elaborated upon it, leaving Albanian leaders with room for speculation. In times of
hardship for China, Albania was proven to be an expensive ally.
The period 1961-1962 was characterized by marked contradictions in SinoSoviet relations. In a brief period of relaxation in 1961, China left the door open on
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possible improvement in its relations with the Soviet Union.23 Lüthi argues that Mao
did not really want any rapprochement with the Soviet Union, but lacked consensus
from other Chinese leaders, bringing as an example Liu Shaoqi’s affirmations that
the Soviet Union was ‘central to the socialist camp’, and how ‘harmful to essential
Chinese interests would be’ a split with Moscow.24 But then in 1962 the Sino-Indian
border clashes, particularly Khrushchev’s neutrality on the issue, stoked Chinese
distrust of Moscow. Eventually, in 1962, the Soviets gave China the promised
designs of the Mig-21 fighter plane, but after that such planes were also offered to
India.25 Not long after, widespread dissent broke out in Xinjiang among the non-Han
population. There ‘the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations led to the mass flight
of 67,000 people’ to Soviet Union.26 In this context the Chinese attempt to bring
Tirana to the table with Moscow is not to be understood as an attempt to push
Albania towards rapprochement with Moscow. Beijing clearly knew that political
tensions between Tirana and Moscow were too extreme to be settled; but Beijing also
knew that Tirana would not abandon China politically. Nonetheless, Albania’s
possible re-establishment of relations with the Soviet Union could have potentially
given Hoxha access to Soviet economic resources by establishing normal trade
relations. In this way Albania would have been politically supporting China but
economically relying less on it, dividing efforts between Moscow, East Europe, and
Beijing.
Another way to explain Deng’s attempt to seat Tirana and Moscow together is to
look to the Chinese internal dynamics in that period. The negative outcomes of the
Great Leap Forward had divided Chinese leadership. Their differences had
manifested at the Lushan Conference in 1959, and led to the Seven Thousand Cadres
Conference of January-February 1962, which was a ‘watershed in the post-Great
Leap Forward process’.27 During the Thousand Cadres Conference Mao and Zhou
admitted that some of their recent policies had caused economic hardship. Liu
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Shaoqi, in his report ‘supervised by Deng Xiaoping’, although praising Mao’s
leadership, also gave to ‘human errors’ and to the ‘practical implementation’ some of
the blame for the economic problems, clearly alleging to the leadership’s directives.28
The divide was between people like Peng Dehuai, Zhang Wentian (both purged in
1959), Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, Wang Jiaxiang, and to a
certain extent Zhou Enlai, who were more prone to the economic development of the
Soviet model, and Mao, who took mass mobilization as a way to boost economic
production. The first, with a different tone, had opposed the Great Leap Forward,
although eventually they also contributed so as to mitigate its effects. 29 Wang
Jiaxiang had gone so far as to ‘advance the three conciliations and one reduction:
conciliate with the imperialists (United States), conciliate with revisionists (the
Soviet Union), conciliate with the reactionaries (India), and reduction of aid to the
world revolutionary forces’.30 It was now possible to envisage two different agendas
within the Chinese leadership. In case Albanian leaders would have accepted a
rapprochement with the Soviets, in particular one regarding economic relations, it
would have been a clear political message of disagreement with Mao’s policy, giving
political credit to those within Chinese leadership who had disputed the chairman’s
chosen course. The timing of such a message would have been opportune, as just two
months after the Kapo-Deng meetings, Beijing hosted the Beidahe Conference, and
later in September 1962 the Tenth CCP Plenum, where opposite views regarding
China’s economic path came once again to the fore. 31 Furthermore, the reestablishment of Tirana-Moscow contacts would have lessened the tension between
China, Albania and the Soviet Union.
Eventually, two events brought China and Albania to a common front again in
late October 1962. First, on 20 October 1962 Chinese and Indian troops clashed at
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the border in the disputed areas along the McMahon line. 32 Chen Yi, Chinese
minister of foreign affairs, promptly informed the Albanian ambassador of the
events. 33 Albania revealed to be a good ally in these times of need as it firmly
defended the Chinese position in the United Nations’ General Assembly, refuting
attacks from other countries following the military confrontation. The Albanian
delegation was instructed to ‘defend China with great force, and condemn the
aggressors’. 34 Albania attacked India, blaming it for having rejected a presumed
Chinese plan for resolution. This face-to-face confrontation between Albania and
India even drew the attention of New York Times, which published the polemics.35
Albania, using documents provided by China, made a long presentation of the causes
of the conflict, explaining how China always ‘made efforts to resolve the border
disputes with India only through negotiations’. Nevertheless, despite China’s efforts,
‘it was not possible to achieve an agreement reciprocally acceptable because of
Indian insisting in putting conditions’ to eventual talks. 36 Albania blamed India,
because it was ‘the Indian troops who first attacked China’s border’37 instigating the
conflict.38 It is interesting that the language used in the Albanian speeches differs
from that in the Chinese documents relayed to Albania before the session. China’s
language was softer, more pragmatic, diplomatic and practical to the issue to be
discussed. Albanian diplomats however, acting on behalf of China in the UN, took an
inflammatory tone, attacking the United States’ leaders as ‘warmongers’ and
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‘blackmailers’, their policy as ‘submerged into sludge’, and their actions as
‘shameful’.39 In November 1962, the general secretary of the UN, U Thant (Maha
Thray Sithu U Thant), called the Albanian representative in UN, Halim Budo, to ask
what Albania thought about possible mediation he might attempt regarding the SinoIndian conflict. U Thant knew very well that by speaking to Albanian representative
on this issue, he was in fact talking to Beijing. 40 Instructed by Beijing, Albania
rejected the mediation and insisted on a solution based on Sino-Indian bilateral
talks.41 For China, since Beijing was not allowed to have its legitimate seat in UN,
then the mediation of the head of this organization was non-sense. On this occasion,
Albania and Soviet Union were antagonists rather than collaborators. When the
Albanian foreign minister Behar Shtylla delivered his speech, the Soviet delegation
left the hall, although the speech did not attack the Soviet Union. On the contrary,
Albania supported the Soviet position on the Berlin issue, and on the issue of peace
treaties between the Soviet Union and both East and West Germany.42 The Chinese
position was defended also by the Soviets, but Khrushchev’s transgression had been
calling for Sino-Indian talks instead of pledging full support for Beijing.43 This event
reinforced Mao’s animosity towards the Soviet Union. At the same time, China
defended Albania from attacks during the congresses of the ruling parties of East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary during November-December
1962.44
The second event was the Cuban missile crisis only two days after the SinoIndian border clashes. Chinese leaders ‘disapproved of Khrushchev’s policy of
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placing missiles in Cuba’, but both China and Albania disapproved also
Khrushchev’s proposed solution to the crisis. 45 For both Beijing and Tirana,
Khrushchev “lost” the confrontation, betraying in the process Fidel Castro and his
communist regime46 – although Khrushchev claimed the resolution of the crisis as a
‘triumph’ for the Soviet Union. 47 Because of Khrushchev’s attention to Cuba, he
‘almost completely neglected Soviet interests in Asia, where China’s influence grew
remarkably at Soviet expense’. 48 Following the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev
seemed eager to pursue the unity of the communist camp. In this direction should be
read also his initiative in February 1963 to hold bilateral talks between the CCP and
the CPSU.49 With the proposal of bilateral talks came also the Soviet invitation to
cease the open polemics – basically to stop the propaganda articles in China and
Albania that continuously, with different tones, attacked Soviet revisionism. Mao
underlined Soviet contradictions on this point: just when the Soviets made their
request, Khrushchev attacked China at the congress of the Socialist United Party of
East Germany. Eventually Mao welcomed the bilateral talks, and China stopped, for
a short time, their polemics against the socialist and communist parties that had
offended it.50
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Mao, meeting the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, also touched upon two
important issues for Albania. First, he told Chervonenko that there would not be a
united socialist camp without Albania. Second, that China, in line with Albania, did
not consider Yugoslavia as part of the communist camp.51 Regarding the first point,
the Soviet Union feebly attempted a solution following the Mao-Chervonenko
meeting. In early March 1963 the Czechoslovakian embassy in Tirana contacted the
Albanian leadership. On behalf of the Soviet Union, they informed Albania of the
letter they had sent to the CCP regarding CPSU-CCP bilateral talks, and relayed also
a short letter addressed to Albania, calling for talks before those of CPSU and CCP.
But this, at least to Albanian leadership, implied that the Soviets saw Albania as an
appendage of China. Consequently, Albania refused to attend any talks under such
‘unequal’ conditions.52
Despite some disagreements, Sino-Albanian relations intensified in 1963. At
least six Chinese delegations from different fields visited Albania during the second
half of 1963, and the visit of Fang Yi, vice president of Chinese State Planning
Commission was among the most important.53 On 31 December, 1963, Zhou Enlai
made his first visit to Albania.54 This was after he had toured ten African nations,
where he ‘convinced them more in the struggle against American imperialism and
less in that against Soviet revisionism’.55 During the first meeting between Enver
Hoxha and Zhou Enlai, Hoxha accredited Albania as a strong interlocutor with
parties and countries where he saw possible to foment sympathy for Sino-Albanian
Marxist cause. He indeed affirmed, that ‘especially addressing Arab countries is our
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duty to create a fertile terrain for the political aims of our countries [China and
Albania]… because we are a small and Muslim country… let alone our people’s
revolution and socialist building’.56 Then Hoxha delivered a long prepared speech
attacking American imperialism, all East European revisionist regimes, and the
Soviet Union and its leadership. On this issue, Hoxha privately had considered
Chinese hesitations, at times, as a sign of weakness, and he defended his position by
stating that the polemic against the Soviet Union ‘was always for the sake of the
socialist camp and the international communist movement’. Furthermore, for Hoxha
‘it is imperative to further strengthen and organize the struggle of communists
worldwide’. 57 Regarding Albania’s relations with the neighbors, in particular the
relations with Yugoslavia and Greece, he depicted a dark situation, but Hoxha also
committed to ‘pay attention to develop with Italy and Yugoslavia normal interstate
relations based on the principle of the peaceful coexistence with countries with
different systems, and make all efforts to avoid tension’.58 Zhou Enlai recognized
Albania’s important role as ‘the upholder of the banner of Marxism in Europe against
imperialism and revisionism, giving a great contribution to the socialist camp…
which is made even greater by the small size of your country’.59 Then Zhou praised
Hoxha’s remarks on all the points he had mentioned during the first meeting. He
pointed out how China and Albania could use in their favor four existing
contradictions in the world: contradictions among imperialists, between imperialist
and socialist camp, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and between
imperialist and oppressed nations. Zhou fully endorsed Hoxha and also gave a long
speech attacking Khrushchev and Soviet Union.60 Then Zhou urged and endorsed
Albania’s will to be active in its contacts with the Arab and African countries and
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communist groups. Regarding Latin America Zhou seemed to rely more on Cuba,
although he had to admit that Castro could not ‘openly’ oppose Soviet Union.61
In his fifth meeting with Zhou Enlai, Hoxha focused on explaining that ‘the
center of revisionism is in Europe, consequently the struggle against it there is more
difficult’. Even though ‘our party has some authority over the European communists,
yet the role of China is and remains decisive in assisting revolutionary Europeans’.
Therefore Hoxha asked for ‘more coordination… as we have embassies in France,
Italy and elsewhere where you do not, you instead have in Soviet Union where we do
not’. To this aim he proposed to China to create a unit at the Chinese embassy in
Tirana, which would stay in ‘close collaboration’ with the Albanian authorities in
coordinating the assistance for the revolutionary groups. Interestingly, Hoxha
mentioned that in Poland there existed at least 30 groups which opposed Gomulka’s
revisionist regime, and that even a coup d’état had been prepared but eventually was
not implemented.62 All this data provided by Hoxha was aimed at increasing China’s
perception of Albania’s role in Europe as important, and consequently increasing
Chinese assistance. Moreover, Albania was testing how far the Chinese could go in
the ideological struggle against Soviet Union, since only some months earlier Zhou
himself had tried to convince Albania to talk to the Soviets. This time in Tirana,
however, Zhou Enlai came to be supportive of the Albanian determination to fight
with firmness against Soviet revisionism. China also launched a campaign of
polemics (nine articles) against Soviet Union from September 1963 to July 1964,
which was a reflection of Mao’s radicalism rather than Albania’s influence.63

The Fall of Khrushchev: Attrition Between Tirana and Beijing
In October 1964, through a soft coup in the Soviet power’s cupola, Khrushchev lost
his power.64 The event was received with mixed feelings by both Soviet and Chinese
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leaders regarding the Sino-Soviet relations, which soon came to a stalemate. 65
Hoxha, on the other hand, was convinced that Khrushchev had been removed by his
close comrades, who were just as revisionist and who would not change the course of
the Soviet Union for the better. In hindsight, perhaps he was right. Immediately after
the removal of Khrushchev, Zhou Enlai took the initiative, without consulting
Tirana, to promote a close up between Tirana and Moscow. Zhou asked the Soviet
Ambassador in Beijing to pressure his government to invite an Albanian delegation
to Moscow, for the celebrations of the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution.66
Zhou Enlai then personally invited Hoxha to re-establish links with Moscow. When
Hoxha was informed of the Chinese actions, he became furious. In meeting with his
close comrades, he stated the need to reconsider all relations with China, because, for
him, China was taking a renegade path. The Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu went
further still, revealing to the Politburo that Albania had prepared a secret plan to deal
with the possibility of being completely isolated without any assistance from any
other country [China], but only normal trade ‘with those that still wants to trade with
us’.67
Hoxha called the diplomatic representative of China in Albania, and through
Ramiz Alia asked China officially to not take any initiative on behalf of Albania.68
The Albanian leadership continued imposing conditions for rapprochement with the
Soviet Union. These conditions were impossible and humiliating for the Soviet
Union: a complete rectification of the line followed by Khrushchev since the
Twenty-second CPSU Congress; the rehabilitation of Stalin; the calculations and
eventual repayments of the damages to the Albanian economy caused by the
interruption of the Soviet aid; the end of the talks on the disarmaments with the
West; the reconsideration of the peace treaties with Germany, and the retaking of
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severe attacks towards Tito. 69 Certainly, these were merely intended to justify
Hoxha’s lack of will for any bilateral talks with the Soviet Union. For Hoxha,
highlighting the divergences with China regarding such rapprochement had only
internal implications, to reinforce his rule and reaffirm a sense of autonomy for
Albania. He knew that China was in great divergence with the Soviets, and he was
perfectly aware that those disputes were not easy to settle even with the change of
leadership in Moscow.70 Hence, his refusal to approach Moscow could not have had
serious implications for Albania’s relations with China. Eventually, during the mid1960s – early 1970s, China came to understand that Brezhnev was no better than
Khrushchev – if not worse. In the same time, however, China’s repeated attempts to
bring Albania to talks with the Soviets eroded Hoxha’s perception of Chinese
position as rigid and irremovable towards the revisionist Soviet Union.

FORMING THE “ANTI-REVISIONIST” FRONT:
CHALLENGING THE SOVIET UNION’S LEADERSHIP OF THE
COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
The Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955 (known as Bandung Conference)
was the first attempt at forming an alternative bloc of the emerging world outside the
East-West confrontation.71 Its failure, shown most clearly by the Sino-Soviet border
clashes, pushed China to seek other ways to make space for its ambition as a global
player. Coinciding with the domestic radicalization following the Sino-Soviet split,
China sought to be a model for the revolutionary forces in the emerging world, in
particular in those countries where the national struggle for independence on the
69
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wave of the decolonization left room at least for revolution, if not necessarily
communist revolution. 72 This required a twofold struggle for China: against
imperialism, embodied in the United States, which for China had ‘replaced German,
Italian and Japanese fascism as the principal enemy of the people of the world’, and
against Soviet revisionism.73 If the Soviet Union’s struggle to gain support in the
Third World came from a logic of Cold War division of spheres of influence74 – with
its borders that outside Europe were fluid – Chinese struggle instead had to focus
more, and at times primarily, against the Soviet revisionism and its powerful political
machine. This was made even more difficult by China’s lack of economic means
compared to Soviet Union.
During his meetings with Hysni Kapo in Beijing in June 1962, Deng Xiaoping
had affirmed the necessity ‘to make long efforts to create a revolutionary nucleus in
the international communist movement’. 75 Deng emphasized the need to open a
breach within the world communist movement and bring to the Sino-Albanian side
the many revolutionary parties and communist groups of the Global South, namely
Latin America, Asia and Africa. Nonetheless, China had begun to create some space
for such manoeuvres, even before relations with Moscow sank, as the case of
Guinea, in Africa, shows.76 Khrushchev some years earlier had mentioned Albania as
‘a precious gem that would attract the rest of the Muslim world towards communism,
especially in the Middle East and Africa. That’s what our intentions were and the
kind of policy we were pursuing’.77
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On this same line, Deng invited Albanian leaders to overcome apparent
prejudices towards these parties, some of which had attacked Albania during the
Moscow Conference in November 1960. Deng stated that their attack on Albania
came due to Soviet pressure, ‘but in deep heart they admire the PLA’s struggle for
the Marxist cause’. 78 Deng was interested also in the West European communist
parties, for which Albania could have more knowledge given its proximity and
diplomatic relations with some of these countries. Hysni Kapo affirmed that Albania
had already received ‘numerous letters from communist parties and groups from 32
different countries’.79 Kapo stated that the ruling parties in the eastern European bloc
had experienced great difficulties which left space for groups within these parties to
emerge against revisionism. The same he affirmed for the communist parties of the
western Europe, where the situation was even easier for the creation of new
communist groups. Regardless the accuracy of Kapo’s affirmations, he was trying to
argue for the lack of necessity for any close up with the Soviets as the breach within
the communist movement led by the Soviets had already occurred. Albania’s
strategy, elucidated by Kapo, was to promote an open international struggle against
Khrushchev’s revisionism.
It was not the first time that the leading role of Soviet leaders in the international
communist movement was challenged. Even in the early 1930s, Trotsky had been the
first to challenge the Soviet (Stalinist) model of communism by forming what then
he called International Left Opposition. 80 More consistently, during 1960 on the
wave of the Sino-Soviet disagreements, some communist parties had supported
China, although not as openly as Albanians.81 The deterioration of China’s interstate
relations with Soviet Union further motivated both China and Albania to try to
capture the sympathy of the small leftist groups or communist parties. This was not
78
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pursued for purely ideological reasons, but also in solidarity with the Third World’s
struggle for emancipation. From this perspective, China and Albania did not make
much distinction between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The
world, for them, was trapped into the American “imperialist” and Soviet “revisionist”
struggle for world supremacy. Therefore, however low the potential to project
effective power worldwide, Beijing tried to accredit itself as an alternative to the
Soviet Union for the newly emerging world.82 But ‘China’s other rival in guiding the
Third World in the struggle against “imperialism” was East Germany’, the Soviets’
most powerful and dedicated protégé.83 Tirana tried to play for Beijing the role that
East Germany played for the Soviet Union, but with less power.
In early July 1963, Hysni Kapo met in Tirana with the Chinese ambassador Lo
Shigao, and asked a pledge of joint support for all those groups in the world that
would

join

the

Sino-Albanian

struggle

against

both

‘imperialism’

and

‘revisionism’.84 The moment he chose showed Albania’s willingness to test Chinese
leaders’ intentions. Albanian leaders knew of the Sino-Soviet interparty bilateral
talks, which started in Moscow the same day Hysni Kapo met in Tirana with the
Chinese ambassador. The Albanians perhaps were correct to doubt the Chinese
conviction against the Soviet Union as the Chinese response to Albanian initiative
came on the last day of the Sino-Soviet bilateral talks in Moscow.85 Chinese leaders
kept all of their options on the table, waiting to see the outcomes of these talks before
taking any step in opposing Soviet Union. For Radchenko ‘the word “talks” is
perhaps inadequate’ to describe Sino-Soviet talks, as they were more ‘heating
exchanges’. 86 Eventually they resulted in a complete stalemate, with both sides
82
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holding their positions on all the issues which had been matter of contention between
Soviet Union and China since the 1950s, ‘with the only benefit that… each side had
the opportunity to explain its position in full’. 87 As Lüthi has stated, ‘Mao’s
comeback in the late summer 1962 provided the impetus for renewed ideological
radicalism in China’s foreign policy… only a complete ideological surrender of one
side could save Sino-Soviet relations’.88 Therefore, ‘it was impossible for the SinoSoviet relationship to develop as long as the ideological disputes continued’.89 The
Soviet Union asked to stop the open polemic, and wanted a communiqué in this
sense, but China refused. The Soviet Union reiterated again its invitation at the end
of November 1963 to stop the polemics in the press. China instead challenged
Moscow by calling for a meeting of the communist parties of all East Asia, New
Zealand, Australia and Albania to be held in early 1964.90 Eventually the meeting
was postponed, as Zhou Enlai later told Hoxha that this meeting ‘does not present
any immediate necessity’.91
In autumn 1963, the roles of China and Albania in support of revolutionary
forces were better outlined. To China, together with the Albanian minister of defense
Beqir Balluku, went also Pirro Bita, Head of the PLA Directorate for Foreign
Relations (International Liaison Department) – a man that would play a crucial role
in the years to come in the contacts between the PLA, CCP, and the revolutionary
87
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groups worldwide. In Beijing he met many times with officials of the CCP
International Liaison Department who told him of the Chinese role in Asia, and
informed him of the Asian communist movements. 92 The Albanian minister of
defense Beqir Balluku also had long conversations with Deng Xiaoping with focus
on the international communist movement and the strategy to be adopted by China
and Albania to build a united front against revisionism.93 For this purpose, China
committed also to building a foreign languages’ publishing house in Albania and a
powerful radio station. 94 Liu Ningyi told Bita that China needed a base in Latin
America, and Bita promptly mentioned Albania’s embassy in Brazil.95 China had
attempted to establish contacts in Brazil even before Albania, when ‘the Brazilians
dispatched to China, shortly after the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, a group of
cadres for six months of indoctrination’.96 But following the military coup in Brazil
in April 1964 in which nine Chinese citizens were arrested, eventually accused of
plotting a communist revolution, Chinese contacts became more difficult. The
Chinese citizens were sent back in China after one year of imprisonment, but this
case caused the interruption of the diplomatic talks between Brazil and China until
1974.97
From 1964 onward, that assistance for the revolutionary forces became
increasingly systematic and intensive. The Albanian leadership established in June
1964 the first monetary fund (named solidarity fund) to assist Marxist and
revolutionary parties – a fund which would continue to exist until 1990. Hoxha
appointed two of his most faithful comrades, Hysni Kapo and the head of the PLA
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International Liaison Department Pirro Bita, to run this program.98 A document of
March 1966 states that the fund was created with an initial Chinese and Albanian
contributions of 500,000 USD, and 200,000 USD, respectively.99 In 1967 the fund
reached almost one million American dollars, with an annual Chinese contribution of
half a million.100 Financing the activities of these groups continued for many years,
in particular the South American and European groups taking the lion’s share of the
fund. To the solidarity fund was added also the political and military training offered
by the party’s school in Tirana and by the Albanian army. 101 Regarding the last
aspect, it is interesting to note that most of the groups that came to Albania for
military training were from Latin America and Africa. Some members of the OLP
(Organization for the Liberation of Palestine) also came. On this point, according to a
recent Albanian publication by a former journalist of the Albanian army, groups from
eleven countries received military training in Albania from mid-1960s to mid-1970s,
among them were people that later would become famous such as Lula da Silva from
Brazil, who later became president of his country, Laurent Kabila from Congo, Abu
Jihad, who was Yasser Arafat’s right hand, and many others.102 Albania’s regime
established relations with dozens of parties and revolutionary groups worldwide,
including groups from at least sixteen African countries, eight parties from Latin
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American countries, sixteen from Asia, two from Oceania, still others from the
Middle East, the West, and (limitedly) East Europe.103
The activities of these groups consisted mainly of publishing and publicizing
propaganda that China and Albania continuously provided. The aim was to promote
China and Albania and attack Soviet Union (revisionism) and the United States
(American imperialism). In Africa and Latin America though, many of these groups
were involved in illegal activities. In particular in Latin America, the political
repression against the leftist movement made difficult and dangerous even simple
political activities such as distribution of pamphlets or meetings in university circles.
But these were also years of revolutionary fervor which affected most of the so
called Third World, therefore making fertile terrain for political activities. 104 In
Albania, for the first time in 1964, came also a limited number of political asylum
seekers from Africa. For instance the president of the revolutionary committee of the
People’s Union of Cameroon, Ndeh Mtumazah, asked in November 1963 to house
his family in Albania, after that they had escaped to Ghana.105 His wife and his three
children reached Albania in April 1964, but their stay was short as in October 1964
they were authorized to leave Albania and go to East Germany where her husband
had gone after ‘becoming an instrument of the Soviet revisionists’, as an Albanian
report stated.106 By 1970 the number of African students increased to twenty, many
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of them children of rebels who passed their whole childhood alone in Albania.107All
the foreign communist activists staying in Albania were provided a monthly salary, a
house or apartment, and education for children.108 Many of them became successful
doctors, or engineers after completing university in Tirana, and in a few cases
remained in Albania for their entire lives. All these activities were in coordination
with Chinese officials, as indicated by hand written notes from Hoxha.

The Anti-Soviet Front: Two Examples of Sino-Albanian Internationalism
In February 1966, an Albanian ship carrying special cargo was about to leave from
the Polish port of Gdansk. Two men, one diplomat and the Albanian trade attaché in
Poland, had organized the embarkation. Their task was to take out of Poland two
leaders of the new Polish Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), [PCP (m-l)], Dajti
and Drini (Albanian pseudonyms) who had organized illegal activities opposing the
ruling party in Poland.109 It was a covert operation that, if discovered, could have
repercussions on diplomatic relations between Albania and Poland which had already
deteriorated after the Soviet-Albanian split in 1961. Polish authorities later
discovered the operation, and the Albanian embassy in Poland was closed for some
time. One of the men that Albanian authorities helped to exile to Albania was
Kazimierz Mijal. Born in 1910, he had been active with the communists during the
Second World War. After the war he served as a minister in Poland, as Mayor of the
city of Lodz, and occupied other offices. But when Khrushchev reshaped Soviet
policy denouncing Stalin’s crimes, Mijal colluded with the ruling Polish United
Workers Party (PUWP), and in 1964 illegally founded his own communist party.
Since Mijal was not unknown to Polish authorities, organizing his exile from Poland
was a matter of both concern and pride for the Albanians. Eventually the operation
was a success, and Mijal reached Albania on 18 February 1966, where he would stay
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for more than a decade, establishing the Polish section of Radio Tirana, and trying to
organize activities in the capacity of general secretary of the PCP (m-l).110
Once safe in Tirana, Mijal’s concern was how to expand the network of
connections in Poland, in the vain hope of undermining Wladyslaw Gomulka’s rule.
From Tirana, Mijal managed to distribute his party’s communiqués to some factories
in Warsaw. As a result, the Polish authorities had many arrested, and the Politburo of
the PUWP criticized the minister of internal affairs, who is reported to have admitted
that they had not surveyed enough. 111 For Mijal’s task the Chinese embassy in
Warsaw was as helpful as the Albanian embassy. Not unlike a great spy movie, the
Chinese embassy collaborated with the Albanian diplomats in Poland to confound
the secret police tasked with keeping an eye on them.112 Albanian authorities tried to
use Mijal’s party as a possible nucleon of further actions in other East European
countries. Albanian authorities sent instructions to the embassies in Budapest, Berlin
and Praha asking to establish contacts with Polish citizens that lived in these cities.113
Poland was the biggest (and important) East European country, and Mijal was the
most experienced man among those supporting the Sino-Albanian cause in all East
Europe.
The Chinese embassy also worked to create contacts between Mijal and others,
including a professor at Warsaw University, Stefan Matuszewski.114 According to the
information given by the Chinese embassy in Warsaw, following the self-imposed
exile of Mijal, the Polish authorities had arrested many political dissidents, many of
whom were members of the newly born PCP (m-l). In addition, the Albanian
embassy in Poland told of Polish police continuously following the movements of its
diplomats and staff. Back in Tirana, Mijal proposed reducing the contacts for some
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time to only one person in Poland: the ‘lady with glasses’. A woman from the
Albanian embassy could meet her at the cinema, once the light were off, they could
exchange the bags, but had to avoid speaking, ‘not a single word’.115 In the bag there
would be correspondence and materials to spread among a restricted number of
people in Warsaw. It is interesting that most of the recipients were bureaucrats and
state employers, including a former deputy chief of the post-war Polish parliament.
The work of Mijal proved difficult, dangerous, and even deadly, as information
arrived in Tirana that an assassin had been sent for him, although this is unverified
and most likely from an unreliable source. 116 In Poland, the illegal activities of
communist groups had been taking place since 1964, with Albanian and Chinese
support. Radio for communications, pamphlets for illegally distribution, and money
for operations had all been provided by Tirana. Enver Hoxha seems to have had great
enthusiasm and expectations for Mijal’s role in Tirana. Not long after Mijal arrived,
Hoxha organized a reception for him, and promised him assistance.117 Hoxha also
advised Mijal to select five Polish comrades with which to reinforce the Polish
section of Radio Tirana, and he suggested building up a section of the PCP (m-l) in
Paris, considering the large Polish diaspora in France. Moreover, Mijal was told to
collaborate with Jacques Grippa, the head of the Belgian communist party, another
party which was receiving assistance from both Albania and China.
The second case regards West Europe, that of Jacques Grippa in Belgium, who
among all the western communists was the first to establish a party that supported a
hard line against the Soviet Union. Jacques Grippa was also an experienced man, as
much as Mijal, and seriously committed to the communist cause. He had been part of
the resistance against Nazism in Belgium. Arrested by Gestapo in 1943, he was
tortured, and then sent to the concentration camp of Buchenwald. But he had the
fortune to survive and return to Belgium, where he became a known official of the
Communist Party of Belgium. The work with the West European communist groups
was easier. Their leadership did not have to work in exile, their meetings with the
people, and their propaganda were not suppressed, although in some cases, other
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forms of repression were used, in particular against the distribution of pamphlets that
called for the rebellion and overthrow of the democratic regimes in West Europe.
After the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, Grippa supported Mao, becoming one
of the most known supporters of Maoism in Europe. In 1963, he was expelled from
the Communist Party of Belgium, but soon he founded the new Belgian Communist
Party, Marxist – Leninist [BCP (m-l)]. 118 He was important for Albania and for
China because of his extended contacts with communist parties worldwide. He
personally claimed to be in contact with as many as sixty communist parties and
groups. 119 And initially, he supported even more strongly than Mijal the Chinese
struggle against the Soviet Union.
Therefore, for Hoxha, these two men were precious keys to establishing a strong
network of communists in Europe, which could be faithful to China and Albania.
Grippa collaborated with Albania from Brussels, and published documents of Mijal’s
party, such as the declaration of the PCP in La Voix de Peuple, (People’s Voice), the
official party press of the Belgian Communist Party, although they censored the
comments on Jews and other issues. Grippa proved hard to deal with, and it seems
that in 1966 he was behaving very selectively towards the Marxist groups. He
disagreed with the Albanian leaders about a Spanish communist party, recently
founded, and its illegal activities. Then, in Spain, followed the founding of another
communist party. Albania established contacts with both parties, although just one of
them was deemed fully Marxist. Grippa did not agree with the fact that Albania was
helping both of these groups, preferring to assist only the party led by someone
called Valera.120 Perhaps Grippa accredited himself as the reference, as a filter, for
the Albanian and Chinese contacts with the western European communist groups,
and claimed a certain role. He might have felt bypassed, therefore he blamed Albania
for assisting many groups that often were in conflict with each other. However,
considering that most of these parties and groups were small, and almost none of
them had consolidated power, Albanian leaders thought that having more options on
the table was better than having none left. Grippa, on the contrary, thought that,
given the limited resources, it was wiser to concentrate their efforts only towards
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those parties that had toed the right line. He looked, for example, at France, where
two groups, one in Marseille and the other in Paris had been assisted, where only the
groups of Paris truly shared their ideology. Kapo and Alia accepted that in the case
of France, Albania had been mistaken, and reminded Grippa to address his criticisms
to the PLA, and not its Chinese comrades, whom Grippa had also blamed.121 These
groups were also competing for resources, and Grippa could have had concerns
regarding the use of these resources. China, not Albania, had been the first to assist
Grippa in building his new communist (m-l) party, after his expulsion from the
Communist Party of Belgium in 1963. Beijing not only recognized the new party, but
assisted them materially and received Grippa in Beijing. In 1964, divergences about
the tactic and the approach to new European communist groups emerged between
China and Grippa, as Beijing wanted to establish relations with any possible
communist group that diverged from the Soviet Union, while Grippa remained
selective, using ideological boundaries and practical performances as his criteria for
evaluation.122
Beyond the propaganda narrative, neither Beijing nor Tirana were promoting
revolution – not at least in Europe. They wanted cells of Marxist-Leninists within,
but mostly outside, the communist bloc to provide legitimation for their split with the
Soviet Union. Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, many political parties in
the West had been taking the side of China, including groups within the European
big communist parties such as in France, Belgium, and Italy. In addition, these
groups could be useful as a bridgehead for further expansion of Mao’s, and
eventually Hoxha’s, thought. The work in the West, however, would not be easy. In
western Europe, the leadership of the communist movement was in the hands of the
largest communist parties of the western camp, the Italian Communist Party and the
French Communist Party. Both had strong ties with the Kremlin, which even the
United States found difficult to cut, as shown recently. 123 They shadowed almost
every attempt by leftist movements to gain political influence. Moreover, the
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economic growth in West Europe reached its peak during mid-1960s, in what is
known as the “Trente Glorieuses [The Glorious Thirty]”, the time of thirty years
1945-75 of economic growth after the Second World War.124 This undermined the
power base of the revolutionary forces. In this context, China and Albania could only
proselytize among extra-parliamentary leftist groups, which opposed both the
parliamentary left and the right.
These political communist groups were notable for the division amongst
themselves at this time. Each country had many groups that supported the SinoAlbanian alliance, but none were strongly collaborative with each-other.125 There are
at least three reasons for this. First is the fact that many of these groups claimed to be
the real communists in their country and they wanted to be recognized as such by
others. The second factor is their competition for resources, as they knew China and
Albania would support those most adherent to rigid ideological principles. The third
factor concerns the Albanian and Chinese strategy to not prioritize or even pursue
unity in these groups – because, in the case of betrayal by one group or party, they
could have other available groups to support their policy. Another significant aspect
of this assistance concerned the armed struggle, or lack thereof. No evidence has
emerged to suggest that China and Albania supported armed struggle in any
European country. This is likely due to the fact that, among other reasons, both
Beijing and Tirana had correctly seen that conditions for communist revolutions in
West Europe remained far from being ripe. Therefore, when asked to provide
military equipment, Hoxha was quite categorical in denying the western European
groups, as in the case of an Italian communist group. One Chinese concern about the
assistance provided to European groups was to avoid being accused by any European
country for intervention in internal affairs. Hoxha, in his personal diary in 1965,
criticized China for fearing too much. It seems, however, that China, although not
explicitly, was content to leave the “dirty work” of directly intervening on behalf of
these European groups to Albania, and in turn Beijing provided the financial and
material assistance.
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Regarding Latin America and, in particular, Africa, both China and Albania
thought there could be good chances for these revolutionary groups to assume
political power. Perhaps they were right, because following the decolonization
process, in many African countries’ leftist groups seized, or nearly seized, authority –
demonstrating in the process that these revolutions were more than just remote
possibilities. The same could be said of the Latin American groups. As the economy
in these countries was in the hands of oligarchies, with great support from United
States, and the political power was mostly in the hands of corrupted and authoritarian
military regimes, both China and Albania believed communist revolutionary parties
could gain support from the masses.126 In a visit to Albania in January 1964, Zhou
Enlai affirmed that ‘the revolutionary flame… exists today in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, countries where there is ongoing national revolutionary upheaval, there are
revolutionary conditions’.127 Their concern in this case was not the oppression of the
authorities, but the Cuban hold on these groups. They deemed Cuba revisionist,
although they both supported Castro.

CHINA’S ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ALBANIA
Unlike Kim Il Sung, Hoxha did not seek economic advantages from both China and
the Soviet Union – by playing Beijing and Moscow against each other.128 Although
during the party congress in February 1961, Hoxha mentioned to Kozlov and
Andropov that the Soviet call for peace would remain unanswered until complete
implementation of the economic assistance according to the agreements; Hoxha did
not push for further negotiations. From documents, it is clear that Hoxha prioritized
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the Chinese economic assistance, regardless of his eventual relations with Soviet
Union. This is shown by his conversation with the Soviet delegation in Tirana, which
focused more on the cause of Soviet-Albanian disagreements, rather than looking for
a way out of the stalemate.129 In fact, Hoxha’s position towards the Soviets was even
stronger by then, backed by the political and economic support of Beijing.130 After
all, Albania was not in the same position as North Korea, and a fight to control
Albania hardly would have occurred between China and the Soviet Union.
Chinese leaders actually contributed quite directly to Hoxha’s hostility towards
Moscow. For instance, Li Xiannian told Hoxha in February 1961 in Tirana, that
China would not provide as much military assistance to Albania as it received from
the WPO members.131 This left Albania at the mercy of Moscow’s conditions, but
since Moscow was providing no assistance by that time, Hoxha could not choose to
stay between Moscow and Beijing. Of course, he fully embraced China. Therefore,
when, between December 1960 and January 1961, an Albanian economic delegation
headed by Spiro Koleka, member of the PLA CC and vice head of the State Planning
Commission (a powerful state institution that used to plan and supervise the FYP),
visited China, their aim had not been to request a complementary loan, but
substantial assistance to replace the Soviet planned aid for the entire FYP.
Eventually, China approved a loan of 500 million rubles for the Albanian FYP 19611965. Although Albania formally was tied to agreements with Soviet Union for the
same FYP, the lack of Soviet implementation of these agreements made Albania
economically a client state of China. This came also as a consequence of the
continuous assurances China made to Albania, regarding its support, which as they
said, was going to be ‘unconditional’. As the events that followed would show, this
statement was not entirely true.
China’s promise was functional to both the Soviet-Albanian split, and to the
Sino-Soviet split. Other factors may have played a role as well. Chinese leaders knew
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that the Albanian quarrel with the Soviet Union resulted in Albanian quarrels with all
the other eastern European countries, and negatively impacted their economic
assistance to Albania. Hoxha personally had contributed to this situation by attacking
one by one nearly all the eastern European leaders during the Moscow Conference in
November 1960. Once relations with Moscow further deteriorated, and Albania was
isolated by the Soviet East European bloc, China perhaps was confident to persuade
Albania to give up at least some of its requests for assistance in developing their
heavy industry, and follow Chinese suggestions to prioritize light industry and the
production of consumer goods. This seems to have been the case when, in January
1961, in Beijing, Zhou Enlai confirmed China’s readiness to assist Albania, but also
asked for revisions to the Albanian plan. Zhou’s demands were similar to those
Khrushchev had made a few years earlier. China had confirmed the loan of 500
million rubles to Albania, which signed the beginning of many years of Chinese
assistance to the Albanian economy and to its FYPs, and replaced entirely the oncepromised Soviet assistance.132 However, Zhou did not agree with the Albanian plans
of building sixteen industrial projects for the period 1961-65. Although he eventually
ceded to their requests, he made three criticisms: first, of building large, complex
industrial projects while the agriculture was still backward, because ‘…if there is no
progress in the agriculture then there are also obstacles to the development of the
industry…’; second, of the manpower required for these industrial projects,
manpower that Albania’s small population – then around 1.6 million – could not
muster; and third, of the difficulties posed for China in providing products that
required advanced chemical processes, both for agriculture and industry.133
Zhou Enlai, knowing that Albania had run out of alternatives, thought he could
push Albanian officials to revise the FYP. In fact, only 100 out of 500 million rubles
of the Chinese assistance, less than one third, was addressed to agricultural
132
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investments. But Hoxha’s firmness withstood Zhou’s attempts. Significantly, Zhou
affirmed that his suggestion to focus on agriculture and light industry came ‘from our
[Chinese] experience’.134 By now the consequences of the Great Leap Forward had
been clear for Chinese leaders, and its outcomes had reduced China’s capacity to
project abroad the economic power they had planned when they launched it in 1958.
Zhou Enlai did not mention the Great Leap Forward explicitly, however, and there is
no evidence that Albanian officials came to know of its real consequences. On the
contrary, Li Xiannian told Albanian leaders in Tirana in February 1961 an outright
lie, affirming that Chinese economy ‘has been growing speedily… the industry has
developed greatly, in particular in the last three years’.135 Li Xiannian, who seems to
have been in contact with Beijing during his stay in Albania, was the first to propose
to send Chinese experts to Albania, and committed to assist as much as possible in
all fields. Despite the hardship in China, Beijing committed also to provide Albania
with the necessary wheat for the coming five years, part of the grain would have to
be imported from Canada.136

Finally Developing the Industry
Following the interruption of all relations with the Soviet Union, in early 1962
Albania asked China to revise the agreements regarding the FYP reached less than a
year earlier, to increase the investments in heavy industry. Albania had three
priorities: first, building a strong metallurgic sector; second, considering the
existence of a large number of rivers, the construction of a network of powerful
hydroelectric power plants; third, utilization of the oil fields. Another priority was
the building of plants for the production of chemical fertilizers to help boost
agricultural production. From December 1961 to January 1962, the Albanian head of
the State Planning Commission, Abdyl Këllezi, paid a visit to China. He re-
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135
“Minutes of conversation between comrade Enver Hoxha, Mehmet Shehu, Spiro Koleka with the
Chinese delegation headed by comrade Li Xiannian that has come in Albania to participate at the
Fourth Party Congress, Tirana, 09 February 1961”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1961, D2, f.17.
136

“Minutes of the second meeting between comrade Enver Hoxha, Mehmet Shehu, and the Chinese
delegation headed by comrade Li Xiannian, Tirana, 25 February 1961”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK,
V. 1961, D4, f.32-39.

136

negotiated the agreements of the FYP 1961-65 in the light of the recent interruption
of economic credits to Albania from the Soviet Union and East European bloc. China
accepted the requests for an additional loan of 30 million rubles (33 million USD),
and moreover, agreed to provide the technology (tubes) for the oil extraction – one of
the most important raw materials in Albania and a possible source of foreign
currency – by purchasing them directly from western countries in foreign
currency.137 In this new agreement, in total Albania was approved assistance of an
additional 29 industrial projects for a total loan of 151.9 million rubles138 (168.609
million USD).139 The two countries also decided to create a joint shipping company.
Zhou Enlai mentioned that Albania was one among more than 22 countries
China was then assisting.140 Unlike the Soviet Union, China had great problems with
its technological capabilities, forcing it to import technology from West Germany,
Canada, and Japan.141 For Albanian leaders this was not much of a concern as far as
‘all our plan is assured’, as Këllezi reported in Tirana.142 Zhou Enlai stressed that
Albania’s share of Chinese foreign aid was even larger than that of North Korea.143
137
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Perhaps that was partially true, but differently from Albania, North Korea was also
(and mainly) receiving assistance from Soviet Union. In addition, the total economic
aid granted to Albania was a long term loan, whereas before 1960 China had
provided to North Korea free aid totalling 1.6 billion rubles.144 Later, China granted
North Korea another long term loan of 420 million rubles for the years 1961-64.145
The fact remains that Albania was among the top beneficiaries of Chinese foreign
aid, on the same level as Vietnam and North Korea.146 In the 1960s, following the
Great Leap Forward, China was forced to re-assess its assistance to the African
countries, reducing that share of its efforts to the ‘minimum resources’ possible.147 In
return, China, in competition for influence with the Soviet Union, offered more
ideological assistance, scholarships for students and Chinese experts abroad. 148
Significantly, because Albania was the only European communist ally of China, it
was not affected by the Chinese reduction in foreign aid, but for the losses of others,
it now enjoyed the lion’s share of Chinese foreign assistance. This came about as
China’s bordering countries, after the 1960s, as mentioned above, chose to stay
mainly under Moscow’s umbrella, politically and, consequently, economically, as in
the cases of North Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam.149
The negotiations for this new agreement were not as easy as Albania had
expected. In fact, due to its own economic hardship, China seemed to step back in its
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commitment towards part of Albania’s industrial projects. At a certain point, Zhou
Enlai told Këllezi that it was impossible for China to ‘assume the entire burden they
[Soviet Union and other European countries] had assumed for you’. 150 China’s
hesitation to commit to building the Albanian heavy industry projects was received
with astonishment in Tirana, because China had initially offered to provide
‘unconditional’ assistance. A stunned Këllezi told Zhou that ‘you have assumed the
responsibilities to overcome our difficulties’, to whom Zhou Enlai replied that ‘only
in part’.151 For Zhou, it was better to speak less about the economic and more of
political collaboration, stressing the political importance of the alliance. For Albania,
however, economic survival was as important as the political – though the latter did
not depend as much on the alliance, or non-alliance, with China. From the Chinese
perspective, Albania had opposed the Soviet conditional economic assistance
because it found in China an alternative to Moscow’s interference. To the Chinese,
Tirana seemed desperate, in a position of tied-aid, and without any clear alternatives.
Therefore, when China made the same criticism the Soviets had to Albania, it
seemed possible to persuade the Albanian government not to undertake an economic
path that could prove burdensome for China (despite official rhetoric sustaining the
opposite) and prove neither efficient nor profitable for Albania. This was a
miscalculation, for Albanian leadership was determined to decide in full autonomy
the economic course of their country. It was precisely this determination that had tied
Albania to China, not simply the lack of alternatives, which Beijing did not
understand immediately.
On the other hand, the Chinese objection to Albania’s plans of prioritizing heavy
industry was coherent with the lessons China learned from the outcomes of the Great
Leap Forward. This experience changed China’s model of foreign aid, by
emphasizing ‘the light industry and agriculture in the early stages of
development’. 152 Albania, however, doggedly pursued the heavy industrialization
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that the Soviets had first promised (then denied), which had become an obsession for
Hoxha. Zhou Enlai blamed the Chinese struggles in part on the Soviet Union, which
had withdrawn all of its specialists from China, abandoning the joint industrial
projects. In this way, Zhou argued that China was going through a period of
economic difficulties and thus could not play the economic role it had planned had
the Great Leap Forward’s outcomes been according to the expectations.153
Among the many complex industrial projects Albania wanted to build was
achemical fertilizer plant, inclusive of a unit for the extraction of gas from oil. China
did not have the adequate technology for the plant, but was willing to enter into
negotiations on behalf of Albania with “Montecatini”, one of the biggest Italian
companies specializing in chemical products. China was interested in acquiring
advanced foreign technologies. 154 This was a chance to do exactly that, in
conjunction with Albania’s needs. Albania also requested the necessary technical
assistance from China to study, plan and eventually transform the Drini River, in the
North, into a hydropower cascade. At that stage, China agreed to study the idea, but
preferred (and suggested) using oil to generate electricity instead. But for Albanian
leadership, which were farsighted in this case, the oil extraction and processing was
much more complex, requiring technology and capital that Albania did not have,
whereas the Drini would be a reliable source of clean energy. During the
negotiations, China conceded the investments for nearly all of the heavy industrial
projects – neglecting, at Albania’s behest, agriculture and light industry.
But in its economic relations with China, Albania neglected (or preferred to
ignore) the technological gap between China and the rest of the communist camp, not
on the production of primary goods for the people and building the infrastructure. See Jeremy
Friedman, Shadow Cold War. The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World, 119.
153
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to mention the advanced capitalist nations. Despite the sincere efforts of Zhou Enlai
to convince Albania not to rely too heavily on China, because of this lack of
development, Albania trusted more in China’s potential than even China did. In their
second meeting, on 31 January, 1962, Zhou reaffirmed to Këllezi that China would
assist Albania without hesitations, but suggested that the leadership in Tirana should
not assume that China could resolve every problem, because ‘if then this plan is not
implemented, the people would lose its trust in the leadership’, warning that the plan
might not be implemented according to the schedule.155 In short, Albanian leaders
simply thought their country ‘was never a big cost for China, and the exaggerated
requests were a test of our alliance with Beijing’. 156 Furthermore, the Chinese
assistance was not direct financial aid to Albania but a loan to be repaid through
exports after barter agreements were negotiated.157
In June 1962, Hysni Kapo accepted an invitation to visit China. In January 1962,
Zhou Enlai had told Këllezi that China was committed to help as much as possible,
now in June 1962, only six months later, he confessed to Kapo that some of the
industrial projects for which China had offered its assistance would need to be
postponed to the next FYP, but that China remained committed to provide to Albania
whatever they could produce.158 Kapo eventually posed this problem directly to Mao
when the two met on 29 June, 1962, in Wuhan, but Mao showed less interest in
economic issues than political and ideological ones. Most of the projects began late,
as the blueprints came from China only after gathering the necessary information in
Albania.159 These delays were also a tactic China used to discourage Albania from
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making further requests. Eventually this proved ineffective, as a tireless Albania
increased its requests, believing that the more it asked, the more it got. One form of
aid that did reach Albania at this time was the Chinese specialists in charge of
planning and implementing the industrial projects.160
In 1963, the flow of Chinese aid had greatly increased Albania’s trade deficit,
exacerbated by the Chinese refusal to import anything Albania proposed to export.161
By the end of 1963, the bilateral trade reached 53 million rubles, compared to 1960
when it was only around 8 million rubles. Due to the increasing trade, the embassy in
Beijing was reinforced with a staff and trade representative with the main task of
following and supervising the delivery from China of the equipment for the industrial
projects. Of the 24 industrial projects China committed to build in Albania for the
FYP, only a small number of them had begun construction in 1963.162 More than
likely, the delays were due to the lateness of agreements reached with China, after
the withdrawal of the Soviet assistance, and, for some, also for the technological
problems in China. Around 284 Chinese specialists went to Albania at this time to
help with the implementation of these agreements, with particular regard to the
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building of 19 out of the 24 projects. In this first period, 104 Albanians also went to
China to acquire expertise in building and managing complex industrial combines.163
During his visit to China in September 1963, the defense minister of Albania,
Beqir Balluku, in a time when it was impossible to implement fully even the
agreements of the 1961-65 plan, asked Zhou Enlai to assist Albania with the FYP of
1966-70. China committed to this FYP but Zhou stressed that Albania should ‘base
the development on its own forces’.164 The goal of a self-reliant economy was one of
the principles of China’s foreign aid, which for Beijing marked the difference with
the Soviet assistance. 165 As Jeremy Friedman argues, the Chinese model of
development concluded in economic autonomy, not necessarily meaning a socialist
economy.
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This principle, although explicitly manifested in African (non-

communist) countries, did not correspond with the Albanian plan to pursue the
socialist economy at all costs. This was reinforced further by Balluku, who expressed
the intention of his government to rely on China for future economic development, as
‘Albania cannot implement its FYP ’66-70 without the assistance of the PRC’.167
At the end of 1963, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited Albania for the first
time, and celebrated the New Year in Tirana. China had first shown readiness to
assist Albania, but once the Soviet-Albanian split was definitive, Tirana met some
resistance in Beijing over the promised ‘unconditional assistance’ it had expected.
The visit of Zhou, therefore, was a chance for Hoxha to personally address this issue
with his Chinese counterpart. Although Hoxha promised to pay more attention to
agriculture, in his conversation with Zhou, Hoxha emphasized three sectors for
which he stressed the importance of Chinese assistance, none of them agriculture.168
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Zhou received a number of drafts of studies of Albania’s economic
perspective.169 The documents given to Zhou Enlai were anticipations of the future
FYPs, trying to engage China in a long term aid agreement. Although through these
documents Albania sought to accurately depict the situation to Zhou, their main
purpose was to highlight the potential yet unrealized. It would have not been easily
possible to convincingly exaggerate their situation, because hundreds (later
thousands) of Chinese specialists were staying in Albania at that time, and Albanian
officials knew that they had reported diligently to their home country. Zhou visited
Albania after announcing, during his African tour, the eight principles of Chinese
foreign assistance:170 1. China always follows the principle of equality and mutual
benefit in providing aid to other nations; 2. China never attaches any conditions or
asks for any privileges; 3. China helps lighten the burden of recipient countries as
much as possible; 4. China aims at helping recipient countries to gradually achieve
self-reliance and independent development; 5. China strives to develop aid projects
that require less investment but yield quicker results; 6. China provides the bestquality equipment and materials of its own manufacture; 7. In providing technical
assistance, China shall see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully
master such techniques; 8. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special
demands or enjoy any special amenities. Some of the principles that guided China’s
cooperation with Africa underlined the neutrality and ‘non-alliance’ of those
countries, in a postcolonial logic of relationship.171 During Sino-Albanian summits
these principles were not mentioned as a guideline in the economic cooperation
between Albania and China. The application or not of the eight principles to SinoAlbanian economic collaboration was marginal to the major ideological and
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geostrategic principles that guided the alliance. To Hoxha’s gratitude for the
generous Chinese assistance, Zhou Enlai emphasized the reciprocity of the aid.
Moreover, in proportion to Albania’s population, ‘you should not thank us on the
contrary, we should thank you more’ Zhou said.172 At the end, he reaffirmed China’s
commitment to assist Albania’s economy.
In 1964, China pushed forward the implementation of many industrial projects,
and also approved an additional loan of 6.5 million rubles for the remaining year
1964-65.173 Soon, however, some technological problems emerged, in particular in
the construction of a steel plant (Kombinat) in the city of Elbasan, 30km southeast of
Tirana. The problems began even before putting the first stone in its foundations.174
The Chinese experts’ laboratory tests were inconclusive regarding whether the
Albanian mines yielded the right minerals for producing the steels they wanted.175
Meanwhile, the preparation for the next FYP, 1966-70 had already begun, and in
January 1965, the Albanian Government sent a letter to the Chinese Government
with a long list of requests for the FYP.176 Some of the Albanian requests for the new
plan were considered by Chinese officials unreasonable – perhaps rightly so. For
instance, while the construction of the metallurgic combine in Elbasan was still in its
initial phase, Albania already asked to enlarge its processing capacity from 100
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thousand tons to 300 thousand tons per year. The total loan for the FYP they planned
to ask was 250 million rubles, mainly focusing on the industrial projects.177
In late March 1965, Zhou Enlai visited Albania for the second time. 178 The
occasion came after his attendance, in Bucharest, of the funeral of Romanian leader,
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. Zhou had taken initiative of visiting Tirana in order to
settle the Chinese disagreements with Albania that had emerged after Khrushchev’s
removal. Zhou considered this visit a good chance to reduce the gap with Tirana
regarding the views of the two parties over international issues, in particular those
concerning the communist camp. For Hoxha and Shehu instead, it was a good chance
to discuss again with Zhou about the forth FYP, 1966-1970, and for which a
delegation was about to visit China. While Hoxha began his talks with the economic
collaboration and the need for Chinese assistance, Zhou, instead, started with the
political issues, underscoring that the important issues over which the two parties
were somehow in disagreement were political, not economic. 179 Regarding the
economy, Zhou Enlai reaffirmed repeatedly the Chinese commitment to assist
Albania in order to for the latter better play its role on the international stage – the
role for which China was providing support.180
During April-June 1965, an Albanian economic delegation visited China to
discuss the unfinished projects of the FYP 1961-65, and to negotiate the FYP 196670. The talks with Zhou Enlai and Li Xiannian revealed some difficulties.181 What
mostly displeased Chinese leaders was Albania’s request for large quantities of grain,
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something China had to purchase in foreign currency from other countries such as
Canada. 182 Chinese officials repeated to Albanians that the living standards were
higher in Albania than in China, therefore Albania could not claim that it did not
have enough food for its own population. This contrasted with massive Albanian
efforts to develop industrial projects which for China were often even of doubtful
profitability. 183 Two factors influenced China’s almost unfriendly response to
Albania’s demands for crops: first, China’s difficulties since the failed Great Leap
Forward; second, the Vietnamese requests for food supplies were deemed to be far
more urgent.184 China responded by making great efforts to supply huge quantities of
food to Vietnam – a country then in a bloody conflict. 185 Eventually, China and
Albania reached an agreement on the total amount of the loan for the FYP 1966-70,
and on the list of industrial projects.186 China provided a total loan of 170 million
rubles, 82 million of which went for 18 new industrial projects, for a total of 45
industrial projects.187 Despite the confrontations with the Albanian delegation about
the request for crops, China approved 400 thousand tons of grain for the five year
period. China also agreed to help Albania to build its first major hydroelectric power
plant, with a dam 60 meters tall, in the city of Vau i Dejës. Beijing also postponed by
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ten years the Albanian repayment of the instalments for the previous loans. 188
Undoubtedly, Albania was proving to be a costly ally.

Chinese Military Assistance and Albania’s War Doctrine
There is perhaps no other field where Albania benefitted more from Chinese
assistance than in the military cooperation. This can be explained by the fact that
since the establishment of the PRC, China had faced many military challenges, such
as wars in Korea and Vietnam as well as the Sino-Indian clashes, which obligated
Beijing to build its own military industry. Even more so after the Soviet interruption
of military cooperation with China, and the technological transfer that went with it.
In this context, however high the Albanian requests were, they were still a minor
request compared to the amount of armaments China was producing and transferring
to Vietnam or North Korea. For the first time since winning its independence,
Chinese assistance allowed Albania to build a relatively modern and potent
professional army that could face any regional threat – at least this is what Albanian
leaders sustained. At the beginning of the 1960s, however, China had made clear its
position that it would assist only if the Soviet Union would interrupt its military aid
to Albania. When the Soviet Union isolated Albania in the WPO, China answered
Tirana’s call for aid.189 As confirmed by Hoxha’s talks to his officials, not only was
China going to help, but their (economic and military) assistance was going ‘beyond
the expectations’.190 Chen Yi, then China’s foreign minister, said in 1961 that the
Albanian requests ‘are a small thing, not a heavy burden for China’.191 According to
the Albanian ambassador’s report, Chen Yi said to him that ‘we provide military
188

Ministry of Trade, 23 November 1964, in AQSH, F.503, V. 1965, D223. The rest of the loan was
11.5 million for agriculture, 12.8 million for oil extraction, and 9.65 million for the transportation and
other 54 million in other fields.
189
“Notes from the meeting of Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu with Chinese ambassador in Albania,
Lo Shigao, 25 April 1961”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1961, D7. The ambassador informed
Shehu of the Chinese decision to help Albania with military supplies. Further confirmation came also
in June 1961, after that Soviet Union withdrew its military base. When Chinese leaders received the
Albanian ambassador in Beijing, Mihal Prifti, they all reaffirmed Chinese intention to assist Albania
in all fields, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1961, D11.
190

“Records of the 22nd PLA Plenum, 06 February 1961”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1961, D29, f.236248. Hoxha was reporting based on the correspondence he had with an Albanian delegation that was
in China negotiating military supplies.
191

“Information regarding the meetings of the Albanian ambassador in China, Mihal Prifti, with the
leaders of the party and the state of the PRC”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1961, D11, f.3. In his
meetings with Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping in 1961, the Albanian ambassador in
Beijing was told that China had decided to assist Albania at all costs.

148

assistance to Laos, Cuba, Algeria, and UAR (United Arab Republic: Egypt and
Syria)… we provide almost the entire military needs of Korea and Vietnam… To us,
your military requests don’t represent a burden at all’. 192 If not all the economic
requests for the FYP 1961-65 could be satisfied by China, the military demands,
instead, ‘were fully accepted, and the supplies will be delivered exactly as we
asked’.193 China provided Albania with the type of armaments and the techniques
that the Soviets had promised, and with ‘whatever China can produce for itself’.194
Soon in Albania arrived also the Chinese military experts in order to train the
Albanian army in the use of the new techniques.195 Since the very beginning, the
Albanian requests were, in the eyes of Chinese officials, disproportionate to its small
territory and population. Albania asked for hundreds of tanks, aircrafts, and jets, all
supported by an official narrative that portrayed Albania as the westernmost outpost
of communism, completely besieged by imperialist and revisionist countries.
Whereas the economic assistance was offered as long term loans that Albania
had to pay back in the years to come, either in foreign currency, or (and mainly)
through exports of raw materials, the armaments received from China were
completely free of charge, as shown by the protocols signed each year.196 Regarding
this point, it seems that Chinese leaders thought differently after signing the
agreement. In summer 1965, Zhou Enlai raised the question of including the
materials for military constructions as a part of the economic loans. He was not
talking about the armaments, but only construction materials that Albania had
requested to build the tunnels and bunkers for its army.197 At Albania’s insistence,
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Zhou had to step back. Eventually Albania received military aid from China so large
that it had ‘no comparison [in quantity] with that received from the Soviet Union’.198
The fortification of the country, through the construction of tunnels and bunkers,
took a real and successful leap forward with great Chinese assistance. By the end of
1964, more than 150km of tunnels were built, these did not include the tunnels in the
inhabited areas, but only those for storing the armaments, and to be used by the
soldiers in case of war.199
In 1963 the Albanian leadership decided to send the minister of defense, Beqir
Balluku, to China to discuss political, ideological, and military issues with the
Chinese leaders. 200 The minister had to make some additional requests for new
armaments. The whole strategy, expressed to Zhou by Balluku, was based on the use
of heavy artillery to reject the first wave of a possible attack. This would require
artillery powerful enough to face a large-scale attack. Hence the request for heavy
armaments. There were two main arguments behind this doctrine: first, Albania, the
minister affirmed, was ‘completely isolated and surrounded by enemy states… which
are drafting plans to annihilate Albania… because we stand firmly in our position of
Marxism-Leninism’; second, in case of war, it ‘will fight in conditions of inferiority
to the enemy, and under complete siege’.201 The Albanian minister argued that in
AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1965, D8, f.206. Not only the armaments, but even the huge tunnels that were
built to host the armaments which were expensive, were built in many cases with the generous
assistance of Beijing.
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case of war Albania did not want to give up at the first battle, retreating into a
guerrilla war in the mountains. It wanted instead to break the first wave of attack by
facing the strategic supremacy of the adversaries with the tactical and operational
maneuverability of Albanian troops, and by using in their favor the terrain.202 He
then explained that since the enemy would have the air supremacy, the construction
of tunnels and bunkers all over the country was a necessary defensive measure, in
order to conceal the armaments and to protect the people from air strikes. It is
interesting to note who he believed might become the aggressors. For the minister, if
China would provide the requested weapons, Albania could face without any
hesitation, and defeat any attack, coming separately from any of the neighboring
countries, Yugoslavia, Greece, and even Italy. But Albania feared a coalition of these
countries, or the military alliances of NATO or WPO. Albania feared an alliance of
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as this ‘could provoke Albania to create incidents,
pushing the WPO to turn Albania into a second Hungary’.203
Albanian leaders knew that they could not realistically defend against all those
depicted as their enemies, but the strategy was to transform a hypothetical war into
an international conflict, so that eventually NATO would play a role of deterrence, as
the Albanian coasts are just in front of Italy. It was a concern of gaining time, the
time necessary to transform any eventual war against Albania in an international
issue, guaranteeing to any enemy that an invasion of Albania would not become a
fait accompli on the international stage. The obstacle to this strategy would be a
treaty of non-aggression between NATO and WPO, which would transform Albania
into an easy target for the Soviets. Such a hypothesis was not remote, as during the
Geneva talks on disarmament in February 1962, the Soviet delegation had proposed a
treaty of non-aggression between NATO and the WPO.204 Balluku, in fact, did not
conceal Albania’s fear that Soviet Union ‘might use the WPO for aggressive
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purposes against Albania’.205 Fortunately, for Hoxha, such a treaty between NATO
and WPO did not find any support, yet the Soviet Union and United States signed the
Partial Ban Test Treaty at the end of July 1963. Both China and Albania, for different
reasons, firmly opposed it. 206 China was not against the ban of atomic tests in
principle, but understood this treaty as an attempt to prevent the Chinese from
developing an atomic arsenal. For China, it would not be enough to stop specific
tests, rather, all atomic arsenals in the world should be eliminated. Albania, however,
saw it as the first step of a larger understanding and consensus between the Soviet
Union and the western camp, which would leave more room for Khrushchev to
maneuver and close the ranks within the socialist camp.207

Albania’s Proposal of a Treaty with China
It was in this context that Albania, through its minister of defense, proposed
discussion with China on the possibility of signing a treaty of mutual friendship and
assistance between China and Albania, or, alternatively, a treaty of collective defense
that would include China, Albania, North Korea, and Vietnam.208 Chinese leaders
also had ‘planned to construct an alliance system with neighboring socialist countries
including Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam’.209 From documents, however,
it is not clear if Albanian leaders knew of such plans. A formal alliance with China,
in case of any sort of conflict, would mean for Albania to have on its side a large and
powerful country, which could have exerted significant influence in Albania’s favor
among the big powers, although militarily, this would make no difference. The
Albanian minister too stated that such a treaty would ‘be a political act’ and nothing
more. 210 China, however, was not willing to sign such a treaty. First, as Deng
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Xiaoping said to Balluku in their third meeting, it was highly unlikely that NATO
and WPO could come to terms for a mutual non-aggression treaty, because ‘there are
many complicated issues, especially Germany… the positions of the Soviets and
Americans are different also regarding the banning of the nuclear tests… the Soviets
might be very interested in a treaty, but United States would ask for a high price in
turn’.211 The second and more important motivation was China’s existing military
assistance to North Vietnam and North Korea, making it impossible to similarly
assist Albania. Any formal treaty could not offer more to Albania than it was already
receiving from China.
By rejecting this treaty, China was admitting that beyond the propaganda, it
could not assist Albania directly in the event of a war. Albania’s position was unlike
those of North Korea and Vietnam for Chinese national security. Albania was simply
a precious political ally far away, which had to be satisfied with the supplies it was
receiving. Deng Xiaoping denied the presumed threats Albanian leaders claimed they
would possibly face. To the Albanian claim that the United States and NATO could
attack the country, Deng replied that America was even avoiding a war with Cuba,
which is only some miles from American coasts, and had no interest at all in
attacking Albania. Only Yugoslavia, Deng admitted, could potentially threaten
Albanian security, but would an attack on Albania ‘be in their best interest?’, he
wondered. Deng also considered that an eventual attack from the Soviet Union would
come only if NATO or the United States attacked Albania, but since this probability
was low, the Soviet threat was also less imminent. Deng also suggested that Albania
should not exit the WPO, but stay as a member for tactical reasons. He expressed
doubts about Albania’s necessity for the heavy armaments it had requested, repeating
that would be ‘better to concentrate on the agriculture and construction’. 212 But
Balluku insisted on his point, reducing the threats to a more realistic dimension –
Albania’s neighbors. He reminded Deng of the fact that Albania did not have
diplomatic relations with Greece, which had been in a state of war with Albania since
the Second World War.213
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Albania asked that at least 90 thousand tons of military equipment be delivered
as soon as possible, and requested to update some armaments, replacing them with
new, more modern and powerful technologies that China might have developed by
then. 214 Regarding the transportation of these materials from China to Albania,
according to Rrahman Parllaku, a general of the army who visited China on three
occasions, the armaments were disguised as civil goods, and some of these
armaments, such as airplanes and tanks, were dismembered before loading, and
reassembled in Albania.215 The costs of shipping were paid half by China and half by
Albania.216 At this stage the army was provided with land-air missiles, and the Navy
was also reinforced.217
During Zhou Enlai’s visit in December 1963-January 1964, Enver Hoxha, in his
first meeting with the Chinese minister, alluded to the WPO as a threat to Albania,
and again explored the possibility of collective defense with China. Hoxha had to
admit that Yugoslavia was avoiding border incidents, but was still ‘…calling openly
for the overthrow of the Albanian leadership’.218 Zhou said that he was sending a
message to Yugoslavia by visiting Shkodër, a city bordering Yugoslavia. The
presence of Zhou and the Albanian minister of defense at the border area was ‘a
warning to them [Yugoslavia]’.219 Zhou Enlai reinforced Deng’s idea that the United
States was concentrating more on the struggle and competition with the Soviet Union
in other regions and was less interested in escalating tension in Europe – due also to
the American involvement in Vietnam. Throughout the talks, Zhou Enlai stressed
that the imperialist countries and in general ‘our enemies have not prepared the
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conditions to move to war’.220 In this way, he rejected Albanian claims that their
country was under siege and about to face an attack.
Enver Hoxha, instead, reaffirmed the Yugoslavian threat, drawing some parallels
between Tito’s indirect involvement in Hungary in 1956, and a similar scenario for
Albania. He emphasized his point by providing information from the State Security
(the secret police at the time, known in Albanian simply as “Sigurimi”), according to
which, in Yugoslavia ‘there are three centers [of espionage] against Albania, with
eleven outposts, involving a hundred officials…’.221 The Soviet secret services were
reported to be collaborating with the Yugoslav espionage to gather information about,
and undermine, Albania. The same was reported of Greece, which the Americans had
supposedly used as their base for espionage against Albania. These countries were
allegedly gathering mercenaries, mainly Albanian exiles, ‘2000 in Greece, 1800 in
Yugoslavia’, trying to organize incursions in Albania, in order to foment rebellions,
and overthrow the regime.222 It is not clear how reliable the information was, or if it
was fabricated in order to persuade Chinese officials to support the Albanian requests.
But it was no secret that although Albania did not openly claim Kosova, they
supported the claims of the Albanian population in Yugoslavia for greater autonomy,
possibly self-governance. This, Hoxha believed, was another reason Tito opposed
Albania and its leadership.223
Zhou Enlai reiterated his view that Albania should not leave the WPO, but
should wait for when the alliance would violate its rules, providing an excuse for
Albania to denounce it. Hoxha agreed, but still saw the alliance as dangerous, as if
one of Albania’s neighbors were to attack it, then this alliance, instead of defending
the country, would give license to the Soviets to intervene, officially to defend
Albania, but actually to occupy it. In that case, the WPO would be an obstacle to any
sympathy from the West towards Albania, officially a member of the alliance.224
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Zhou Enlai reconfirmed China’s commitment to help Albania’s army, and stated that
China ‘will send the supplies according to the plan… in case of new advanced
armaments we will send them without waiting for a request, albeit not in big
quantities… for the tunnels and fortifications it would be better if you send someone
to Korea to see and get experience’.225 This visit revealed to Hoxha that although
China would provide Albania with armaments, it would not commit to a formal
military alliance. China indirectly warned Hoxha not to provoke any tension in the
region. As a result of the new equipment from China, one of the main problems that
surfaced was the lack of manpower to manage the armaments. In 1964, the army had
only 16 generals, and only around 120 colonels.226 The military schools were trying
to solve the problem by accepting more students each year, but these problems
persisted until 1970.227 With Chinese assistance, Albania could enlarge its navy from
a single base, in Vlora, to three – covering the entire coast. Moreover, the Chinese
armaments enabled reorganization of the entire army, adding for the first time new
branches, such as a unit against chemical attacks, and restructuring the chain of
command. With the new organizational structure, the army could mobilize a
contingent ‘twice larger than the previous structure’.228
In 1965, when an Albanian delegation visited China, Zhou Enlai firmly opposed
Albania’s defense strategy, recommending guerrilla warfare instead.229 Zhou brought
the example of Vietnam, but the Albanian minister argued that Vietnam was an
occupied country that had no choice but to fight accordingly, whereas Albania was
an independent country with a regime in power, controlling the entire territory and in
case of attack had to make efforts to defeat the aggressors. Zhou Enlai’s remarks
most likely were also a reflection of a similar debate in China about Chinese military
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strategy.230 That debate was mainly between those who were in favor of a strong
professional army, like Luo Ruiqing, and those who emphasized more political
preparation and peoples’ war, such as Lin Biao. 231 Luo defended building a
professional army ‘able to use conventional weapons’ to oppose the enemy. Lin, on
the other hand, prioritized ‘political preparations, and Mao’s Thought’. 232 Mao
favored Lin’s argument, but many years later, after Mao’s’ death, Luo was
rehabilitated and reinstated, after he had been purged during the Cultural Revolution.
Albania did not draft its first official document regarding a war strategy until
1967. The first document possible to track in the archives regarding the defense
strategy was drafted under the supervision of the Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu. In
November 1967, the Council of Defense discussed the draft and apparently there
were no disputes among the Council members about the document. However, some
discrepancies emerged between Shehu and the defense minister Balluku regarding
their idea of war. For Shehu, the partisan war (guerrilla tactics) should be considered
auxiliary to a frontal clash as Albania was building up a modern army. Balluku
instead wanted to emphasize in the document those aspects regarding the preparation
of a partisan’s war. Decisively, Hoxha offered his more support to Shehu.233

Conclusion
The period that preceded the alliance were years of great convergence between
Albania and China, owing to their corresponding interests and mutual opposition to
the destalinization process. Once the alliance was established, however, and
Albania’s economic support was exclusively in China’s hands, the relations became
more complexed. Contrary to the perception, Sino-Albanian alliance begun with
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attrition. Hoxha, in supporting China against the Soviet Union, had successfully
gambled on a positive outcome, which in fact resulted in the peaceful end of
Albania’s relations with the Soviet Union. This, from Hoxha’s perspective, was a
political and strategic victory. He, however, wanted China to believe that for Albania,
the split with Soviet Union was not only a Tirana-Moscow issue concerning only
Albanian regime’s security. Hoxha made efforts for China to see Albania’s struggle
against Soviet Union as a struggle concerning the communist principles that Moscow,
for Hoxha, had betrayed. Related to this, the Albanian leaders claimed to have
defended Chinese interests by opposing Moscow, as far as those interests
corresponded with their interpretation of the communist ideology. Consequently
Hoxha did not expect any reversal of the policy towards the Soviet Union. With
China’s attempt to convince Albania to seat on the same table with the Soviets,
Hoxha discovered that Beijing’s policy towards Soviet Union was not as linear as
Tirana’s policy. For Hoxha keeping away from any rapprochement with the Soviet
Union was paramount. But was also fundamental for him that China keeps equally
distant from any rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Both, interstate and
interparty close relations between Moscow and Beijing were two undermining
factors for his regime who had built a huge propagandistic narrative of the SinoAlbanian common struggle against the Soviet Union – attacking it as a “revisionist”
country.
On the other hand, China perhaps had neglected Hoxha’s determination to
continue firmly his opposition to the Soviet Union. If China found impossible to
convince Albania to normalize relations with Soviet Union, or even just with East
European socialist countries, it thought instead it could have a say regarding
Albania’s economic policy. In fact this was more related to practical issues involving
China’s foreign aid. But on this point too Albania’s stubborn standing and Hoxha’s
determination to pursue the heavy industrialization were difficult to overcome by
Beijing. At the end China and Albania continued their antagonism towards Moscow,
and Beijing also accommodated Albania’s economic and military requests. Yet,
Beijing refused to establish a treaty of alliance (for defensive purposes) with Tirana,
turning down Albania’s request which in a way was a message to Tirana that China’s
assistance to Albania had also limits. One unknown aspect of the Sino-Albanian
relations during this period is their common effort to challenge Soviet power within
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the international communist movement, by trying to bring on their side communist
parties and Marxist and leftist movements which supported the Chinese course. More
specifically, if China’s rivalry with Soviet Union, among others, because of Beijing’s
claims of equal footing with Moscow in the communist camp, is an established fact
for the historians, less established, if not known at all, is that part of China’s design
to acquire a prominent position, alternatively to the Soviets within the international
communist movement, was Beijing’s use of Tirana in this sense. In fact China saw in
Tirana a solid ally in promoting China’s claim for leadership in both, the
international communist movement, and the so called Third World. As the next
chapter shows, Sino-Albanian coordination and common action further intensified
during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, which although initially received with
reticence in Tirana, eventually the Albanian leadership strongly supported.

159

CHAPTER FOUR

TURBULENT TIMES, 1966-1970:
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON THE
SINO-ALBANIAN RELATIONS

Introduction
The Chinese Cultural Revolution was a moment of great instability in Chinese
history; one that left its mark on Chinese attitudes towards the world, creating similar
instability in China’s international relations. Those with Albania were no different.
When the Cultural Revolution started in 1966, almost all Chinese ambassadors
abroad were called back to Beijing for ‘education’ and disputes emerged in ‘more
than thirty out of roughly forty countries with which it [China] had diplomatic
relations’.1 Though Albania was not among the countries that openly disputed the
Chinese Cultural Revolution, it feared the effects this turmoil could have on its
alliance, and the benefits thereof, with China.
Initially, Albanian leadership attacked the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and in
private, secret debates rejected its main patterns as anti-Marxist. Eventually, though,
Albania ended up promoting also its own form of Cultural Revolution, which was
not motivated by any internal political necessity – there were no lines of dispute
within the leadership – but it served to strengthen the alliance with China and further
consolidate the party’s control over the Albanian society. Through his own Cultural
Revolution, Enver Hoxha achieved three important objectives: first, Albania gained
more economic and military aid from China, as a reward of the support for the
Chinese Cultural Revolution; second, the Albanian Cultural Revolution removed
within Albania, through controlled mobilization of the masses, any obstacle to the
complete dominance of the party over all aspects of the Albanian society – mainly
religion; third, it was a further step towards the emancipation of women.
By the time of the beginning of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the
communists in Albania had already been ruling the country for twenty-two years, and
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the country was in a state of relative welfare, owing almost entirely to China’s
economic assistance. The Chinese Cultural Revolution came unexpectedly for
Albania, and its leaders were caught by surprise and were confused about its nature,
its aims, and the possible outcomes. To gather more information, from April 1966 to
September 1967 Hoxha sent many delegations to China, until he was assured that
this revolution could be a political and economic opportunity for Albania if he
supported China. Albania’s support, however, did not come immediately: instead,
when Hoxha first called a meeting in the Politburo in October 1966, he attacked the
‘chaos’ in China and the cult of Mao which for him had reached a ‘disgusting level’.
Despite the fact that from documents emerges a Hoxha able to make very lucid
analyzes of Chinese (and international) politics, he and the PLA, thought it
unconceivable that a political crisis like China’s could be induced by its leaders
themselves. Therefore, he did not fully understand, nor consequently accept, that the
top of the pyramid of an established system like the CCP, could decide to shake its
own foundations, making the Chinese Cultural Revolution a ‘unique’ revolution.2
Later, to sweep away doubts, Hoxha received Zhou Enlai and, importantly, Kang
Sheng, who definitively convinced him that supporting the Cultural Revolution
would be the right choice. Gradually, what started as a nightmare for Albania became
a great opportunity for the regime.3

Perceptions of the Chinese Cultural Revolution
The Cultural Revolution in China is one of the most debated events in the second
half of the Twentieth Century. The historical narrative about it is mainly negative,
that of a great calamity and a dark period in China’s history.4 Recently, however,
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new research has been conducted which, without denying the violence unleashed
during those years, also reveals overlooked aspects of the Cultural Revolution.5
In the mid-1960s a line was drawn within the CCP, leading to a confrontation,
the line was between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi.6 The first signs of the struggle
within the CCP had appeared during the Great Leap Forward, in the late fifties, early
sixties.7 Among many, three moments here above mentioned were indicative of the
coming clash: first, the Lushan conference in 1959, then both the Beidahe
conference, and then also the Tenth Plenum of the CCP in 1962. The economy was
the main concern over which the so-called rightists, later called revisionists, and
leftists, the group supported by Mao, argued until they reached an open
confrontation. According to Gao, before this happened, both sides ‘did not object to
the idea that something had to be done in China in order to avoid events like those in
Budapest in 1956 happening in Beijing’ too. 8 Mao and Liu, however, saw the
problem from different perspectives. For Liu the problem was grassroots corruption
by elements outside the party.9 Mao, instead, thought that the problem was inside,
and was not organizational but ideological.10 Mao wanted to prevent any deviation
like that of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union, and he thought revisionism could be
5
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prevented only by suppressing within the CCP those that might have similar
temptations. By doing this, he wanted to avoid any challenge to his power within the
party. Indeed, at a certain point, at the beginning of the sixties, Mao thought he had
no authority over the party. The Cultural Revolution became a formidable weapon in
his hands to regain the total control of the party and the country. But this weapon
could not be developed or used without great turmoil and many casualties.
When the Cultural Revolution became known to the Albanian embassy,
diplomats sent a radiogram from Beijing proposing open support for the Cultural
Revolution.11 The embassy was running too fast. Uncertainty dominated perception
abroad about Chinese events, and the embassy’s will did not correspond to the
official stance in Tirana, where the party lacked an official position regarding the
events in China. Consequently, Albania decided to proceed with caution. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tirana stated that, ‘…what is happening there is
China’s internal affair’, and emphasized the fact that it was too early and not
necessary to either support or deny it. 12 As has been explained by scholars, the
Cultural Revolution was mainly (not only) a struggle within the leadership of the
CCP, not aimed at becoming a world revolution. 13 China, more desperately than
ever, needed foreign friends, in particular due to the Cultural Revolution’s impact on
China’s diplomacy and foreign affairs.14
In April of 1966, the Chinese government officially invited an Albanian
delegation to visit China, and the Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, led it personally.15
The Albanian leaders were anxious to know more about the events, and expected this
visit to be fruitful in this sense. During his visit, which began on 29 April 1966,
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Shehu and his delegation were warmly welcomed with a rally of one million people
in Beijing, the equivalent of half of the Albanian population at the time.16 The fact
that Liu Shaoqi, President of the PRC, received them in person, did not belie the
struggle to occur within the Chinese political system in the coming months, when
Liu would be one of the main victims, perhaps the most notable, of the Cultural
Revolution. The delegation toured China for two weeks, until 11 May, 1966, but
there are no reports showing that they had any conversations focused on the Cultural
Revolution. Mainly they spoke of economic collaboration and ideological and
political coordination, issues Albania and China had long been discussing. Only in
his meeting with Mao did the Chairman allude to unpredictable events, when he said,
‘…we must prepare, it can happen that revisionists enter Beijing and our comrades
can happen to transform into revisionists. This is one of the possibilities’.17 There
was no explicit mention of the Cultural Revolution, but Mao expressed his idea that a
cleansing campaign was necessary in China, where he suspected highly ranked
officials to be revisionists. Mao stated that since there were counter-revolutionaries,
there must be revolution, ‘where leftists are, there are rightists too’ For Mao
therefore, to act against them was necessary. 18 He then asked Shehu if there was
bamboo in Albania, because, Mao added, with revisionists should be as with bamboo
‘…it should be removed the bamboo layer… while keeping only the center, the good
part of it… we have removed the layer [of the party] like in bamboo, Gao Gang,
Peng Dehuai, Peng Zhen, etc. This is what we will do with those still undiscovered
that are sleeping next to us yet’.19 Shehu did not get the point on ‘revisionists in
Beijing’ and Mao did not elaborate. The revisionists for Mao were precisely those
receiving Shehu, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping.20 Shehu did not understand, nor
did the other leaders in Albania, the dynamics of Chinese politics in those years, that
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identifying a potential danger within the party did not always lead to an immediate
purge.
Even though the CCP had fewer years in power in China than the PLA in
Albania, it had a longer tradition of political internal debates.21 If, in Albania, the
political power of the communist party was reduced to the personal power of Enver
Hoxha, the CCP instead had a long tradition of collegial deliberations, some tracing
back to its foundation in 1920s.22 Therefore, unlike Albania, in China the purges
often were preceded by a process of analyzis and assessment of effective power
because in China political power was less concentrated than in Albania. Nonetheless,
as scholars have outlined, of the fifty-seven founders of the CCP, eventually only
two survived purges.23
During his visit, Mehmet Shehu also had talks with Deng Xiaoping regarding the
ideological and political issues that concerned, united, or divided both parties. What
most divided them was the issue of the existence of the bourgeoisie as a class in an
established socialist society. For Deng ‘even after the revolution and the taking of
power… capitalism or revisionism can still restore to power.’ 24 This was Mao’s
position too, but in Albania, this possibility was not worthy of consideration because
they claimed that in a truly socialist country, only the communists held power, and
what was left was perhaps only remnants of the bourgeoisie, but not the class as a
political entity. The response of Mehmet Shehu predicted just how the Albanian
Cultural Revolution would evolve in the following years. Shehu said that ‘your
experience is very valuable for us… [Yet] … we take from it what is appropriate for
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the conditions of Albania’.25 When Shehu met Liu Shaoqi, unexpectedly for Shehu,
Liu expressed many critiques of Stalin’s, listing his major mistakes. These included:
Stalin’s claim that socialism had won in Soviet Union, lowering the Soviet people’s
vigilance against internal enemies; Stalin had underestimated the masses by relying
primarily on the party’s bureaucrats, and he had denied class differences between the
peasantry and the proletariat.26 Shehu reported that for Liu, ‘these are the reasons
why revisionism has emerged in the Soviet Union’.27 In addition, Liu alleged that the
Soviet Union was imperialist in its attitude towards China, with regard to border
disputes regarding territories that once formed part of the Chinese Empire. 28
Although Shehu avoided entering into discussions on this issue, he deemed
Khrushchev, not Stalin, responsible for the birth of revisionism.
At the end of this visit, the two parties decided to prepare and release a joint
communiqué. This revealed the oft-disputed ‘question of classes in the socialist
society and the causes of the emerging of revisionism and restoration of
capitalism…’. 29 Shehu complained about the fact that Chinese comrades did not
accept the Albanian formulation that ‘the class struggle exists between two lines, the
socialist and capitalist, but not between socialist and bourgeoisie’. For Albania, after
communist rule had been established, the bourgeoisie as a class should have been
extinguished otherwise the communists would have not accomplished a key task:
overthrowing the bourgeoisie class. Instead, the Chinese comrades considered that
‘during… the socialist era, in the socialist countries, there exist the bourgeoisie class
too and [only] based on this [assumption] the class struggle is between proletariat
and bourgeoisie’.30 Neither party renounced its position, and in order to agree the
25
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joint communiqué, both agreed to general declaration regarding socialist society and
the necessity of class struggle.31
Another explanation of these differences rests in the different natures of the
communist revolutions in China and Albania. In Albania, the revolution had been
organized by a restricted group of middle class people, formed in the urban areas of
Albania, and in some cases educated in western Europe. In China, instead, although
‘the CCP had little concern for rural matters during its first few years’ 32 from
foundation, the peasantry had a central position in forging the identity of the Chinese
communist revolution.33 In China the delegation received a “top-secret” document
from the CCP regarding the Politburo’s dismissal of the group of five persons in
charge of the Cultural Revolution. 34 The document is mainly the discussion, and
decision, to dismiss Peng Zhen and his group that had been ‘totally’ wrong for (not)
criticizing “Hai Rui Dismissed from Office”.35 The criticism of this literary work was
one of the first stage curtains to open on the Cultural Revolution in China and made
Peng Zhen its first target and victim.36 Mao wanted an open and strong criticism of
this piece but Peng Zhen, Mayor of Beijing and member of the Politburo, did not
have the same zeal and tried to protect the author, Wu Han, who was the deputy
mayor of Beijing.37
On 24 June, 1966, Zhou Enlai returned to Albania, on a tour of many countries.
In the meantime, the Cultural Revolution became rougher and this captured the
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attention of the Albanian leadership. Shortly before Zhou landed in Tirana, page
three of People’s Voice included Albania’s first article about the Cultural Revolution
in China. 38 In a regime where details were often symbols transmitting political
messages, it is worth noting that the first article mentioning the Cultural Revolution
was not front page news. The event was described only in general terms such as a
‘…vital part of the further and broad socialist revolution’, against remnants of the
bourgeois culture and against the possibility for revisionists to take the political
power.39 There was nothing on battles between factions, red guards, work groups,
struggle sessions, or any violent action. In retrospect, this article seems like Albanian
authorities’ wishful thinking. The visit of Zhou Enlai could have been useful to
remove the uncertainties the Albanian leadership still had about the Cultural
Revolution, but not even Zhou could, at that stage, know what was to come.
In his political diary, Enver Hoxha wrote nothing of this visit, mainly because he
considered that nothing relevant came into the open with Zhou Enlai’s visit, as ‘not
even Mao’ could have predicted the evolving of the situation.40 His expectations to
understand better, however, were great, as he told the Chinese, ‘…you are running a
great revolution of extraordinary importance’. 41 In his welcoming speech, Enver
Hoxha expressed his deep gratitude for Chinese assistance in his country and his
‘solidarity with Mao’s thought’. But Hoxha also made clear that Albania would not
faithfully adhere to the Chinese path. For Albania to ‘learn very much from you
[China]… we adopt [and adapt] to the real [specific] conditions of our country’ the
policies promoted in China. For reasons concerning Albania’s national security and
independence from Yugoslavia, Stalin always remained for Hoxha the central figure
in world communism, and this was a good chance to respond to the criticism of
Stalin that Liu Shaoqi had addressed in meeting Mehmet Shehu earlier that year. For
Hoxha, any attempt to use the Cultural Revolution to attack Stalin was rejected. In
38
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his long experience, Hoxha said, ‘…our party has no documents... that allow us to…
determine any responsibility of Stalin… [Therefore]… the line followed by Stalin…
has always been a Marxist-Leninist line, a revolutionary line’.42 Then, in talking to
Zhou Enlai, Hoxha followed up with a long explanation on why, according to him,
Stalin had made no mistakes regarding either political power concepts, the theory of
class struggle, or any of the other issues discussed in Beijing a few months earlier.
Hoxha alleged that if the Cultural Revolution in China was aimed at the substitution
of Stalin’s position, as a great figure of international communism, with Mao, and
substitution of the Stalinist way with the Maoist, using Mao’s thought, then Albania
would not follow the same path.
Enver Hoxha was anxious to explain to Zhou Enlai another point that had been
cause for dispute in Beijing between Shehu and Liu; the existence of the bourgeoisie
class in a socialist country. He stressed Albania’s specifics and why there were only
remnants of the old classes, but no class other than proletariat which had retained
political power. Albania, for Hoxha, had always been a poor country and that did not
allow the emergence of a class of capitalists and bourgeoisie. Therefore, the
bourgeoisie lacked conditions to become a powerful class and remained small.
Moreover, after the liberation, the communists could immediately solve the problems
of political power and the class struggle by violently overturning the other classes,
leaving them no chance of survival. Hoxha praised his party’s proletarian
dictatorship, which through public trials and merciless campaigns had eliminated
almost all its enemies. In Albania, definitely, the only class in power was the
proletariat. Nevertheless, a merciless class struggle was necessary and it mainly
served to suppress the remnants of the overturned classes, their ideologies, religion,
and old traditions.43
In his intervention, Zhou Enlai ceded nothing, and repeated the same criticisms
of Stalin that Liu Shaoqi had expressed in Beijing to Mehmet Shehu. Zhou stated that
if current leaders assessed Stalin’s merits and mistakes and gave him a grade, ‘we
can say he has three mistakes and seven merits’.44 He also said to Hoxha that maybe
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in Albania the antagonist class remained small, but ‘in China we are speaking about
sixty million people, and for sure we cannot just eliminate them’. 45 Zhou’s visit
certainly did not clarify any parts of the Cultural Revolution, as Hoxha hoped it
might. On the contrary, the visit left more confusion and room for speculation.
After Zhou Enlai’s visit, the bilateral correspondence between the parties
intensified, probably because China sensed Albania’s confusion, and possible
misperception, of Chinese events. Among many documents, the PLA received the
official communiqué released after the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee of
the CCP, simply known as Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress held in
Beijing on 1-12 August 1966.46 For Albania, it was important that this document
expressly deemed Soviet revisionism as dangerous as American imperialism.47 That
is, by identifying Soviet Union as one of the targets of the Cultural Revolution’s
struggle, Chinese leaders were identifying a target in common with Albania, at least
one target that the Albanians would not miss. The CCP passed to the PLA other files,
in order to ‘exchange the experience’, regarding the ‘socialist education campaign in
the countryside… the campaign for the four cleansings movement’, and other
documents of this nature.48
The People’s Voice still wrote on the importance of the Eleventh Plenum
Communiqué, albeit without much zeal, by publishing an article that emphasized
how this revolution was ‘…the best evidence of the class struggle in the actual period
in the People’s Republic’. 49 By saying ‘in the People’s Republic of China’, they
inferred that the Cultural Revolution was still a Chinese phenomenon. Mainly, the
People’s Voice used Xinhua – the Chinese official news agency – as the source of its
information and published Xinhua’s articles, or parts of them. Indeed, another article
reported much of what Xinhua had officially published regarding a rally Mao held
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Beijing with one million students and teachers on 15 September, 1966.50 It is worth
noting that People’s Voice reported only some parts, those appropriate according to
them for the Albanian reality, and not the entire space Xinhua had given to the event
in Beijing. The events in China were becoming too important and an intervention of
Hoxha that could orientate the restricted group of high officials of the party was
necessary.

Condemning the Chinese Cultural Revolution
In his diary, published after the Sino-Albanian split in 1979, Enver Hoxha wrote
about his first impressions of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.51 Published once the
relations with China were interrupted, with the purpose of sharing his thoughts
regarding Chinese politics, this diary is not reliable. Nevertheless, in many of its
passages it is possible to observe a certain coherence between the diary and the
archives, in this way motivating those voices that see his political diary written ex
post intending to rewrite history in Hoxha’s favor after the split with China.52 The
first issue about the Cultural Revolution that Hoxha touched upon was the cult of
Mao, which Hoxha considered unacceptable. Mao, Hoxha said, was venerated in
China as a God. The Chinese, by so doing, were diminishing the role of the masses
and the role of the communist party, ‘...they are turning the cult of Mao into a
religion’.53 Hoxha did not see Mao as the successor to Stalin. For he saw himself as
the most loyal follower of Stalin, the only one to be internationalist, leading the only
‘communist castle in the Adriatic coast’. Hoxha emphasized with pride that ‘…we
[Albanians] are, in fact, the only ones defending the figure of Stalin’.54
Besides, Mao had criticized Stalin and therefore, in Hoxha’s eyes, did not
deserve the same consideration. For Hoxha, raising the cult of the individual was to
subordinate the role of the CCP to that of Mao. He argued that the party should be
50
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the protagonist, instead of relying on Mao’s figure. Mao, in contrast, challenged the
limits of the party and became a leader above the CCP. There is no doubt that the
political leadership in Albania was conscious of China’s great international
importance, they even would often publically and openly deem Beijing a protagonist,
but for them this was only a consequence of China’s size and vast resources. In
Hoxha’s view, China was important because it was China, not because it was ruled
by Mao. The point, however, concerned Albania’s autonomy from China. If Mao had
to become the new personification of world communism, then Hoxha was pressured
to follow Chinese path. The experience with the Soviet Union under Stalin was
significant in this regard. Hoxha wanted to maintain autonomy from China, because
Chinese policies were not fully endorsed by Hoxha, and autonomy of action for him
was paramount. Hence came his criticism of Mao’s cult.
On 10 October, 1966, Enver Hoxha, in a meeting of the Politburo, commented
for the first time on the Chinese Cultural Revolution. 55 After reminding his
colleagues of the secrecy of his speech, Hoxha blamed China for the lack of
information in his hands, so it was not easy to analyze the Cultural Revolution. For
Hoxha, China, as so big a country, was very important for the communist cause, and
the events in Beijing resonated internationally. He warned to not confound his
criticism of this revolution with the many other criticisms coming from three
different directions; from the capitalists, revisionists, and real Marxist-Leninists.
Despite the fact that Albania was among the real Marxist friends of China, it feared
that it would be a ‘great mistake if our Chinese friends confound these three
directions… In that case, they would lack Marxist objectivity’. Hoxha was not alone
in criticizing the Cultural Revolution, though alone in doing it secretly, as the
‘revisionist’ countries, Soviet Union, and its allies ‘will use the words of Marx and
Lenin to criticize the Cultural Revolution’. By so doing, our criticism, he argued, will
‘be in the same form but not the same purpose with these betrayers’… [Therefore]
Chinese comrades have the heavy burden of distinguishing friends from foes’. 56
Hoxha intended his criticism to be constructive, and not a challenge to his best, and
only, ally. This was also an occasion for him to remind the party’s cupola members
55
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of some of the issues that had motivated dissent with the CCP. Therefore, eventual
disputes on the Cultural Revolution would not be the only reason for a hypothetical
split with China.
Hoxha resumed all the disputes that had emerged between Albania and China
during the visit of Shehu in Beijing, and the visit of Zhou Enlai in Tirana earlier that
year: Chinese leaders never showed enough firmness against Yugoslavian
revisionism, and they did not ‘have clear idea of Tito’s betrayal’ of communism;57
‘Chinese comrades did not realize how dangerous Khrushchev’s line was... Despite
the fact that they did not openly accept Khrushchev’s defamation and slander on
Stalin, within them they believed it… they even strengthened their thoughts with
alleged [Stalin’s] mistakes’;58 the different assessments of Stalin’s figure, emerged
between Hoxha and Zhou Enlai during Zhou’s visit to Albania in June 1966 when
Zhou had had a long conversation with Hoxha. Regarding Stalin’s rise to power,
Zhou tried to convince Hoxha that Stalin was not infallible. Hoxha listened to Zhou,
‘but he did not convince us at all’. Regarding the Chinese ‘soft tactic’ in the
propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union, during which China ‘tried to
convince us to dismiss the open polemic [with the CPSU]’. Hoxha decided that ‘the
Chinese comrades… had few illusions and a punishable attitude’. And regarding
Albania’s dissent with China on the ideological controversy, over ‘the existence of
feudal bourgeoisie class as the class that fights us from a position of power’. Finally,
Enver Hoxha understood that ‘factions within the [CCP] leadership should be very
deep… dangerous enemies stay in the Central Committee and inside the Politburo’.59
Before taking any side in the struggle within the Chinese leadership, Hoxha decided
to wait and see who would win and who would lose before risking standing on the
wrong side.
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Then Hoxha showed interest and concern in the CCP leadership’s changes as
‘Lin Biao came out being the second after Mao [Eleventh Plenum], and comrades
like Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De pass to be eighth or ninth in the list… how?… we know
nothing’. Hoxha attacked the Red Guards that had been formed before the plenum
was held, and attacked the ‘cult of Mao… which is reaching a disgusting level’.
Some issues, therefore, were clear, but in general, there remained many uncertainties
as ‘we do not see clear orientations of this revolution’. Hoxha could not see what
truly comprised this revolution. At this stage the Cultural Revolution consisted in,
and was veritably reducible to, the actions of Red Guards that ‘change the names of
the streets… raid and loot the people’s homes… spreading the feeling of the
arbitrariness… and what’s even more dangerous, attack the party’s committees, burn
libraries and destroy old monuments. It is very difficult to call this revolution a
cultural one’.60 He attacked also the policy of making tabula rasa with the past, like
the Cultural Revolution, he said, seemed to attempt. On this point, one scholar
recently had to say that ‘The Cultural Revolution destroyed China’s traditional
culture in a way that the most iconoclastic reformers of the twentieth century could
not have imagined’.61 Other scholars instead accredit to that period the conservation
of old monuments, and new discoveries such as the famous Army of Terracotta.62
Hoxha did not approve of the fact that in China the party seemed to leave every
initiative in the hands of young people that were not workers but students. This
caused him to wonder where the proletariat was in the event, and why these masses
had gotten so out of control. Probably because Chinese comrades, ‘have drawn the
conclusion that all these problems will be resolved by red guards… This is… a way
of anarchy… This revolution, I think, is nothing but a rectification of the party’s
line’. He warned that ‘our purpose and great care is, and should be, to avoid falling
into error’, thus in Albania a similar path now was foreclosed.63 For Hoxha, all this
data was enough to decide that the experience of the Chinese Cultural Revolution at
least should not be imported tout court in Albania.
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This speech is extremely important as it shows the feelings that the Albanian
leadership truly had towards the Chinese Cultural Revolution. It proves equally the
vacillation of the pro-China policy in Tirana, because while this speech was full of
resentment towards some aspects of Chinese politics, only one month later, came
strong support for the Cultural Revolution – although they did it for strategic reasons.
This is comprehensible because the situation in China was changing so rapidly that
any definitive assessment would have been misleading and likely belied by future
events. At the same time, in the People’s Voice, the space dedicated to the Cultural
Revolution was limited. The decision to keep a low profile about the Cultural
Revolution in this early stage came from the top leadership. In Hoxha’s words,
‘…our press does not speak about the Cultural Revolution in a manner and the same
way Chinese propaganda does’.64 In the spirit of this phrase it is possible to denote a
certain defensive attitude. The CCP tried to persuade Albania to offer open support
to the Cultural Revolution but it seems that Hoxha decided to wait for a better time.
Hoxha, before supporting it, was waiting for political assurances and of economic
benefits. He was hopeful that the Chinese delegation for the PLA Fifth Congress in
Tirana, in November 1966, would be able to clarify his many doubts. Fortunately,
Kang Sheng would do exactly that.

Kang Sheng’s Visit and Albania’s Support for the Cultural Revolution
In November 1966, the PLA organized its Fifth Congress. In late October of that
year, the Chinese delegation led by Kang Sheng arrived in Tirana. In his first
meeting with Enver Hoxha, on 28 October, 1966, Kang explicitly asked for stronger
coordination between the two parties in the struggle against imperialism and Soviet
revisionism. 65 Kang did not mention immediately the Cultural Revolution until
Hoxha pressed him to do so, but he reserved the right to later comment on it, after the
congress.66
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At the reception in honor of the Chinese delegation, held on 30 October, 1966,
Enver Hoxha confirmed general support for the Chinese ‘revolutionary actions’. In
turn, Kang Sheng emphasized that when all revisionist parties and imperialist
countries were defaming the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Albanian comrades were
among the few parties that supported China and that this was greatly appreciated by
Mao. Kang appreciated the fact that Albania ‘in its own way, is carrying out a proper
Cultural Revolution’.67 This proclamation, however, seemed premature, as Albania
had not yet announced any such initiative, unless we consider the Albanian political
public discourse in which the term “revolution” described nearly every policy and
action in the country. What, indeed, Albanians had done, was to call for a stronger
and larger mobilization of the masses for a further and deeper “revolutionization” of
socialist life throughout the country. In practice, this meant participation by the
party’s officials in the production of goods and volunteer work by the youth: building
dams, roads, and railways. It also meant reinforcement of the ideological education
in the schools, and winning a stronger hold of the party, through the political
commissars, as well as over the army. These steps were already adopted at the
beginning of the year and Albanians did not associate these actions with any official
“cultural revolution”. In his salute to the congress, Kang announced the decision in
China to carry on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution with the ‘main objective
to struggle against a group of people that hold high positions in the party and follow
the path of capitalism’. 68 Kang gave no further explanations on the Cultural
Revolution.
In his speech to the congress, Enver Hoxha, on the other hand, used ambiguous
terminology to refer to recent events in Albania, be they a Cultural Revolution or
mere continuation of existing policies. He called for less bureaucratization, more
ideological work, and deeper class struggle – an oft-heard call to the Albanian ear.
New in this speech, though, were the terms “further” and “less”. A new extent and
level of the struggle were the outcomes of his speech to the congress, together with a
deeper struggle against religion and more efforts for the emancipation of women.
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At Hoxha’s solicitation, Kang Sheng had a long conversation with Hoxha and
other important leaders, almost entirely about the Cultural Revolution in China. Until
this moment, the Albanian leadership had been only scarcely informed of it, mostly
by those who had become its targets: Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Consequently,
Kang Sheng dispelled many doubts about the main aims of the Cultural Revolution.
According to Kang, first of all the Cultural Revolution’s aim was to ‘…destroy the
social bases for capitalistic restoration’. He then explained how the struggle had been
mainly against the Beijing faction, meaning Peng Zhen, and how it had started in
early June 1966 with the first Dazibao and the mobilization of the masses that led to
the ‘reorganization of the party’s committee in Beijing’.69 This, in Hoxha’s eyes, was
the reason why Zhou Enlai could not provide any exhaustive information during his
visit in June the same year. It was because even Zhou could not have predicted how
violent and destructive the movement would become. Kang Sheng emphasized that
Mao himself was leading this revolution and was strongly supporting the Red
Guards. Hoxha in his diary had been very harsh in judging the Red Guards, whose
only ability was to ‘…defend Mao Zedong and cheer him to the sky, to regard him as
a God’.70 Now he was told that Mao supported them because they were fighting the
revisionists within the party. Mao, Kang said, was so enthusiastic about the Red
Guards that he decided to endorse them as ‘a revolutionary movement… all over
China’.71
Kang then listed the main characteristics of the Cultural Revolution in China.
First, this revolution was a step in the ‘class struggle, a necessary step in the socialist
revolution’. Second, and most important, it ‘was aimed to fight those that, holding
high positions within the party… want to take the capitalist and revisionist road, like
Khrushchev in Soviet Union’.72 Kang thus was saying that the Cultural Revolution
intended to eradicate what Hoxha feared most, the rise of revisionism within the CCP
that would look for appeasement with Moscow, undermining the Sino-Albanian
alliance. Third, the Cultural Revolution was trying to improve proletarian democracy
69
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through the introduction of criticism and self-criticism among the masses. Fourth, the
Cultural Revolution was laying the foundation of a class of intellectuals who would
show solidarity with the workers and the masses, representing them and their efforts
better. Fifth, through the Cultural Revolution it was possible to improve productivity
and increase economic production. He then explained that those revisionists within
the party, in addition to the Beijing group and Peng Zhen, were Liu Shaoqi and Deng
Xiaoping. It was possible, Kang added, that still other members within the party
would need to be purged. He also told that a committee for the Cultural Revolution
(Cultural Revolution Small Group), which he himself was part of, had been
established and was headed by Chen Boda. His explanation, however, was more
about the events, targets, and first results of the political struggle during this early
stage of the Cultural Revolution. He omitted every analysis regarding the historical
roots of these confrontations within the CCP, concentrating more on the effects –
how the Cultural Revolution pursued the socialist education of the masses and how
this improved the struggle against revisionism and imperialism – rather than
explaining the real point – the radical confrontation between the lines of Liu Shaoqi
and Mao Zedong. This, however, was all of little import to Hoxha. He knew that
Kang would never reveal the full truth of the Cultural Revolution. Hoxha gleaned
two important points from all that Kang did and did not say: China was struggling
against revisionists, and Mao was leading this struggle. Now, for Hoxha it was clear
which side to support, Mao’s anti-revisionist line as represented by Kang Sheng.
After Kang’s speech, the first step for Albania was to begin openly supporting
the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and to learn more about it. Hoxha could learn, as he
stated, from Kang Sheng’s gift to him, a book of Mao’s quotations – in French, no
less, ‘the language of the Parisian communards’. 73 Enver Hoxha expressed his
happiness to be in the same standing with China and with a bit of sarcasm he
expressed his disappointment with the CCP’s leniency towards the revisionists. He
said, in Albania instead, ‘those like Peng Zhen we kick them out [shot them] of the
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party’.74 Hoxha never fully accepted the “leniency”, according to him, that the CCP
sometimes reserved for Chinese officials. Following the visit of Kang Sheng,
stronger support for the Chinese Cultural Revolution was possible but had to be
under the party’s strict control. In November 1966, the Albanian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs sent via radiogram its official standing towards the Chinese Cultural
Revolution. It stated, ‘…Regarding the Chinese Cultural Revolution read and study
the speeches of comrade Enver, Mehmet and Ramiz during the congress. 75 The
Cultural Revolution has the purpose to fight the remnants of revisionist bourgeois
ideology… revisionism and capitalism, and for a definitive victory of the socialist
system’.76
The detailed speech of Kang Sheng constituted a turning point for the Albanian
leadership’s perception of the Cultural Revolution, but passed unnoticed by the great
mass of the people which continued to be informed through People’s Voice. After
Kang Sheng left Albania, on 13 November, 1966, the first article of People’s Voice
regarding the Red Guards was published, and it explained their ‘oath to… Chairman
Mao’.77 On 28 November 1966, in a reception in Beijing, Petro Dode, the head of the
China-Albania Friendship Association, and Chu Tunan, met and spoke about the
Cultural Revolution. 78 The perception was that Kang Sheng, and thus China,
intended to engage Albania in supporting the Cultural Revolution more strongly. A
persuasive policy was the great economic support that Albania received precisely
during the Cultural Revolution, at a time when China had enormous problems with
its own economy. China had sent clear signals to Albania during Shehu’s visit in
April 1966 that stronger political support for China would correspond to stronger
economic assistance. 79 Then in summer 1966, a delegation of oil extraction
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specialists went to Albania, to help build one of the most important sectors in
Albania’s economy. To the Albanian demand for an additional effort from China in
assisting with extracting and refining the oil, China responded by approving a new
long term loan of 14.3 million rubles without interest, which would be used
exclusively as oilfield investments.80
Later, in 1967, Enver Hoxha wanted to express once again his view on the
Chinese Cultural Revolution. His opinion had not changed much from his first
address. First, he reviewed for the participants the speech of Kang Sheng from
which, Hoxha claimed to have learned exactly what he had suspected, that within the
CCP was a very dangerous faction. The spirit of Hoxha’s speech was to highlight the
correctness of his previous analysis, when ‘our plenum of the Central Committee,
was right in its evaluation that people like Peng Zhen could not be an isolated case’.
The PLA plenum he mentioned actually did not count at all when it came to
decision-making. Nonetheless, he used these party institutions to give to his absolute
personal power the semblance of collegiality, the appearance of legitimacy and the
party’s democracy. Then he explained how the CCP, before the Cultural Revolution,
was totally in the hands of revisionists, such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, and
‘that is why slogans such as “Bombard the Headquarters” appeared and the masses
were mobilized’. For Hoxha, the most important thing was that the army remained on
Mao’s side, otherwise it would not have been possible to regain any control. The
battle between the two factions was still ongoing and was a bloody fight because ‘the
enemy knows it is fighting for life or death… creating confusion and anarchy all over
China.’ Hoxha’s main concern was keeping China from a close up with the Soviet
Union, as well as earning further Chinese economic and military assistance. Hoxha
clearly linked the Albanian support for China with the Chinese aid, as the importance
of this support was shown by, ‘their exemplary complaisance, and readiness in
meeting our demand… [with the]… colossal aid they provide us’.81
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In his first speech Hoxha had been very critical of the Cultural Revolution, and
even Mao. Now, he argued ‘if we [privately] spoke sometimes a little bit too badly
about Mao, about the Cultural Revolution’ that was ‘in our interest, in the interest of
our great cause’. This seems to suggest that initial hesitations were a way to turn
China more complacent towards Albanian demands; otherwise, how can one explain
that once Albania turned to be a zealous promoter of the Cultural Revolution, ‘China
in turn supported us more and more?’. It is true that, for Hoxha, some events were
characteristic of China and he did not approve of them, but he came to believe that
the overall line of the Cultural Revolution was a proper instrument for staying the
revisionism in China. Albanian leaders considered that if Liu Shaoqi’s revisionist
stable came to power, China would have approached the Soviet Union, and then
Albania could have met pressure to improve relations with Yugoslavia. The same
demand, years before, had come from Khrushchev and had been one of the main
reasons for Albania to break with the Soviet Union. Now, for Hoxha it was vital that
China should stay away from the Soviet Union, ‘this is the most important thing for
our cause… which would not be possible if it was not for Mao’. Nevertheless, if
mistakes persisted in Chinese politics, that was something they had to deal with, and
we (Albanians) must ‘learn the lessons and not repeat them here’.82

Prelude to Albanian Ideological and Cultural Revolution
In China, the Cultural Revolution did not come unexpectedly.83 For MacFarquhar the
origins can be traced back to the late 1950s, in the debates about the Great Leap
Forward’s policies.84 In 1963 came the “Four Clean-ups” Campaign, to purify the
country’s politics, economics, organization, and thought known as the Socialist
Education Movement. 85 Then came the criticisms of “Hai Rui Dismissed from
Office”, which led to the dismissal of Peng Zhen, the secretary of Beijing
82
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Communist Party and Mayor of the city. Later came the creation of the group for the
Cultural Revolution, the use of Dazibao and the Red Guards –and then the call of
Mao to “Bombard the Headquarters” in his struggle against the line of Liu Shaoqi.86
In Albania, similar developments arose, but the chain of events was shorter and
less dramatic, and the leadership propagandized all policies under the label of the
Cultural Revolution as a continuation rather than interruption of the revolutionary
action for the building of socialism. At the beginning of February 1966, Enver Hoxha
decided to address a letter to the people, preparing them for revolutionary measures
necessary for the further development of socialism. 87 In the army, ranks were
promptly removed and political commissars were introduced. Their power over the
army was extended, in this way reinforcing Hoxha’s political control over the armed
forces. State officials and employers of public administration were sent to participate
in campaigns of physical work, collectivization started everywhere – including those
areas economists knew to be unproductive.88 The decision to remove the ranks in the
army initially did not earn enthusiasm, as shown in the discussions of the Council of
Defense in February 1966. The political chief of the army, Sadik Bekteshi, accused
the chief of the general staff, General Petrit Dume, of opposing the removal of the
ranks.89 The dispute was among a professional general of the army and a political
commissar. In this short debate, it is significant that the defense minister Beqir
Balluku, in his private talks with Hoxha, defended the chief of the general staff, and
attacked the head of the political directorate in the army.90 Hoxha did not take a side,
perhaps not wanting to upset the army, but more likely, intending to later identify all
those opposing the removal of the ranks. However, it was decided that before May
1st, 1966, this decision had to be implemented.91 Nonetheless, Hoxha had thought of
86
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removing the ranks years earlier. In his personal diary in 1964 he had noted that ‘I
am afraid of the ranks in the army’, and ‘our army should not be an army of a
military cast, a cast of marshals, generals, colonels… who one day can claim to have
the political power through a putsch… it should be an army of proletarians,
commanded by the party and an army of the party… the party should command the
army, not the other way round’.92 It is highly plausible that part of these measures
might have been undertaken following the Chinese model.93
This, however, was not yet the launch of the Cultural Revolution in Albania. The
Chinese authorities in Beijing expressed their happiness that similar steps to those in
China were being taken in Albania. Chinese vice president Dong Biwu told the
Albanian ambassador in Beijing, Nesti Nase, in April 1966 that ‘…we are happy that
your party has undertaken a range of revolutionary steps… analogous with those
undertaken here by our party’. 94 Yet they were only steps, perhaps towards a
revolution, but not yet an Albanian Cultural Revolution. Some of these measures
were met with limited resistance. A letter assumed to be written by the Head of the
Army’s State Security Police (Sigurimi), Halil Xhelo, ‘in name of many officials’,
expressed great dissatisfaction with these policies.95 He was immediately arrested,
but it is worth noting the mood expressed in the letter – feelings likely shared by
many in the country. The letter, addressed to Enver Hoxha, criticized the entire
course of policies in Albania, ‘First were Yugoslavians… then came Soviets… now
came Chinese. The Chinese put the physical work, we run to emulate it, the Chinese
do gymnastics in the street, we run to copy it too. The Chinese remove ranks in the
army we rush to remove them too… This is the peak of being servile, obsequious;
this is the burial of everything national’. 96 This letter did not stop any of the
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decisions taken to involve the masses in socialist education. They were extended to
education and culture, copying aspects of Chinese socialism, which Albania had been
observing carefully since the beginning of the relations with China.97 Every school
and every office was obligated to participate in annual military training – called
zbor98 – and the military education had to be integrated with physical education.99
In December 1966, People’s Voice reprinted an article from Xinhua emphasizing
the fact that art should serve ‘workers, soldiers, and peasants’.100 Shortly after the
publication of this article, People’s Voice announced that a ‘revolution’ in the school
was necessary, because ‘…in the context of deepening the Cultural Revolution101 is
required a further “revolutionization” of our education and our school’.102 Now there
was a link between the two events, one in China, and the other in Albania. In a call
on 28 December, 1966, the PLA CC proclaimed the beginning of ‘revolutionary’
volunteer actions for the construction of a railway. In the past, Albania had mobilized
the youth for such purposes, to accomplish their key economic objectives. On 5
January, 1967, the People’s Voice republished an article first published in China, for
the New Year in Renmin Ribao and Hong Qi (Red Flag), informing the readers that
they were reading not the entire article but ‘that part of the editorial entirely
dedicated to the Cultural Revolution’. 103 It was the beginning of a long series of
articles in People’s Voice ‘entirely dedicated’ to the Cultural Revolution in China. In
an article published in early January 1967, Nexhmije Hoxha, the wife of Enver
Hoxha and Politburo member, invited scholars in social sciences to no longer
separate theory from practice, arguing that scientists should not ‘stay closed in their
97
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ivory tower… disconnected from… the revolutionary practice’. 104 To rely on the
masses was always a slogan of Albanian communism, but here the point was
different. The improvement of education and the founding of some universities had
made many institutions able to do research and educate generations of scholars, who
in their specific fields enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy, albeit limited. Now this
autonomy was going to be permeated by the spirit of the communist party, by its
ideology. In fact, ‘it is necessary that with the problems concerning social science the
party cadres too should be involved… to apply the theory of M-L to the conditions of
our country’. 105 This meant that research in social science must conform to the
Marxist interpretation of history. The censorship threatened works that did not
conform to Marxist ideology because now, as the party used to say, ‘Ideology comes
first’.
In the People’s Voice, on 10 January, 1967, a party’s secretary of a small
agricultural commune, labelled some local comrades as ‘bad elements’, a term taken
from China. 106 The next day, People’s Voice, for the first time, reported on the
struggle within the CCP. Great debates ensued in the main factories and working
centers, bringing the Chinese Cultural Revolution to the Albanian masses. It did not
mention any specific names, only a ‘group of revisionists, capitalist roaders’.107 The
implied leader of this faction, Liu Shaoqi, could not be mentioned explicitly, as he
was still officially the President of China. On 15 January, 1967, People’s Voice
opened with an editorial regarding an initiative from writers and artists in Shkodër,
an important city in north Albania. They seemed to have drawn inspiration from the
earlier article of Hoxha’s wife, and had taken actions ‘to revolutionize the entire
artistic, cultural and literature movement’. 108 The People’s Voice now associated
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more strongly the events in China with those in Albania and promoted the Cultural
Revolution with great zeal. Many factories organized meetings, open discussions,
and even rallies to support the Chinese Cultural Revolution.109 On 24 January, 1967,
open discussions were reportedly held in working units all over Albania, expressing
great admiration for Mao and felicity for the working class in China ‘for keeping
high the flag of Mao’s thought’.110 Now even Albania was joining the cult of Mao,
probably the only foreign country to do so. Enver Hoxha, who had been very critical
of Mao’s cult, now relented, when it served national interest. Hoxha knew his
personal cult was not in danger, in any case, and knew very well that Mao’s cult in
Albania, unlike in China, would be tame and expressed through small acts only:
putting Mao’s photos in public celebrations, giving his name to some industrial
projects, maybe citing Mao’s quotations.
From December 1966 to January 1967, a delegation headed by Hysni Kapo and
defense minister Beqir Balluku visited China. Their reports from Beijing were
enthusiastic. Balluku, went to China with the specific aim ‘to present a new request
to China for additional armaments’.111 The minister, in addition to being received
with great honors, was also rewarded with all the expected assistance – a reward for
Albania’s support of the Cultural Revolution. Balluku took with him a long list of
requests for armaments, reaching a total weight of nearly 200 thousand tons, to be
delivered in lots within the period 1967-71, with a value of 650 million rubles – but
for Albania, free of charge.112 With this new plan, the leadership planned to extend
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the number of the military forces to 400 thousand by 1970, from 229 thousand in
1966.113 In Beijing, Balluku met Ye Jianying, a member of CCP’s Politburo who was
assigned to discuss and deal with the Albanian requests. Balluku was surprised to see
that his requests were accepted without hesitation, and his presentation of the
military strategy was not disputed, as Zhou Enlai had done months earlier. On the
contrary, Ye Jianying affirmed that ‘your cause, is our cause... we stand together,
fight together, and win together’.114
If Kang Sheng had left some doubts about the Chinese Cultural Revolution’s
righteous purposes in his speech in Tirana in November 1966, Kapo’s talks with
Chinese comrades during this visit were going to remove them all. He met with Kang
Sheng many times and had one meeting with Mao, and the focus of their talks was
the Cultural Revolution.115 Mao was happy to meet the Albanian delegation and for
the photo-taking invited Kapo and others ‘to smile because the photo should be full
of life, the proletariat should look like live but not dead people’.116 Mao then blamed
Albania for attaching too much importance to his salute to the PLA Fifth Congress,
in November 1966. He, probably unconsciously, touched upon Hoxha’s criticism of
Mao’s cult. Mao blamed the Albanians for ‘having raised it [Mao’s salute to the PLA
congress] too high, do you want to raise even higher my cult?’117 In China too, he
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said people gave him many epithets such as ‘great teacher, great leader… but I have
been a teacher, in primary school... being a professor, no way, I never went to
university’.118 Mao then admitted, with a bit of irony, the confusion in China: ‘Look
at the mess in China, see, things do not go well’.119 He said that since 1962 he had
identified the problem, and then had warned that there was a revisionist threat in
China. Now, Mao added, through the Cultural Revolution, ‘solving definitively the
problem will require maybe one year… Many years ago I said we should purge
millions… I had no other choice!’120 The Albanian delegation reported back that the
struggle against revisionism in China was ‘as has never been before’, and this not
only ‘will strengthen China… [But]… reduce definitely the possibility for capitalist
restoration’.121
Some diffidence, however, still persisted in Hoxha. Commenting on the reports
from Beijing, he wondered, ‘if the [political] power exists in China today? Who are
the Red Guards?... Who are the Rebels?’ Hoxha was also told about the role of the
army, which was very active on the revolution’s side and sometimes supported the
Red Guards. He, however, considered that this could be dangerous since it should
always be the party that rules over the army, never the opposite. In Albania, the role
of the army was subordinated to the rule of the party and no challenge to Hoxha’s
power was impossible. But China, as Hoxha saw it, had become a ‘non-revolutionary
democracy… and there is not anymore the party but just Mao… and the army that
plays a great role’. Nevertheless, once back in Tirana, the delegation confirmed that
‘Mao’s line has won strategically’, and this reassured Enver Hoxha that he stood on
the right side, that his support for Mao was the support for the victorious faction.122
In this way the relations with China, and its assistance, were not threatened. The visit
of Kang Sheng to Albania and that of two Albanian delegations to China swept away
any doubt of the Albanian leaders about the Cultural Revolution in China. Albania
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had been courted to support China in exchange for extraordinary economic and
military assistance, exceeding even what had previously been agreed. Enver Hoxha
had prepared the public opinion through the People’s Voice on the importance of the
Cultural Revolution and had announced small steps in that direction for Albania. The
time was ripe for a similar revolution in Albania.

The Ideological and Cultural Revolution in Albania
On 7 February, 1967, People’s Voice published on the front page a speech Hoxha
addressed to the entire nation. The Albanian Ideological and Cultural Revolution had
begun. The ties with China had been strengthening for years, and though the Maoist
Cultural Revolution had at first confused the Albanian leadership, Enver Hoxha was
now convinced that the Chinese Cultural Revolution was a step forward in the
struggle against revisionism, and as China increased its aid to his country, he decided
to launch the Cultural Revolution in Albania. His speech tackled “Further
Revolutionization of the Party and the Power”.123 This speech is assumed to be the
official beginning of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution in Albania. The use of
the word “further” in Hoxha’s speech, was not accidental, for two reasons: first, as
mentioned, this was a continuation of the path of building socialism in the country –
which started in 1944 when the communists came to power – not a rupture with the
post liberation social and political order. Second, this was a “furthering” of all the
steps undertaken in the very recent past, it was a continuation, more fervent, perhaps,
of the measures adopted (but adapted) from China during the last years. Hereafter,
the historical legacy (the rule of the party since the end of the Second World War)
and the new opportunity (alliance with the Chinese) would be merge along a unique
path. Yet intending to mark the differences from China, Hoxha’s speech welcomed
the most representative strata of the country: students, soldiers, workers, and
123
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intellectuals. This differed from China, where only young students had promoted the
Cultural Revolution, at least in its early stages. China’s experience was not lost on
Hoxha, who wondered where the working class was in this revolution.
The Albanian Cultural Revolution performed three tasks: first, it displayed
sympathy to an important ally – and in repaying the kindness, China was very
generous with Albania; secondly, it was a good chance to remove any obstacles
within the country that could challenge the party’s objectives for development, with
particular reference to religion; third, it gave a great leap forward to the emancipation
of women. Hoxha did not just use slogans and unleash the masses, like Mao had
done, but gave precise indications of what he wanted people to fight for, what the
role of the masses was, and what the limits were. The terminology he used, however,
was nothing new. What was new was the increased pace of the policies; in building
the country, sacrificing everything for the homeland, devoting life to that of the
masses – and the role of the masses; in mobilizations to eradicate religion,
emancipate women and increase productivity. Hoxha stressed the importance of
“accountability”. This required open discussions in the party’s base-organizations,
meaning the local parties of each economic unit, each factory or institution, and each
commune. In these organizations, the masses could fulfill their true role, in collective
criticism sessions similar to the Chinese “struggle sessions”. The difference was that
in Albania these sessions did not result in collective violence. These sessions aimed
only to seek the “truth”, because ‘only in these collective sessions, the truth can
come into the open and the masses can have the control.’ However, Hoxha warned
that these sessions must never become battlefields because ‘our party is not an arena
for developing the class struggle. It is the party itself who leads the class struggle, it
does not allow the existence of groups or factions of revisionists, Trotskyists, or
liberals within it’. If, in Albania, revisionism did not come to power, according to
Hoxha, it was because of these rules, and because ‘the party is not a den of people
without ideology. ’It is clear, therefore, that in Albania the leadership defined itself
as being above the masses, and not subject to their criticism, unlike in China, because
‘our party has at its foundation… the democratic centralism… a central leadership…
All the other organs must obey and apply its decisions’.124 It was impossible to be
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clearer. The masses, instead, if a struggle was necessary, could sacrifice the local
communist leaders, those of the party base-organization. The masses in China,
incited by Mao, caused the removal and dismissal of almost the entire leading group
of the CCP. Hoxha, on the contrary, had already achieved the goal years before by
purging any groups or individuals who challenged or were merely suspected to
challenge his political wishes. Hoxha simply did not have anyone left as a target
within the leading organs of the party.
The first step of the Cultural Revolution in Albania was the ‘struggle without
compromise against religion and the old habits and consuetudes’.125 In Albania, the
struggle against religion had some particularities considering the fact that the country
had had a very active class of religious elites in the past. The clergy, Muslim and
Christian, were involved in the national public life. The Ideological and Cultural
Revolution was a good chance for the party to remove all these ‘ruins’ of the old
society. The day after the publication of Hoxha’s speech, students of a high school in
Durrës, the port city near Tirana, started their struggle against religion, opening a
debate at school and attacking religious beliefs as remnants of the old society that
must be eradicated. Enver Hoxha made no better efforts to preserve the traditions of
his country than had Mao, whom he privately once criticized for making ‘tabula
rasa’, the old religious monuments. In the context of the Albanian Cultural
Revolution, hundreds of Churches, Mosques, and other worship monuments were
razed to the ground. The work was meticulous because religion was an organized
community of clergy and had deep roots in people’s conscience – it was precisely
‘the opium of the people, that poisoned them and therefore their [party’s] task was to
cure them’.126 It was, therefore, necessary to fight against religious philosophy, their
everyday practice, and the links they had with people’s life. Everything had to be
planned and ‘nothing should be left to chance’. In this struggle, the authorities made
key differentiations. For them, ‘the clergy, except the Catholics, is very ignorant, and
the practice of the religion is through an archaic liturgy in Arabic that no one can
understand’, which made it easier to defeat. ‘The Catholic clergy’ however, was
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‘richer’, highly educated and disciplined, the fruit of a long tradition, and so more
difficult to eradicate.127
Since the very beginning of communist rule in Albania, religious schools had
been closed and education was totally in the hands of the state. The education of new
generations of clergy was made further impossible because education abroad was
prohibited without official permission – which the regime never gave. Therefore
none of the clergy could go to Italy, traditionally the home of Catholic education, nor
did the state allow any other member of other religions to pursue their religious
studies abroad. Now, the only task for the authorities was a struggle against the
institutions where people went to pray, against Churches and Mosques, and against
the last generation of clergy yet living. The instruction for the local party committees
was ‘to destroy churches, mosques, monasteries, temples, the only places where
clergy can meet the faithful people.’ However, as the letter admitted, this would not
be easy, because there was still part of the population that was practicing, thus, ‘the
destruction of Churches… of course is more difficult because we must not go
directly against that part of the people that still believes’. Nevertheless, the
determination must be firm ‘until total disappearance [of the religion] from the
earth’. Among its means, the party had used propaganda to direct nationalism as ‘a
weapon in our hands against religion, because Islam has been the ideology of the
Ottoman invaders, Christian Orthodox is the ideology of the Greek chauvinists and
Catholic religion was the ideology of the Italian invaders’. By associating these
religions with these “enemies”, the masses were closer to rejecting their religions.
The leadership feared that people’s sentiments against this atheist policy may lead
them to turn against the party, and so the leaders did not use the same space in mass
media that they gave to other policies of the Cultural Revolution. In the above letter,
they warned the local committees to be determined but, if possible, without
provoking the people’s feelings, ‘not entering an open conflict with the population’,
because this be an obstacle for generations to come. Hence, the party must treat the
people that have religious feelings, ‘as the doctor who cures the disease, which turns
people into the joys of life’.128 In the meantime, propaganda did prioritize the link
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between religions and the oppressive practices of the past, the link between clergy
and how they supported the property owners and moreover the exploitation of the
masses, and to show how, for them, religion enslaved man by glorifying only God
and diminishing man’s capacities and creativity.
It is worth noting that People’s Voice largely omitted mass revolutionary actions
against religion, despite a clear desire to promote other maneuvered public initiatives
that was expressed in its writing almost daily in 1967. The struggle against religion
had to continue without any leniency, but partially out of sight. This was very
comprehensible because the population perceived the struggle against religion as an
oppressive policy, and an extremist interference in a most intimate, centuries-old
tradition. In addition, the religions had a long history of peaceful cohabitation and
did not threaten the national unity. People simply did not see any concrete threats to
national security that justified eradicating the religious influence. The older
generation especially did not welcome this policy, despite the fact that they could do
nothing but comply, and sometimes were even forced to support it. Aware of this, the
party instructed the local districts to pursue this goal with determination but avoid
‘…public discussions… everything must be done without fuss’.129 The destruction of
some historical worship monuments met resistance from not only the people but even
from the minister of education and culture, Thoma Deljana. He wrote a letter to
Enver Hoxha demanding more care and eventually protection from ‘this desire
without brakes to deepen artificially the Ideological and Cultural Revolution that is
causing violent and extreme actions… In Vlora there is insistence to destroy the only
ancient monument of the city, the Muradije’s Mosque. In Fier, trying to remove the
cross in the Saint George Church, they destroyed all the architecture… in Saranda
the Church of pre-Ottoman era was turned into fertilizer’s deposit… Is flagrant the
case of the Church of Vau i Dejës [District of Shkodër) that was razed to ground with
explosives.’130 Concluding the letter, he asked for these issues to be discussed within
the highest organs of power. He was rewarded years later with a purge and long
years of imprisonment. The anti-religious campaign, in only its first months, caused
the closure of 2169 religious buildings, 740 Mosques, 765 Churches and
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monasteries, and 530 monuments of other religions. The properties were promptly
confiscated by the state.131 Some of these monuments were razed to the ground, like
the monumental Orthodox Cathedral in the center of Tirana, where the state built
“Hotel Tirana”, at the time famous for being the highest building in the country (15
floors), still a landmark of the city. It was a way to show that socialism was rising
higher from the ashes of the old world. A small fraction of these monuments,
however, survived, and these are those monuments that had historical importance for
their architecture, art, and national history. Of all the worship monuments surveyed
in 1967, prior to the Cultural Revolution, a year and a half after the Cultural
Revolution had begun, only 111 had the fortune to be put under state custody as
national heritage in a second survey in 1969.132 The rest of them, if not literally razed
to ground, were transformed into the army’s deposits, small theaters, or even stables
for animals. 133 Some had the better fortune to serve as spaces for “Culture
Houses”.134 The uses of some worship monuments for civil purposes were dictated
not by the good will to preserve them but because the construction of new buildings
was expensive. Most of the clergy’s members also had a sad destiny, many where
executed after farce trials, and the rest were condemned to long years of work camps
and prisons. When the regime fell, in 1991-92, of hundreds of clergy from various
religions, less than a dozen were still alive. Curiously, during this campaign it was
reported that many people expressed opinions linking this struggle with the Cultural
Revolution in China. For instance, in the city of Fier someone was reported to have
commented ‘Why do we imitate China?’. In Shkodër someone else said, ‘They [the

131

“Informative Report, 07 July 1967: On the first results in the struggle against religion and some
measures to further deepen it”, in AQSH, F.511, Ministria e Arsimit dhe e Kulturës [Ministry of
Education and Culture], V. 1967, D20, f.22; Decree Nr. 4263 of the Presidium of the National
Assembly, in AQSH, F.511, Ministria e Arsimit dhe e Kulturës [Ministry of Education and Culture],
V. 1967, D20, f.20
132
AQSH, F.511, Ministria e Arsimit dhe e Kulturës [Ministry of Education and Culture], V. 1969,
D66, f.18-20.
133

Ibid., f.73-80

134

The Culture Houses (Culture Halls) were spaces dedicated to the performance of artists, mainly
singers, dancers and theater companies where usually, after working, people gathered to assist their
performances. Their activity was a job of propaganda being under the Party’s control and their
performance used to show the greatness of the socialist life and be a tribute to the homeland. They
were widespread all over the country, and even the small communes used to have one.

194

Albanian leadership] follow the way of China’, and in Gramsh, a small city, someone
affirmed that ‘now entered a new religion, that of Asia’.135
The second task of the Cultural Revolution in Albania was the emancipation of
women. Women at this time, despite having been marginalized in the past, were not
excluded from the public debate and life in the country. In Albania, women played
an important role in history, for their contribution in the national struggle against
foreign rule over the centuries. Strong women had acquired prominent positions in
the national historical narrative – and myth. In the 15th century, for instance, when
Scanderbeg – an Albanian national hero – was fighting against Ottoman Empire, his
sister Mamica was alleged to be one of his bravest soldiers. She died fighting on the
battlefield, passing into the legend as a great warrior. In the early Twentieth century,
another woman became very famous. Her name was Shote Galica and her fame came
from her fight alongside her husband against the Ottoman rule first, and Serbian
incursions later. She became so well known that her fame eclipsed her husband’s.
Then, in more recent times, there were dozens, if not hundreds, of women who had
made great contributions to the arts, education, languages, and many other fields – a
common pattern with the rest of European countries. Therefore, in shaping the new
historical narrative, the regime knew that women would play an important role.
But these were privileged women and not representatives of the society as a
whole. The emancipation project of the Cultural Revolution, however, became a
massive endeavor across the strata of society, focused not only on women’s
emancipation, but also revolutionizing men’s views of women. The process can be
traced back to the liberation war, when, as in the rest of Europe and world, women
participated actively in the war. Now the process had to proceed a step further.
Already in November 1966, during the Fifth Congress, Hoxha had mentioned the
necessity for a leap forward in the emancipation of women. Two days after launching
the “Ideological and Cultural Revolution”, the People’s Voice, reporting on a
discussion in a small commune of Gjirokastra, noted that it was time ‘to remove the
rope from the [women’s] back’.136 In another article, People’s Voice highlighted the
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local actions for the emancipation of women all over the country.137 In accordance
with the established public narrative of that time, every revolutionary action was
reported to have started from the base, from the people. The party wanted to show
that there was independence, autonomy, and democracy among the masses. After
these first local actions, the propaganda massively publicized Enver Hoxha’s visits to
factories and cooperatives, and his supposed correspondence with the people and
organizations of the party that participated in demonstrative revolutionary actions,
upgrading these actions from local initiatives into national policies.138 The masses
were used as the actors in a movie, to play their part in actions promoted by the top
leaders, by pretending to have initiated such actions.
The primary motivation behind the women’s emancipation campaign was
Albania’s economic development. Albania was building, with Chinese assistance,
hundreds of industrial projects. The Chinese leaders wondered many times if this
small country could muster a sufficient workforce for these projects. In some parts of
the country, women were still excluded from public life and from access to many
offices. This revolution intended to bring these women into the economic system.
Despite the propaganda’s focus on gender equality, this was the primary reason for
the emancipation project. There were other causes too, such as political control. In a
regime where the only legitimate authority to lead the people and control them was
the party, it was not acceptable to leave a large part of the female population under
the rule of their family’s male members. In some remote areas of the country
marriage was still arranged during childhood and women’s roles in society were
established by these antiquated mores. This, for a part of the population, especially in
the countryside, meant living in a parallel situation where old habits were more
meaningful than state laws. This situation would not be tolerated any longer by the
regime. The population, especially the young and the middle aged, welcomed this
policy and actively supported the female emancipation campaign. The emancipation
was, and is still deemed by some, a great achievement. Still though, even redeemed
from their previous condition of servility, women were still denied many freedoms
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due to persistent gender norms. The emancipation in Albania was far from what
feminist movements protested for across Europe in the late 1960s, unbeknownst to
many isolated and uninformed Albanian women. For instance, the family was
incentivized to have many children, since the state claimed to take charge of all the
basic needs for their growth. For this reason, despite the fact that abortion was
sanctioned as a right, it was discouraged unless for life-saving measures. Similarly,
the right of divorce, which on paper was fully guaranteed to women (and to men),
was minimized by the courts of the time, which received political instructions to
make every effort to pacify couples before granting any requests for divorce. The
process, however, was successful in promoting equality of gender in the sense of the
women’s participation in public life, and in their access of many important offices.
Still today, Albanian women participate actively in politics, which most likely is a
legacy of that regime.
One of the ways of practicing the revolution in Albania was to use the Albanian
Dazibao, known as Fletërrufe.139 It is a term composed by two words, fletë, which
means page or sheet, and the word rrufe, which means lightning or thunderbolt.
Fletërrufe, therefore, were pages written to criticize – sometimes attack – someone
or something, and were posted in public spaces. The importance given to them was
very high, as they served as‘powerful tools for the ideological-political and moral
education of the masses’. 140 It is true that the mobilization of students and the
fletërrufewere similar to the practices of the Cultural Revolution in China, however,
the difference is that these fletërrufe did not become the instruments of different
groups to struggle against each other, nor did they inspire violence like the Dazibao
did in China. The students in Albania never held the power the Red Guards did, nor
did they play so great a role. The similarity, therefore, was limited to their form.
One of the outcomes of the Albanian Cultural Revolution was the increase of
economic production. Contrary to China, where in the first wave of the Cultural
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Revolution the economy greatly suffered, in Albania the economic production during
this period drastically increased. In particular, many infrastructural works were
completed. On the other hand, greatly affecting the households’ economy was the
drastic reduction of family yards. These yards were the only private property left to
the peasants after the expropriation and nationalization of the land since the 1950s.
Now, officially, as a step towards the further “revolutionization” of the country, these
yards were almost entirely nationalized because private yards were considered
bourgeois remnants of the old society. These measures, sometimes extreme, were
deemed necessary, because it was the only way ‘…to demolish the feudalbourgeoisie remain’. 141 The speech of Enver Hoxha that started the Cultural
Revolution in Albania was the pretext not only to begin the revolution itself, but also
to further raise the cult of Enver Hoxha. There was no day that widespread
propaganda did not report the “greatness” of Enver Hoxha in supporting the
revolution and the socialist cause. The first page of the Albanian Cultural Revolution
concluded with a declaration of the Government and the Central Committee
addressed to all the people through the People’s Voice, concerning certain measures
decided in the context of the Cultural Revolution, like the reduction of the personal
yards in the communes, the further participation of the state officials in the
productive works and the reduction of the high salaries. While China’s Cultural
Revolution came to an official conclusion in 1976 – and for Mao, 1969 – Albania’s
Cultural Revolution had no such finale. In a way, it had never started either.

Chinese Cultural Revolution: Strengthening Mao, Weakening the AntiRevisionist Front
As usual, the PLA congress in November 1966 was an arena of meeting for many
communist parties and groups coming from different continents. By now the Chinese
Cultural Revolution had become a known event within the international communist
movement – although with unknown dynamics. Kazimierz Mijal, the Polish exile in
Albania and head of the PCP (m-l), told Albanian leaders that he would want to meet
the communist groups during the congress but that he was concerned of what the

141

All and with all forces for further revolutionization of the party and People’s power [Të Gjithë Me
Të Gjitha Forcat Për Revolucionarizimin e Mëtejshëm Të Partisë Dhe Të Pushtetit], People’s Voice
[Zëri i Popullit], 11 February 1967, V.26 Nr.36, BK, Periodiku, SHG 32/1B.

198

CCP could think about his activities, implying that his main aim probably was to
enter the good graces of the CCP in addition to Hoxha.142 Initially he expressed his
full support for the Chinese Cultural Revolution and appreciated Mao’s figure as a
great Marxist leading to spur forward the world communist movement. Considering
Albanian leadership’s suspicion of Mao’s cult and thought, most likely they did not
appreciate Mijal’s pledges of admiration for Mao. Mijal proposed to support
publically the Chinese Cultural Revolution, but the cult of Mao, to him, in the
European context was unconvincing and hard to accept. 143 Mijal met with Kang
Sheng in Tirana on 31 October 1966. Kang offered all Chinese readiness to assist the
PCP (m-l), and invited Mijal to visit China, which he did from 14 November to 29
December, 1966.144 It is interesting that this trip was under cover, presenting Mijal
not with his real name but as part of an Albanian delegation. With Mijal went Koçi
Xengo, a high official of the PLA, who knew Polish after working as a diplomat for
years in Warsaw.
Mijal met with Chinese officials alone several times, Mao included. But he told
his Albanian friend that he did not fully understand the Cultural Revolution – or
perhaps he pretended as such. He affirmed that certain aspects of the Chinese
Cultural Revolution were characteristic of China, and that Europe would always
struggle to understand them. Hoxha, also very suspicious of the Chinese events,
asked Mijal to set aside his concerns and support China for the time being. Still, after
Mijal’s return to Tirana, he remained unconvinced of the real aims of the Cultural
Revolution, and how could it impact the cause of international communism. He
sustained two main objections: first, the prominent role of Mao and his personal cult;
second, perhaps consequently, the diminished role of the working class.145 During his
visit, Mijal was pressed continuously by Chinese officials to make any requests for
assistance he might need. Mijal did not make material requests but only wanted
recognition, asking China to publish documents of his party and make known in the
propaganda that his party supported China and the CCP. The fact that Mijal was
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based in Tirana for his activities, but sought Chinese recognition, shows the different,
complementary, role Tirana and Beijing played for these parties. Tirana was
geographically more appropriate, being in Europe, as a logistic base from which to
organize political, legal, and in particular illegal, activities in the western
hemisphere. Consequently the material assistance from Tirana was more effective. In
addition, they could use Albania’s diplomatic network in the West for coordination
with other groups. On the other hand, Mijal’s emphasis on Chinese recognition
shows that China was for most of these groups the ultimate source of legitimation.
Still, Hoxha had a strong hold over his guests, and tried to use them to get more
credits from Beijing. Chinese authorities knew that the support for these groups, in
particular those assisted directly by Albania, should go through the Albanian political
filter and that Hoxha could influence either their support or their lack of support for
China. Hence, when Mijal visited China, Chinese officials hastened to tell him that
‘Enver Hoxha strongly supports the Cultural Revolution’.146
Regardless the disagreements concerning some aspects of the Cultural
Revolution, Albania used this period to accredit itself as China’s most precious ally,
by trying to maximize foreign support through the establishment of a contact
network and expanding the assistance to foreign communist groups everywhere. For
instance, with the collaboration of Jacques Grippa in Belgium, strong ties were
established with illegal communist groups in Congo Brazzaville, where Grippa had
good connections with the revolutionary groups, and where Cubans had also
intervened. To the allegations and the gossip about the possible participation of Che
Guevara in the revolution in Congo, Grippa in Tirana said that Cubans, probably Che
Guevara too, had entered the country, but had turned back because of conflicts with
the Congolese groups.147 In late 1966 a meeting was organized in Rome, with the
help of the Albanian embassy, and was attended by Congolese members of an illegal
group.148 Secretly these members went to Albania for military and political training.
Eventually, fighting among themselves for power in a very fragmented context,
where the ideological boundaries were often hard to distinguish, these groups ceased
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effectively fighting for the revolution.149 Consequently Albania, in coordination with
China, did not train these groups with the exclusive goal of a communist revolution.
What was most important was to challenge the Soviet power and influence in Africa.
The two Congolese states, Congo Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of
Congo, were emblematic in this. But did Albania really want to engage in armed
conflicts over uncertain political returns? Most likely, had it not been for the Chinese
support, Albania would not have had the power to finance parties and train illegal
groups from four continents. It was acting indeed, not just in its own interests, but
China’s as well, in cases when the latter went beyond Asia in competition with
Soviet Union, seeking to become a revolutionary world power. The limit to China in
this period was the turmoil caused by the Cultural Revolution, and its lack of
international recognition. Precisely because of these two factors, Albania’s assistance
to China became crucial in mitigating China’s (largely self-imposed) isolation. At the
same time, very subtly, Hoxha used his contacts with foreign groups as a backup for
the undesired event of a split with China. Hoxha wanted to make sure that if a split
with China became reality, he would retain international political support and
recognition.
In November 1966, Jacques Grippa, the leader of the BCP (m-l), participated in
the Fifth PLA Congress and met with the Albanian leaders on many occasions. He
reported to have organized meetings in Belgium with students and other youths to
inform them about the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Youth attendance at these
meetings was high, but high also was the number of those who were not fully
convinced of the good intentions of the Cultural Revolution.150 Even Grippa was not
fully convinced. When he went on vacations with his wife in Albania in August
1967, he vented his great dissatisfaction with certain Chinese policies. He had been
in China during 1966, and lamented the fact that not only had he been kept
completely uninformed about the Cultural Revolution, but he was also not allowed to
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meet the Indonesian communist party officials in Beijing.151 Grippa was not alone in
his frustrations over the lack of information. Kazimierz Mijal told similarly of his
meetings with Chinese diplomats in Tirana, that the information provided about the
Cultural Revolution was ‘very vague’, or sometimes clearly inaccurate, as it was
when he was told the Cultural Revolution would be over within the year (1968).152
China contributed very much to the communists’ suspicions in Europe about the
Cultural Revolution, when for instance they refused to allow Mijal to visit China
again in 1968, claiming the Chinese leaders were too busy. 153 China might have
thought that Mijal was used by Albania to extract information from China that it did
not otherwise have.
Grippa’s divergences with Chinese comrades dated back to 1964, mainly
regarding the criteria upon which assistance was granted or denied to communist
groups in West Europe. Grippa complained of China’s lack of distinction between
authentic and imposter Marxist-Leninist groups. Furthermore, ‘in dealing with us,
China’s representatives in Europe were not ideological comrades, but bureaucrats,
who feared the consequences of contacting with us’. He brought as example the fact
that China did not protest when French communists were arrested in Switzerland,
‘just because they had visited Chinese embassy in Berna’. Grippa had thought that
the Cultural Revolution in China would have positively impacted the CCP’s foreign
relations, ‘but it did not happen instead’, lamenting that in 1966 China had impressed
him negatively with respect to his visit in 1962.154 As he explained, when he visited
China in August 1966, he had an overt polemic with Kang Sheng regarding which
principles new Marxist parties in Europe should follow. Kang told Grippa that
sometimes they should work even with groups that have different ideas, while Grippa
showed more dogmatism. At the end Kang suggested Grippa to concentrate more on
Belgian affairs, rather than expanding his contacts. This visit of Grippa, in a few
words, was a complete failure, and divergences with the CCP seemed to be difficult
to repair. It was about all this that he reported to Ramiz Alia, Hoxha’s close comrade,
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in Tirana. Although CCP leaders used to inform Tirana often about their relations
with other communist parties, regarding Grippa it seems that the CCP did not inform
Tirana. This can be deduced from the warm welcome Grippa received in Tirana
when he returned from China. Considering how he was later criticized for his
standing against China, he would have not been so well-received had Albanian
leaders known in advance his divergences with Beijing.
Grippa criticized some of the slogans being promoted by the Cultural Revolution
in China. For instance, he did not agree, and refused to publish in his newspaper in
Belgium, the Chinese slogan “it’s right to rebel”, as he considered it too vague and
could even be used to rebel against communists. He also criticized the little space
Chinese propaganda had reserved for the communist struggle in Europe. This, for
him, was due to China’s disregard for the urban working class in Europe, in favor of,
he believed, rural mobilization. He was also disappointed with the marginal role the
Cultural Revolution seemed to reserve for the working class, compared to the grand
emphasis placed on students and peasants. On this point, Hoxha’s view was identical
to Grippa’s. Grippa also opposed the Chinese slogan “one splits in two”. For him the
Chinese comrades did not explain with this slogan the difference between the
antagonist contradiction and the non-antagonist contradiction.155 Following his talks
with Alia, Grippa planned a meeting with Hoxha. After learning of Grippa’s many
criticisms of China, almost the same arguments Hoxha had made in private
conversations with close comrades, Hoxha refused. Commenting on the conversation
between Grippa and Alia, Hoxha rejected completely Grippa’s criticism of the
Chinese Cultural Revolution, and a week later he sent to the Chinese embassy the
records of the conversation between Alia and Grippa.156 But Grippa reminded Alia
that, after all, the BCP (m-l) was not a branch of the CCP, and Grippa therefore had
the right to publish whatever he considered appropriate. Hoxha noted that perhaps
the message was also to the PLA, in a clear attempt to challenge Albania to rethink
its position. What worried Hoxha most about Grippa was the latter’s defense of Liu
Shaoqi. Although Grippa did not take Liu’s position in the internal CCP struggle, he
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wondered, ‘are all the accusations against Liu well-founded?’.157 For Hoxha this was
too much. Despite most likely sharing similar concerns, privately, Hoxha accused
Grippa of taking Liu’s – meaning the revisionist – side, instead of defending Mao.
He could not but reject Grippa’s position as anti-China.
One week after sharing his sincere thoughts, Jacques Grippa was called in Tirana
to meet Alia again. Alia read a note he claimed was written by Hoxha, which
considered Grippa’s view on China, ‘deeply wrong, not based on arguments, was an
attack to the great revolutionary Mao Zedong and completely anti-Marxist’.158 Alia
told Grippa that Hoxha and the PLA considered the Cultural Revolution as a great
contribution to the communist cause. He invited Grippa to call a meeting of the
central committee of his party in Belgium, to hold a session of self-criticism and
revise his position towards Beijing. Grippa, on the other hand, rejected Albanian
accusations, and kindly warned that ‘If our party is mistaken the repercussions are
limited, but if you instead are wrong the repercussions abroad are more severe, and if
the CCP is wrong, then the repercussions internationally are even greater’.159 With
this meeting Grippa was dismissed, and a letter from the PLA was sent to Paris to the
Albanian ambassador (covering also Belgium) recommending him to keep an eye on
Grippa. 160 If Grippa had warned Albanian leaders of repercussions, he had not
imagined that he would be the first to suffer from them. Immediately after his return
to Belgium, within his party emerged a group that opposed Grippa’s line. Eventually,
not long after his sojourn in Albania, he faced a putsch and was expelled from his
own party. Although there is no clear evidence that Albania was behind this, the
timing and the accusations against Grippa by the new faction seem to leave little
room for alternative interpretation. This is reinforced also by the fact that the new
group rushed to send a letter to Hoxha after Grippa’s dismissal, in which they
rejected entirely Grippa’s position on the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and fully
supported it as a great event for the world communism.161 In December 1967, Grippa
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was expelled from the party, mainly for having attacked the Chinese Cultural
Revolution, as shown in the declaration of the central committee.162

The Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Increasing Aid to Albania
In September - October 1967, Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu visited China once
again, this time at the peak of the Cultural Revolution, and Albania this time needed
greater assurance that the Chinese Cultural Revolution would not affect negatively
China’s economic assistance to Albania. Indeed, it did affect the assistance, but only
positively for Albania. In his talks with Zhou Enlai, Shehu was surprised by Zhou’s
willingness to increase the technological and economic assistance to Albania. In
1965 Zhou had been critical regarding the building of hydropower plants, and
recommended oil to generate electricity instead, now China agreed to accelerate the
works on the hydropower plant of Vau i Dejës (Mao Zedong Plant) that was under
construction, and to a bigger plant in accordance with the plans Albania had
presented years earlier, but which had been postponed by China.163 China promised
also to increase the production capacity of some existing factories. The Albanian
premier also requested additional armaments that had been denied to Balluku during
his visit in February of the same year. Zhou Enlai was ready to meet any Albanian
requests. 164 Although the Cultural Revolution caused enormous difficulties to the
Chinese productive system and to the economy in general, Albania was assisted as
never before, and as it never will be again. In 1967, an attempt was drafted for
completing the industrial projects by the following year. 165 China began its
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geological studies regarding the remaining hydropower plants along the Drini River,
where Albania wanted to build 5 projects, with a capacity of more than 1.3 million
kWh energy. 166 This, along with technology for the oil extraction, was very
demanding for China to supply.167
During Shehu’s visit in China, September-October 1967, Beijing committed to
anticipate the delivery of the military supplies they had promised to Balluku earlier
in January 1967, and promised an additional 100 air fighters and around 130 tanks,
after questioning Albania’s capacities in human resources to manage such large
quantity of heavy armaments. 168 As shown in the discussions of the Council of
Defense, 80 percent of the entire military equipment, which was part of the
agreement for the period 1967-71, was delivered in 1968, three years in advance of
the schedule.169 This came due to two international events. First, in April 1967, a
coup d’état led to the rise of the regime of the colonels in Greece, who in their
rhetoric did not conceal territorial claims over southern Albania. 170 After the
establishment of the military regime of the colonels, the Albanian leadership
seriously feared an armed conflict. At the border with Greece a few Albanian
casualties were caused as a consequence of the armed clashes. Hoxha did not want
any further escalation, and ordered the border patrol troops to not react ‘to the Greek

166

At the end of the alliance with China, Albania had almost finished the second plant, and later build
the third.
167

In one report of the trade office of the Albanian Embassy in Beijing, the situation regarding the
delivering of the oil extraction equipment from China was considered “very bad”. In, Ministry of
Trade, 24 January 1967: “Report of the trade office of the embassy in Beijing on the state of the
import of goods for 1967”, in AQSH, F.503, V. 1967, D100, f.2.
168

The Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army asked the Albanian premier if he
was sure that Albania could manage all the supplies he was asking (page 19-20 of the report). In
Politburo, Tirana, 18 October 1967: “Report of comrade Mehmet Shehu about the visit of the
Albanian Party’s and governmental delegation in the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1967, D15, f.2-30.
169

Top-Secret: Council of Defence, 25 November 1967, in AQSH, K. Mb, V. 1967, D2, f.20.

170

Kostis Kornetis, Children of the Dictatorship: Student Resistance, Cultural Politics, and The “long
1960s” in Greece, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013); Robert V. Keeley, The Colonels' Coup and
the American Embassy: A Diplomat's View of the Breakdown of Democracy in Cold War Greece,
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, c2010); Formally Greece had still in force the
state of war with Albania, approved since when Greece declared war to Italy in 1940. In 1944, after
the withdrawal of the German troops, the Greek army established a regime of terror in Chameria
(northern Greece, bordering Albania), expelling with force the Albanian population of the zone. Those
that survived, some tens of thousands, left their homes and escaped to Albania, but they would never
see again their land. Those few that remained in Greece instead, had to convert to Christian orthodoxy
and change their names and language, being completely assimilated within decades.

206

provocation without authorization from the capital’. 171 Yet, the Albanian army
drafted operational plans based on hypothetical attacks from Greece. Rather than an
invasion, they thought that the colonels could launch a massive air attack,
destabilizing the country and destroying its fragile economy.172 With its small ally in
this precarious situation, China accelerated the delivery of military supplies to
Albania. 173 In 1967 alone, the value of the total amount of armaments Albania
received reached 84 million yuan. 174 Curiously, during 1967, China and Albania
hired a Greek ship for the transportation of part of the armaments. 175 This was
intended to be a message to the colonels in Athens, despite the fact that Chinese
military assistance to Albania was not a secret. Some years later, in 1971, the same
colonels would ask Albania to establish diplomatic relations with Greece, and
Albania agreed, not without first warning them that any aggressive policy towards
Albania would fail.
The second event was the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia to
repress what has been remembered as the Prague Spring, and the subsequent
proclamation by Brezhnev of the Soviet doctrine of the ‘limited sovereignty’. 176
171
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Following this event, in September 1968, Albania denounced the WPO and withdrew
from it. The fear that incidents might give an excuse to Soviet Union for an
intervention had always been high, and Hoxha seized this opportunity to make the
step he had been waiting for. Albania was de facto expelled from the WPO in 1961,
as the minister of defense had not been invited in the meetings of the member
countries, nor had Albania been invited to participate in any common military
maneuver since then. It was the right moment, according to the leadership, to break
the juridical ties that still kept Albania in an alliance that in their view had become a
hostile, Soviet-controlled stable. 177 Hoxha feared an extension of the conflict to
Romania and Yugoslavia, Albania being more worried about the latter possibility.
Operative plans to face an eventual attack from the Soviet Union were quickly
drafted following the formal ousting of Albania from the WPO.178 The situation was
further complicated when in autumn 1968, the Albanian population staged massive
protests in Kosova, seeking better conditions and autonomy for their region. Tito was
caught between two potential fires, the Soviet threat on one side, on the other was the
nationalistic movement of the Albanian population in Kosova, whose claims were
supported by Albania. But in this situation, Hoxha did not hesitate to stand on
Yugoslavia’s side in case of Soviet attack, showing a clear conciliatory attitude
towards Tito – whom he saw as the lesser of two evils. Through public speeches and
indirect diplomatic contacts the message to Tito was that he could concentrate his
troops on Yugoslavia’s eastern border, to defend his country from a possible Soviet
invasion, rather than the southern border with Albania. Hoxha also knew that
Yugoslavia was too precious for the western bloc and for NATO, and therefore
would have been well defended, but in this eventuality, Albania would have been
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trapped between the two biggest military alliances of that time, not sure at all that its
borders would have remained immune from this possible conflict.
The withdrawal of Albania from the WPO preceded another visit of the
Albanian defense minister to China in September 1968, officially on occasion of the
celebrations for the founding of the PRC. His real motivations were to review some
agreements regarding new armaments from China. The last agreement had been just
one year earlier, and the delivery of the military supplies was going according to
plan. Therefore, Zhou Enlai, and the leadership in China, were not enthusiastic to
review the agreements, nor to provide any further armaments. Shocked by Tirana’s
new requests, China decided to send to Albania the chief of the general staff, Huang
Yongsheng, to assess the situation.
Zhou Enlai nearly caused an incident with Balluku – so perceived at least by the
Albanian leadership. Balluku reported that Zhou Enlai had opposed Albania’s plans
to heavily arm the country. Zhou argued that because of the size of Albania, in case
of war the country ‘would be wiped out at the first attack’. Then later in another
meeting, Zhou told the Albanian minister that ‘with Yugoslavia, in the present
situation [Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia] you could establish a military
alliance. The Romanians, Czechoslovakians, and Yugoslavians are now our indirect
allies’.179 This conversation initially was not reported to all Politburo members in
Tirana, but only to Hoxha. Eventually, he decided to share it with the others,
although reminding them of its secrecy. Hoxha perceived Zhou’s invitation for a
rapprochement with Belgrade outrageous. Zhou had indeed stepped on Hoxha’s
Achilles’ heel. Balluku in his prompt response to Zhou Enlai considered Yugoslavia
‘the biggest enemy of our country’. Zhou then moved quickly to other issues in an
attempt to diminish the damage, but then, when Balluku was discussing Albania’s
defense strategy, mentioning the Greek threat, Zhou again provoked Balluku by
asking, ‘But don’t you think that the Soviet Union would defend you from a Greek
attack’? These positions were deemed by Shehu in Tirana as ‘anti-Marxist, hostile,
and anti-Albanian’, and by Hoxha as ‘harmful to the international communist
movement, to the revolution and to the struggle against imperialism and modern
179
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revisionism’. Hoxha drew the conclusion that Zhou Enlai was ‘a revisionist, and
despite his active participation in the Cultural Revolution, he in fact is against this
revolution’.180
At the end Zhou Enlai accepted some of the new requests by Albania, including,
among many materials, hundreds of tanks, tens of air fighters, many torpedodestroyers, missiles, and other equipment. Zhou agreed to provide immediately 200
million shells (bullets and rackets), part of the plan for one billion shells, 10 thousand
machine guns, 2500 anti-air strikes machine gunners and hundreds of artillery
pieces.181 China also committed to provide, by 1969, 90 percent of all the armaments
that it had agreed to provide by 1971.182 Huang Yongsheng stayed for one week in
Albania, visiting many military garrisons. 183 Following his visit, a load of 19,000
tons of military supplies reached Albania that same month, and another load of
around 80,000 tons of materials were delivered by the end of 1968. 184 Some
problems did emerge with the Albanian officials, mainly pilots of fighter jets, who
went to China for training. One report from the Albanian embassy in Beijing,
complained about the poor discipline they showed, and the ‘immoral acts’ (trying to
approach local girls, and even a case of rape), consequently, an entire group of 18
pilots was called back to Albania in the first year of their study in China. 185
Nonetheless, the military equipment continued to be readily and rapidly supplied. In
celebration of the Albanian National Day, at the end of November 1969, Li Xiannian
visited Albania, accompanied by a large number of officials of the Chinese army. It
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is curious to see that by the end of 1969, Albania expected to have received a total of
160 thousand tons in ammunitions (shells and bullets), which, according to the
calculations, ‘requires a storage space of 16km tunnels, at least 7m large’.186 The last
load for the year 1969 reached Durrës in December 1969, carrying more than 1400
tons of materials. 187 At the beginning of 1969, the two governments signed an
agreement to speed up the fortification process in Albania by sending a group of
Chinese experts who had experience in constructing tunnels from their time in
Vietnam.188 Meanwhile, regardless of Albanian leadership’s rhetoric aimed against
Yugoslavia, by the late 1960s Albania’s foreign policy towards its northern neighbor
had changed from unconcealed enmity to timid openness, and even to collaboration,
accompanied by Yugoslavia with a substantial improvement of the status of the
Albanian population in Kosova. Belgrade also changed its attitude towards Tirana,
and in 1969 officially asked to raise the diplomatic representation from the level of
legation to that of embassies. Albania, not completely trustful of Yugoslavia, waited
until 1971 before accepting the Yugoslavian proposal.189
In this context of Chinese enormous assistance to Albania, in 1968 the Albanian
government initiated the study of an economic plan for the entire decade 1970-80,
which would completely rely on Chinese assistance.190 Although most of the new
186

A detailed list of all armaments Albania expected to receive during 1969 was drafted by November
1968. Available in AQU, Sekretariati, V. 1969, D114, f.9; In the heavy artillery instead, the total
amount of load was expected to reach 266.218 tons. In, “The résumé of the tonnage of the military
equipment, divided in categories that will arrive from China during the year 1969, and the first half of
1970”, in AQU. Sekretariati, V. 1969, D114, f.2.
187

“List of the equipment that arrived from China with the ship “Hainan” on 13 December 1969”, in
AQU, Sekretariati, V. 1969, D116.
188

Tirana, 14 March 1969: “Contract (agreement) of the group of experts of the air photographing
with helicopters MI-4, design of tunnels, missiles and anti-air artillery (AKA, in Albanian), from the
experience in Vietnam”, in AQU, Sekretariati, V. 1969, D285. These experts, 19 in all, were mainly
engineers.
189

Mehmet Shehu affirmed Albania’s lack of trust on Yugoslavia, conveying any close up to the
improved status of the Albanian population in Kosova, where since 1968 there had been a progressive
improvement of their political and national status within the Federation, allowing them to use their
language, found a university, and strengthen the cultural ties with Albania. In Politburo, Tirana, 20
January 1971: “On the establishment of embassy-level diplomatic representations between Albania
and Yugoslavia”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1971, D41, f.188-193.
190

Politburo, Tirana, 15 April 1968, in AQSH, F.14, OU,V. 1968, D7. There were two fields in which
Albania aimed to make big investments: the construction of the big hydropower plants in Drini River
– Fierza plant, and Komani plant, and the deep and complex processing of oil. Albania had discovered
new oilfields rich but its quality was not very good because of the high percentage of Sulphur. This
required the construction of complex combines that could process it and consequently extract other
products from oil such as gasoline and benzene for industrial use.

211

plan concerned the expansion of production capacities of existing industrial projects,
the planned investments would cost the equivalent of 46 new projects. 191 In July
1968, Albanian Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu sent a letter to Zhou Enlai asking
China to accept an economic delegation from Albania in order to negotiate a new
loan. Zhou Enlai accepted and a delegation headed by vice Prime Minister Adil
Çarçani went to Beijing in September 1968.192
China eventually accepted most of the Albanian requests, including the building
of another large hydroelectric power plant in Fierza, and the completion of the
metallurgic plant in Elbasan – a gigantic project for Albania which required the
participation of around 15 thousand workers during its construction, and a permanent
workforce of 10 thousand workers employed in the production line. 193 The two
governments signed the agreement on 20 November, 1968, for a new Chinese loan,
totalling 1.56 billion yuan (252.4 million rubles), 194 and 35 million USD cash,195
which was additional to the loan approved in 1965 for the fourth FYP 1966-1970.196
The total amount of the loan China approved for Albania in November 1968 and then
again in October 1970 reached almost 3 billion yuan, (697.8 million rubles).197 On at
least two occasions, China used Albania for technological transfer purposes. First,
the constructions of chemical fertilizer plants, and second the hydropower plants. In
the second case, when the hydropower plant of Vau i Dejës (Mao Zedong plant)
begun construction, it was necessary to import equipment that China could not
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produce. China entered into talks with Italian companies regarding the production of
particular trucks for the transport of the materials and equipment to build the dam.
Those trucks were produced in China later. The delegation that had been in China to
discuss the loan, managed to increase and modify in Albanian favor some of the
agreements concerning the exchange of goods within the plan 1965-70. They also
managed to assure most of the cables and wires needed for the electrification of the
country. In fact, in the 1970s, in some remote parts of Albania, people still relied on
candlelight. It was not surprising that China perceived paradoxical the Albanian
determination to pursue heavy industrialization whilst in many respects Albania was
still backward.
The building of these industrial projects shaped the entire national life of
Albania during the 1960s and 1970s, as it required a huge mobilization of the
workforce and building from the ground of entire cities in the country. The city of
Elbasan, which hosted the metallurgic plant, needed an additional workforce of more
than twelve thousand people along with their families. This required the construction
of additional six and a half thousand apartments for a new population of thirty-five
thousand people. 198 This necessitated the building of related social and cultural
institutions such as schools, theatres, libraries, and other facilities. In some places,
this meant ancient and tiny villages became new-born cities overnight. The city of
Laç that hosted the workers of the superphosphate plant was such a case. The same
happened in the small city of Ballsh, where for the building of a large and complex
plant for oil processing, it was necessary to employ more than three thousand people,
and afterwards a permanent workforce of around two thousand people, plus another
two thousand in smaller factories related directly to this plant. In all, an entire city of
thousands of people was built around this factory, which still exists and is partially
functional.
In 1969, China faced many challenges. The tension with the Soviet Union along
the border resulted in armed clashes, while internally China faced problems created
by clashes between groups because of the Cultural Revolution.199 In this context, it
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was expected that China might not fulfill the contractual obligations with Albania as
scheduled. Instead, as shown in a report of the trade office at the Albanian embassy
in Beijing, precisely during these conflicts, China accomplished more for the
Albanian economy than in any previous period. With only some limited delays, all of
the agreements were kept for this year.200 In 1970, the PLA Politburo assessed the
achievements of the fourth FYP 1965-70, which was nearing conclusion. According
to the discussions, most targets of the plan had been reached, and in many industrial
sectors the targets were even surpassed.201 The national income in Albania increased
by 30 percent in five years, certainly owing to the Chinese assistance. Because of
these results, Albania’s economy in these years seemed relatively flourishing.
Agriculture was the only major sector of the economy where the targets were not
achieved, with many farmers lacking the necessary level of mechanization, but this
did not cause any shortage of food, or primary goods in general.
In the early 1970, the Albanian government had good reasons to celebrate these
achievements; and good reason for optimism as they began preparations for the new
FYP 1971-75. This new plan had some marked differences with those previous. First,
since most of the heavy industry projects were still under construction, only eight
new projects required complete Chinese assistance. 202 In total, 36 new industrial
projects were planned for construction – some new factories, and some
enhancements to existing plants. That so few were put completely on Chinese
shoulders indicated that Albania had acquired in these years, thanks precisely to the
Chinese expertise, the capacities to develop its own industry. Another fundamental
aspect was Albania’s planned diversification of its commercial portfolio with
different countries regarding some specific equipment that China could not provide.
state of projects, exchange of goods and respective implementations for the year 1969, and the review
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For instance, Albania decided not to ask for all the transportation trucks from China,
but decided to purchase them from Czechoslovakia and Poland – an old Chinese
suggestion.
To finalize the assistance for the FYP 1971-75, a delegation visited China in
August 1970, led by the head of the Albanian State Planning Commission, Abdyl
Këllezi, who stayed in China for more than two months, until October of that year,
for negotiations.203 During the stay the delegation toured many provinces in China,
where they were told that the Cultural Revolution had won everywhere, and Mao’s
thought had triumphed. By 16 October, 1970, the two sides signed the agreements
regarding China’s new loan to Albania. Although it was less than Albania had asked
– 1,880 billion yuan or, equal to 445 million rubles (534 million USD) 204 – it
included funds for the construction of the great hydropower project of Fierza.205 In
addition, China approved a loan in foreign currency of 14 million USD cash to be
used for importing goods China could not provide.206 In these agreements, Albania
was granted two great advantages: first, it could start to repay this loan after 1990;
second, the loan was without any interest. Curiously, while throughout Europe in the
1970s, television was the most important means of propaganda diffusion and
entertainment, Albania was still the age of the radio. Now, finally, with Chinese
assistance, Albania had the possibility to build a powerful television station, together
with the technological capacities to manufacture its own televisions.207
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MITIGATING CHINA’S ISOLATION. SURROGATE DIPLOMACY
China had delivered great economic and military assistance to Albania. To make
good on its end of the bargain, Albania dramatically increased efforts to defend
Chinese interests in international organizations. At sessions of the United Nations,
Albania fought a determined battle over the legitimate seat of the PRC. It also
strongly defended the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the international forums and
organizations where it had its representatives. The entire diplomatic network of
Albania was at China’s disposal. In November 1966, the Albanian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs instructed its diplomatic network to defend the Cultural Revolution
and the ‘…international authority and prestige of China that has become a shield
against imperialism and revisionism’.208 The Sino-Indian border clashes, the SinoSoviet territorial disputes, the issue of Tibet, and the question of China’s
representation in UN were the main issues about which Albania lent support to
Beijing.
In 1945, China had been one of the founders of the UN, but it was Chang Kaishek (Jiang Jieshi) who signed the Charter in China’s name. As the leader of
Kuomintang (Guomindang - GMD), he was then internationally recognized as
China’s leader. During China’s civil war, Chang Kai-shek was defeated, resulting in
the foundation in 1949 of the People’s Republic of China.209 When, in November
1949, the PRC claimed its seat in the United Nations, it was still occupied by the
Republic of China (ROC), which as a consequence of the civil war de facto
represented only the island of Taiwan. 210 The United States had assisted the
Nationalists during the civil war, but eventually they realized that Chang Kai-shek’s
cause was lost. Washington ‘affirmed the traditional open-door policy’ for China,
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and the desire ‘for its unity’, but it maintained ‘recognition for the Nationalist
(GMD) government’.211
More specifically, the United States managed to turn the issue of the PRC’s
representation into an ‘important matter’ that required the vote of the two-thirds of
UN member states.212 So the question was formally reduced to whose credentials
were valid, those of Taipei or Beijing. Thus the issue became one of representation,
not admission.213 From a larger perspective, the United States had hoped in vain that
Mao’s China would embrace the Yugoslavian path, meaning friendly relations with
the West without giving up the communist party’s rule, never blindly following
Soviet dictates.214 Scholars have even sustained that without Chinese involvement in
the Korean War, the United States would not have opposed the PRC’s representation
in the United Nations.215 In fact, the United States’ closest ally, the United Kingdom,
recognized Beijing’s government just months after the establishment of the PRC, in
January 1950 – not without causing attrition between London and Washington.216
Beijing sustained that resistance to its participation in the UN ‘has not actually
caused any damage to China, but has impaired the prestige of the United Nations and
made it unable effectively to play its role in accordance with the Charter’. 217
Nonetheless, as Byron Weng argued long time ago, although Beijing was not
represented, the ‘UN has been a constant factor in Peking’s foreign policy
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deliberations’.218 Because of its importance, China used Albania as a favored channel
to transmit its messages to the UN, and every year sent explicative materials to the
Albanian government presenting China’s views and policies. 219 The pivot of
Beijing’s policy towards its representation in UN was represented in the “One
China” argument, placing the Taiwan issue as strictly an internal affair of the PRC.
The second axis of China’s policy was its rejecting any solution that would include
their dual representation in United Nations – an option Beijing always rejected
because it was clear that would legitimate Taiwan’s de jure independence. Therefore
any resolution to admit the PRC in UN, had to go in parallel with one pushing for the
ousting of Taipei from the organization.
Albania joined the United Nations on 14 December, 1955, and immediately
participated actively in all its related agencies. At the beginning, Albania acted in
accordance with Soviet directives, and passively supported decisions made in the
Kremlin. Following the Sino-Soviet and Soviet-Albanian split, however, Albania
became active in using the United Nations as a stage from which to loudly speak out
on international relations and the division of the world in spheres of influence
between superpowers. As one scholar has noted, during the Cold War, the United
Nations was ‘the conspicuous and most highly publicized arena’.220 Albania’s voice
in this arena became even louder after 1961, when the alliance with China was
consolidated. Representing China also had many benefits for Albania. Beyond the
Chinese assistance it received for its role, Albania also acquired certain notoriety in
the international scene that it had not enjoyed in at least four centuries. In addition,
Albania tried to position itself to carry the banner of the struggle for liberation of
nations across continents as it strongly supported the decolonization process. This
process helped enormously to increase, year after year, the support for China in the
UN. The new states became so numerous that, at a certain point, the Albanian
ambassador noted how the UN had turned into a ‘world exhibition’.221 This activism
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of Albania came to be useful to China, which used the network Albania had been
building in UN, and beyond, to promote its policies and eventually also to join the
UN. Now, during the Cultural Revolution, Albania’s diplomatic network became
almost the only channel to convey China’s voice in international organizations. This
situation was caused by two factors: first, Albania was ideologically China’s closest
ally; second, among China’s supporters, Albania was also the most stable, with a
consolidated diplomatic network, and was internationally recognized. This situation
enabled China to use Albania’s diplomatic network to promote its interests via what
we can call surrogate diplomacy – although this term is not used by scholars in
analyzing foreign policy and international relations, yet for a limited period and for
some concerted tasks Albania did perform exactly as a surrogate for Beijing.
Although China did not rely exclusively on Albania to promote its interests in forums
where it was unrepresented, Albania remained the most active promoter of China
until early 1970s.
The first time Albania presented a resolution in China’s favor in the UN was in
October 1963, in conjunction with many African and Asian states.222 The JournalAmerican, a newspaper closed in 1966, called the resolution a challenge to the Soviet
Union, reflecting both, Sino-Soviet and Albanian-Soviet tensions. 223 In this same
session, Albania presented to the UN General Secretary a declaration from the
Chinese government advocating the total destruction of nuclear arms, and proposing
an international conference of world leaders.224 China had made great efforts in the
1950s to possess nuclear technology, but the Soviet Union, which at the beginning
had promised to help, eventually reneged its promise and withdrew all nuclear
experts from China. Chinese declaration followed the meeting between the
governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union, resulting in
the agreement on the partial cessation of nuclear tests. China saw the agreement as an
attempt by these countries to keep their monopoly of the world’s nuclear weapons,
rather than a genuine effort for peace, proposing instead the total destruction of the
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nuclear arsenals.225 The declaration included a frontal attack on the Soviet Union,
describing it as a country that ‘aligns with the forces of war against the forces of
peace, allies with the imperialism to oppose socialism, allies with United States to
oppose China’. 226 The Soviet ambassador Andrei Gromyko and the American
ambassador Adlai Stevenson had a long conversation, alleged to be very friendly,
and allegedly to keep the Cold War outside the works of that session of the UN.
When Albania raised the issue of China’s seat in the UN, in a speech on 16 October,
1963, the Soviet delegation stayed in complete silence, neither approving nor
opposing, a silence which the Journal-American called a ‘a sign that shows the depth
of the quarrel between Beijing and Moscow, a path towards a complete split between
them’. The same interpretation was given by New York Times.227 In another analysis
The Post considered that Beijing and Moscow were in a race for the leadership of the
anti-colonialist countries, but ‘the more Soviet Union would try to isolate Beijing,
the more China would want to join the United Nations’.228 All the debates in the
General Assembly devolved into attacks between the American ambassador in the
UN, Adlai Stevenson, and the foreign minister of Albania, Behar Shtylla. Certainly,
Albania’s standing was very radical, even more than China requested it to be.
Albanian diplomats used extreme language, often with direct offenses to the United
States, but this was not enough to call much attention from Washington, which did
not see Albania as a threat on the international stage. The reason behind the furious
reaction of the American diplomats, rather, was China, which they mentioned in
nearly every attack they directed at Albania. Adlai Stevenson, in a declaration to the
press in 1963, correctly affirmed that ‘the foreign minister of Albania in this case
was absolutely China’s spokesperson’.229
In 1964 instead, China faced another challenge in UN. The UN Commission for
Decolonization discussed the territories of Macao and Hong Kong. China asked

225

“Declaration of the Chinese Government [Declaration du Gouvernment Chinois]”, 31 July 1963, in
AMPJ, OKB, V. 1963, D662/22, f.125-131.
226

Ibid., f.128.

227

Ibid., f.51-52.

228

The Post, 19.09.1963, in Ibid.

229

The text of Stevenson’s declaration to the press correspondents at UN regarding the speech of
comrade Behar Shtylla of 27 September 1963, New York, 27 September 1963, in AMPJ, OKB, V.
1963, D662/26, f.60-62.

220

Albania to defend Chinese claims over these territories. Consequently, Albania
opposed the interference of the members of this commission in the issue of the
decolonization of Macao and Hong Kong. 230 China was a great supporter of the
process of decolonization, but it feared that on the wave of the process worldwide,
territories that Beijing claimed under its sovereignty could proclaim their
independence as well. When the Albanian vice foreign minister Vasil Nathanaili met
with the Chinese ambassador in Tirana, Xu Jianguo, the ambassador asked Albania
to oppose any claim that these colonies be treated as colonial countries – as such
subject to a process of independence. China’s ultimate goal was their unification with
the Mainland. It was a paradox: China preferred to keep Hong Kong and Macao
under British rule, eventually negotiating later their return to China, rather than see
Beijing’s control precluded by their becoming independent cities.
During 1964, Albania had tried to mediate on behalf of China on different
issues. For instance, on Beijing’s request, Tirana asked the Turkish authorities to
invite a trade delegation from China. This was a very sensitive issue, as Turkey held
an important, delicate position in NATO, was a strong supporter of the United States,
and had only recently improved relations with Tirana. In many other forums, Albania
actively put forward China’s interests in the agenda, such as in April 1964, at the
Geneva conference for trade and development. The Albanian minister of foreign
trade, Kiço Ngjela, asked the immediate ousting of the representative of Taiwan, and
the consequent representation of the PRC. In the same time at the Universal Postal
Union Congress, the Albanian delegate protested because of the lack of
representation of China. The same happened at the World Health Assembly, where
the representative of Albania opposed the credentials of the representative of Taiwan,
but in the end it had little choice but to relent.231 That same year Albania opposed the
presence of Taiwan at the eighth conference of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA).
In November 1965, the Chinese ambassador in Albania, Xu Jianguo, alarmed by
the decision of the UN to open a debate in the General Assembly on the question of
Tibet, asked Albania to oppose both the United States and India, which had both
230
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insisted on raising the issue, and to defend the PRC against attacks. The issue was
not new for China. In august 1959, during the consultative preparatory meeting of the
socialist countries in Sofia (Bulgaria), following the Tibetan turmoil, Chinese
representatives brought the issue of Tibet to the attention of the entire socialist bloc.
China was afraid that the United States might raise this question for discussion at the
UN General Assembly. For China, behind all this was India, which according to
Beijing had the full support of the United States. Beijing feared that the United States
would also support India’s eventual effort to transform Tibet into an international
conflict, potentially compelling the UN to act against China.232 The Albanian foreign
ministry urged the Albanian diplomats in New York to make efforts to persuade
Afro-Asian countries to oppose America, as China had expressly ‘asked us to assist
on this issue’.233
The support of Albania became even more precious because of the
disagreements within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The NAM was a sequel
of the Bandung meeting of 1955. One of the most relevant members of the
movement was Egypt, the most important North African country at the time, ruled in
1960 by Nasser (Gamal Abdel). Nasser attempted to organize a second conference,
after Bandung’s model, possibly in Cairo, and tried to convince Nehru, the Indian
premier, to improve the relations with Zhou Enlai in order to involve China as well.
But Nehru opposed the organizing of this conference, as it would be perceived as an
anti-American event. Nehru instead promoted a movement of the non-aligned
countries later the same year.234 This was confirmed only some months later by the
Chinese ambassador in Berlin in a conversation with the Albanian ambassador.235
Later, during 1961, this conference was organized in Cairo as a meeting of the
neutral countries, which China, it seems, did not appreciate because of the
contradictions among the participating countries. This meeting indeed served as a
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preparatory meeting for the foundation of one of the most debated organizations
during the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), founded in Belgrade in
the meeting of the neutral countries in 1961.236 The only positive fact for China, at
least according to Beijing’s ambassador in Berlin, was Cuba’s participation, since
Cuba was clearly a country that opposed the United States.237
The disunity of this movement was noted by China’s diplomats, who divided the
participants into three groups: first, those that served the American interests, such as
India and Yugoslavia; second, those that could oppose the American policy but were
weak, such as Cuba, Mali and Algeria; third, those countries that moved right and
left according to different interests, such as Indonesia and Ceylon (Sri Lanka).238 In
Belgrade, in the founding meeting of the NAM in early September 1961, the
Egyptian correspondent noted that to have a joint declaration ‘not even 50 days
would be necessary considering the very different content of each delegation’s
speech’. 239 The contradictions among the organizers were confirmed also by the
Chinese diplomats in Cairo, who, speaking with the Albanian ambassador, confirmed
NAM’s division into three groups: the right-leaning group headed by Tito-Nehru, the
centrist group led by Sukarno-Nasser, and the small left-leaning group headed by
Cuba. 240 Some years later, in 1967, the Syrian diplomats in Paris, talking to the
Albanian ambassador, affirmed that the non-aligned bloc was finished when ‘Nehru
died, pushing India in America’s arms… and Nasser is trapped in the Yemenite
war’. 241 These contradictions often made the support of these countries for China
uncertain – or if they were certain – weak. Even more so during the Chinese Cultural
Revolution.
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In December 1965, during the Twentieth General Assembly of the UN, the
question of Tibet was again included in the agenda. Following Chinese instructions,
Albania rejected the mere existence of a ‘question of Tibet’ and any discussion on
this issue was deemed meaningless.242 For Albania, Tibet was a place where ‘until
recently people lived in conditions of total slavery and indescribable misery… but at
that time the representatives of Nicaragua, Philippines and Salvador [promoters of
the issue in UN, supported by the US] never showed any concern about the human
rights in Tibet’.243 Then, the Albanian delegate warned that, by becoming American
spokespersons, would not save these countries from eventual American aggression if
any their policies would not align to American interests in the future.244 On the other
hand, the Albanian minister praised China for its great achievements in improving
the lives of the people in Tibet. He mentioned the agrarian reform and the
investments in agriculture, education, and infrastructure, generally improving the
living standards, specifically in the building of a network of health care centers, and
increasing the number of Tibetan cadres. The minister declared that if there would be
a country about which the UN should debate on human rights, ‘there is no need to go
far since it is just in our face, here in the United States where 20 million black people
are continuously discriminated against’.245 Since speculations over the human rights
in Tibet proliferated, China allowed a number of foreign correspondents to visit the
region in summer 1965. 246 They could visit only places where the Chinese
government granted permission, and Albanian correspondents, aimed at disproving
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what they called American defamations of China, wrote enthusiastic articles about
Tibet.
During all these years Albania also strongly attacked the American intervention
in Vietnam. 247 In many meetings with Chinese officials Albanian officials talked
about Vietnam and about the American aggression, but China did not ask for any
Albanian concrete support on this issue. The reason might be the fact that Vietnam
was also supported by Soviet Union, and in the UN, Moscow had more power than
the other socialist countries. The Albanian speeches in favor of the Vietnamese
cause, however, can also be explained as an attempt by China to accredit Beijing
with a certain role, since China provided enormous assistance to North Vietnam, as it
considered all Indochina to be of strategic importance for its own national security,
because of geographical proximity, and historical links. The permanent
representative of Albania in the UN, Halim Budo, in a speech addressed to the
General Assembly on 17 December 1965, attacked American policy in Vietnam,
using the same arguments reflected in Chinese documents relayed to Albania, but
with a characteristic Albanian combative tone. The speech was full of contempt
against the United States for ‘trying to use this tribune for their aggressive
purposes… keeping away the public opinion from the serious problems of our
time… concerned instead of reducing the wave of indignation for the barbarian
aggression against Vietnam’.248
In June 1966, just some months before the Twenty-first UN General Assembly,
Albania, Cambodia and Algeria, together with other countries, coordinated to
promote again the inclusion in the agenda of the question of the PRC’s representation
in UN. 249 Although likely untrue, a Cambodian representative sustained that his
government did not consult China about its initiative to promote China’s rights in the
UN, and queried if Zhou Enlai during his visit to Albania, in June 1966, had
expressed any change of policy.250 Indeed something new was expressed in Tirana
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but not from Zhou Enlai, rather than it was from the Charge d'Affaires of China in
Albania, who in a meeting with an official of the foreign ministry had said that China
would not join the UN regardless of the result of this year’s vote, ‘as long as that
organization would remain under American control’.251 In this way, he implied as
well that any resolution in China’s favor would fail. This position however, reflected
the self-inflicted isolation of Beijing from the first year of the Cultural Revolution in
China. In any case, the Albanian delegation in the UN was instructed to defend the
Chinese Cultural Revolution in accordance ‘with the speech of Enver Hoxha’, to the
congress of the party.252 In 1966 information warned Albania of a coming Canadian
initiative seeking proper resolution of the PRC’s recognition in the UN, without
removing Taiwan’s seat, in harmony with the American plan for two Chinas. 253
According to the Canadian ambassador, their initiative was aimed at ‘provoking
negotiations between China and the United States’, because ‘the situation is so tense
that either they negotiate or there would be a war between China and America’.254
Although the Albanian initiative was joined and supported by other countries, such
as Cambodia and Algeria, their stances differed in modality and language. During the
talks of the authors among the authors of the resolution, Albania claimed that the text
of the “Memoire Explicative” was weak, so it pressured the group to make some
changes, possibly using the strong language Albania was familiar with. In particular,
the non-aligned countries, such as Cambodia, did not accept the Albanian suggestion
to refer Taiwan as ‘the Chang Kai-shek Clique’, opting instead to adopt the formula
of ‘the representatives of the pseudo regime of Chang Kai-shek’. 255 Albania also
lamented resistance from some countries – which in the document are mentioned as
‘mainly African countries, Algeria included’ – to attack the American ‘aggressive
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policy against China’. 256 Albania, based on China’s arguments, sustained that the
United States had invaded Taiwan, and therefore, had invaded China. Albania was
not optimistic about the votes China would receive in this session, mainly because of
‘the changes that have occurred in some African countries due to the military coups
supported by the United States’.257 Ultimately, the resolution in favor of China was
rejected, 46 countries voting for it, 57 against. It is interesting to note the remark of
the Albanian ambassador to his ministry in Tirana after the vote. He considered the
work of United States to oppose China easier that year ‘probably due to the internal
situation in China’, alluding to the Cultural Revolution and all the inertia it had
created in China’s diplomacy and foreign affairs.258 In this session, those that voted
against China included some countries that had supported it the year before, such as
Morocco, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Congo, Ruanda, and Libya. The
newly admitted members, Lesotho and Guyana, also voted against China, while
Burundi and Senegal, having abstained the previous year, supported China in
1966.259
During 1967, China entered its second year of the Cultural Revolution, which
further paralyzed its diplomacy. In June 1967, Pakistan and Mauritania joined as coauthors of the resolution for China’s readmission into UN. 260 In the discussions
among the co-authors, Albania disagreed with Algeria which promoted the use of a
conciliatory language. Albania proposed mentioning Taiwanese representatives as
‘the clique of Chang Kai-shek’, rather than the Algerian version of ‘the regime of
Chang Kai-shek’, but at the end, Albania had the support of Congo, Mali and Guinea
and its proposal passed.261 Albania and Algeria also opposed each other over the
Albanian suggestion to emphasize China’s respect for sovereignty of the other
countries and its policy of non-intervention in their internal affairs. Algeria proposed
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to avoid any similar mention in light of what had happened in Beijing, where as a
result of the turmoil the British embassy had been set on fire, and a British journalist
held hostage.262 But for Albania, precisely because of these events, China needed to
be defended even more. Finally, the Albanian suggestion passed because of the
support of the African countries. It is worth noting that among the communist
countries, only Albania was active in defending China. Romania, which participated
as a co-author of the resolution, barely said a word during the discussions between
Algeria and Albania over the content of the documents. 263 Preparing for these
meetings, the Albanian foreign ministry instructed the Albanian delegates to the UN
that the documents (resolution and memoire explicative) should not leave space to
any interpretation that alludes to a possible isolation of China in the international
community. For this reason, the Albanian ambassador proposed to remove the part of
the document in which China was described as a ‘victim’ of American expansionism,
instead emphasizing that ‘our governments did not stop the denouncing of the
aggressive policies against China’.264 By the end of the meeting, all the Albanian
remarks had been accepted by the authors and incorporated into the documents, and
the resolution. Yet, these small disagreements were a symptom of the larger divide
that existed between Albania, as a communist country, and the Third World countries
– although Albania never accepted the Three World’s theory. But they also show that
through the first phase of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Albania remained
faithfully on China’s side, supporting its interests internationally.

Conclusion
Although the Sino-Albanian relations during 1962-1970 saw some mutual distrust
and persistent attrition, this was the most fruitful period of the alliance. The attrition
came about due to China’s contradictory policy, at least in Albania’s eyes, toward the
Soviet Union, at times conciliatory and at times inflammatory. If the change of
leadership in the Soviet Union was seen as a chance for China to better relations with
Moscow, Albania instead was determined to avoid any rapprochement. Moreover,
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from Hoxha’s perspective, there was no reason for rapprochement with Moscow
when there had already been efforts to breach the Soviet leadership of the
international communist movement. In this sense, Albania had moved forward in
capturing small movements and leftist parties that supported the Chinese line.
Fortunately for Hoxha, the combination of the assertive policies of Brezhnev and the
radicalization of China, which resulted in the Cultural Revolution, kept China and
Albania tied together. Albania had decided to promote China as an alternative to
Soviet leadership within the international communist movement. Although fully
aware that this objective was difficult to achieve, Albania claimed an active role for
China and defended China in international forums and international organizations –
chiefly, the United Nations.
The Chinese Cultural Revolution had initially confused Albanian leaders – for a
moment they even feared China might turn revisionist – but when the domestic
turmoil further isolated China, Albania clearly recognized, and seized, the
opportunity for economic and political benefits. Yet this event did reveal some of the
divergences between the two allies that would resurface later. Albania did not accept
any revision of the Stalinist dogma, therefore any Chinese claim of Mao’s thought as
an original contribution to communism was met with skepticism. Hoxha’s
ideological inflexibility pushed China to look for common grounds to accommodate
Albania’s expectations. Eventually, Albania and China found a common
understanding: China assured Albania of its antirevisionist (anti-Soviet) course,
Albania consequently supported more than ever China within the international
communist movement, and on the international stage. In turn China provided Albania
with an exceptional amount of economic and military aid. Nonetheless, Albania did
not imitate China, and its Cultural Revolution was similar to the Chinese one in the
shape and in terms of public discourse, but different in practice. The Albanian
political system was dominated by one man, who had purged and executed most of
his comrades, and who now had no rivals. His control over the party (and the
country) was complete, and his ideology – a mix of nationalism and Marxism – faced
no challenges by any other line within the power system. In Albania, with no
revisionists to contend, the Cultural Revolution could address more practical goals.
Albania’s Cultural Revolution was a struggle for total control of the party. The
Chinese one instead was a struggle within the party, defined by an inter-party
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ideological struggle. Therefore, the two cultural revolutions were connected, but had
more differences than similarities. Although there is no evidence that China put
pressure on Albania to promote the Cultural Revolution, certainly many facts show
that China at least succeeded in persuading Albania that the Cultural Revolution
would be beneficial. The Chinese Cultural Revolution put Sino-Albanian relations to
the test, which they passed successfully, and the alliance lasted for another ten years.
In this period, the Chinese assistance transformed Albania into a construction
site, building hundreds of kilometers of railways, tens of new factories, industrial
projects, and hydropower plants, and reshaping the agriculture. In a short period of
time, Albania pursued, and attained forced economic industrialization, and
paradoxically achieved higher living standards than even China, thanks to Chinese
aid.
China assured Albania’s military defense through the provision of an
unprecedented amount of armaments. This assistance did not dictate any
predetermined military strategy to Albania, because for Beijing, Albania was not of
strategical military interest, therefore the Chinese leadership never went beyond
providing some suggestions – at least partially aimed at containing the high requests.
This is understandable considering the different role Albania played for China as
compared to the Soviet Union. For the Soviets, especially after the Tito-Stalin rift,
Albania was a strategic outpost of the communist bloc in Southeastern Europe,
whereas for China, the alliance with Albania was important politically, but not
militarily, or strategically. Therefore this different role, together with the
geographical distance, shaped the alliance and the military assistance. Albania was
interested in arming itself, and it did not serve the interests of China to assist in that
process, whereas in the case of the Soviet Union, it was prudent to arm the Albanians
and to maintain a military base in their country (the naval base of Vlora), for its
proximity to the NATO bases in Italy. In this way, the Soviet Union had its only
military base in the Adriatic coast. The Soviet Union, at least under Stalin, was
interested in using Hoxha to balance Tito, whereas, to China, this aspect was
irrelevant. Nonetheless, China showed great readiness to defend Albania from its real
or perceived threats.
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PART THREE

THE END, 1971-1978
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CHAPTER FIVE

CHINA MOVES WEST, 1971-1974

Introduction
The first years of the Chinese Cultural Revolution were a golden period for Hoxha to
maximize the benefits of his relations with China by exploiting China’s isolation
from the international community. Economically, the period from 1966 to 1974-5
was the most fruitful for Albania. Politically, the Chinese Cultural Revolution
seemed to guarantee the continuation of the left turn in Mao’s policies in China. This
had, in Hoxha’s eyes, reinforced the revolutionary path in China. No matter mass
mobilization used to purge adversaries, Mao, the Albanians were convinced, had
pursued the Marxist line and defeated revisionism in China. For Hoxha, this meant a
further radicalization that reaffirmed their common ideological struggle against the
Soviet Union’s revisionism. Albanian leaders could all but have expected the drastic
turn in China’s foreign policy at the beginning of the 1970s, least of all normalization
with the United States. Hoxha was shocked by hearing of the direct communication
between Chinese and American leaders. He would not accept Mao’s policy of
balancing the Soviet Union with the United States. In fact, he did not believe what
Chinese leaders then seemed convinced of – the Soviet military attack against China
following the border military clashes between the two countries.
The Chinese decision to engage in direct talks at the highest level with United
States came without notifying Hoxha. Once he came to know of Henry Kissinger’s
secret trip to Beijing, and the decision to receive the American President Nixon in
China, Hoxha realized that Albania had begun losing the importance it had for China,
together with all this implied. Hoxha’s disappointment, which reflected a veiled
despair, was expressed in his letter addressed personally to Mao – a plea to
reconsider receiving Nixon. To Hoxha’s dismay, Mao completely ignored the letter,
deigning not even to return correspondence. Hoxha’s letter can show how far
removed from the realities of international relations he was at this time, in abject
denial of his country’s isolation. Mao’s response (lack of it) to the letter, meanwhile,
shows how strongly he had started to embrace openness, in a way, rectifying his
mistakes and missed opportunities as the leader of the world’s largest population.
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Mao’s decision not only balanced the Soviet threat, but shaped China’s policy for
decades to come, although only after his death would China fully open its doors. Yet
for the time Mao was alive, a feeble hope remained in Albanian leadership for
another possible “turn left” for China. The Tenth CCP Congress, which praised the
Cultural Revolution, and the campaign against Lin Biao, were interpreted in this
sense in Tirana. However, even though the political relations between China and
Albania begun deteriorating, China’s openness to the West obligated Hoxha to revise
Albania’s priorities. In fact, seeing that China was losing the ideological Marxist
solidity Hoxha so dearly treasured, he prioritized the economic relations with China
– at least as far as China’s reorientation of its international relations did not
negatively affect Chinese economic assistance to Albania.

From Tension to Distension in China’s International Relations
In May 1969 the newly appointed Chinese ambassador in Albania, Geng Biao,
visited Enver Hoxha during the latter’s vacation in Vlora. China could not have
chosen a better person for such role in Albania in that period. Geng Biao was an old
revolutionary who had fought in the war against Japan, and was untouched by the
purges of the Cultural Revolution.1 In his long meeting with Hoxha, including also a
lunch, the conversation between Biao and Hoxha centered on the struggle against
Soviet revisionism, American imperialism and Yugoslavian Titoism. Hoxha’s
lingering obsessions with these issues reflected Albania’s political stagnation. The
ambassador informed Hoxha that the Cultural Revolution in China ‘is over, but
perhaps needs one year to definitively triumph’. Hoxha reinforced that ‘we consider
this experience [the Cultural Revolution] a great treasure, a colossal experience from
which we all should learn’.2 Hoxha panegyrized Mao and China, and Geng endorsed
this adoration in his notes. But Hoxha seized again the opportunity to remind the
ambassador of Albania’s support in the Sino-Soviet territorial disputes. These
disputes nearly brought the Soviet Union and China to war when they resulted in

1

Larry M. Wortzel and Robin Higham, Dictionary of Contemporary Chinese Military History,
(Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1999), 103–104.
2

“The meeting of the First Secretary of the PLA CC, comrade Enver Hoxha, with the ambassador of
the People’s Republic of China, comrade Geng Biao, in Vlora [city in South Albania], 25 May 1966”,
in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1969, D5, f.6-9.

233

armed clashes at the Ussuri River in March 1969.3 The tension was high because,
among others, Moscow ‘encouraged the belief that it was ready to launch war with
China that could begin with a nuclear strike’.4 Following the first border clashes,
Albania denounced the Soviet Union as the instigator of the disputes and the
aggressor of China.
The first step in resolving these disputes was a short meeting at the Beijing
airport between the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin and Zhou Enlai. Kosygin stopped
at Beijing’s airport on 11 September 1969, on his way back to Moscow from the
funeral of Ho Chi Min in Vietnam. This meeting coincided with the Beijing meeting
of Rita Marko, an Albanian Politburo member, with Kang Sheng, who informed
Marko that ‘while we are speaking here, at the airport should have arrived Kosygin
to speak with our officials’.5 Later, Zhou Enlai also briefed Marko on his meeting
with Kosygin. Marko, reflecting both Albania’s fear of any Sino-Soviet distension,
and political inflexibility in international relations, affirmed that ‘I think this meeting
was completely inappropriate’. Zhou Enlai, who was not new to opposing Albanian
officials, retorted ‘you [Albanians] are too much extremists… Stalin talked even to
Ribbentrop’. Zhou’s remark on Albanian extremism was relatively accurate, if so
was Marko’s report to Hoxha. Marko had gone to Beijing at the invitation of Li
Xiannian, after they had met in Hanoi at the funeral of Ho Chi Minh. After landing in
Hanoi, Li Xiannian requested to meet Marko, to warn him that they each would
likely come face to face with Kosygin during the funeral ceremony, and in that case
perhaps they should shake hands with the Soviet leader. Marko opposed firmly even
this simple gesture, claiming that ‘considering the events [border clashes] Soviet
3
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Union is your enemy, therefore shaking hands with them is unjust’. On 9 September,
1969, the day of Ho Chi Minh’s funeral, Li Xiannian and Kosygin did come face to
face during the ceremony. Kosygin stretched his hand to Li, who refused to shake it
and instead turned the other direction, under the vigilant eye of Marko – this is at
least what Marko reported to Hoxha.6
In Beijing, however, Zhou Enlai assured Marko that in his meeting with Kosygin
at the airport, ‘there was nothing of party questions, but interstate issues… our
polemic in the field of ideology will continue’, in a way alleviating Albanian
concerns that the Sino-Soviet tension on border disputes could turn into an
opportunity for a revision of the Sino-Soviet relations altogether, possibly resulting
in rapprochement.7 So high was the fear of such possibility that Hoxha instructed one
of his secretaries that was about to visit China in September 1969, to air his many
grievances over the Zhou-Kosygin meeting.8 Hoxha opposed any and all talks with
the Soviets, although he affirmed ‘it is right to have talks, but not at this high level’.
To the Chinese argument that this was a tactical meeting, he countered his vague one
that ‘history has proved that those that are fascists [the Soviets] cannot be tricked
with tactics’. Moreover, Hoxha doubted also of the Chinese claims that Soviet Union
could unleash war against China, and that, already, 70 Soviet divisions had been
moved to their border. ‘Soviet Union has in all 150 divisions, some of its divisions
are in Europe, some in Soviet Union, how could be possible to move war to China
with 70 divisions?’. Hoxha concluded that ‘Chinese leaders are predisposed to help
the Soviet revisionist traitors, they are in favor of large scale friendly relations with
Soviet Union’. Yet Hoxha warned that in talking with Chinese leaders ‘we should
consider the great socialist interests, but also our internal political economic
interests… We have not been in agreement with Chinese leaders even in the past, but
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we thought that things improved. The way how Zhou Enlai poses these questions
means that our disagreements with them are deep, therefore if they continue on this
way we will certainly confront with them because these are essential questions of
line’. In the past Hoxha had also criticized Zhou Enlai and, as discussed in previous
chapters, the two had debated important ideological issues. However, Hoxha had
then rested assured that Mao remained the ultimate decider of China’s political
course. Now instead, Marko reported that ‘from what I could see, Zhou Enlai is in
charge in all fields’.9 This could have raised suspicions in Hoxha – who allowed
nothing without his personal approval – that Zhou could pursue a proper agenda in
China’s relations with Soviet Union.
The fact is that Mao remained strongly in command of China’s agenda, but he
had left in the capable hands of Zhou Enlai the everyday goings-on of the country,
trusting him to mitigate the negative impact of the Cultural Revolution’s turmoil.
Zhou Enlai eventually reassured Albania, in his talks with Haki Toska in Beijing,
that ‘we [China] will continue the struggle against modern [Soviet] revisionism’.10 In
June 1970, the minister of security of Albania, Kadri Hazbiu, met with Zhou Enlai
and Kang Sheng in Beijing. Some days earlier, they had also met with a Romanian
delegation. According to Zhou Enlai, the Romanians had asked the Chinese to assist
them in building their military industry, in a cooperative effort that would include
Albania. This came after Hoxha, in a tour of northern Albania, bordering Yugoslavia,
had affirmed that in case of Soviet attack to Yugoslavia or Romania, Albania would
not hesitate to stand at their defense. The Albanian minister noted how Hoxha’s
speeches have been understood ‘as a larger policy of openness and collaboration with
these countries… [but] these [are] illusions’. 11 Had such policy been pursued by
Albania, Zhou Enlai would most likely have seized the opportunity to disengage
from Albania’s requests for military supplies, if not their collaboration as a whole.
But Zhou might have also interpreted Hoxha’s speeches as a reorientation of
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Albania’s foreign policy towards a feeble openness. Eventually no steps were taken
in this direction anyway.
China did not pursue any rapprochement with the Soviet Union that Hoxha had
feared; in fact the two remained inimical toward one another. However, and because
of the tension with Soviet Union, Beijing drastically reoriented its policy towards
United States – which to Hoxha came as a complete shock. Regardless of the
meeting between Zhou Enlai and Kosygin, China continued, from 1969 to the early
months of 1970, to believe that the Soviet Union posed a nuclear threat. For this
reason, Mao had instructed his four marshals, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian,
and Nie Rongzhen to evaluate the possibilities of war. In this context, the United
States sent some signals of overture to China, in particular, resuming their
ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, but also of normalization of the relations in
general.12 Initially, the Chinese marshals put the United States and Soviet Union on
the same front as equally serious enemies. 13 But when the Soviets followed the
Zhenbao Island incident (eastern Sino-Soviet border) in March 1969 with an attack
on the border in Tielieketi in August of that year, (in the western Sino-Soviet
border), it ‘pushed the four marshals, as well as Mao and other Chinese leaders, to
reconsider the necessity of playing the American card’. Subsequently, they
differentiated their enemies, and discussed the necessity ‘to ally with the less
dangerous enemy in order to confront the more dangerous enemy’.14 In the United
States, President Richard Nixon arrived at the same conclusion that ‘…in the existing
circumstances, the Soviet Union was the more dangerous party’.15 This was the most
radical departure in Chinese foreign policy since the PRC’s foundation, but also a
departure in American policy from the 1960s when following the Sino-Soviet split,
Washington had ‘considered forming an alignment with the Soviet Union against
China’. For the American policy under Richard Nixon, the rapprochement with
12
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China served to ‘end the war in Vietnam, and promote détente with Soviet Union’.16
Talks between the United States and China had been taking place since 1953 at
irregular intervals in Warsaw. 17 But for Henry Kissinger, who was the key
protagonist of the Sino-American rapprochement, before the early 1970s, due to
Mao’s radicalism – his refusal of the peaceful coexistence, and his concept of
continuous revolution – rapprochement with China had been impossible.18
In the early 1970s, Kissinger, initiating the first direct talks with the PRC,
ordered the American ambassador in Warsaw ‘to approach Chinese diplomats… the
occasion was the Yugoslav fashion show in Warsaw’. 19 Eventually two teams of
negotiators met in Warsaw on 20 February, and on 20 March, 1970. These talks did
not result in major changes but they opened the door to further developments
resulting in Nixon’s call, during his trip to Pakistan and Romania in July 1970, for
‘high level exchanges with China’.20 In September 1970, the Albanian vice Premier
Abdyl Këllezi met with Mao. Mao, at a certain point in talking about Nixon’s visits
in Europe stated that ‘before dying, Nixon wants to visit China’. Këllezi did not
grasp Mao’s remark, and affirmed that ‘if he comes here he would be beheaded’.
But, for Mao, was ‘not exactly what would happen, because if he comes here means
he wants something. The Americans say that Warsaw is not anymore the appropriate
location where to have talks… Then we told them to come here to Beijing’. Mao was
trying to dig into Albania’s thought on what he already had decided would happen in
the near future. He continued querying his country’s closest ally, asking Këllezi ‘do
you think there is more contradictions or more possibility for collaboration between
United States and Soviet Union?’. But Mao realized that there was not much to glean
from his Albanian friend’s mind when Këllezi responded that ‘in the struggle against
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China, against Albania and the revolution, their collaboration is clear’.21 The events
that followed showed that the opposite was true.
China signaled its openness in October 1970, when Mao gave an interview to
Edgar Snow, who had been granted occasional preferential access to Mao since
1936, followed by Snow’s book on Mao.22 Mao, according to Kissinger, pronounced
revolutionary words in his interview to Snow, which was published months later, but
Kissinger admitted that the United States did not grasp the meaning of Mao’s words.
Mao in fact stated that even Nixon ‘would be welcome, either as a tourist or as a
president’. 23 However, beyond ideological considerations, the biggest obstacle to
Sino-American direct talks was the question of Taiwan, which eventually China and
the United States chose to put aside. In Washington, in January 1971, a message
through Romania arrived from Zhou Enlai, affirming that President Nixon would be
welcomed in Beijing.24 The United States ignored the invitation for the President, but
welcomed direct talks. But then it was China which, for some time, did not respond,
until an American table tennis (Ping-pong) team participated in an international
tournament in Japan. Mao seized this opportunity and invited the American team to
visit Beijing, which eventually they did in mid-April 1971, giving life to what
became known as the “Ping-Pong diplomacy”. 25 Then, in late April 1971, Zhou
Enlai, through Pakistan, sent a message to Washington inviting an American
21

“Minutes of conversation between Mao Zedong and Abdyl Kellezi, 28 September 1970”, in AQSH,
F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1970, D7, f.68-78.
22
Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, Rev. and enlarged ed, Pelican Books, (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1972, c1937).
23

Edgar Snow, “A Conversation with Mao Tse-Tung ” Life 70, no. 16, (30 April 1971), 47, in
Kissinger, On China, 226.
24

Kissinger, On China, 230.

25

Nicholas Griffin, Ping-Pong Diplomacy: The Secret History behind the Game That Changed the
World, (New York: Scribner, 2014). The study is centered on the figure of Igor Montagu, a British
table tennis player, who founded the International Table Tennis Federation, and was also a communist
activist; Mayumi Itoh, The Origin of Ping-Pong Diplomacy: The Forgotten Architect of Sino-U.S.
Rapprochement, 1st ed., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). According to this study instead,
without the determination and decision of Gotō Kōji, president of the Japan Table Tennis Federation,
to have the Chinese team in the competition, the Ping-Pong Diplomacy would have not been possible.
The author gives the definition of Ping-Pong Diplomacy:“the use of table-tennis tournaments as a
diplomatic vehicle during the Nagoya’s World’s in 1971, which paved the way for Sino-US
rapprochement in 1972”. It gives also a wider definition:“the employment of international table tennis
tournaments as a diplomatic tool to break the stalemate in relations among nations where the official
diplomatic channels are absent or stalled” (both definitions in p.3); Zhaohui Hong and Yi Sun, “The
Butterfly Effect and the Making of “Ping-Pong Diplomacy”, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 9,
no. 25 (2000): 429–448.

239

emissary to visit China, naming Henry Kissinger, ‘the Secretary of State William
Roger, or the President himself’.26 Eventually was Henry Kissinger who made two
trips to Beijing, one secretly on 9 July 1971, and the other publicly in October 1971
which concluded with the Shanghai Communiqué.27
Zhou Enlai called the Albanian ambassador in China, Xhorxhi Robo, on 17 July,
1971 to inform him of the secret visit of Kissinger days earlier, and of the decision to
welcome Nixon in China. Not dissimilarly from the Soviet’s attitude towards
Albania in its rapprochement with Yugoslavia in mid-1950s, China decided to not
inform Albania of any of the steps leading to Kissinger’s visit. The new ambassador
of China in Albania, Liu Zhenhua, had met Hoxha in February 1971, but in their
conversation the ambassador did not touch upon any of these questions, preferring to
explain the purge of Chen Boda instead.28 The ambassador met also with the PLA
member responsible for external relations, Pirro Bita, twice in April 1971 and foreign
minister Behar Shtylla once in June 1971, but he did not provide any information on
these events. He only mentioned in April that Mao appreciated the American writer
Edgar Snow, and that he had decided to open China for visits to rightists, centrists,
and leftist elements.29
But Albania also failed to recognize the importance of some signals it had
received earlier. For instance, in a conversation between the Albanian ambassador in
the UN and his Romanian counterpart, Diakonesku, in the UN in September 1967,
the latter said that very soon China will be in the UN, but that this ‘will be
accompanied by major changes in the American foreign policy, and they are
preparing for this’. He revealed also that China and the United States were having
talks not only in Warsaw, but also ‘in other locations’, without specifying where.
These talks would have the intention to normalize the bilateral relations between
China and the United States, as after all for America ‘the question of Chang Kai-shek
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is not important at all, and America would be ready to sacrifice it for the relations
with China, which for them is much more important... the Americans do not want a
war with China, I can assure you for this’. 30 The Romanian ambassador’s words
could be a message addressed to Beijing, but most likely instead, they are the best
evidence of how China had kept Albania away from the insights of the SinoAmerican talks that led to the normalization. Yet, in 1967, with the fervent left
radicalism unleashed by the Cultural Revolution, for Albania was effectively hard to
perceive the possibility that soon China would reshape its foreign policy. Another
sign of China’s slow openness came in June 1971, when the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs organized a tour outside Beijing for foreign journalists, including
those from the West. The Albanian reporter noted how in Xi’an, the journalists ‘were
allowed to take any picture they wanted, without any restriction’. 31 To Albanian
leadership’s dismay, their allies’ openness extended as far as the White House.
When Zhou Enlai called the Albanian ambassador on 17 July, 1971, Kissinger’s
visit was no longer a secret, as two days earlier, both Beijing and Washington had
issued simultaneously the declaration that had been drafted during Kissinger’s visit
in Beijing. What Zhou Enlai told the Albanian ambassador is quite similar to the
account that Henry Kissinger gives of these events. Zhou affirmed that ‘Nixon for
three years has been asking to visit China… he will not come as a tourist but as a
president… we have been talking to the Americans for sixteen years in Warsaw but
with no progress… this is a continuation of those talks in another level… an overall
escalating of the talks [and relations]… Nixon immediately after taking office
authorized Kissinger to take contact with us… in December 1969 the Yugoslav
embassy in Warsaw organized an exhibition where the American diplomats called
our diplomats but they refused to respond and left the room avoiding the
Americans… the main problem to discuss is Taiwan, but also other issues’. Then
Zhou justified these steps not as consequences of the Soviet threat, which seemed to
serve as the main catalyst in this rapprochement, but other reasons. For him ‘the
situation in United States is worsening, there could be a revolutionary storm in the
near future… we need to be in contact as much as possible with the American
30
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masses, of all elements… hence the visit of the Ping-Pong team… United States is
sincere in these talks because is interested to end the war in Indochina [Vietnam]’.
Then Zhou explained that Kissinger’s visit had two objectives: preparing the visit of
President Nixon, and preparing high level discussion on many issues.32 In a meeting
in Cairo, between the Chinese and Albanian ambassadors, the Chinese ambassador
argued that the American talks with China ‘demonstrates the American isolation.33
After the meeting with Zhou Enlai, the Albanian ambassador returned to Tirana
and personally briefed Enver Hoxha on these talks. Hoxha, who had feared SinoSoviet rapprochement, now saw that China was instead reshaping its relations with
the leader of the “imperialist” camp. He expressed his discontent in a letter addressed
personally to Mao:
‘We should have been consulted on these important issues… In particular for
such steps that largely resonate internationally… For us is understandable that
for the sake of the people, and of the revolution, China should develop
diplomatic relations with all the nations, included with the United States… Yet
the American imperialism is the number one enemy of the peoples… in
particular of the Vietnamese people…’. [In this way Hoxha was suggesting that
China, pursuing normalization with the United States, was betraying the
Vietnamese people’s war]. ‘Therefore your decision to welcome Nixon is for
us unjust, undesirable, we do not approve it, we do not support it… If you
really had to open talks with President Nixon, then at least these should be on
an equal footing, with the United States recognizing the PRC, and removing
the obstacles to its readmission in UN, removing the troops from Taiwan,
withdrawing the troops from Indochina, and moreover removing the threats
from China’s borders… Under these circumstances there could be talks, but
without necessary pass from a very low level to a very high level… Nixon’s
visit could have many negative impacts on the revolutionary movement, and on
our cause… This will even lower the internal resistance in United States to
Nixon’s policies, which he seizes as an opportunity for re-election… The visit
will encourage the centrists and opportunists, the various Togliattists [the
reference is to Palmiro Togliatti, head of the Italian Communist Party until
1966 when he died, considered revisionist] and the Romanians, who are
already speaking of the new unity in the international communist movement,
that now new perspectives are opened also for the settlement of the Sino-Soviet
32
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divergences... The talks with Nixon gives strength to the revisionists to devalue
all the struggle of China against the Soviet renegades… Perceiving the SinoAmerican talks as against Soviet Union, Moscow will strengthen even more the
revisionist cliques, and try to debilitate the revolutionary position of China…
The American imperialism will never give up its strategic objectives, the war,
and aggression. Otherwise it would not be imperialism… When it comes to
issues regarding the Soviet Union, we think we should have a common
standing regarding possible Soviet actions against China and Albania… The
view of the American imperialists towards the Soviet Union, expressed by
Kissinger, should not be kept secret to us… Now that the Cultural Revolution
triumphed everywhere in China, that China came out of it stronger than ever,
suddenly the fake friends pretend to be your sincere friends… China has
always been standing as an invincible castle of socialism and revolution… This
[revolutionary policy] is in contradiction with the decision to welcome
Nixon’.34
China never replied directly to this letter, but Beijing’s message was clear when,
in November 1971, at the PLA Sixth Congress, China, for the first time, refused to
send a delegation. This put Hoxha in a difficult situation, who had to justify the
Chinese absence to many foreign small communist delegations. His excuse was that
‘the great tasks they [Chinese leaders] are carrying on in China did not allow them to
participate… But the CCP is always among us, in full unity with our parties in the
struggle for the full socialist triumph’.35 Although Albania remained committed to
oppose the Soviet Union, this could never be pursued through a close up with United
States, according to Hoxha’s regime, for the leader of the imperialist camp demanded
similar opposition. In a way, Hoxha sent a public message to China through his
speech to the congress. Despite praising China and Mao as the main support for the
world revolutionary forces, and differently from his speeches in previous party
congresses, where he concentrated on the evils of Soviet Union, throughout this
speech, Hoxha now attacked the United States with the same fervor. He concluded
34

“Top-Secret: Letter of the PLA CC, (signed by Enver Hoxha), addressed to the CCP, to Mao
Zedong, 06 August 1971, regarding the coming visit of the American President Nixon to China”, in
AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1971, D3, f.49-67.
35

“The speech of comrade Enver, on 31 October 1971, during the meeting with the foreign delegates
participating at the PLA Sixth Congress”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1971, D6, f.1-3. The delegations
were from Latin America (Chili, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, etc), from Europe,
(England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Poland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain
etc.), and Asia, (Indonesia, Malay, Japan, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, etc), Australia and New
Zealand; In total there were 41 parties that either sent a delegation or a message addressed to the
congress, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1971, D22, f.1-2.

243

that ‘the standing towards American imperialism is the test for all the political forces
[Marxist] in the world’.36 Significantly, with regard to the kind of standing towards
the United States, Hoxha mentioned frequently in his speech the Vietnamese
resistance to American occupation.37 Nonetheless, Mehmet Shehu, in his report on
the FYP’s achievements, and the coming FYP’s objectives gave vast credit to
Chinese assistance for Albania’s economic progress. More specifically, he mentioned
that in ten years from 1960 to 1970 the gross domestic product (GDP) of Albania had
more than doubled. In 1970, the national income was 55 percent higher than in 1965,
the agriculture output 1.8 times higher, and the industrial production 2.5 times.38 The
government, in its report, gave direct credit to Chinese assistance for all this growth,
and blamed the Soviet Union for what they called an attempted blockade against the
Albanian economy. The industrial production from 1965 to 1970 increased by 83
percent, but the agricultural production in the same period increased only by 33
percent.39

The Communist Parties’ Reactions to Sino-American Talks, and China’s Seat in
the UN
During the informal meetings with many foreign communist delegations that that
occurred at the Sixth PLA Congress in November 1971, China’s absence did not pass
without comments, some of which indicated dissatisfaction with China’s acts within
the communist camp. The Austrian delegate, Franz Strobel, commenting on Nixon’s
visit, wondered rhetorically, ‘when is Nixon coming to Albania?’. He labelled the
Chinese decision to not send a delegation to foreign party congresses as
‘extraordinary, as the same internal situation in China… Nixon’s visit to China has
caused confusion within communists’. Some of these delegates met in Tirana with
the Chinese ambassador in Albania, Liu Zhenhua. One of them, David Benkis,
representing the communist party of Chile (m-l), lamented the lack of financial
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assistance that Geng Biao had promised to give him in Albania during this congress.
In another meeting, he complained of the treatment that the CCP had reserved for
certain parties, which he alleged was not based on the equality among parties. The
Australian delegate also met with the Chinese ambassador, and then asked the
Albanians to host a communist activist, wanted by the Australian police, named
Armstrong who sought to leave China for Albania. The Belgian delegate, after
meeting Hoxha, is reported to have said, ‘You are different from China’, without
further elaborating. Kazimierz Mijal, representing the PCP (m-l), in presence of the
Brazilian delegate, affirmed that the ‘Chinese refusal to send a delegation leaves
room for speculation by the revisionists that there is no unity between China and
Albania’.40 Mijal reinforced his contrariety to China’s decision to not participate at
the congress, when on 5 November he told the Chinese ambassador in Tirana, Liu
Zhenhua, ‘I am against Chinese decision to not participate at the congress, which
itself has raised debates and speculations of a possible disunity between China and
Albania’. 41 A meaningful comment came from the Chilean delegate on Chinese
policy when he affirmed in an informal meeting that ‘China now prioritizes the interstate relations, rather than inter-party relations’.42 This offered the best explanation of
the departure in Chinese foreign policy from its ideological radicalism, to state
pragmatism in international relations.
During the congress, Albania accredited itself with the restoration of the PRC’s
rights in the United Nations. All the foreign delegations praised Albania’s efforts in
New York to promote China’s interests. This work had continued since the very
founding of the Sino-Albanian alliance and was pursued with great determination.
The PRC, however, did not owe its admission to the UN, to Albania’s efforts, but to
the Sino-American rapprochement. Yet, even after the visit of Henry Kissinger to
China, Albania dutifully promoted China’s interests in United Nations. Even after
being informed of Kissinger’s visit, Albania worked hard during the Twenty-sixth
General Assembly in 1971 to restore China’s rights in the organization. At the
beginning of the session no one was sure that this would become so crucial a year in
40
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that sense, not even China. The key issue at that time was how best to deal with
Taiwan, and the risk that many countries which might not otherwise oppose China’s
seat, would recoil from the ousting of Taiwan, and only accept in full a solution that
included two Chinas. In the meeting with Kissinger, the issue had been left to future
discussions, which itself was already a step forward from the previous Chinese
policy towards Taiwan.
As far back as 1955, China and the United States had discussed renouncing the
use of force in Sino-American relations, and during the Bandung conference Beijing
had stated that it was against a war with United States.43 However, China claimed
that the tension, which implied eventual war, was due to what China called
occupation of Taiwan by American forces. Therefore, the preclusion of the use of the
force implied the withdrawal of the American military support to Taiwan. China
considered that ‘to what means China will use to liberate Taiwan, this is entirely a
matter of China’s sovereignty and internal affairs. Therefore, any Sino-American
announcement must not interfere with this matter by no means’.44 At that time and
for long after, Albania fully supported Beijing’s stance, and in October 1962, the
Albanian ambassador in the UN called the Taiwan representatives ‘private citizens
representing nothing’.45
In 1971, Albania tried to coordinate and incite some countries to influence others
in their regions to vote against separating the admission of the PRC from the ousting
of Taiwan. For instance, Algeria could exercise a certain influence over its neighbor
Tunisia, which had supported the two Chinas solutions. The other obstacle to
overcome was the Americans’ eventual resolution requiring a supermajority (two
thirds of the votes) for the PRC’s admission, which was seen as very difficult,
despite Albania’s coalition already representing a simple majority. To address this,
Albania wanted Algeria to launch the initiative to include the PRC, in order to
maximize the support among the African and NAM countries. 46 China, however,
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preferred Albania as its spokesperson in the UN. In a meeting with the Albanian
foreign minister, the Chinese ambassador in Tirana expressed the idea that, in this
session, the issue of the PRC seat would be more complicated than usual, saying –
without fully explaining the reasons for this complication – that United States had
been pressuring Taiwan to accept the PRC as a member of the UN, eventually
preserving the Taiwanese seat as well.47 On the other hand, China did not seem to
expect any surprises this year, and did not even want to join UN this year, and their
authorization to Albania, rather than to Algeria, to present the resolution speaks to
this. Albania was an isolated member of the international community, in continuous
verbal tension with both the West and the East, whereas Algeria had friends in both
blocks and probably could have garnered more support for China. Yet neither of
these countries necessarily could have changed the balance of power within the
United Nations General Assembly.
Signs of the balance tipping in China’s favor in the UN had appeared since 1966,
when a member of the Austrian delegation confirmed to Albania, certainly sending a
message to Beijing, that Canada in ‘six months will recognize China’, and Austria
would follow. 48 From the talks of the Albanian representatives in the UN with
foreign diplomats and representatives of different countries, it became quite apparent
that, in principle, many European countries of the western bloc, at least those that
claimed neutrality, such as Austria and some Scandinavian countries, would
willingly vote for China; they were just waiting the right moment – a moment of
lower tension between China and the United States. Canada, on the other hand, had
asked Cambodia in 1969 to encourage China to establish diplomatic relations with
Canada, in the spirit of the talks they had in Stockholm.49 The Canadian step was
followed by Italy, which in 1969, for the first time, did not dispute the existence of
only one China. Italian diplomats in the UN told Albanian diplomats that they were
watching the Sino-Canadian talks, and would possibly take similar steps. 50 This
change in the Italian attitude towards the PRC was a consequence of the changes of
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the internal politics of Italy in 1969, wherein Pietro Nenni became the foreign
minister, and then Aldo Moro assumed the post later the same year, both of them
prone to the normalization of the relations with the PRC.51 This line was reinforced
by the Italian ambassador in the UN, who in a conversation with the Albanian
ambassador, said that Italy had not decided yet how to vote, but had decided to ‘not
vote against China’. 52 He then added that Italy was most welcomed to normal
relations with China among the ‘trade circles’.53
Eventually, by mid July 1971, Albania, together with all the other authors,
presented the request to the UN to introduce in the agenda of that session the
question of China’s restoration to its seat. The United States, just one month later,
presented the same request. For the first time, the United States proposed accepting
the PRC in the UN, but the second part of the American resolution opposed the
ousting of Taiwan from the organization, by asking instead that the vote to expel
Taiwan should require two thirds of the UN General Assembly members. Indeed,
according to Albanian informal surveys, the United States saw could no longer afford
to keep China out of the UN, but at least, at that precise moment, wanted to avoid the
ousting of its small ally, therefore asked that the second part of the Albanian
resolution – which concerned the ousting of Taiwan – should be valid only if voted
by two thirds of the General Assembly members.54 The American move put Albania
and the United States on the same front regarding the admission of the PRC, but at
odds over Taiwan, with Albania in a serious dilemma. The initiative to grant Beijing
a seat, and deny any to Taipei, was imperiled, as its authors estimated that the
United States could get the necessary votes against the ousting of Taiwan, but at the
same time, by not opposing the supermajority threshold for restoring China’s seat,
Albania’s main task would become much more achievable. This, however, would
mean no less than the division of China, and the acceptance of Taiwan as a separate
entity in the UN.
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To respond to this challenge, Albania prepared to withdraw its resolution in case
the United States did not step back on its support for Taiwan. In the worst case
scenario, Albania prepared a declaration in the name of the People’s Republic of
China, stating that Beijing would never take its seat in UN, regardless of the votes,
before the ousting of Taiwan. More concretely, Albania prepared a resolution that
would see the General Assembly vote on the American request to apply the two
thirds rule for the ousting of Taiwan: meaning that the American demand for the two
thirds supermajority would be valid only if previously authorized by two thirds of the
UN General Assembly members. This aggressive move by Albania invited an
unexpected reaction from China. By late September 1971, in a run of consultations
with China, the Charge d’Affaires in Tirana, Li Xiaolin, asked Albania on behalf of
his government to modify the Albanian position on the United States’ initiative.
Albanian diplomats in New York were furious about this request, proposing to the
government in Tirana to persuade Li that the Albanian initiative was the only one
capable of challenging the American’s two Chinas policy. Albania did not know,
however, that China and the United States were agreeing to set aside this matter, and
the rapprochement between them was proceeding in this sense, implying that the
United States would not challenge China and at the right moment, soon, would agree
to accept PRC and accept in the meantime the ousting of Taiwan. Now, Albania’s
position was seen as a challenge to both China and the United States.55 The end of
the deadlock came to the surprise of Albania, and probably many other countries,
which could not see backstage in this situation, when Taiwan announced its
unilateral withdrawal from United Nations.56 The ROC ambassador to the United
Nations, Liu Chieh, in his own words, admitted ‘defeat with dignity’.57 Perhaps with
dignity also for Washington, although the vote of admission of the PRC ‘signified
the first major defeat of the United States in the General Assembly, and marked the
emergence of the Third World as a dominant force’.58 China’s admission ‘marked a
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real watershed in the evolution of the United Nations… and China emerged as the
self-appointed champion of the new actions initiated by the Third World’.59
China not only avoided consulting Albania on any of its steps leading to its
rapprochement with the United States, but also of Lin Biao’s death, of which Albania
was not informed officially until almost one year later. In fact, the death of Lin Biao
had occurred in September 1971, when trying to escape to the Soviet Union, his
plane crushed in Mongolia. Only in mid-July 1972 was the Chinese ambassador in
Tirana informed of this event, explaining it as an escape from justice after Lin had
been unmasked in his attempt to kill Mao and seize political power.60 In 1972, Prince
Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia visited Albania. Hoxha met with him four times.
After the restoration of China’s rights in the UN, and in particular the process of
distension with the United States, Albania had lost its role as China’s spokesperson
on the international stage. Sensing that he was no longer needed, Hoxha assumed that
China would be less inclined to support his country militarily and economically, and
that such aid would not last long unless he reshaped his policy too – a step he had no
intention to take, not at least to the extent China had. Consequently, during Hoxha’s
four meetings with Prince Sihanouk, he emphasized China’s great role for him in
helping the Cambodian people. Hoxha was trying to play the card of the interlocutor,
trying to find a role to Albania in its alliance with China. Sihanouk, in fact, had no
need for Albania’s intermediation in his relations with China.
Yet Cambodia’s relations with China, as Richardson has shown, were
complicated at times, and the role of Sihanouk controversial.61 Sihanouk stopped in
Tirana after visiting Yugoslavia, where he endured treatment as a Chinese satellite by
some Yugoslavian ministers. Albanian leaders emphasized instead that China was
Cambodia’s best ally, but Sihanouk had no need for such a message because Beijing
was his second home.62
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The Last Economic Benefits
Although Richard Nixon’s visit to China ‘changed the world’, as at least one scholar
has affirmed, those days were not followed with particular interest in Albania, if
anything, perhaps with some embarrassment.63 Hoxha did not want any such change,
but from archives, it seems the event was not accompanied in Albania by any
Politburo meetings. After all, the visit concluded an ongoing crescendo of events
which had enabled Albania to absorb their initial shock at this drastic change in
China’s policy. The Sino-American normalization, however, from Albanian
perspective changed the patterns of the Sino-Albanian relations. Hoxha understood
that the Sino-American rapprochement was the beginning of China’s integration into
the international system. Therefore, from this moment onward, he prioritized more
the economic rather than the ideological aspects in Albania’s relations with China,
although Albania continued its revolutionary rhetoric. Since Hoxha had made up his
mind to avoid any drastic openness in Albania’s foreign policy – on the contrary, to
close the country even more – he decided to extract whatever economic and military
assistance he still could from China, predicting, correctly, that the opportunity to do
so would not last forever. Albania’s refusal to follow China’s path of openness is
shown by what Hoxha told the Chinese ambassador in Albania, Liu Zhenhua in
September 1972. During this meeting, to the Chinese announcement that West
Germany had decided to recognize China, Hoxha replied that Albania would not take
such steps to establish relations with that country before receiving German war
reparations. He made clear that China could now purchase from West Germany the
equipment needed for its work on the industrial projects in Albania – showing how
far from the West Hoxha wished to stay while maximizing his Chinese aid.64 Two
more factors contributed to Albania’s relative trust in the continuity of China’s
assistance. First, Hoxha was conscious that however Chinese foreign policy may
change, the country would remain under Mao’s leadership. Second, the Tenth CCP
Congress, in August 1973, had fundamentally reconfirmed the communist course
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under Mao’s leadership, offering an umbrella of legitimacy that included the alliance
with China.65 This convinced Hoxha that during Mao’s lifetime, China’s openness to
the United States was a strategic move in China’s international relations, but not a
drastic revision of its internal economic and political course. Hoxha continued
portraying Albania still, as ‘China’s most faithful ally’.66 And China responded by
continuing its economic and military assistance for Albania. Curiously, China
provided also medical treatment for Enver Hoxha. From October 1973 to March
1974, a group of doctors from China stayed in Tirana where they provided
specialized medical treatment to the aging Albanian dictator for his heart and
diabetes problems.67
In September 1971 China approved a new loan of 30 million rubles (70 million
yuan) for the years 1972-75, entirely dedicated to the agricultural investments in
Albania.68 The general staff of the army in Tirana had proposed in April 1971 new
requests of military equipment from China, for a total of 229.000 tons, with an
estimated value of 1.165 billion yuan.69 Regarding the FYP 1971-75, the Albanian
government predicted a GDP in 1975, around 55 percent higher than in 1970, in
particular an industrial production that in five years would be, they said, 62-66
percent higher than in 1970, with particular emphasis on the increasing of the heavy
industry while the light industry would increase only by around 40 percent.70 In 1971
the two governments agreed to make minor change to the FYP by increasing the part
of the loan that goes for the industry by 184 million yuan.71 This was due to new
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calculations for those industrial projects that were in delay and required updated and
more careful calculations regarding the equipment.72
In November 1972, the Albanian defense minister Beqir Balluku, for the last
time in his life, visited China.73 He stayed almost 45 days, met often with Chinese
leaders, and presented a new, long list of requests for military supplies for the period
1973-77.74 In Albania, in his meeting with the commander of the Beijing garrison,
Hoxha had stressed that his country was surrounded only by enemies, regardless of
what he called conjectural normalcy. He highlighted more what divided Albania
from, rather than what had in common with, the other Balkan countries.75 Balluku
attempted the same in China, but the Chinese generals disproved the Albanian
minister’s alarms with the fact that he had already, in 1968, presented the same
situation to Zhou Enlai, while now in 1972, ‘with all its neighbors Albania had gone
through an improvement of the relations’, to which the minister replied that this was
only to gain time needed for challenges that might come in the future.76 One such
challenge for Balluku, following Hoxha’s instructions, was Yugoslavia. For
Albanian leaders, seemingly prophetic in this, ‘once Tito will die, will bring a war
for hegemony between Serbs and Croats’, which could threaten Albania.77 Fearing
the consequences of a possible Yugoslavian disintegration, Hoxha, in many speeches,
expressed a preference for Yugoslavia ‘exactly as it is’, defending its status quo as a
Federation.
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Zhou Enlai suggested including the military supplies in the commercial channels
as a loan. This idea was reiterated by Huan Yuanbing, director at the Chinese defense
ministry, who estimated the Albanian requests to total 3 billion yuan, which he said
‘should be considered as a loan, based on the same criteria China grants credits to
other countries’. 78 After meeting firm opposition from Albanian officials, China
stepped back and approved most of the Albanian requests for armaments, but made
clear that Albania was being treated in a privileged way. According to Zhou Enlai,
Albania was placed second after Vietnam in Chinese military assistance to foreign
countries. In total China committed to provide 884 artillery pieces, 36 military
aircrafts, 200 tanks, and 18 different military ships for the navy, 1872 different
vehicles, and 20 thousand tons of ammunition.79 China provided also construction
materials for the further fortification through the building of hundreds of thousands
of bunkers that soon started to become part of the landscape across Albanian territory.
Today, those yet resisting the ravages of time are a famous, and infamous, touristic
attraction. This would be the last important agreement regarding the military
assistance China provided to Albania.
Yet complications surged in the implementation of this assistance. Some
industrial projects took far longer than expected.80 For instance, the biggest industrial
project, the metallurgic plant, presented problems beyond what Albanian and
Chinese experts had expected, and its construction in 1972 was in a complete
stalemate, almost a failure.81 China sent to Albania a delegation headed by the vice
minister of industry who tried to deal personally with the difficulties that the Chinese
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experts encountered.82 From December 1972 to January 1973, this industrial project
was visited also by the Chinese minister of metallurgy, and the director of the
institute for research on iron, in Beijing, Lu Da. Lu blamed the followers of Lin Biao
as saboteurs, who became an excuse, in Albanian eyes, for any failure in their
economy. 83 In meeting with workers in the city of Elbasan, where the plant was
located, the Chinese minister apologized for ‘the delay of seven years’, and promised
the full mobilization of the energies to finish the plant successfully.84 Once back in
Beijing, he tried to accelerate progress by radically changing some aspects of the
projects.85 The Albanian minister of industry, Koço Theodhosi, asked China to make
possible the first production of iron in this plant by the end of 1975 at the latest.86
This case shows that Albania relied too heavily on China’s capacities, and China
agreed too readily to build what Albania demanded, even when those demands would
be impossible to meet.
In April 1973, the Politburo in Tirana analyzed a plan by the government
regarding the economic development of the country until 1990, including the FYP
1976-80. In this document, for the first time the government considered that, in the
early 1980s Albania would pass from an agricultural to an industrial country. For the
government, industrialization promised to narrow the differences in living standards
and income per capita between the cities and the countryside. 87 None of these
objectives – the modern industrialization and the increase of income – were achieved.
So unrealistic was the plan that it affirmed the objective to study and eventually build
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the first nuclear reactor, with the long term goal of building a nuclear center to
produce electricity, together with the electronic industry. 88 The spirit of this
document was completely disconnected with the real economic possibilities and
situation of Albania. In late 1973, almost all of the big industrial projects, including
those started in 1962, were still under construction. By 1974, only 9 out of 31
industrial projects China had committed to in 1968 were built, the remaining being
either under construction, or had yet to start.

Conclusion
The end of the 1960s, beginning of the 1970s, corresponded to a turning point in
China’s international relations. Among many, two main factors convinced Chinese
leadership that the path of confrontation with the world’s great powers would lead at
best to a further isolation of China, but could lead also to war. The first factor (not in
order of importance) was China’s internal situation, related to the mass mobilization
and the Cultural Revolution, which had made possible for Mao to regain total control
of the party, and marginalize potential competitors. Therefore, Mao did not
necessitate any longer radicalism and mass mobilization to defeat power challenges.
But Mao also came to understand that, beyond the official narrative, China could not
base only on the ideology its claims to have a strong voice on the international stage.
The second factor concerned the Soviet Union’s threat to China’s national security.
The border conflict, in fact for the first time since the end of the Second World War,
pushed Chinese leaders to think of the possible war between the two countries, with
uncertain outcomes, except the fact that perhaps for China would have brought
tremendous sufferings. Mao could not risk losing what he had gained through
internal political struggle because of an external enemy which could have tried to
annihilate Mao’s rule. Moreover, the world revolution rhetoric, so much
propagandized by Mao, had lost its zeal because the decolonization process was
towards its end. China must have realized that most of the new born countries did not
exchange nationalism for communism, and China’s influence over these countries
was not a permanently achieved goal. This tells much of China’s world weight
altogether. Definitely, Chinese leaders understood that China could not challenge
forever the world order without first being part of it. Hence the normalization with
88
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the United States suddenly became part of the new Chinese strategy of pursuing
coexistence with, and integration in, the international system. Chinese leaders were
far sighted enough to see how their ideological struggle with both the Soviet Union
and the United States, did not bring any concrete benefit to Chinese people.
Therefore, the Chinese leaders, tried to find a common understanding between the
communist ideology and the economic and political objectives of their rule.
For Albania this turn came unexpectedly. The Chinese leaders under any
circumstance bothered to consult, or simply let know, the Albanian leaders of part of
the backstage which led to their decision to normalize the relations with the United
States. In hindsight, perhaps they were right to not do so because Albania’s reaction
of total disagreement was predictable, which eventually is what happened. On this
point, China’s behavior towards Albania was quite similar to the Soviet Union’s
treatment of Hoxha regarding Khrushchev’s decision of rapprochement with
Yugoslavia. Hoxha disapproved of China’s change in its foreign policy because it
undermined Hoxha’s political legitimacy. He had been propagandizing for more than
a decade how China was the leading country in the struggle against United States.
Not only Sino-American normalization undermined Hoxha’s political rule but also
he correctly understood that this change might impact also China’s foreign aid.
Indeed, as the next chapter shows, Albanian leaders’ suspicion of this were
confirmed when in power was shortly rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping. His rehabilitation
was a clear sign that not only China’s foreign policy had changed, but that this
change was accompanied by China’s internal policy changes affecting the power
cupola of the country and rectifying part of the policies recently pursued. Yet, until
1974 China did not give up assistance for Albania.
Consequently, since China’s normalization with United States, did not
immediately, and drastically affect Chinese assistance to Albania, Hoxha decided to
prioritize the economic collaboration with Beijing. Partially this was also due to the
fact that the most important industrial projects planned with Chinese assistance were
still under construction. Therefore, any political decision to ditch relations with
China, because of ideological disagreements concerning Chinese foreign policy,
would have had an enormous negative impact on the Albanian economy. On the
other hand, despite the beginning of the process of normalization with the United
States, the CCP Tenth Congress, in a way alleviated Hoxha’s suspicion that China’s
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change would be drastic. In fact for the time Mao would lead, Hoxha came to think
that China’s course, at least its main patterns, would resemble and reflect some of the
Marxist ideology. In that way he could still use the Albanian friendship with China in
its internal politics. Nonetheless, the years 1971-74 were a shifting sand period for
the Sino-Albanian alliance which would not resist very long the death of Mao
Zedong and the second rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping.
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CHAPTER SIX

THE END OF THE ALLIANCE, 1974-1978

Introduction
The Tenth Congress of the CCP was followed with interest in Albania, although no
delegation had been invited to participate. Hoxha deemed it an important moment in
the Sino-Albanian relations because apparently it upheld the political line of the CCP.
It actually seemed to strengthen Mao’s position – dogmatic opposition to revisionism
– and highlighted the Cultural Revolution. This perception was reinforced further
with the launch of the campaign against Lin Biao, and the anti-Confucius campaign.
Denouncing Lin as a traitor and revisionist assured Hoxha that China still was
struggling against revisionism. All this seemed a sort of revival of the first phase of
the Cultural Revolution, which Wang Hongwen called it the ‘second Cultural
Revolution’. For Teiwes and Sun ‘…in 1973 Mao’s emphasis shifted to strident
reaffirmation of its [Cultural Revolution’s] 70 percent achievements… this was the
essence of the Tenth Congress’.1 At least, this is also the light in which the Albanian
embassy in Beijing assessed it.2 As Maurice Meisner has argued, ‘yet, the “criticize
Lin, criticize Confucius” had less to do with Lin Biao or Confucius, than it did with
conflicting evaluations of the Cultural Revolution and the question of who was to
lead China into the post-Cultural Revolution era, and in what direction’.3 Although
Deng Xiaoping was reinstated in state offices in 1973, he, initially, kept a low profile,
and it was not yet possible for the Albanian leadership to understand the political
meaning of Deng’s rehabilitation, that China’s period of left radicalism would soon
end.4
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Finally, in 1975, China drastically reduced the economic assistance to Albania,
although both countries claimed strong relations. This, however, put Hoxha in a
difficult position. From Albania’s perspective, the Sino-American normalization had
jeopardized the ideological axis upon which Hoxha built its narrative of China as the
leading country of the struggle against both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Yet, for the time Mao was alive Hoxha thought that there would be perhaps benefits
by keeping the good relations with China. When in 1976 Zhou Enlai first, and Mao
Zedong later died – which were followed with the definitive emergence of Deng
Xiaoping – Albania lost any sympathy within the CCP. At this point Hoxha would
understand that his country either adapts to the changing world, following the
Chinese path of openness and reformation, or ditch definitely the alliance with China.
Hoxha, again, thinking of the best for his personal power, and not the best for his
country, found easy the choice.

Changing Winds. Purges in Albania
Following the visit of Kissinger first, and Nixon later, foreign diplomats had been
alluding to the deterioration of the Sino-Albanian relations. They were not wrong as
shown by China’s response to Albanian leader’s request to send a high political
delegation for talks.5 To test Chinese intentions towards Albania, in summer 1973,
Hoxha mentioned the idea to send a high delegation to China, possibly headed by the
Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu. Shehu’s last visit had been in 1967, and no high
delegation, if we exclude ministers, had been exchanged between Albania and China
since then. Hoxha’s step was discussed only with Shehu and Kapo, which shows that
they were suspicious of the Chinese response. Only on 23 January, 1974, did Shehu
propose such a visit to the Chinese ambassador in Albania, Liu Zhenhua. Liu
responded enthusiastically, but his enthusiasm was shadowed by the lack of
enthusiasm of the Chinese leaders in Beijing, followed by weeks of silence. Then in
mid-February 1974, the Albanian ambassador in China, Behar Shtylla, in a meeting
with Geng Biao solicited a response, but Geng Biao only affirmed that they had
received the proposal and the CCP CC would soon decide. Liu, in Tirana, received
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word of the decision on 20 February 1974. China agreed in principle but wanted such
a visit to take place during the second half of 1974. For Albania this postponement,
and the feeble response given, were a clear sign that China was not intending to
strengthen relations with Albania.6
In February 1974, in meeting an African delegation, Mao launched the theory of
the “Three Worlds”: in the first world were United States and Soviet Union, in the
second world were Japan, Canada, and Europe, and in the Third World, almost all
Asia (China included), Latin America and Africa. This theory was Mao’s reelaboration of the older theory of the intermediate zone, which had appeared in 1964
in Renmin Ribao.7 In April 1974, Deng Xiaoping, who led the Chinese delegation at
the annual UN General Assembly, emphasized the theory to a world audience. 8
Hoxha later would vehemently oppose this theory, clinging to the classical division
of the world between socialist and capitalist countries. But Hoxha’s attack reveals to
have been clearly orchestrated in conjunction with his country’s split from China.
From documents emerges that Albania did not initially oppose this theory. Asked by
He Ying, Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs, if he agreed with Deng’s speech,
the Albanian ambassador in China Behar Shtylla affirmed to ‘completely agree’.9
The meeting took place on 12 April, 1974, one day after Renmin Ribao published
Deng’s speech in UN.
Deng’s rehabilitation in 1974 was followed with concern by Albania because
when Deng had been purged, he had been attacked also by the Albanian leadership.
His rehabilitation left room for concern over possible revision of policies previously
promoted in China. Information arrived in Tirana from a Chinese source, affirming
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that ‘many mistakes had been made during the Cultural Revolution’, with particular
emphasis on the purge of old comrades ‘who have given great contribution to the
Chinese revolution’, mentioning the case of Deng Xiaoping. Moreover, the source
affirmed that most of the people in China did not approve of such policies. 10
Although not approving of many aspects of the Cultural Revolution, Hoxha
ultimately fully supported it because it had purged the revisionists (pro-Soviets)
within the CCP, at least, so he was told. Now one of the most prominent revisionists
purged during the Cultural Revolution emerged again as a prominent political figure
in China. Worse yet, for Hoxha, this revisionist was also bringing forward political
ideas regarding the world division that did not entirely correspond to the communist
dogma. In November 1974, Yao Wenyuan, heading a Chinese delegation in Albania,
tried to assure Hoxha on this issue, affirming that ‘Including China in the Third
World does not mean we are like the nationalist countries [decolonized], but we do
this to help them from the hegemonic countries’.11 Deng’s rehabilitation in 1973 had
not been discussed in any PLA forum; or if it was, no evidence of such a discussion
was recorded.
To the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, corresponded in Albania instead, the
furthering of the politics of isolation and repression – which in fact begun already
before Deng’s return in office. In late December 1972, in the annual national song
competition, many artists performed music clearly influenced by modern jazz and
soul, which in Albania was expressly forbidden. The new year, 1973, began with a
purge of nationally known artists including, but not limited to, those musicians. Tens
of artists went into long years of detention, some died in prison, others executed. The
same fate befell the PLA Politburo members in charge of culture, Fadil Paçrami and
Todi Lubonja, only the latter surviving the regime. Another purge, involving less
people, but resonating much more, followed in 1974 in the army, which included the
defense minister Beqir Balluku, the chief of the general staff, Petrit Dume, and the
generals of the general staff Hito Çako and Rrahman Parllaku. Only general Parllaku
10

Beijing, 24 July 1974: “Information regarding the conversation between Jovan Andoni [Albanian
employee at the embassy in Beijing], and a Chinese employee of the Ministry of Communication”, in
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survived.12 It all began with the study of the thesis of the Council of Defense. This
purge is still subject to disputes among Albanian historians, concerning why Hoxha
promoted it. However, it seems that is not due to a struggle for the leadership of the
party, as Balluku, the highest ranked victim, was only third in the line of succession,
after Hysni Kapo and Mehmet Shehu. In 1973, the defense minister had promoted
updating a strategic document, the defense thesis, but disputes emerged between the
minister and the chief of the general staff, Petrit Dume, concerning aspects of the
new document. Substantially, the minister did not promote the drafting of new thesis,
only a review of the war doctrine that had been approved by Mehmet Shehu, and by
the Council of Defense (Enver Hoxha) in 1967. Eventually his review turned into
revision, hence he was purged as revisionist, defeatist and traitor. The minister took
such step without informing Enver Hoxha. The extent to which the minister
promoted changes in the document was overall limited – even the difference in the
terminology is minimal – and it did not completely reject the previous document’s
conclusions. 13 The crucial point for Hoxha, however, was that the minister could
mobilize the armed forces, its general staff, put them under his orders, and use for his
personal purposes for years without even informing Hoxha.14 If he could do this to
prepare and review an important document, he could possibly have also used this
influence to foment consensus to overthrow the leadership. Hoxha’s suspicions were
reinforced also by information about Balluku’s misappropriation of funds. In his

12

I interviewed general Parllaku in Tirana in August 2015.

13

The discussion and criticisms to Beqir Balluku were done during the PLA Fifth Plenum 25-26 July
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landing of foreign troops, which implied to accept the defeat.
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personal diary Hoxha noted that Balluku had used his position to access public funds
for the wedding of his son, and to buy expensive gifts abroad with and for his wife.15
Although there was no apparent connection to the relations with China, this
purge in a way was a message to the past objections of Zhou Enlai to the Albanian
war doctrine. Beqir Balluku had visited China three times, and one of the accusation
against him during the debates in the party’s plenum, was his acceptance of Zhou
Enlai’s suggestions to adopt a strategy of guerrilla war, rather than a conventional
confrontation with modern armaments. 16 These accusations were contradictory as
Albania then still considered itself a close ally of China, and no anti-Chinese policy
was promoted yet by the leadership. Albanian leaders actually made this purge seem
to the Chinese officials that it was against those who ‘had been anti-Chinese, and
against the Chinese Cultural Revolution’. In the talks with Chinese officials, Beqir
Balluku was continuously associated with Lin Biao.17
In October 1974 a sensitive issue was raised for Hoxha – Chinese criticism of
Stalin. Behar Shtylla was called by Yu Zhan, Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs,
who levied serious accusations against Stalin, different from those Hoxha had
already heard from Chinese leaders since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.
Yu Zhan in fact went back in time, to the 1940s when the leader of the CCP had been
Wang Ming. For Zhan, because of Stalin’s support for the leftist line of Wang Ming,
‘in the first civil war the CCP lost ninety percent of its forces’. Then Yu Zhan
accused Stalin of not having supported strongly enough the struggle against Chiang
Kai-shek, which, Yu claimed, had damaged the party. Yu then called Stalin’s line
‘dogmatic… of leftist opportunism… in Yalta Stalin recognized Chiang Kai-shek as
China’s leader’, concluding that Stalin ‘wanted to control the war [its outcomes] in
China’, but most importantly that ‘for the revolution it should not be any center’, and
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each country should follow its own proper way.18 This was followed by a string of
discussion points which stretched the affinity between Albania and China further yet.
On 29 November 1974, on occasion of the celebrations in Albania for thirty
years of liberation from Nazism, Hoxha asked the head of the Chinese delegation,
Yao Wenyuan, about Tito’s possible visit to China, because ‘we have heard about
this’ Hoxha said. Yao Wenyuan did not deny the visit happening, but simply and
shortly affirmed that ‘Tito hasn’t asked for any visit of high level delegation’.19 The
Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement had been one of the motivations of the SovietAlbanian split, and Tito’s presence in Beijing certainly could lead Albania to distrust
China’s course, regardless of the recently-relaxed relations between Tirana and
Belgrade. One day after Hoxha’s conversation with Yao, during the official meeting
between the Chinese and Albanian delegations on 30 November, Mehmet Shehu
made clear the Albanian disagreement with China regarding the Sino-American
normalization. For Shehu, ‘although on strategic issues we agree with you, when it
comes to the tactic instead we have some differences’, bringing as an example the
fact that ‘you have talks with the Americans, whereas we have decided to not have
any relations with United States’. Yao Wenyuan responded curtly that ‘we do not ask
you to follow our policy’. Shehu, highlighting the supposed threat to Albania’s
national security, was underscoring China’s rapprochement with Albania’s enemy,
and how this policy undermined the Sino-Albanian relations. Nonetheless, for
Albania, according to Shehu, ‘the most precious thing on the international stage for
us has been and still is the friendship with the Chinese people’.20
In May 1975 another purge concerned the head of the State Planning
Commission, Abdyl Këllezi, and the minister of the industry and mines, in charge
18
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also of the oil fields, Koço Theodhosi. Both of them had been several times to China,
and both were severely criticized, dismissed from all offices, expelled from the party
and a few years later executed.21 These events were a paradox considering that the
annual oil extraction had surpassed the two million tons, more than ever before in
Albanian history. But their problems were political rather than economic, as Abdyl
Këllezi was also the head of the China-Albania Friendship Association. His disgrace
in China was perceived as politically meaningful, the same as the disgrace of Qazim
Kapesyzi, military attaché in Beijing, and Pirro Gusho who had served as official in
Beijing, and after the purge committed suicide. An Albanian student in Beijing,
Hajdar Muneka, reported to the Albanian embassy, that his Chinese roommate, and
also one of his Chinese professors, told him that the purging of some officials in
Albania, including the defense minister Beqir Balluku, was perceived in China as a
political message and sign of the break of the friendship.22 One year later, in 1976,
the minister of agriculture, Pirro Dodbiba, and the minister of education and culture,
Thoma Deljana, were both purged – eventually both survived to the fall of the
regime.23
These purges are still subject to disputes in Albania over why Hoxha condemned
people that never challenged him. An explanation may lay in Albania’s relations with
China. This wave of purges came once China’s path of openness was traced, and it
deeply undermined Hoxha’s power’s legitimacy. Albania was about to remain
completely isolated while its closest ally moved West, and the economy would be the
first to suffer the consequences. By 1974 Hoxha had already understood that the
possibility of relying on China for much longer was becoming remote. The split with
the Soviet Union had been accompanied by concerned voices, but Hoxha silenced
21
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these by painting China as a better alternative. Now, with a break from China in the
horizon, and with no alternatives, those voices related to the real problems Albania
would be facing: its economy and defense. Silencing them enabled Hoxha to avoid
any challenge within his party over the impending split with China. They might even
had gone further, asking to intensify economic relations with the West – something
Hoxha himself eventually limitedly, but unsuccessfully, attempted.

Prelude to the Break
The events of the last two years prior to 1975 saw continued reductions in Chinese
assistance for Albania. The leadership in Tirana sensed that the alliance with China
was coming to a conclusion. Because of these feelings of distrust, when the FYP
1976-1980 was drafted, the debate on the request for assistance from China captured
Hoxha’s personal attention more than its predecessors had. Mehmet Shehu had sent a
letter asking Chinese leaders for economic assistance for the FYP, and China
accepted an Albanian economic delegation to negotiate the request. Nonetheless,
Hoxha personally supervised the details of the delegation’s trip, their speeches, and
the priority of economic projects. The fact that Albanian leaders doubted China’s
willingness to assist Albania is shown by Hoxha’s preparation of three alternative
decrescendo requests, accompanied with three respective speeches depending on
Chinese reaction. Interestingly Hoxha suggested the delegation praise Deng
Xiaoping in its speech. It is also meaningful that he suggested the removal from the
prepared speech of the delegation any reference to specific names of the recently
purged officials in Albania.24 Those ministers and officials had been to China many
times, and had negotiated many agreements with Beijing in the past. This confirms
that their purging had some political connotation in Albania’s relations with China,
and that such a connotation could be perceived also on the Chinese side.
In Albania the government had discussed a first plan requiring 813 million
rubles. But Hoxha deemed it unrealistic and three alternatives were prepared. The
first two included 665 and 600 million rubles respectively. In the worst case scenario,
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Albania expected from China to approve the third option, that of 550 million
rubles.25 To Albanian leadership’s dismay, China granted only 225 million rubles,
and financed 10 out of the 20 industrial projects Albania had requested.26 For the first
time, the delegation was expecting to negotiate exclusively with Deng Xiaoping.
Eventually Deng did not receive the delegation, and was Li Xiannian who negotiated
with the Albanians. When, during the Cultural Revolution, Deng had been purged
alongside Liu Shaoqi, Hoxha on many occasions had attacked Deng publically as a
capitalist roader and betrayer of the socialist revolution in China. Before the
departure of the Albanian delegation, Hoxha admitted that the economy for the next
five years would grow very modestly, suggesting the delegation to delete the part of
the speech that depicted a flourishing economy, ‘when instead we neither predict, nor
expect it at all’.27 The delegation met with Zhou Enlai in mid-June, for only fifteen
minutes at a hospital, where Zhou was recovering, while the economic issues were
negotiated with Li Xiannian.28 Li had been in Albania at least twice, and knew very
well not only the situation of the industrial projects in Albania, but also how to
negotiate with Albanian officials.
The records of the meetings in Beijing between Li Xiannian and Adil Çarçani,
shows that despite initial courtesy, the talks were very tense, and China’s attitude had
drastically changed towards Albania. Moreover, this time China showed to not cede
to the Albania’s requests as had done in the past. During the first meeting, Li
Xiannian told Çarçani the amount of the loan that China could grant to Albania,
arguing that China was a poor country. The departure from previous Chinese
economic policy toward Albania became clear in reading the specific reduction of
Chinese aid. First, China, Li Xiannian said, ‘will not provide any longer wheat for
your population which we have always imported from other countries for you…
25
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second, we will commit to build only 10 industrial projects, and third, the military
supplies will be included in the loan’. The head of the Albanian State Planning
Commission, Petro Dode, doubted that its alleged backwardness motivated China to
reduce the aid, arguing how ‘China today is much more powerful than has been in
the past’. The Albanians asked Li to revise this decision by submitting it again to the
leadership, mentioning Mao.29 After a week, in the second and last meeting with Li
Xiannian, following instructions from Tirana, Adil Çarçani affirmed ‘all the
dissatisfaction of our leadership… this is an unexpected decision which drastically
reduces your assistance to us’. Adil Çarçani asked Li to reconsider their decision and
asked to transmit to Mao their complaint. Li instead affirmed that ‘our party, Mao
included, has already seriously considered this issue… that our assistance to you is
already very big… Chinese assistance per capita to Albania has been higher than to
any other country’. Adil Çarçani insisted to have a response ‘from the CCP Central
Committee [Mao] on this issue’, but Li Xiannian responded back that ‘what I told
you is not just my personal opinion… no other response will be given to you’.30
Albania, with no other choice, accepted the small loan, and the economic agreements
regarding the FYP 1976-1980 were signed at the beginning of July 1975 – the last
Chinese economic grant for Albania.31
The problem was clearly of political nature. Deng Xiaoping offered Chinese
assistance to foreign countries no longer on the basis of ideological affinity but on
practical calculations. First and foremost, Deng wanted, and began pursuing, China’s
modernization, where foreign policy decisions ‘...have to be based on anything other
than practical considerations…’. 32 In fact for Deng, ‘all the policies were to be
judged by the economic criteria’, and the foreign aid made no exception.33 He surely
knew very well the criticism he had received from Albanian leaders, and now he
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could have his revenge, although most likely, he was motivated by political and
economic considerations rather than personal feelings. China, however, intended to
preserve relations with Albania, but on a new basis, which required a political
adaptation of Hoxha’s regime to China’s new course of openness. This would prove
difficult for Enver Hoxha to agree to, though he certainly wished also to maintain
good relations with China.34
This friendship was to be tested again when Albanian leaders forwarded to
China a new request for armaments in November 1975.35 The request contained a
long list of new armaments for a total of 380 thousand tons of equipment.36 Albanian
leaders did not expect a complete acceptance of their requests, but neither did they
expect a near interruption of the aid. For Hoxha, it was significant that among all the
countries relying on Chinese military assistance, Albania was the only one
exclusively dealing with China, whereas both Vietnam and North Korea received
military assistance also from the Soviet Union. Regarding the Chinese assistance to
Third World countries, Albania argued that China should give priority first of all to a
socialist country like itself, and then to the rest of the world.37 At the end, in late
December 1975, an agreement was signed. China not only rejected the Albanian
requests, but ‘the Chinese military assistance practically was interrupted’, as Mehmet
Shehu wrote to Hoxha of the conclusion of the negotiations.38
According to a document of the Council of Defense in September 1976, Chinese
military assistance had reached an amount of more than 450 thousand tons of
34

Hoxha told the Chinese ambassador in Tirana that Albania had only one great friend, and that was
China. In, “Notes from the conversation of Enver Hoxha with the Chinese ambassador in Albania Liu
Zhen Hua, 30 September 1975, on occasion of the reception of the ambassador for the 26 years of the
PRC”s foundation”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, D8.
35

AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, D10.

36

“Top-Secret: Letter of the PLA CC, signed by comrades Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, sent on
12 November 1975 to the CCP CC, regarding the situation of the army and its further strengthening
with new Chinese armaments”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, D8. In the letter the requests
included 800 new tanks, 65 air fighters, 38 helicopters, 42 ships of different kind, billions of rackets
(more than two billion, combined shells for guns and machine guns), hundreds of missiles (8 groups
in total), thousands of cannons, thousands of submarine torpedoes, etc.
37

AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, D12.

38

This is what the Premier Mehmet Shehu wrote to Hoxha to inform him about the conclusion of the
negotiations, in “Letter of comrade Mehmet Shehu to comrade Enver Hoxha about the Chinese
response to the military delegation”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, D13, f.3. Similarly to the
negotiations for the economic assistance, for the delegation were prepared in advance three speeches:
if the requests were accepted at 80% then express gratitude, at 40-50% not happiness, and less than 30%
a speech of protest.

270

armaments over the years.39 In particular, the amount of ammunition provided had
been so large that decades later Albania had to build four factories in order to
dismantle them due to the obligations resulting from its membership in NATO.
Albania joined NATO in 2009, but only in 2015 did the process of dismantling the
old armaments finish, and not before an accident in one of the plants near Tirana, a
blast which caused 26 deaths after an accidental explosion on 15 March 2008. 40
Despite the cessation of military assistance, however, it should be noted that China
did invest enormously in Albania’s industry, totalling 132 industrial projects with its
assistance.41

The End of the Alliance with China, 1976-78
In early January 1976, Zhou Enlai died. Chinese leaders decided to not receive
foreign delegations at his funeral. In fact, in Albania, Mehmet Shehu and Ramiz Alia
prepared to participate at Zhou’s funeral, but Deng called the Albanian ambassador
and asked to cancel their visit, affirming that they had asked the same to other
diplomatic representatives. 42 After the death of Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping came
under attack once more in 1976. This campaign was followed with great interest in
Albania because Deng’s rehabilitation two years earlier corresponded to a drastic
change in Chinese attitude to Albania, which in turn was a consequence of the more
pragmatic and less ideological turn Deng was trying to give to Chinese policy
39
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altogether. Considering that Enver Hoxha had publically attacked Deng Xiaoping as
a revisionist, affirming Hoxha’s support for Mao during the Cultural Revolution,
then Deng’s rehabilitation was a negative signal for Tirana regarding the Chinese
course. Therefore, news of Deng being purged once again should have been received
with relief in Tirana, were it not for information from the Albanian embassy in
March 1976 that affirmed the campaign against Deng had not impacted China’s
foreign policy, but was only for ‘internal purposes’ of the party. According to the
information, Mao had stated that despite the campaign against Deng, ‘the possibility
for revisionism to succeed in China is higher’. 43 To further criticize Deng, were
summoned also the foreign teachers in Beijing. They were told that Deng had
opposed the class struggle, and this was shown by ‘his theory that the main moving
forces of the society are the productive forces, not the revolutionary forces’.44 Other
documents were relayed to Albania by Chinese officials where Deng Xiaoping was
accused of pursuing the restoration of capitalism.45
Small signals of the deterioration of relations emerged on many occasions. For
instance, talking to an Albanian diplomat in Beijing in March 1976, an Egyptian
diplomat affirmed to have heard voices in the diplomatic circles about divergences
between China and Albania, and that the relations had deteriorated.46 An information
reached the Albanian embassy in Beijing that one of the Albanian students in
Shanghai had been put under observation by Chinese authorities, eventually though,
this proved false.47 In early April 1976, the military attaché of the Albanian embassy
was approached by a man introduced with the name of Fang Zhan, who claimed to
have been in Albania in 1964. He told the attaché that there was a struggle in China
between two lines. He then sustained to have suffered during the Cultural Revolution
43
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because he had been in the Soviet Union studying Russian, and often worked as
translator for them. Referring to the campaign in the press against the rightist
deviationism, the man affirmed that, in fact ‘it was addressed against Deng
Xiaoping’, anticipating what next happened to Deng. 48 When the new Chinese
ambassador in Albania Liu Xinquan, wanted to hold a reception for the Albanian
leadership, upon his arrival in Tirana in late September 1976, he was told that the
leadership could not attend because ‘they are busy’.49 In Buenos Aires (Argentina),
the Chinese ambassador asked the Albanian ambassador ‘when the Albanian
population did migrate to Kosova?’ The Albanian ambassador responded with
irritation that there were no migrations in Kosova because that area had always been
inhabited by an autochthonous population of Albanians. 50 The Hong Kong based
newspaper, Far Eastern Economic Review, was reported to have written an analysis
on the Chinese politics, alluding to the possible improvement of Sino-Polish
relations, ‘corresponding to the deterioration of the Sino-Albanian relations… now
that China does not need any more Albania, the dogmatic standing of the Albanian
leaders put in difficult position Chinese leaders’.51
After Mao’s death Albanian leaders waited anxiously to see what next will
happen regarding China’s course. On 28 October, 1976, Li Xiannian told the
Albanian ambassador that the criticism of Deng will continue – which for the
Albanian leaders meant that Deng ‘will not be rehabilitated very soon’.52 This was
reassuring for Albania, at least regarding the Chinese economic assistance, which
albeit having been substantially reduced, remained Albania’s main economic source.
On this point, Albanian leaders had good reasons to fear a reshaping of the Chinese
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foreign aid by Deng Xiaoping. In April 1976, information arrived at the Albanian
embassy attributing to Deng the claim that ‘Now Albania has already a solid
economic base, let it then walk on its own feet’.53 Other similar signals came from
the diplomatic circles. In the reception of the Swedish foreign ministry in Stockholm
the Chinese ambassador was openly asked by the Swedish officials if ‘there would be
changes in China’s foreign policy after Mao’s death’. The ambassador denied such
voices affirming that ‘China will follow Mao’s line’.54 A similar story came from the
Albanian embassy in Vienna, where the Chinese ambassador went so far as to affirm
that ‘China will never change Mao’s line… the CCP will not improve the relations
with the revisionist parties, neither will China take any initiative to improve relations
with the revisionist countries’. 55 On the other hand, the direct contacts between
Chinese leaders and Albanian officials and leaders became an occasion to show all
the divide that was created between the two countries. In October 1976, the planned
courtesy visit of the Albanian ambassador in Beijing to the new Chinese leader, Hua
Guofeng, was postponed.56 The preparations for the celebrations of the anniversary
of Albania’s liberation, on 29 November 1976, organized by the Albanian embassy
in Beijing, resulted in a harsh confrontation between the ambassador and the vice
minister of foreign affairs of China Yu Zhan. The cause was the decision of the
Albanian diplomats to put three portraits during the celebrations in the reception of
the Hotel Beijing. The Albanian ambassador was not allowed to put the portraits of
Mao Zedong and Hua Guofeng next to that of Enver Hoxha.57
The political divide was reflected, expectedly, in problems with the economic
collaboration. In October 1976, only 22 percent of the goods listed in the barter
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agreements for that year had been exported from China to Albania.58 This also can be
explained with the fact that 1976 was a difficult year for China. Politically, there was
the death of Zhou Enlai in January, then during the year two major earthquakes
devastated some areas, in particular Sichuan province. Later, in September 1976,
died Mao Zedong. Therefore, is understandable that these events may have certainly
affected the economy. Chinese leaders instead blamed the “gang of four” for the
delays in delivering supplies to Albania.59
In November 1976 at the Seventh PLA Congress, China again for the second
time refused to send a delegation, although affirming that ‘this does not harm the
fraternal relations between the two parties and countries’.60 But the relations were
harmed when Hoxha, during his speech to the congress, subtly attacked China’s
policy of openness. He had told the Politburo that during the congress he would not
conceal the political disagreements with China, which for him were a consequence of
the anti-Marxist standings of Chinese leaders ‘supporting every sort of fascist
organization such as the European common market, or NATO’. For Hoxha ‘political
and ideological contradictions existed, and continue existing, between us and the
Chinese comrades’. China had become, for him, an opportunist country, because
‘when China was isolated on the international stage, it did support Albania’. But
during these years, ‘we have succeeded to not fall into their line, and keep our own
path’.61 Importantly, Hoxha thought that ‘after the death of Mao the situation [SinoAlbanian relations] will deteriorate… but perhaps Mao also did know of this, or
perhaps he did not, or perhaps he allowed deterioration to balance the opposite
groups within the leadership’.62 Albanian leadership made the decision to underline
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divergences with China in October 1976, just before the opening of the congress, but
after the arrest of the Gang of Four.63
Hoxha might have looked with increasing interest to the possible seizure of
power by Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen – called
the Gang of Four – whom he hoped capable of reversing China’s path of openness.
To Hoxha’s expectations regarding Mao’s succession had contributed also Mao some
years earlier, when at the Tenth CCP Congress, in 1973, ‘Mao had chosen him
[Wang Hongwen] to be the leading candidate to succeed him as head of the party’.64
Eventually Wang Hongwen lost Mao’s trust in 1975, but Albanian leaders did not
know of this. 65 Hoxha firmly defended them [the Gang of Four] once they were
arrested at the beginning of October 1976, and years later convicted in a public
trial.66 Their arrest was for Hoxha the end of the Cultural Revolution, and he well
understood that was also the end of the entire revolutionary path China had claimed
to have followed under Mao. Immediately after receiving a report from the Albanian
embassy in Beijing, which informed of their arrest and the accusations of conspiracy
against them, Hoxha summoned a restricted number of people to discuss the issue.
This shows that the Albanian leadership correctly understood the arrest of the Gang
of Four as the end of an epoch for China. Hoxha defended Wang Hongwen, and
rejected the accusations against him as ‘baseless’. He considered the four of them
revolutionaries, overthrown by counter-revolutionaries behind which for Albanian
leaders stood Deng Xiaoping, and also Zhou Enlai. But Hoxha blamed also Mao, and
considered him responsible, ‘because he supported the rightist elements within the
party… such as Deng Xiaoping’. Basically Hoxha was blaming Mao for not having
assured continuity of his line before dying. For Hoxha, they were arrested because
they had opposed the rise to power of Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng, and in
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general had opposed the policy of openness pursued by China. Behind all this action
for Hoxha, had been Zhou Enlai ‘who supported by Mao, brought around him all
reactionaries and revisionists… placed them in key positions in the state and the
party… plotted to purge all the adversaries, first Lin Biao… then Chen Boda… and
finally reinstated Deng Xiaoping’.67 Hoxha concluded that the four had been the last
real Marxists within the CCP who were arrested by a group of revisionists. A few
months later, in December 1976, Hoxha argued that ‘Hua Guofeng is a transitory
leader of compromise, who is trying to get the support of the rightist elements left by
Zhou Enlai’.68
In the PLA Seventh Congress that year participated more than 19 foreign
delegations, mainly members of small communist parties. 69 During the informal
talks, they discussed also the events in China. From Asia came communists from
Laos, Vietnam and North Korea. Some delegations, such as those of Peru, Ecuador
and Brazil, asked to meet the Chinese ambassador. 70 The main topic of their
discussion in Albania was the extent of the reformation in China. These small parties
were concerned about their futures, of the ideological axis upon which they had built
their action. Among these groups, Reginald Birch, a British communist, affirmed to
have a confidential document for Hoxha regarding a meeting he allegedly had with
Chinese comrades, with whom he had discussed the current situation in China.71 No
such document was found in the archive, nor is it clear if he relayed it to Hoxha.
Chinese events reflected also in a rally organized at the end of the congress in Tirana,
in particular among the European delegations. Since not all of them could address
greetings to the people gathered in the rally, they were suggested to choose one
representative to stand in the name of all the European communist (m-l) parties.
Albania suggested the representative of the Marxist party of Germany, Ernst Aust,
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but the Scandinavian parties opposed him, with the motivation that the German
communists did not recognize the new leadership of China, Hua Guofeng, as a
communist leader, choosing instead to support the ‘Gang of Four’.72 Hoxha did not
react to this seeming provocation, as with his closest comrades, he too had expressed
all his disappointment about the treatment the gang of four had received.
After the congress, the message of Hua Guofeng for the celebrations of the
anniversary of the Albanian independence in late November ‘for the first time was
not published’ in the Chinese press.73 On 8 December, 1976 the CCP sent an official
letter of protest for the accusations of the Albanian leaders during the congress,
which, it claimed ‘were against the ideas of Mao Zedong’. 74 Information was
collected by the Albanian embassy in Beijing indicating certain distance the Chinese
officials kept from the Albanians in China, mainly students and diplomats.75 A report
of the Albanian embassy in Beijing in late 1976, affirmed that ‘here are rehabilitating
everything that has been attacked during the Cultural Revolution’.
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concluded that ‘now with China we are ideologically enemies’ because for him now
China had become a ‘social-imperialist country’. 77 Then, in June 1977, Hoxha
permanently abandoned the alliance with China, affirming that ‘China has deviated
from Marxism-Leninism, and is preparing a regressive turn like Yugoslavia and
Soviet Union’, and went into a long analysis of the theory of the Three Worlds,
rejecting it as non-conformant to Marxist division of society and the world.78 This
came after a Chinese parliamentary delegation had visited both Romania and
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Yugoslavia, two countries which Chinese leaders had suggested Hoxha to intensify
relations with, but which Hoxha had continuously deemed revisionists and enemies.
In May 1977, two musical groups, one from Romania and the other from Yugoslavia
toured China. In the official reception, the Romanian group was received by Ji
Pengfei, secretary-general of the standing committee of the Chinese National
Assembly (Parliament), but the Yugoslavian group was received by Wu De (Li
Chunhua), a closer collaborator of Hua Guofeng. After asking about this
differentiation, Albania’s embassy reported to have been told ‘now the relations [of
China] with Yugoslavia are very important… they will be strengthened even more in
the future…’.79
The turning point however came on 7 July 1977, when the People’s Voice in
Albania published the article “The theory and the practice of revolution”. The article
was a frontal attack to the Chinese theory of the Three Worlds. It stressed the
importance of Lenin’s works and the characteristic of the current epoch as one of
contradiction between capitalism and socialism, and the necessity of proletarian
revolution. Then the article, after praising Lenin and mentioning neither China nor
Mao by name, but referring to ‘the authors’, attacked Mao’s theory of the Three
Worlds. The theory was an attempt ‘to hide the class character of the political
forces’. Furthermore, ‘the world is definitively divided between two camps: socialist
and capitalist. The struggle between these two camps is the axis of the entire life of
our epoch… the so-called theory of the three worlds, ignoring socialism as a social
system, it ignores the fundamental contradiction of our time, that between capitalism
and socialism… this theory is aimed at preventing revolution and defending
capitalism’.80 In this way Hoxha went public in his disagreements with China, and
vehemently attacked China and Mao’s idea of world division as anti-Marxist. In a
long elaboration, he alluded to the rise of China as just a superpower among other
superpowers, competing for influence and world markets, but not the cause of
revolution. Curiously, the article appeared just when Deng Xiaoping was about to be
reinstated.
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The article was soon publicized worldwide by the daily press, as it was
Albania’s first and most violent, public, and dramatic attack of China. But different
sources would interpret the attack differently. The Greek daily Kathimerini wrote of
‘unexpected Albanian action’, motivated by the decrease in Chinese economic
assistance to Albania. The Japanese Kyodo News connected the article to divergences
in foreign policy. The Sunday Times wrote that ‘Albania is seeking new friends’.
Very accurate seems to have been the analysis of Daily Telegraph in mid-July,
which, among others, stated that ‘Hoxha was mistaken to think and hope that the
gang of four would take over the political power after Mao’s death’, and linked the
disagreements also with Tito’s planned visit to China. For the British Times, this was
the signal of the ‘complete interruption of the special relations between China and
Albania’ due to ideological divergences, but also due to Chinese invitation for the
Yugoslavian leader Tito.81 To Albania’s dismay and anxiety, in August 1977, Deng
Xiaoping received in Beijing Josif Broz Tito, the Yugoslavian leader and Hoxha’s
oldest enemy. What a blow for Hoxha to see the honors with which Tito was
received in Beijing, when Hoxha’s request to send Mehmet Shehu three years earlier
had been postponed by Chinese leaders sine die, eventually never taking place.
In addition to the press, this article also caused a vivid debate in the diplomatic
circles.82 But it caused also the first public reaction of Deng Xiaoping. During an
interview with the France Press Agency (known as AFP/Agence France-Presse), on
21 October, 1977, he was asked what he thought of the Albanian attacks on the Three
Worlds theory. He responded that ‘this criticism is irrelevant to us… in the future the
theory of the three worlds will be the foundation of our foreign policy… the most
fanatic opponent of this theory is Soviet Union’. 83 This was a clear message for
Hoxha regarding the Chinese course. A more interesting piece of information for the
Albanian leaders came from Paris. In December 1977, the Albanian ambassador in
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Paris met with the journalist of the AFP that had interviewed Deng Xiaoping in
Beijing. According to the journalist, Deng had affirmed that ‘I am not interested’ in
Albania’s considerations of Chinese policies. According to the French journalist,
Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng were in a rivalry, ‘and soon Deng will replace Hua
Guofeng’ he affirmed.84 China’s reaction towards Albania, however, was generally
cautious, and perhaps calculated, trying to avoid direct and open tension. In fact, had
Chinese leaders reacted through a public polemic, Albania’s role in this dispute
would have been highlighted. In that case Albanian leaders would have had an
undeserved space and attention. Indeed, the European and American press did
publicize Albania’s article, highlighting it as a turning point for Sino-Albanian
relations. 85 Therefore China decided to lower the profile of the disputes, through
small steps, such as the slow interruption of the economic supplies.
Information from the Albanian embassy, from unspecified sources, mentioned
the possibility for China ‘to interrupt completely the military supplies’, and that
‘within the general staff of the Chinese army there have been disagreements
regarding the standing towards Albania…’. 86 The source did not clarify in what
specifically these disagreements consisted. Foreign newspapers speculated of a wave
of arrests of pro-China elements in Albania, which were reproduced in China in the
party cadres’ newspaper. Albania submitted an official note of protest, claiming their
publishing as an attack on the Sino-Albanian friendship. 87 The Chinese response
came through a verbal note in mid-October 1977, which considered the Albanian
note an interference in China’s internal affairs since they were not published for the
public but for the party cadres’. 88 Reis Malile, Albanian vice minister of foreign
affairs, who had also served as ambassador in China, met on 29 October, 1977, with
the Chinese ambassador in Tirana Liu Xinquan, and demanded a definitive response
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about the completion of construction works in the integrated oil refinery, and the
metallurgical project, which had been continuously postponed due to technical
problems. The ambassador replied in a meeting one month later, when he protested
the way Albania was dealing with this problem, and expressed his indignation for the
interferences of the Albanian minister of mines and industry, Xhafer Spahiu, who
according to him, ‘has accused the Chinese experts of delays without any base’. He
said that all the recent delays were due to the sabotage of the “gang of four”, who
damaged the economy and created great turmoil, and China expected Albania to
understand this situation. Malile rejected the Chinese statements and asked for a
response specifically concerning the delays of that industrial project, affirming that
issues such as the sabotage work of the gang of four were internal affairs, which
should not impede China from respecting the agreements signed between the two
countries. Hence the consideration that this statement of the Chinese ambassador, full
of political notes beyond the issues about which they had met, ‘have specific and
determined purposes’, alluding that China was using the quarrel on one industrial
project as an excuse for escalating the tension of its relations with Albania. From
Albania’s standing however, the impression may be that Albania was similarly
guilty, stressing the economic issues to find a political way out of its alliance with
China, which by now had become an uneasy partner. The Albanian vice minister
noted that the indefinite postponement of the projects ‘is damaging very bad the
economy of the country’, an affirmation full of implied notes of sabotage of the
economy.89 Between October 1977 and May 1978 Albania addressed other notes of
protest to the Chinese ambassador in Tirana, urging the completion of some pending
industrial projects. Difficulties were encountered also during the visit to China of an
Albanian trade delegation in November 1977. The delegation went to China to
conclude the trade agreements for the year 1978, but disagreements soon surged
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regarding the currency in the bilateral trade between China and Albania, eventually
resolving it by adopting the American dollar.90
On 7 July, 1978, China decided to interrupt economic and military assistance to
Albania, and withdraw its many specialists from Albania. The official notice of the
decision, delivered to the Albanian embassy in Beijing by the vice minister of
foreign affairs of China, Yu Zhan, came exactly one year after the People’s Voice’s
article published on 7 July 1977 had attacked the Chinese Three Worlds theory.91
After 24 years of intense relations, and 17 of effective alliance, China and Albania
downgraded their fraternal relations to ‘normal relations’. Unlike the split with the
Soviet Union, Albania’s split with China was not radical. In fact, both countries
maintained their embassies and ambassadors in the respective countries, and trade
and communication, although on a lower scale, continued between the two countries.

Conclusion
The period from 1974 to 1978 saw the end of Albanian leaders’ feeble hope that
China would never become so open that it would question, and consequently
reshape, the entire course of history since the founding of the PRC. Hoxha’s hope
lied, at first, in Mao’s hold of the leadership, and after Mao’s death, on those close to
him who had promoted the Cultural Revolution. This mass movement, aspects of
which had been severely criticized by Hoxha, remained the reference to which
Hoxha attached his hope regarding his ally’s future. But the arrest of the Gang of
Four extinguished his expectations to see China reverse the policies of openness.
That Hoxha found China’s openness reversible shows how desperately he lacked the
realism during this time – a time when China’s strategic interests on the international
stage required Chinese integration into the international system. Hoxha’s distance
from political reality in analyzing Chinese policies is shown also by his attention to
the Gang of Four, and the fact that he considered it possible for the Gang to seize
political power. In fact, with the purges of 1972-74, Hoxha had proven determined to
90
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walk in the opposite direction of China. He would not concede any sort of isolation,
nor allow any degree of openness. On the contrary, those purges were precisely signs
that he would follow, at all costs and alone if need be, the path of Stalinism. He had
worked for this continuously, and the purges were aimed at preventing any reversal
of these policies in Albania.
On the other hand, with the second and definitive rehabilitation of Deng
Xiaoping, China opened even further to the West, and solidified the steps taken since
the visit of Kissinger to Beijing. Slowly, but irreversibly, what would remain of
Mao’s revolutionary policies were only symbols, which for Albanian leaders were
not enough to justify the existence of solid political relations between China and
Albania. Eventually, Albania lost the most impacting ally it had during the post war
period. Although Hoxha called for increasing the economic relations with European
countries, his country had been so deeply isolated that after 1978 it lacked any
serious initiative to open to the world. Hoxha remained a Stalinist until the day of his
death. And he had created the conditions that even after him, there would not be any
sort of Albanian Deng Xiaoping to open Albania’s doors. In fact, the only survivors
of Hoxha’s purges in the Politburo had been Hoxha’s lackeys, who even after his
death in 1985 faithfully carried out his orders.
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CONCLUSION

Before the communist regime established its rule in Albania, following the Second
World War, the country had never enjoyed guaranteed sovereignty, although it had
international recognition. Between the two wars, both Yugoslavia and Italy had
strongly interfered with the internal policies of Albania, competing for its control,
until Italy invaded it at the beginning of April 1939. The war and the geographical
location of Albania decided its political fate for the coming half century, as the
communists were the only force that organized a strong resistance to the foreign
invaders during the war, assisted in this first by the British officials and later by the
Yugoslavian emissaries, whose role was determinant in opening the path to Enver
Hoxha to reach the position of the military commander first, and political leader
second, a position he kept until he died, ruling the country with an implacable iron
fist.
During the war period, with his astute tactics, Hoxha led the Yugoslavs that
sponsored him to believe he would be easily maneuverable, that he could be used
against those in the Albanian intelligentsia that were given to strong nationalism,
which had openly claimed the province of Kosova – mainly inhabited by Albanians –
into post war Albania. After the war, Yugoslavia not only managed to keep Kosova,
but almost to annex Albania as its seventh republic. I have showed in the first chapter
that Hoxha survived because he maximized the newly-emerged Tito-Stalin disputes,
and so consolidated both his regime and his personal power. Yugoslavia’s threat to
Albania and to Hoxha’s personal rule, accentuated Hoxha’s nationalism, which,
before the split with Belgrade, had been shadowed by the socialist brotherhood
narrative. Subsequently, Hoxha, in his public discourse, resumed the threat
historically the neighbors represented for Albania’s existence, and so nationalism
together with ideology (Marxism), became determinant factors in Albania’s foreign
policy after the Second World War.1 It is precisely in this context of national (in-)
security and ideological implications that the Albanian-Soviet alliance was forged.
The Warsaw Pact became a good umbrella in this sense, had the Soviet Union

1
Elez Biberaj, Albania. A Socialist Maverick, (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press,
1990), 85. For Biberaj “Nationalism no doubt was the most important determinant”.
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interfered not with the internal affairs of Albania – until attempting to change the
leadership – showing that its aims were to treat Albania simply as its satellite, good
enough to protect the Southwestern flank of its empire by using it as a base, but
subject to Soviet impositions. As far as Soviets did not threaten the power position of
Hoxha, they were courted to assist Albania, which they did, but once Stalin died, and
Khrushchev initiated a policy of revising Stalin’s policies and place in history,
Hoxha grew wary. Khrushchev not only rectified Stalin’s policies, but openly
promoted (at least he tolerated) similar revisions in all the other communist countries
of East Europe, with the consequence of pushing towards the change of the
leadership. He did not conceal that Albania too should undertake reformative steps
toward total destalinization. Hoxha felt his personal power threatened, and so he
sought new allies, and for a safe way to disengage from his now burdensome ally. As
shown in the first part, the East European turmoil in the aftermath of Khrushchev’s
reformation brought both China and Albania on the same line of resistance, for
different reasons, to this course. Therefore, Albania found soon a friend in China,
who offered economic and military assistance, and unlike the Soviet Union, did not
manifest any intention to interfere with the internal policies of Albania, with Hoxha’s
Stalinist manners. The successful management of the Albanian-Soviet split, made
Hoxha a good survivor and offered to his people the image of a leader that could
guarantee the national sovereignty and the economic sufficiency. In addition, he
made clear to the new allies that he was seeking more a partnership, based on mutual
benefits and built over a solid common ideological ground, not a top-down servile
alliance.
In the second part of this research I have shown how from 1960 until the end of
Albanian communism, Albania’s history was inextricably related to Chinese
vicissitudes, its foreign and internal policies. Since Albania had won independence,
no other foreign power impacted Albanian life and history as China did with its years
of great assistance; and no other small communist country in Europe played such a
particular role for China as did Albania during the Cold War. As shown in my
research, its particularity lies in its exclusive relationship, its common ideology, but
most importantly in the fact that Albania more than any other country supported
convincingly and dogmatically China’s alternative to the Soviet power as a leading
actor of the international communist movement. Their respective leaders managed to
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intersect idealism with realism, both in China and in Albania, and successfully build
an alliance that for more than a quarter of the Cold War period resisted internal and
international challenges. The leaders manipulated the masses, by convincing the
people of their respective countries of the idealist and sincere communist reasons
behind the friendship, hiding the disputes that came to emerge at times, when
instead, this alliance often corresponded to practical necessities experienced by
China when trying to expand its influence in competition with the Soviet Union, and
by Albania when seeking new suppliers and its own eventual autonomy. An
autonomy that derived first of all from its geographic distance with China, but also
by internal considerations of Hoxha’s regime that following entirely China’s path,
economically and politically, would have undermined his power and Albanian
regime’s consolidated policies. Consequently, Albania took from China what most
suited Albania’s regime.
Nonetheless, as I have shown in the second and third part of my research, Hoxha
refused to reconsider his established communist ideology. He criticized aspects of
the Chinese revolution, such as the centrality of the peasantry and the nature of the
class struggle, and also refused to acknowledge in full the Chinese claim that Mao’s
thought was a novel and vital contribution to communist ideology. In fact, beyond
public appraisal, Hoxha hardly digested Mao’s thought. This, however, reflected
Hoxha’s linearity in internal and international policies, which did not allow much
flexibility. In fact, as far as the communist ideology remained the driving axis of
China, Hoxha did not hesitate to fully support Beijing. Indeed, Albania became the
most – and only – fervent supporter of China and Mao, in particular through Mao’s
most leftist policies, essentially throughout the 1960s. It is in this period that Albania
partially replaced Chinese diplomacy in the international organizations, and became
China’s spokesperson in United Nations. In this role, Albania’s diplomatic network
was at complete China’s disposal. Albania’s international interests converged with
China’s interests, making possible the pursuit of common agendas.
In the final part I have shown how the Sino-Albanian split also was as particular
as the alliance itself had been. When, in 1961, the Soviet-Albanian split occurred, the
two countries had interrupted even their diplomatic relations. This did not happen in
the Sino-Albanian split. In fact, amid the notes of mutual protest and accusations
between Beijing and Tirana, the two governments maintained diplomatic relations
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and continued to trade together, although now based on international trade rules and
laws, and no longer based on ideological principles. The economic exchange after
the split remained very limited. In the Balkans, China decided to increase relations
with Yugoslavia instead, and later continued supporting Serbia – a policy that
continues today. If China would have continued approving Albanian requests, most
likely, Albania would have prioritized its economic ties with China, setting aside all
the political divergences about the new policy of openness promoted by Deng
Xiaoping. After all, China’s open doors policy did not begin in 1978, when China
interrupted the assistance to Albania, but was a process that had started with
Kissinger’s visit in 1971. Since then, Albania had had the time to interiorize and to
find a way to adapt to this new situation. The new requests sent to Beijing after 1971
were a sign of the fact that Albania had already prioritized the economy in its
relationship with China, but it was too late, as for Beijing the alliance with Albania
had now become obsolete.
Here lies the answer to a fundamental question; who benefitted more from this
alliance? Because of the Chinese assistance, Hoxha’s regime survived the Soviet
threat, and also managed to gain support due to the relative economic progress of
Albania. Thus, it is possible to argue that it was Hoxha’s Albania to mostly benefit in
the short-term. However, in the long-term, China reaped great fruits from this
friendship. China managed to break out of international isolation thanks to countries
that did not align with the Soviet-American exclusive predominance in their
respective areas of influence. Albania, for a relatively short period, was almost the
only open door for Beijing in Europe, and certainly the only to support Mao, and an
indefatigable voice in the United Nations. This helped China’s engagement with the
world in a long-term process, one China started then, and is still carrying out today,
whereas China’s interrupted assistance to Albania led to the complete collapse of the
Albanian economy. Chinese leaders, and China, did not lose from the alliance with
Albania, nor from the break of it. On the contrary, China did use this alliance for the
time it was necessary to its own interests on the international stage, and dismissed it
once it became an obstacle to the new course undertaken, in particular after Mao’s
death. If Hoxha had been farsighted to seek an alliance with China after the split with
Soviet Union, he had not been thereafter farsighted enough to find alternatives,
should the alliance with China dissolve. On the contrary, he had prohibited any
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economic concession or grant with ‘revisionist, or capitalist companies or countries’
– sanctioned in the new constitution that had been approved in 1976.2
Hoxha had decided to keep Albania away from any possible openness, included
away from any economic collaboration that would include credits from foreign states
or companies. During the communist period, China was, in fact, the last country from
which Albania received credits. Thereafter, the Albanian leaders, in complete
contradiction with the reality, sustained that their country was among the fewest in
the world to flourish thanks to the socialist economy. How much Hoxha had decided
to ignore the reality is shown better by his own assessment. For Hoxha, in a time
‘when the inflation, unemployment, and other negative phenomenon affects the
living standards of the working people in the capitalist and revisionist countries, in
Albania, on the contrary, … there is no inflation, no unployment and no economic
migration’. 3 In 1982 Hoxha would further reinforce affirming that ‘the great
economic crisis, and consequently the political one, is further deepening in all
worlds’ continents and all states, with the only exception of Albania’.4 But after the
Sino-Albanian split the reality for Albania, however, became quite dark. The break
of the Chinese aid was a huge blow that caused Albania enormous problems,
plunging its small economy into full crisis from which did not recover until the end
of the regime in 1991.5
The interruption of Chinese assistance was immediately reflected in the
economic development plan for the years 1980-85, where, although with a language
full of optimism, the regime expected a very modest growth.6 Another consequence
of the interruption of the assistance was the fact that Albania, although it had
developed its industries greatly, lacked the technological equipment to produce and
use new machinery. In some cases, this could not even be supplied by western
2
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sources, as those parts would not be compatible with the entire chain of the unit, and
since there were no available funds to purchase full equipment, many Albanian
factories ceased work altogether. Some industrial projects were inefficient because
the technology they used was obsolete. For instance, the metallurgic plant
(Kombinat) in the city of Elbasan, once the “feeding plant” of all the industry, as the
regime used to call it, became instead the source of the worst pollution in the
country, and remains so to this day. It worked only for 12 years, but it impacted the
health of the local population for decades, causing many casualties, and its
consequences for the environment were catastrophic.
Moreover, China assisted Albania, providing every sort of armament and all of
them without demanding any payment in turn. This assistance did not dictate any
predetermined military strategy to Albania, because for Beijing, Albania was not of
strategic military interest, therefore the Chinese leadership never went beyond some
suggestions regarding the war strategy Albania should build with the Chinese
armaments, in case of war. When Chinese military assistance struggled to meet the
overwhelming requests, in addition to Chinese internal impediments in production, it
became necessary to pressure Albania to come to terms and accept eventual
restrictions in the amount of supplies. This is understandable considering the
different role Albania played for China compared to the Soviet Union, and in this lies
the main difference in Albania’s relations with these two countries. If for the Soviets,
especially after the Tito-Stalin rift, Albania was a strategic outpost of the communist
bloc in Southeastern Europe, for China instead, Albania was an important political,
not a military geo-strategical ally. Therefore, this different role, together with the
geographical distance, shaped the alliance and the military dynamic therein. Albania
was more interested to arm itself, rather China being so interested to arm Albania,
whereas in the case of Soviet Union it had been also the interest of the Soviets to arm
the country and to have a direct military base in Albania (the naval base of Vlora Pashalimani), for its proximity with the NATO bases in Italy. Albania managed to
play well the role of a tiny ally, in particular during the years of the Chinese Cultural
Revolution, extracting concessions and, according to China, placing Albania only
second to Vietnam in Chinese military assistance to foreign countries. The entire
country was fortified during those years, building hundreds of thousands of bunkers
with Chinese aid, still today visible in many parts of the country.
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Ignoring Chinese calls for a diversified trade network, Albania had chosen the
exclusive link to China. This worked for the time that relations among the two
countries stayed stable, but once disputes came to the fore, Albania was unprepared
to open towards international trade market, and not having a big country on which
rely, it had to adapt (unsuccessfully) to international trade rules. The main base for
trade was to sell minerals – chrome in particular – that Albania had at its disposal.
The problem however was that the technology to process the minerals was backward,
revealing how obsolete, inefficient, and unprofitable some investments in the heavy
industry had been, making it difficult for foreign markets to accept many Albanian
products. Albania reacted to the break up with China trying to approach
economically Yugoslavia and improved its relations also with Greece and Italy, and
strengthened contacts with Turkey. 7 All of these measures proved insufficient to
replace the huge assistance China had provided during all those years. After 1980 the
country entered into the list of the poorest countries in the world, with people in long
queues for hours for very basic goods. The crisis ended with protests and the fall of
the regime in 1991, and the embracing of an opened capitalistic system, which did
bring more wealth to the country, but also discomfort and pain for many citizens,
caused by the savage use of the resources and the huge gap between the rich
oligarchs and the rest of the population.8 Not very differently has been the course of
Chinese capitalism, or its socialist market economy, (officially, neo-liberalism with
Chinese characteristics),9 but at least China retained, on the international stage, the
centrality that, in Mao’s era, it had achieved through its ideological struggle.
It is a fact that no other country could have played such a big role as China
played for Albania, no other country was ideologically so close and geographically
7
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so far. A perfect combination for Tirana to maximize the profits from such an
alliance, and to get the maximum benefits from its big ally without fearing it in case
of a split. The Soviet Union had been a direct threat to Albania, because it was
hypothetically able to sustain a war for its relative geographic proximity and had
already intervened in Budapest and in Prague. Albania managed to avoid the Soviet
threat with Beijing’s support. China was for Albania exactly as the Sun stands to the
Earth; not too close to burn it. But Albania chose to burn anyway, through a harsh
self-imposed isolation shown most visibly in the massive bunkerization of the
country. At a certain point, particularly in the late 1970s, this fortified Albania was
very similar to the situation described in the famous novel of the Italian novelist
Dino Buzzati, ‘The Tartar Steppe’, in which a military garrison is kept permanently
into a mobilized state waiting to face the tartar invasion, which will never take
place.10 It transformed instead the self-sieged into a collective state of paranoia. That
garrison in Buzzati’s novel, is the most authentic metaphor for what Albania, and in
particular Enver Hoxha, had become towards the end of the Cold War.

10
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